In the USA and USSR, work began simultaneously on atomic bomb projects. In August 1942, the secret Laboratory No. 2 began to operate in one of the buildings located in the courtyard of Kazan University. The head of this facility was Igor Kurchatov, the Russian “father” of the atomic bomb. At the same time, in August, near Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the building of a former local school, a “Metallurgical Laboratory”, also secret, began operating. It was led by Robert Oppenheimer, the “father” of the atomic bomb from America.
It took a total of three years to complete the task. The first US bomb was blown up at the test site in July 1945. Two more were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August. It took seven years for the birth of the atomic bomb in the USSR. The first explosion took place in 1949.
Igor Kurchatov: short biography
The "father" of the atomic bomb in the USSR, was born in 1903, on January 12. This event took place in the Ufa province, in today's city of Sima. Kurchatov is considered one of the founders of peaceful purposes.
He graduated with honors from the Simferopol men's gymnasium, as well as a vocational school. In 1920, Kurchatov entered the Tauride University, the physics and mathematics department. Just 3 years later, he successfully graduated from this university ahead of schedule. The “father” of the atomic bomb began working at the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology in 1930, where he headed the physics department.
The era before Kurchatov
Back in the 1930s, work related to atomic energy began in the USSR. Chemists and physicists from various scientific centers, as well as specialists from other countries, took part in all-Union conferences organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Radium samples were obtained in 1932. And in 1939 the chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. The year 1940 became a landmark year in the nuclear field: the design of an atomic bomb was created, and methods for producing uranium-235 were proposed. Conventional explosives were first proposed to be used as a fuse to initiate a chain reaction. Also in 1940, Kurchatov presented his report on the fission of heavy nuclei.
Research during the Great Patriotic War
After the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Leningrad and Moscow institutes that dealt with problems of nuclear physics were urgently evacuated.
The head of strategic intelligence, Beria, knew that Western physicists considered atomic weapons an achievable reality. According to historical data, back in September 1939, Robert Oppenheimer, the leader of the work on creating an atomic bomb in America, came to the USSR incognito. The Soviet leadership could have learned about the possibility of obtaining these weapons from the information provided by this “father” of the atomic bomb.
In 1941, intelligence data from Great Britain and the USA began to arrive in the USSR. According to this information, intensive work has been launched in the West, the goal of which is the creation of nuclear weapons.
In the spring of 1943, Laboratory No. 2 was created to produce the first atomic bomb in the USSR. The question arose about who should be entrusted with its leadership. The list of candidates initially included about 50 names. Beria, however, chose Kurchatov. He was summoned in October 1943 to a viewing in Moscow. Today the scientific center that grew out of this laboratory bears his name - the Kurchatov Institute.
In 1946, on April 9, a decree was issued on the creation of a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. Only at the beginning of 1947 were the first production buildings, which were located in the Mordovian Nature Reserve, ready. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.
RDS-1, the first Russian atomic bomb
They called the Soviet prototype RDS-1, which, according to one version, meant special." After some time, this abbreviation began to be deciphered somewhat differently - " Jet engine Stalin." In documents to ensure secrecy, the Soviet bomb was called a "rocket engine."
It was a device with a power of 22 kilotons. The USSR carried out its own development of atomic weapons, but the need to catch up with the United States, which had gone ahead during the war, forced domestic science to use intelligence data. The basis for the first Russian atomic bomb was the Fat Man, developed by the Americans (pictured below).
It was this that the United States dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. "Fat Man" worked on the decay of plutonium-239. The detonation scheme was implosive: the charges exploded along the perimeter of the fissile substance and created a blast wave that “compressed” the substance located in the center and caused a chain reaction. This scheme was later found to be ineffective.
The Soviet RDS-1 was made in the form of a large diameter and mass free-falling bomb. The charge of an explosive atomic device was made from plutonium. The electrical equipment, as well as the ballistic body of the RDS-1, were domestically developed. The bomb consisted of a ballistic body, a nuclear charge, an explosive device, as well as equipment for automatic charge detonation systems.
Uranium shortage
Soviet physics, taking the American plutonium bomb as a basis, was faced with a problem that had to be solved in an extremely short time: plutonium production had not yet begun in the USSR at the time of development. Therefore, captured uranium was initially used. However, the reactor required at least 150 tons of this substance. In 1945, mines in East Germany and Czechoslovakia resumed their work. Uranium deposits in the Chita region, Kolyma, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the North Caucasus and Ukraine were discovered in 1946.
In the Urals, near the city of Kyshtym (not far from Chelyabinsk), they began to build Mayak, a radiochemical plant, and the first industrial reactor in the USSR. Kurchatov personally supervised the laying of uranium. Construction began in 1947 in three more places: two in the Middle Urals and one in the Gorky region.
We walked at a fast pace construction works, however, there was still not enough uranium. The first industrial reactor could not be launched even by 1948. It was only on June 7 of this year that uranium was loaded.
Nuclear reactor startup experiment
The “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb personally took over the duties of the chief operator at the control panel of the nuclear reactor. On June 7, between 11 and 12 o'clock at night, Kurchatov began an experiment to launch it. The reactor reached a power of 100 kilowatts on June 8. After this, the “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb silenced the chain reaction that had begun. The next stage of preparation lasted two days nuclear reactor. After cooling water was supplied, it became clear that the available uranium was not enough to carry out the experiment. The reactor reached a critical state only after loading the fifth portion of the substance. The chain reaction became possible again. This happened at 8 o'clock in the morning on June 10.
On the 17th of the same month, Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, made an entry in the shift supervisors' journal in which he warned that the water supply should under no circumstances be stopped, otherwise an explosion would occur. On June 19, 1938 at 12:45, the commercial launch of a nuclear reactor, the first in Eurasia, took place.
Successful bomb tests
In June 1949, the USSR accumulated 10 kg of plutonium - the amount that was put into the bomb by the Americans. Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, following Beria's decree, ordered the RDS-1 test to be scheduled for August 29.
A section of the Irtysh arid steppe, located in Kazakhstan, not far from Semipalatinsk, was set aside for a test site. In the center of this experimental field, whose diameter was about 20 km, a metal tower 37.5 meters high was constructed. RDS-1 was installed on it.
The charge used in the bomb was a multi-layer design. In it, the transfer of the active substance to a critical state was carried out by compressing it using a spherical converging detonation wave, which was formed in the explosive.
Consequences of the explosion
The tower was completely destroyed after the explosion. A funnel appeared in its place. However, the main damage was caused by the shock wave. According to the description of eyewitnesses, when a trip to the explosion site took place on August 30, the experimental field presented a terrible picture. Highway and railway bridges were thrown to a distance of 20-30 m and mangled. Cars and carriages were scattered at a distance of 50-80 m from the place where they were located; residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks used to test the force of the impact lay with their turrets knocked down on their sides, and the guns became a pile of twisted metal. Also, 10 Pobeda vehicles, specially brought here for testing, burned down.
A total of 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. Today in Sarov, which was formerly Arzamas-16 (the laboratory is shown in the photo below), a mock-up of the bomb is on display. It is located in the local nuclear weapons museum.
"Fathers" of the atomic bomb
Only 12 Nobel laureates, future and present, participated in the creation of the American atomic bomb. In addition, they were helped by a group of scientists from Great Britain, which was sent to Los Alamos in 1943.
In Soviet times, it was believed that the USSR had completely independently solved the atomic problem. Everywhere it was said that Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, was its “father.” Although rumors of secrets stolen from Americans occasionally leaked out. And only in 1990, 50 years later, Julius Khariton - one of the main participants in the events of that time - spoke about the large role of intelligence in the creation of the Soviet project. The technical and scientific results of the Americans were obtained by Klaus Fuchs, who arrived in the English group.
Therefore, Oppenheimer can be considered the “father” of bombs that were created on both sides of the ocean. We can say that he was the creator of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. Both projects, American and Russian, were based on his ideas. It is wrong to consider Kurchatov and Oppenheimer only as outstanding organizers. We have already talked about the Soviet scientist, as well as about the contribution made by the creator of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. Oppenheimer's main achievements were scientific. It was thanks to them that he turned out to be the head of the atomic project, just like the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR.
Brief biography of Robert Oppenheimer
This scientist was born in 1904, April 22, in New York. graduated from Harvard University in 1925. The future creator of the first atomic bomb interned for a year at the Cavendish Laboratory with Rutherford. A year later, the scientist moved to the University of Göttingen. Here, under the guidance of M. Born, he defended his doctoral dissertation. In 1928 the scientist returned to the USA. From 1929 to 1947, the “father” of the American atomic bomb taught at two universities in this country - the California Institute of Technology and the University of California.
On July 16, 1945, the first bomb was successfully tested in the United States, and soon after, Oppenheimer, along with other members of the Provisional Committee created under President Truman, was forced to select sites for the future atomic bombing. Many of his colleagues by that time actively opposed the use of dangerous nuclear weapons, which were not necessary, since Japan's surrender was a foregone conclusion. Oppenheimer did not join them.
Explaining his behavior further, he said that he relied on politicians and military men who were better familiar with the real situation. In October 1945, Oppenheimer ceased to be director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. He began work in Priston, heading a local research institute. His fame in the United States, as well as outside this country, reached its culmination. New York newspapers wrote about him more and more often. President Truman presented Oppenheimer with the Medal of Merit, the highest award in America.
They were written, except scientific works, several “Open Mind”, “Science and Everyday Knowledge” and others.
This scientist died in 1967, on February 18. Oppenheimer was a heavy smoker from his youth. In 1965, he was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer. At the end of 1966, after an operation that did not bring results, he underwent chemotherapy and radiotherapy. However, the treatment had no effect, and the scientist died on February 18.
So, Kurchatov is the “father” of the atomic bomb in the USSR, Oppenheimer is in the USA. Now you know the names of those who were the first to work on the development of nuclear weapons. Having answered the question: “Who is called the father of the atomic bomb?”, we only talked about initial stages history of this dangerous weapon. It continues to this day. Moreover, today new developments are actively underway in this area. The “father” of the atomic bomb, the American Robert Oppenheimer, as well as the Russian scientist Igor Kurchatov, were only pioneers in this matter.
It is traditionally believed that everything is clear with the American atomic bomb. She was “generated” by R. Oppenheimer. You can also say something about this different points view, but this, as they say, is “their” problem. In any case, the issue of personal priorities in the creation of American nuclear weapons is covered richly. The volume of literature devoted to this problem in the West can only be envied.
As for the domestic atomic bomb, for a long time, when atomic topics were strictly classified, the question of the authorship of the atomic bomb was practically not raised. The breaking of the dam of silence has led to a sea of speculation. And even if we leave aside the question of the role of intelligence data, a lot still continues to remain unclear. So who is the “father” of the first domestic atomic bomb? I. V. Kurchatov?.. Yu. B. Khariton?.. Yes, the complex structure that ensured success was headed by these very people. But next to them “stood” K. I. Shchelkin, Ya. B. Zeldovich, N. L. Dukhov, E. I. Zababakhin, P. M. Zernov and many, many others.
This turns out to be a kind of collective “responsibility”. And, in our opinion, it fully answers the question of who is the “parent” of our nuclear power... The activities of everyone, including the leaders, were based on the principle of not taking into account the level of problem solving, not striving to share “laurels.” Therefore, when the electrical wires were broken due to a fallen tree and the casemates were de-energized, the specialists conducting experiments at that time called not just anyone, but the head of the facility, P. M. Zernov. And he, without expressing the slightest dissatisfaction that this was “not his level,” took appropriate measures. Therefore, KB-11 employees working within certain thematic areas, theoretical and experimental physicists, designers and mechanics, automation and electronics specialists shared ideas, ideas, and considerations with each other.
I came up with one, implemented another, improved a third. And the common cause only won! But neither the first, nor the second, nor the third at that time even thought about who the real creator of the innovation was. Amazing time and amazing people! This is one side of the question of the “paternity” of our domestic first atomic bomb.
It is simply not right to look for one specific “father”. To make the first atomic charge, at least three conditions were needed.
Firstly, the general scientific and technical level corresponding to the task. It was determined by the state of fundamental and applied science, as well as the science of design.
Secondly, a certain quality of technological support for solving the problem - new, often unique, materials and processing methods were required.
And finally, the third condition: the financial capabilities of the state, supported by proper organizational structure, promoting optimal interaction of the three components of a single complex “science - technology - production” in line with the atomic program and on a national scale. The implementation of these three conditions was complex and extremely complex nature and would be impossible without people - scientists, organizers of science and production, specific performers of work. The share of each of them was different in terms of responsibility for the case, the level and volume of issues being resolved. And this is natural. But the main thing is different. The feeling of this responsibility was the same for everyone, regardless of their position, position and area of work. This is precisely what became the key to successful progress towards the intended goal and the rapid entry of the Atomic Project to the finish line.
Change military doctrine USA in the period from 1945 to 1996 and basic concepts
//On the territory of the United States, in Los Alamos, in the desert expanses of New Mexico, an American nuclear center was created in 1942. At its base, work began on the creation of a nuclear bomb. The overall management of the project was entrusted to the talented nuclear physicist R. Oppenheimer. Under his leadership, the best minds of that time were gathered not only in the USA and England, but practically throughout Western Europe. A huge team worked on the creation of nuclear weapons, including 12 laureates Nobel Prize. There was no shortage of financial resources.
By the summer of 1945, the Americans managed to assemble two atomic bombs, called “Baby” and “Fat Man”. The first bomb weighed 2,722 kg and was filled with enriched Uranium-235. “Fat Man” with a charge of Plutonium-239 with a power of more than 20 kt had a mass of 3175 kg. On June 16, the first test site of a nuclear device took place, timed to coincide with a meeting of the leaders of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France.
By this time, relations between former comrades had changed. It should be noted that the United States, as soon as it had the atomic bomb, sought a monopoly on its possession in order to deprive other countries of the opportunity to use atomic energy at their discretion.
US President G. Truman became the first political leader to decide to use nuclear bombs. From a military point of view, there was no need for such bombing of densely populated Japanese cities. But political motives during this period prevailed over military ones. The leadership of the United States strove for supremacy throughout the post-war world, and nuclear bombing, in their opinion, should have been a significant reinforcement of these aspirations. To this end, they began to push for the adoption of the American “Baruch Plan,” which would have secured for the United States a monopoly on atomic weapons, in other words, “absolute military superiority.”
The fatal hour has arrived. On August 6 and 9, the crews of the B-29 "Enola Gay" and "Bocks car" aircraft dropped their deadly payload on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The total loss of life and the scale of destruction from these bombings are characterized by the following figures: instantly died from thermal radiation(temperature about 5000 degrees C) and a shock wave - 300 thousand people, another 200 thousand were injured, burned, or exposed to radiation. On an area of 12 sq. km, all buildings were completely destroyed. In Hiroshima alone, out of 90 thousand buildings, 62 thousand were destroyed. These bombings shocked the whole world. It is believed that this event marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race and the confrontation between the two political systems of that time at a new qualitative level.
The development of American strategic offensive weapons after the Second World War was carried out depending on the provisions of military doctrine. Its political side determined the main goal of the US leadership - achieving world domination. The main obstacle to these aspirations was considered to be the Soviet Union, which in their opinion should have been eliminated. Depending on the balance of power in the world, the achievements of science and technology, its basic provisions changed, which was correspondingly reflected in the adoption of certain strategic strategies (concepts). Each subsequent strategy did not completely replace the one that preceded it, but only modernized it, mainly in determining the ways of building the Armed Forces and methods of waging war.
From mid-1945 to 1953, the American military-political leadership in matters of building strategic nuclear forces(SNF) proceeded from the fact that the United States has a monopoly nuclear weapons and can achieve world domination by eliminating the USSR during a nuclear war. Preparations for such a war began almost immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany. This is evidenced by the directive of the Joint Military Planning Committee No. 432/d of December 14, 1945, which set the task of preparing the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities - the main political and industrial centers Soviet Union. At the same time, it was planned to use the entire stock of atomic bombs available at that time (196 pieces), the carriers of which were modernized B-29 bombers. The method of their use was also determined - a sudden atomic “first strike”, which should confront the Soviet leadership with the fact that further resistance was futile.
The political justification for such actions is the thesis of the “Soviet threat,” one of the main authors of which can be considered the US Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, J. Kennan. It was he who sent a “long telegram” to Washington on February 22, 1946, where in eight thousand words he outlined the “vital threat” that allegedly loomed over the United States and proposed a strategy for confrontation with the Soviet Union.
President G. Truman gave instructions to develop a doctrine (later called the “Truman Doctrine”) of pursuing a policy from a position of strength in relation to the USSR. To centralize planning and increase the effectiveness of the use of strategic aviation, in the spring of 1947, the Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) was created. At the same time, the task of improving strategic aviation technology is being implemented at an accelerated pace.
By mid-1948, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff had drawn up a plan for a nuclear war with the USSR, codenamed “Chariotir”. It stipulated that the war should begin "with concentrated attacks using atomic bombs against government, political and administrative centers, industrial cities and selected oil refineries from bases in the Western Hemisphere and England." In the first 30 days alone, it was planned to drop 133 nuclear bombs on 70 Soviet cities.
However, as American military analysts calculated, this was not enough to achieve a quick victory. They believed that during this time Soviet army will be able to capture key areas of Europe and Asia. In early 1949, a special committee of senior Army, Air Force, and Navy officials was created under the leadership of Lieutenant General H. Harmon, which was tasked with trying to assess the political and military consequences of the planned atomic attack on the Soviet Union from the air. The committee's conclusions and calculations clearly indicated that the United States was not yet ready for a nuclear war.
The committee's conclusions stated that it was necessary to increase the quantitative composition of the SAC, increase its combat capabilities, and replenish nuclear arsenals. To ensure the delivery of a massive nuclear strike by air, the United States needs to create a network of bases along the borders of the USSR, from which bombers carrying nuclear weapons could carry out combat missions along the shortest routes to planned targets on Soviet territory. Need to expand mass production heavy strategic intercontinental bombers B-36, capable of operating from bases on American territory.
The message that the Soviet Union had mastered the secret of nuclear weapons caused ruling circles The US desire to start a preventive war as quickly as possible. The Troyan plan was developed, which envisaged starting fighting January 1, 1950. At that time, SAC had 840 strategic bombers in combat units, 1,350 in reserve, and over 300 atomic bombs.
To assess its viability, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff ordered Lieutenant General D. Hull's group to test the chances of disabling the nine most important strategic areas on the territory of the Soviet Union in staff games. Having lost the air offensive against the USSR, Hull analysts summed it up: the probability of achieving these goals is 70%, which would entail the loss of 55% of the available bomber force. It turned out that US strategic aviation in this case would very quickly lose its combat effectiveness. Therefore the question about preventive war was removed in 1950. Soon the American leadership was able to verify in practice the correctness of such assessments. During the course of which began in 1950 Korean War B-29 bombers suffered heavy losses from attacks by fighter jets.
But the situation in the world was changing rapidly, which was reflected in the American strategy of “massive retaliation” adopted in 1953. It was based on the superiority of the United States over the USSR in the number of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. It was envisaged to wage a general nuclear war against the countries of the socialist camp. Strategic aviation was considered the main means of achieving victory, for the development of which up to 50% of the financial resources allocated to the Ministry of Defense for the purchase of weapons were allocated.
In 1955, SAC had 1,565 bombers, 70% of which were B-47 jets, and 4,750 nuclear bombs with yields ranging from 50 kt to 20 mt. In the same year, the B-52 heavy strategic bomber was put into service, which gradually became the main intercontinental carrier of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the military-political leadership of the United States is beginning to realize that in the context of the rapid increase in the capabilities of Soviet air defense systems, heavy bombers will not be able to solve the problem of achieving victory in a nuclear war alone. In 1958, medium-range ballistic missiles "Thor" and "Jupiter" entered service and were deployed in Europe. A year later, the first Atlas-D intercontinental missiles were put on combat duty, and the nuclear submarine J. Washington" with Polaris-A1 missiles.
With the advent of ballistic missiles in the strategic nuclear forces, the United States' ability to launch a nuclear strike increases significantly. However, in the USSR, by the end of the 50s, intercontinental carriers of nuclear weapons were being created, capable of delivering a retaliatory strike on the territory of the United States. The Pentagon was particularly concerned about Soviet ICBMs. Under these conditions, the leaders of the United States considered that the strategy of “massive retaliation” was not fully consistent with modern realities and must be adjusted.
By the beginning of 1960, nuclear planning in the United States was becoming centralized. Before this, each branch of the Armed Forces planned the use of nuclear weapons independently. But the increase in the number of strategic delivery vehicles required the creation of a single body for planning nuclear operations. It became the Joint Strategic Objectives Planning Staff, subordinate to the commander of the SAC and the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. In December 1960, the first unified plan for waging a nuclear war was drawn up, called the “Unified Comprehensive Operational Plan” - SIOP. It envisaged, in accordance with the requirements of the “massive retaliation” strategy, waging only a general nuclear war against the USSR and China with the unlimited use of nuclear weapons (3.5 thousand nuclear warheads).
In 1961, a “flexible response” strategy was adopted, reflecting changes in official views on the possible nature of the war with the USSR. In addition to all-out nuclear war, American strategists began to accept the possibility of limited use of nuclear weapons and waging war with conventional weapons for a short period of time (no more than two weeks). The choice of methods and means of warfare had to be made taking into account the current geostrategic situation, the balance of forces and the availability of resources.
The new installations had a very significant impact on the development of American strategic weapons. Rapid quantitative growth of ICBMs and SLBMs begins. The latter is being improved Special attention, since they could be used as “forward-based” assets in Europe. At the same time, the American government no longer needed to look for possible deployment areas for them and persuade the Europeans to give their consent to the use of their territory, as was the case during the deployment of medium-range missiles.
The US military-political leadership believed that it was necessary to have such a quantitative composition of strategic nuclear forces, the use of which would ensure the “guaranteed destruction” of the Soviet Union as a viable state.
In the early years of this decade, a significant force of ICBMs was deployed. So, if at the beginning of 1960 the SAC had 20 missiles of only one type - Atlas-D, then by the end of 1962 there were already 294. By this time, Atlas intercontinental ballistic missiles of the "E" modifications were put into service. and "F", "Titan-1" and "Minuteman-1A". The latest ICBMs were several orders of magnitude higher in sophistication than their predecessors. In the same year, the tenth American SSBN went on combat patrol. The total number of Polaris-A1 and Polaris-A2 SLBMs has reached 160 units. The last of the ordered B-52H heavy bombers and B-58 medium bombers entered service. The total number of bombers in the Strategic Air Command was 1,819. Thus, the American nuclear triad of strategic offensive forces (units and formations of ICBMs, nuclear missile submarines and strategic bombers) was organizationally formed, each component of which harmoniously complemented each other. It was equipped with over 6,000 nuclear warheads.
In mid-1961, the SIOP-2 plan was approved, reflecting the “flexible response” strategy. It provided for five interrelated operations to destroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal, suppress the air defense system, destroy military and government agencies and points, large groupings of troops, as well as strikes on cities. The total number of targets in the plan was 6 thousand. Among the topics, the plan's developers also took into account the possibility of the Soviet Union inflicting a retaliatory nuclear strike on US territory.
At the beginning of 1961, a commission was formed whose duties were to develop promising ways for the development of American strategic nuclear forces. Subsequently, such commissions were created regularly.
In the fall of 1962, the world again found itself on the brink of nuclear war. The outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis forced politicians around the world to look at nuclear weapons from a new perspective. For the first time, it clearly played the role of a deterrent. The sudden appearance of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba for the United States and their lack of overwhelming superiority in the number of ICBMs and SLBMs over the Soviet Union made a military solution to the conflict impossible.
American military leadership immediately announced the need for additional armament, effectively setting a course for unleashing a strategic offensive arms race (START). The wishes of the military found due support in the US Senate. Huge amounts of money were allocated for the development of strategic offensive weapons, which made it possible to qualitatively and quantitatively improve strategic nuclear forces. In 1965, the Thor and Jupiter missiles, Atlas of all modifications and Titan-1 were completely withdrawn from service. They were replaced by the Minuteman-1B and Minuteman-2 intercontinental missiles, as well as the Titan-2 heavy ICBM.
The marine component of the SNA has grown significantly quantitatively and qualitatively. Taking into account such factors as the almost undivided dominance of the US Navy and the combined NATO fleet in the vast oceans in the early 60s, the high survivability, stealth and mobility of SSBNs, the American leadership decided to significantly increase the number of deployed missile submarines that could successfully replace medium-sized missiles. range. Their main targets were to be large industrial and administrative centers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
In 1967, the strategic nuclear forces had 41 SSBNs with 656 missiles, of which more than 80% were Polaris-A3 SLBMs, 1054 ICBMs and over 800 heavy bombers. After the obsolete B-47 aircraft were removed from service, the nuclear bombs intended for them were eliminated. In connection with a change in strategic aviation tactics, the B-52 was equipped with AGM-28 Hound Dog cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead.
The rapid growth in the second half of the 60s in the number of Soviet OS-type ICBMs with improved characteristics and the creation of a missile defense system made the likelihood of America achieving a quick victory in a possible nuclear war scanty.
The strategic nuclear arms race posed more and more new challenges to the US military-industrial complex. It was necessary to find new way rapid build-up of nuclear power. The high scientific and production level of leading American rocket manufacturing companies made it possible to solve this problem. The designers have found a way to significantly increase the number of nuclear charges raised without increasing the number of their carriers. Multiple warheads (MIRVs) were developed and introduced, first with dispersible warheads and then with individual guidance.
The US leadership decided that it was time to somewhat adjust the military-technical side of its military doctrine. Using the tried-and-tested thesis of the “Soviet missile threat” and “US backwardness,” it easily secured the allocation of funds for new strategic weapons. Since 1970, the deployment of the Minuteman-3 ICBM and the Poseidon-S3 SLBM with MIRV-type MIRVs began. At the same time, the obsolete Minuteman-1B and Polaris were removed from combat duty.
In 1971, the strategy of “realistic deterrence” was officially adopted. It was based on the idea of nuclear superiority over the USSR. The authors of the strategy took into account the emerging equality in the number of strategic carriers between the USA and the USSR. By that time, without taking into account the nuclear forces of England and France, the following balance of strategic weapons had developed. In terms of ground-based ICBMs, the United States has 1,054 versus 1,300 in the Soviet Union, in terms of the number of SLBMs, 656 versus 300, and in terms of strategic bombers, 550 versus 145, respectively. The new strategy for the development of strategic offensive arms provided for a sharp increase in the number of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles while simultaneously improving their tactical and technical characteristics, which was supposed to ensure qualitative superiority over the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
The improvement of strategic offensive forces was reflected in the next plan - SIOP-4, adopted in 1971. It was developed taking into account the interaction of all components of the nuclear triad and provided for the destruction of 16 thousand targets.
But under pressure from the world community, the US leadership was forced to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. The methods of conducting such negotiations were regulated by the concept of “negotiating from a position of strength” - component“realistic deterrence” strategies. In 1972, the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1) were concluded. However, the build-up of the strategic nuclear potential of opposing political systems continued.
By the mid-70s, the deployment of the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missile systems was completed. All Lafayette-class SSBNs equipped with new missiles have been modernized. Heavy bombers were armed with SRAM nuclear guided missiles. All this led to a sharp increase in the nuclear arsenal assigned to strategic delivery vehicles. So, in five years from 1970 to 1975, the number of warheads increased from 5102 to 8500 units. The improvement of the combat control system for strategic weapons was in full swing, which made it possible to implement the principle of quickly retargeting warheads to new targets. To completely recalculate and replace the flight mission for one missile now required only a few tens of minutes, and the entire group of SNS ICBMs could be retargeted in 10 hours. By the end of 1979, this system was implemented at all intercontinental missile launchers and launch control posts. At the same time, the security of silo launchers of Minuteman ICBMs was increased.
The qualitative improvement of the US strategic offensive forces made it possible to move from the concept of “assured destruction” to the concept of “target selection,” which provided for multi-variant actions - from a limited nuclear strike with a few missiles to a massive strike against the entire complex of targeted targets. The SIOP-5 plan was drawn up and approved in 1975, which provided for attacks on military, administrative and economic targets of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries with a total number of up to 25 thousand.
The main form of use of American strategic offensive weapons was considered to be a sudden massive nuclear strike by all combat-ready ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as a certain number of heavy bombers. By this time, SLBMs had become the leading ones in the US nuclear triad. If before 1970 most of the nuclear warheads were assigned to strategic aviation, then in 1975 4,536 warheads were installed on 656 sea-based missiles (2,154 warheads on 1,054 ICBMs, and 1,800 on heavy bombers). Views on their use have also changed. In addition to striking cities, given the short flight time (12 - 18 minutes), submarine missiles could be used to destroy launching Soviet ICBMs on active site trajectories or directly in launchers, preventing their launch before the approach of American ICBMs. The latter were entrusted with the task of destroying highly protected targets and, above all, silos and command posts of missile units of the Strategic Missile Forces. In this way, a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike on US territory could have been thwarted or significantly weakened. Heavy bombers were planned to be used to destroy surviving or newly identified targets.
Since the second half of the 70s, a transformation of the views of the American political leadership on the prospects of nuclear war began. Considering the opinion of most scientists that even a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike would be disastrous for the United States, it decided to accept the theory of limited nuclear war for one theater of war, specifically the European one. To implement it, new nuclear weapons were needed.
The administration of President J. Carter allocated funds for the development and production of the highly effective strategic sea-based Trident system. The implementation of this project was planned to be carried out in two stages. At the first it was planned to re-equip 12 SSBNs of the J. type. Madison" with Trident-C4 missiles, as well as to build and commission 8 new-generation Ohio-class SSBNs with 24 of the same missiles. At the second stage, it was planned to build 14 more SSBNs and arm all boats of this project with the new Trident-D5 SLBM with higher tactical and technical characteristics.
In 1979, President J. Carter decides on the full-scale production of the Peacekeeper (MX) intercontinental ballistic missile, which in its characteristics was supposed to surpass all existing Soviet ICBMs. Its development has been carried out since the mid-70s, along with the Pershing-2 MRBM and a new type of strategic weapons - long-range ground- and air-launched cruise missiles.
With the coming to power of the administration of President R. Reagan, the “doctrine of neo-globalism” was born, reflecting the new views of the US military-political leadership on the path to achieving world domination. It provided for a wide range of measures (political, economic, ideological, military) to “throw back communism”, direct use military force against those countries where the United States perceives a threat to its “vital interests.” Naturally, the military-technical side of the doctrine was also adjusted. Its basis for the 80s was the strategy of “direct confrontation” with the USSR on a global and regional scale, aimed at achieving “complete and undeniable military superiority of the United States.”
Soon, the Pentagon developed “Guidelines for the construction of the US armed forces” for the coming years. They, in particular, determined that in a nuclear war “the United States must prevail and be able to force the USSR into short time stop hostilities on US terms." Military plans provided for the conduct of both general and limited nuclear war within the framework of one theater of operations. In addition, the task was to be ready to wage an effective war from space.
Based on these provisions, concepts for the development of the SNA were developed. The concept of “strategic sufficiency” required having such a combat composition of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads for them in order to ensure the “deterrence” of the Soviet Union.” The concept of “active counteraction” provided for ways to ensure flexibility in the use of strategic offensive forces in any situation - from a single use of nuclear weapons to the use of the entire nuclear arsenal.
In March 1980, the president approved the SIOP-5D plan. The plan provided for three options for nuclear strikes: preventive, retaliatory, and retaliatory. The number of targets was 40 thousand, which included 900 cities with a population of over 250 thousand each, 15 thousand industrial and economic facilities, 3,500 military targets on the territory of the USSR, Warsaw Pact countries, China, Vietnam and Cuba.
In early October 1981, President Reagan announced his “strategic program” for the 1980s, which contained guidelines for further building up strategic nuclear capabilities. The last hearings on this program took place at six meetings of the US Congress Committee on Military Affairs. Representatives of the President, the Ministry of Defense, and leading scientists in the field of weapons were invited to them. As a result of comprehensive discussions of all structural elements, the program for building up strategic weapons was approved. In accordance with it, starting in 1983, 108 Pershing-2 MRBM launchers and 464 BGM-109G ground-based cruise missiles were deployed in Europe as forward-based nuclear weapons.
In the second half of the 80s, another concept was developed - “substantial equivalence”. It determined how, in the context of the reduction and elimination of some types of strategic offensive arms, by improving the combat characteristics of others, to ensure qualitative superiority over the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR.
Since 1985, the deployment of 50 silo-based MX ICBMs began (another 50 missiles of this type in a mobile version were planned to be put on combat duty in the early 90s) and 100 B-1B heavy bombers. Production of the BGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles to equip 180 B-52 bombers was in full swing. A new MIRV with more powerful warheads was installed on the 350 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, while the control system was modernized.
An interesting situation arose after the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles on the territory of West Germany. Formally, this group was not part of the US National Security Council and was the nuclear weapon of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe (this position has always been occupied by US representatives). The official version for the world community was that its deployment in Europe was a reaction to the appearance of RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles in the Soviet Union and the need to rearm NATO in the face of a missile threat from the East. In fact, the reason was, of course, different, which was confirmed by the Supreme Commander of NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe, General B. Rogers. He said in one of his speeches in 1983: “Most people believe that we are modernizing our weapons because of the SS-20 missiles. We would have carried out modernization even if there were no SS-20 missiles.”
The main purpose of the Pershings (taken into account in the SIOP plan) was to deliver a “decapitation strike” on the command posts of strategic formations of the USSR Armed Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces in Eastern Europe, which was supposed to disrupt the implementation of the Soviet retaliatory strike. To achieve this, they had all the necessary tactical and technical characteristics: short approach time (8-10 minutes), high shooting accuracy and a nuclear charge capable of hitting highly protected targets. Thus, it became clear that they were intended to solve strategic offensive tasks.
Ground-launched cruise missiles, also considered NATO nuclear weapons, became dangerous weapons. But their use was envisaged in accordance with the SIOP plan. Their main advantage was high precision firing (up to 30 m) and stealth flight, which took place at an altitude of several tens of meters, which, combined with a small effective dispersion area, made interception of such missiles by an air defense system extremely difficult. The targets of destruction for the Kyrgyz Republic could be any highly protected pinpoint targets such as command posts, silos, etc.
However, by the end of the 80s, the USA and the USSR had accumulated such a huge nuclear potential that it had long outgrown reasonable limits. A situation arose where it was necessary to make a decision on what to do next. The situation was aggravated by the fact that half of the ICBMs (Minuteman-2 and part of Minuteman-3) had been in operation for 20 years or more. Keeping them in combat-ready condition became more and more expensive every year. Under these conditions, the country's leadership decided on the possibility of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms, subject to a reciprocal step on the part of the Soviet Union. Such an agreement was concluded at the end of July 1991. Its provisions largely determined the path of development of strategic weapons in the 90s. An instruction was given for the development of such strategic offensive weapons, so that in order to fend off the threat from them, the USSR would need to spend large financial and material resources.
The situation changed radically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States achieved world dominance and remained the only “superpower” in the world. Finally, the political part of the American military doctrine was fulfilled. But with the ending " cold war“According to the Clinton administration, threats to US interests remain. In 1995, the report “National military strategy", presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and sent to Congress. It became the last of the official documents outlining the provisions of the new military doctrine. It is based on a “strategy of flexible and selective engagement.” Certain adjustments in the new strategy have been made to the content of the main strategic concepts.
The military-political leadership continues to rely on force, and the Armed Forces are preparing to wage war and achieve “victory in any wars, wherever and whenever they arise.” Naturally, the military structure is being improved, including strategic nuclear forces. They are entrusted with the task of deterring and intimidating a possible enemy, both in a period of peace and during a general or limited war using conventional weapons.
A significant place in theoretical developments is devoted to the place and methods of action of the SNS in a nuclear war. Taking into account the existing balance of forces between the United States and Russia in the field of strategic weapons, the American military-political leadership believes that goals in a nuclear war can be achieved as a result of multiple and spaced-out nuclear strikes against military and economic potential, administrative and political control. In time, these can be either proactive or reactive actions.
The following types of nuclear strikes are envisaged: selective - to hit various command and control organs, limited or regional (for example, against groupings of enemy troops during a conventional war if the situation develops unsuccessfully) and massive. In this regard, a certain reorganization of the US strategic offensive forces was carried out. Further changes in American views on possible development and the use of strategic nuclear weapons can be expected at the beginning of the next millennium.
115 years ago, on January 12, 1903 (December 30, 1902), in the city of Sim in the Urals, in the family of a land surveyor and a teacher, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov was born - the future world-famous physicist, scientific director of the atomic project in the USSR, the “father” of the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear bombs, founder of nuclear energy, founder and first director of the Institute of Atomic Energy (now the National Research Center "Kurchatov Institute"), academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, laureate of 4 Stalin and Lenin Prizes, three times Hero of Socialist Labor.
Under his leadership, the first Soviet cyclotron was built (1939), spontaneous nuclear fission was discovered (1940), mine protection for ships was developed (1942), and the first nuclear reactor in Europe was built (1946).
Since 1925, Igor Vasilyevich, having a diploma from the Taurida University (Simferopol), began working at the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. What issues he dealt with is interesting only to specialists. Let's just say that he made a huge contribution to the physics of dielectrics and laid significant stones in the foundation of semiconductor physics. Already at the age of 31 he became a doctor, professor, and his name was well known throughout the scientific world.
Then it scientific interests made a sharp turn towards nuclear physics - an area that Phystech did not deal with. And here he managed to do a lot, and even before the war he became a world-famous star. Then there was the evacuation of the institute to Kazan, then work on protecting ships from magnetic mines, and then by Government Decree of February 11, 1943, he was appointed scientific director of the “uranium problem.”
Why him? After all, there were many other nuclear scientists in the country. Because there was no personality equal to him in science. When did it become known about work in the USA and fascist Germany over nuclear weapons and to discuss this information, academicians Vernadsky, Kapitsa, Ioffe and Khlopin were called to the Kremlin; it was no coincidence that they named Kurchatov.
He combined the powerful talent of an experimenter, the breadth of scientific thinking, the ability to instantly determine the essence of any scientific problem and unerringly find the right way to solve it, discarding trifles. In addition - a unique memory, fortitude, integrity, leadership talent and, at the same time, an amazing ability to get along with people, even with the most irreconcilable opponents.
Here's what his closest employees wrote about him: “Having taken up the matter, Kurchatov lights himself up, lights up those around him and gives no rest to anyone until the research is brought to complete clarity. But it is impossible to be angry with Kurchatov. He himself works harder than anyone. But as soon as the main thing is decided, he moves on to new topic, with little interest in fine-tuning minor details". It's about the 1930s.
And this is about the 1940s: “During this period, Kurchatov became a statesman. Possessing rare charm, he quickly makes friends among leaders of industry and the army. He organizes new large research institutes, new design bureaus, new industries. Possessing an excellent memory and oratorical talent, Kurchatov speaks with unsurpassed clarity at numerous meetings. His convincing speeches, impeccable in style and brevity, are a constant success. Scientific teams are happy to welcome him in their laboratories. Every conversation with him brings scientific clarity and directs me to the main thing. Kurchatov, like a commander, sets masses of people in motion and invariably wins brilliant victories, moving towards the goal faster than the most optimistic calculations predicted.”. At the same time, he directly supervised the work at his institute.
For almost 15 years, Igor Vasilyevich bore the heavy, enormous responsibility of scientific and government work. His heart could not stand it, but he did the most important thing - he protected the country from the nuclear aggression already planned by the Americans. The urn with his ashes is buried in the Kremlin wall.
In recent years, there has been an objective reassessment of the activities of L.P. Beria. There are no words, this man’s contribution to the creation of Russia’s nuclear shield is enormous. But he had a completely different function - a government function and, in fact, he solved those tasks that only the Government could solve and which Kurchatov set for the Government.
The Russian people are always rich in geniuses. But the 20th century is special. In that century, a galaxy of people was born who combined the genius of a scientist with wisdom statesman- S.P. Korolev, M.V. Keldysh, M.A. Lavrentyev... And the first in this galaxy is Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov.
The kingdom of heaven be upon him!
Valery Gabrusenko, publicist, candidate of technical sciences, associate professor, corresponding member. Petrovsky Academy of Sciences and Arts
In August 1942 in the building former school In the town of Los Alamos, New Mexico, not far from Santa Fe, a secret “Metallurgical Laboratory” began operating. Robert Oppenheimer was appointed head of the laboratory.
It took the Americans three years to solve the problem. In July 1945, the first atomic bomb was detonated at the test site, and in August two more bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It took seven years for the birth of the Soviet atomic bomb - the first explosion was carried out at the test site in 1949.
The American team of physicists was initially stronger. Only 12 Nobel laureates, present and future, took part in the creation of the atomic bomb. And the only future Soviet Nobel laureate, who was in Kazan in 1942 and who was invited to take part in the work, refused. In addition, the Americans were helped by a group of British scientists sent to Los Alamos in 1943.
Nevertheless, in Soviet times it was argued that the USSR solved its atomic problem completely independently, and Kurchatov was considered the “father” of the domestic atomic bomb. Although there were rumors about some secrets stolen from the Americans. And only in the 90s, 50 years later, one of the main figures then - - spoke about the significant role of intelligence in accelerating the lagging Soviet project. And American scientific and technical results were obtained by those who arrived in the English group.
So Robert Oppenheimer can be called the “father” of bombs created on both sides of the ocean - his ideas fertilized both projects. It is wrong to consider Oppenheimer (like Kurchatov) only as an outstanding organizer. His main achievements are scientific. And it was thanks to them that he became the scientific director of the atomic bomb project.
Robert Oppenheimer was born in New York on April 22, 1904. In 1925 he received a diploma from Harvard University. For a year he interned with Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory. In 1926 he moved to the University of Göttingen, where in 1927 he defended his doctoral dissertation under the guidance of Max Born. In 1928 he returned to the USA. From 1929 to 1947, Oppenheimer taught at two leading American universities - the University of California and the California Institute of Technology.
Oppenheimer studied quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, elementary particle physics, and carried out a number of works on theoretical astrophysics. In 1927, he created the theory of interaction of free electrons with atoms. Together with Born, he developed the theory of the structure of diatomic molecules. In 1930 he predicted the existence of the positron.
In 1931, together with Ehrenfest, he formulated the Ehrenfest-Oppenheimer theorem, according to which nuclei consisting of an odd number of particles with spin ½ should obey Fermi-Dirac statistics, and those consisting of an even number should obey Bose-Einstein statistics. Investigated the internal conversion of gamma rays.
In 1937, he developed the cascade theory of cosmic showers, in 1938 he first calculated a model of a neutron star, and in 1939, in his work “On irreversible gravitational compression,” he predicted the existence of “black holes.”
Oppenheimer wrote several popular science books: Science and Common Knowledge (1954), The Open Mind (1955), and Some Reflections on Science and Culture (1960).
