Officers of this department were part of residencies in the capitals of foreign countries and were engaged in intercepting and decrypting transmissions on government and military information networks. In addition, electronic intelligence regiments stationed on Soviet territory, as well as electronic intelligence services of military districts and fleets, were subordinate to this department.
Electronic, space and radio intelligence. Includes the Space Intelligence Center - on Volokolamsk Highway, the so-called “K-500 facility”. It included four departments:
The 1st - radio intelligence department - was engaged in intercepting and decrypting messages from communication channels of foreign states. He led the so-called special purpose units (abbreviated as OSNAZ), which were part of the military districts and groups of Soviet troops in Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Under the leadership of the radio intelligence department, OSNAZ performed the functions of intercepting messages from communication networks foreign countries- objects of radio reconnaissance surveillance by the GRU. For these purposes, the 1st Department of the 6th Directorate had at its disposal 300 people plus 1.5 thousand other military and civilian employees.
The 2nd - the radio-technical intelligence department of the 6th GRU directorate - used the services of the same interception stations and carried out electronic surveillance of the same countries as the 1st. However, the subject of interest of the 2nd Department was radio, telemetry and other electronic signals emitted by military control, detection and tracking equipment. To intercept these signals, he deployed OSNAZ in military districts and groups of troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
3rd - department technical support- was engaged in servicing interception stations, the equipment of which was located in the buildings of Soviet embassies, consulates and trade missions around the world, as well as separately located interception stations in Cuba, Vietnam, Burma and Mongolia.
The 4th - the tracking department of the 6th GRU directorate - monitored around the clock all the information that it obtained through radio intelligence. The main task of the department was to monitor the military situation in the world and especially significant changes in the US military. Each department officer was responsible for his own observation target, among them were the US Strategic Air Command, the US Tactical Air Command and others. Based on the data received from the tracking department, the operational duty officer of the 6th Directorate compiled a daily information report, which, in turn, was included in the final information report of the entire GRU.
The main facilities at the disposal of the radio intelligence service are:
Radio and satellite communications center located near Moscow. It received, including via satellite communication channels, information from 11 strategic electronic intelligence complexes located in the USSR and from 4 foreign ones. The central radio intelligence station in the city of Klimovsk near Moscow, where a service for tracking and primary processing of radio intelligence data worked around the clock. Radio interception and electronic intelligence centers in Lourdes (Cuba), Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam), Rangoon (Burma) and Mongolia. Information from these centers and those located on the territory of the USSR flowed to the central radio intelligence station in the city of Klimovsk.
Information flows from the central radio intelligence station, from tactical intelligence objects in military districts, groups of forces and in fleets were sent to the apparatus of the 6th Directorate, where, on their basis, daily reports were prepared that arrived at the GRU command post, created in 1962 during the Cuban War. crisis, and also included in the daily intelligence reports of the GRU. In addition, reports from the 6th Directorate were sent to the GRU information service, where they were accumulated and analyzed. The USSR radio reconnaissance fleet in its best years consisted of 62 ships. (Source GRU Empire).
Officers of this department were part of residencies in the capitals of foreign countries and were engaged in intercepting and decrypting transmissions on government and military information networks. In addition, electronic intelligence regiments stationed on Soviet territory, as well as electronic intelligence services of military districts and fleets, were subordinate to this department. Thus, this department has at its disposal radio reconnaissance ships, satellites and radio interception centers. For example, during the last war in Yugoslavia in April 1999, a reconnaissance ship Black Sea Fleet "Liman", a few months later it was replaced by "Kildin". Such ships have no missile, artillery, or torpedo weapons. Only radio, electronic and hydroacoustic reconnaissance equipment.
In addition to the 6th Directorate, the activities of several other GRU divisions and services were related to radio intelligence. Thus, the GRU command post, which carried out round-the-clock monitoring for signs of an impending attack on the USSR, also used information that was received by the 6th Directorate. The information support departments carried out the work of assessing intelligence reports coming from the 6th Directorate. The decryption service was engaged in cryptanalysis of intercepted encrypted messages. It was directly subordinate to the head of the GRU and was located on Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow. The main task of the decryption service was to read encrypted messages from tactical military communications networks. A special GRU computer center processed incoming information, which was obtained by radio intelligence using computer technology. The Central Research Institute in Moscow developed specialized equipment for conducting radio reconnaissance, for its production and Maintenance The operational and technical department of the GRU was responsible. Foreign radio interception centers are operated by the Sixth Directorate of the GRU together with FAPSI, for example, the famous radio-electronic center in Lourdes in Cuba. In 2001, by decision of Russian President V.V. Putin, it was closed and dismantled.
As for the GRU Space Intelligence Directorate, it collects intelligence data using satellites. The Directorate directs the actions of OSNAZ - Special Purpose Units subordinate to the First and Second Divisions of the Sixth Directorate of the GRU, whose functions are radio and electronic intelligence. The analysis and processing of the information obtained in this way is entrusted to the so-called “Dozor system”, which is located in the central building of the GRU on Khoroshevskoye Shosse (“object K 200”).
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Registration Mar 26, 2012 Messages 1
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An interesting publication. However, some of the Administration has disappeared somewhere, for example, Analysts were lost, Departments and specializations were added, the Office was “moved” to Khodyn instead of the street. Sorge... For some reason Ogarkov is not mentioned, but the founding fathers should be honored, as it were...
It turns out that we also have secrets from the Pindos attaches that we would like to push out
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So if you add it, then they’ll add it too)))
Actually, in the light of the interests of the Forum, it is worth noting that this kind of service had no desire to “falsify” documents certifying anything and everything. Technological operations of this nature - of course - took place, but with the aim of better developing technological cycles. It was on the basis of "Gryzov" that the technology for replacing photos on docks appeared without re-gluing, but by washing off the old one and applying a new layer of emulsion (essentially gelatin with chemicals). At the same time, the advantage was that there was no need to make molds for the "embossings" (accordingly, the need to apply repeated embossing), the ability to bring the photo in line with the “age” and condition of the document, and so on.
And so everything was based on “doubles” manufactured in the corresponding “yards”. Not excluding Goznak. At one time, a group of comrades received the SySySyR Hero Stars, who brought to their alma mater a whole load of fabulous riches in the form of Uncle Sam passport books from one Arab country, even supplied by this same Uncle with paper from the US Federal Treasury...Then they apparently came to their senses and bombed everything to their American mother...
Last edited: Mar 27, 2012
Roger731
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And why, I'm sorry, "Bats"? Well, some of them are colloquially called “Batmen,” but this has nothing to do with the office or their attributes.
The silhouette that everyone takes for a bat is actually the silhouette of an eagle owl.
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difficultGRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces
Unlike the former KGB of the USSR, the organizational structure of the GRU was practically never advertised or published anywhere. And perhaps the only source of information on this issue is the book “Soviet Military Intelligence” by former GRU captain V. Rezun (V. Suvorov), who fled to England in 1978, published in London in 1984. Of course, this source is far from flawless in terms of accuracy. However, for lack of a better one, the structure of the GRU in the 70s. mainly cited from this book.
The main complex of GRU headquarters buildings was located (and is still there) in Moscow in the Polezhaevskaya metro area, on the territory of the Central Airfield (formerly Khodynskoye Field). The main building - a 9-story structure made of glass and concrete, originally intended for a military hospital - was called “glass” in local slang, and after the appearance of Suvorov’s books it began to be called (mainly by journalists) “aquarium”.
In addition, on the territory of Moscow and below it there is a decryption (crypto-analytical) service, a Space Intelligence Center, receiving and transmitting long-distance communication centers, and long-range reconnaissance radio centers. The head of the GRU, or the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff, subordinate directly to the chief of the General Staff, was his deputy in status, and his position corresponded to the military rank of army general. In the mid-70s. he had one first deputy and several deputies, each of them oversaw one or more GRU departments. More specifically, at the time of V. Rezun’s escape, the head of the GRU, Army General P.I. Ivashutin, had one first and seven “simple” deputies, namely: - first deputy head of the GRU, Colonel General A.G. Pavlov, subordinate to which were all the “extractive” bodies involved in collecting information; - head of the information service, Colonel General A.V. Zotov, who was responsible for all the “processing” bodies of the GRU; - Head of the GRU Political Department, Lieutenant General G.I. Dolin; - Head of the Electronic Intelligence Department, Lieutenant General A. Paliy; - Head of Fleet Intelligence, Admiral L.K. Bekrenev; - Head of the Space Intelligence Directorate, Aviation Lieutenant General V.A. Shatalov; - Head of the Military Diplomatic Academy, Colonel General V.I. Meshcheryakov; - Head of the Personnel Department, Colonel General S.I. Izotov. In addition, the GRU command post and a group of especially important agents and “illegals” were directly subordinate to the head of the GRU.
In the 70s The GRU consisted of 16 directorates. Of these, most were “numbered” - from 1 to 12, but some, such as the personnel department, did not have numbers. The departments directly involved in the collection and processing of intelligence information were divided into directions, and the auxiliary departments into departments. Directions and departments were in turn divided into sections. The GRU also had directions and departments that were not part of the directorates.
The position of head of a department corresponded to the military rank of lieutenant general, the position of deputy head of a department, head of a direction or department corresponded to the rank of major general. The positions of deputy head of a direction or department, head of a section and his deputy - to the rank of colonel. Ordinary section employees held the positions of senior operational officers and operational officers. The military rank corresponding to the position of senior operational officer is colonel, and the position of operational officer is lieutenant colonel. Depending on their function, GRU units were divided into mining, processing and auxiliary. Extractive bodies were those directly involved in the collection of intelligence information.
As already mentioned, they were subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU and included four departments:
The 1st GRU Directorate carried out intelligence reconnaissance in the territory Western Europe. It included five areas, each of which was engaged in human intelligence on the territory of several countries;
The 2nd Directorate was engaged in human intelligence in North and South America;
The 3rd Directorate conducted human intelligence in Asian countries;
4th Directorate - in Africa and the Middle East. The staff of each of the listed departments, according to V. Rezun, consisted of approximately 300 officers in the Center and the same number abroad.
In addition to these four directorates, there were also four separate areas that were not part of the directorates and were also subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU:
The 1st direction of the GRU conducted intelligence reconnaissance in Moscow. The officers who served in this direction were engaged in recruiting agents among foreign military attaches, members of military, scientific and other delegations, businessmen and other foreigners visiting Moscow. Another important task of the 1st direction was the introduction of GRU officers into Soviet official institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, Aeroflot, etc. Positions in these institutions were subsequently used as legal cover during intelligence work abroad.
The 3rd direction of the GRU conducted human intelligence in national liberation movements and terrorist organizations.
The 4th direction of the GRU was engaged in human intelligence from the territory of Cuba, primarily against the United States, in this case it interacted with Cuban intelligence. In many respects, it duplicated the activities of the 2nd GRU Directorate.
The 5th Directorate of the GRU, or the Directorate of Operational-Tactical Intelligence, was also “extractive” and reported to the first deputy chief of the GRU. However, the specificity of its activities was that it did not engage in independent human intelligence, but supervised the work of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of military districts and fleets. The intelligence departments of military districts and naval intelligence were directly subordinate to the 5th Directorate. The latter, in turn, was subordinate to four naval intelligence departments.
It should be noted that if the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the military districts were directly subordinate to the Directorate of Operational-Tactical Intelligence, then the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fleets - Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic - were combined into a single structure known as fleet intelligence. This was due to the fact that if each military district had a strictly defined area of responsibility, then the ships of the Soviet fleets operated in almost all points of the world's oceans, and each ship had to constantly have complete information regarding the potential enemy.
Therefore, the chief of naval intelligence was the deputy chief of the GRU and led the four intelligence directorates of the naval headquarters, as well as the naval space intelligence directorate and information service. But in his daily activities he obeyed the orders of the 5th Directorate of the GRU. In addition, the GRU had two more departments involved in collecting information - the 6th Directorate and the Space Intelligence Directorate. However, since these departments, although they obtained and partially processed information, did not conduct human intelligence, they were not subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU.
The 6th GRU Directorate carried out electronic intelligence. Officers of this department were part of residencies in the capitals of foreign countries and were engaged in intercepting and decrypting transmissions on government and military information networks. In addition, electronic intelligence regiments stationed on Soviet territory, as well as electronic intelligence services of military districts and fleets, were subordinate to this department.
In addition to the 6th Directorate, the activities of several other GRU divisions and services were related to radio intelligence. Thus, the GRU command post, which carried out round-the-clock monitoring for signs of an impending attack on the USSR, also used information that was received by the 6th Directorate. The information support departments carried out the work of assessing intelligence reports coming from the 6th Directorate. The decryption service was engaged in cryptanalysis of intercepted encrypted messages. It was directly subordinate to the head of the GRU and was located on Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow.
The main task of the decryption service was to read encrypted messages from tactical military communications networks. A special GRU computer center processed incoming information, which was obtained by radio intelligence using computer technology. The Central Research Institute in Moscow developed specialized equipment for conducting radio reconnaissance, and the GRU operational and technical department was responsible for its production and maintenance. As for the GRU Space Intelligence Directorate, it collected intelligence data using satellites. The processing organs of the GRU, which were sometimes called the information service, were engaged in the processing and analysis of incoming materials. The position of head of the information service corresponded to the rank of colonel general, and he himself was deputy head of the GRU.
Subordinate to him were six information departments, the Institute of Information, the fleet information service and information services intelligence departments of military district headquarters. The areas of work of each of these divisions were as follows:
The 7th Directorate consisted of six departments and studied NATO. Each department and each section was responsible for researching individual trends or aspects of NATO activities.
The 8th Directorate studied individual countries all over the world, regardless of whether the country belongs to NATO or not. At the same time, special attention was paid to issues of political structure, armed forces and economics.
The 9th Directorate researched military technologies and was directly connected with the Soviet military-industrial complex.
The 10th Directorate studied the war economy around the world, including the arms trade, military production and technological advances of various countries, production and stockpiles of strategic resources.
The 11th Directorate studied the strategic concepts and strategic nuclear forces of all those countries that possess them or may create them in the future. This department carefully monitored any signs of increased activity in the actions of strategic nuclear forces in any region of the globe.
There is no exact information about what the 12th Directorate was doing. The GRU Institute of Information functioned independently of the directorates and reported directly to the head of the information service. Unlike the departments listed above, which studied secret documents obtained through intelligence, electronic or space intelligence, the institute studied open sources of information: the press, radio and television.
GRU units that were not directly involved in the extraction or processing of intelligence materials were considered auxiliary. These divisions included the political department, personnel department, operational and technical department, administrative department, communications department, financial department, first department, eighth department, archive department.
In addition, the GRU had several research institutes and educational institutions. Their functions were as follows: The Operational and Technical Directorate was engaged in the production of intelligence equipment - cryptographic means, equipment for microphotography, radio devices, listening equipment, weapons, poisons, etc. Several research institutes and specialized enterprises were under his control. The administrative department was responsible for providing the GRU with foreign currency. The Communications Directorate was busy organizing radio and other communications between the GRU and foreign residencies. The finance department performed legal financial activities in the Soviet Union.
The first special department of the GRU was engaged in forging passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, military documents, police documents, etc.
The Eighth Division of the GRU was the most secret of all the secret divisions of the GRU. He was engaged in encryption and decryption. The archives department is perhaps the most interesting of all the departments. In its basements, millions of registration cards of illegal immigrants, GRU officers, secret residents, information about successful and unsuccessful recruitment of foreigners, dossiers of various government and military figures from different countries, etc. were stored and are still stored.
However, the foundation of the GRU was made up of intelligence departments and intelligence departments in armies and military districts, as well as special forces units subordinate to them. Their structure during the period described was as follows: At the headquarters of military districts and groups of Soviet troops abroad, reconnaissance was carried out by the 2nd Directorate, consisting of five departments:
The 1st Department supervised the work of intelligence departments, armies subordinate to the district and other units.
The 2nd Department was engaged in human intelligence in the area of responsibility of the district.
The 3rd Department supervised the activities of the reconnaissance and sabotage units of the district.
The 4th department processed intelligence information.
The 5th department carried out radio reconnaissance. In addition, the intelligence department of the district headquarters included several more auxiliary units. The organization of intelligence at the army level was the same as in the district. Only instead of the intelligence department at army headquarters there was a 2nd (intelligence) department, which in turn consisted of five groups. As already mentioned, the expansion of the scope of military intelligence activities and the increase in the tasks assigned to it required more serious and professional training of highly qualified personnel. Therefore, educational institutions of the GRU in the 60-70s. great attention was paid.
The main forge of Soviet military intelligence personnel was the Military Diplomatic Academy (in the jargon of military intelligence officers, a “conservatory”), which was located in Moscow on Narodnogo Opolcheniya Street. The position of head of the academy corresponded to the military rank of colonel general, and in terms of his status he was deputy head of the GRU. Candidates for admission to the academy were selected mainly among military officers, and before receiving admission to the entrance exams, they underwent a comprehensive test for trustworthiness and moral qualities over the course of two to three years.
The Military Diplomatic Academy consisted of three numbered faculties:
1st - Special Intelligence Faculty - trained intelligence officers who were supposed to be used in legal residencies.
2nd - Military Diplomatic Faculty - trained military attaches.
The 3rd Faculty was engaged in the training of operational-tactical intelligence officers assigned to the headquarters of military districts. Although it was officially believed that the 1st faculty trained students who were to work under civilian cover (employees of embassies, trade missions, merchant fleet, Aeroflot, etc.), and the 2nd faculty studied those who were intended to be used As employees of the military attache, their programs were quite similar. In addition, very often graduates of the 1st faculty were sent to the military attache, and vice versa. But the Military Diplomatic Academy was not the only educational institution that trained personnel for military intelligence.
In addition to it, the GRU also had a number of educational institutions: - the seventh Advanced Training Course for Officers (KUOS); - Higher reconnaissance and command courses for advanced training of command personnel (VRK UKS); - faculties in military universities and departments of intelligence courses and disciplines in various military educational institutions(Department of Navy Intelligence at the Naval Academy, Intelligence Faculty at the Academy of the General Staff, Intelligence Faculty at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, Intelligence Faculty at the Naval Academy, Special Faculty at the Military Academy of Communications, Military Institute foreign languages, Cherepovets Higher Military School of Communications, special department of the Higher Naval School of Radio Electronics, special forces department of the Ryazan Higher Airborne School, intelligence department of the Kiev Higher Military Command School, special department of the 2nd Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Technical School, special intelligence department (with 1994) and the Faculty of Military Intelligence at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School).
Head of the GRU of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Valentin Vladimirovich Korabelnikov.
Genus. 01/04/1946. Colonel General. Born in the Tambov region. Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1969), Military Academy(1974), Military Academy of the General Staff (1988). He served in the troops and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In 1991-1997 - head of the department, first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Specialist in the field of substantiating requirements and building an information support system for making military and military-political decisions. Head of research to determine directions for the development of information tools and systems. Author of scientific works on problems of information support for preparation and decision-making. Corresponding member of the department "Technical means of reconnaissance and target designation" of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences. Graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy under the USSR Ministry of Defense. He worked for more than 20 years in the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. From 1992 to 1997, he was the first deputy chief of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. During the hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic, he repeatedly traveled to the combat zone. In May 1997, during the medical examination preceding the dismissal of Colonel General Fyodor Ladygin, he was acting head of the GRU. In May 1997 Appointed head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. August 20, 1997 Was introduced to the Coordination Interdepartmental Council for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States. Since December 31, 1997 - member of the Supervisory Board for the activities of the Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport companies. In July 1999, V. Korabelnikov received gratitude from President B. Yeltsin for his significant contribution to the process of resolving the conflict in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo. September 6, 1999 He was included in the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation with foreign states.
Igor Sergun is a famous Russian military leader. Headed the Main Directorate of the RF Armed Forces. In 2016 he received the title of Hero of Russia. He rose to the rank of Colonel General. At the beginning of 2016, he died under mysterious circumstances.
Biography of an officer
Igor Sergun was born in 1957. He was born in Podolsk near Moscow. He entered the Soviet army in 1973. He began to receive education in the same field.
First, in the biography of Igor Dmitrievich Sergun there was the Suvorov School, then the Higher Command School, which bore the name of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, which was based in Moscow.
Also, the hero of our article graduated from two military academies of the Soviet army and the Russian General Staff.
Career path
Igor Sergun found himself in military intelligence in 1984. He served in various positions in the Main Intelligence Directorate; his career advancement was facilitated by his knowledge of several foreign languages.
In 1998, Igor Sergun served in Tirana and received honorary state awards.
At the very end, he was appointed head of the main directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. And already in the summer next year he received the rank of lieutenant general. In February 2016, President Vladimir Putin approved a decree appointing Igor Dmitrievich Sergun as colonel general.
Performance evaluation
The Minister of Defense gave a fairly high assessment of the work of the hero of our article Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu. According to him, the military intelligence system, when Sergun headed it, began to work most effectively, promptly revealing dangerous threats and challenges to the country's security.
In particular, the head of the GRU, Igor Sergun, personally participated in the development and implementation of the operation to hold a referendum in Crimea, after which the peninsula became part of the Russian Federation. This is one of the most resonant operations Russian leadership recent years, since the inclusion of Crimea into Russia is still not supported by either Ukraine, to which it previously belonged, or the majority of world powers, although this happened in the spring of 2014. This led to Colonel General Igor Sergun being included in the sanctions lists of the United States of America, Australia, Canada and Ukraine as one of the key characters who contributed to undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
In mid-summer 2015, Sergun, together with the best specialists The Main Intelligence Directorate has begun to develop Russian military air operations in Syria.
It is known that the last time the hero of our article appeared in public was in Moscow at an international conference that was dedicated to the situation in Afghanistan. General Igor Sergun delivered a detailed report in which he analyzed in detail the recruiting activity of the Islamic State terrorist organization banned in Russia, and also gave a forecast about its goals and the development of the situation in Afghanistan.
According to some media reports, at the end of 2015, Sergun, on the personal instructions of President Vladimir Putin, unofficially visited the Syrian capital of Damascus. He met with the president of the state in which, for many years, Civil War to convey a formal offer from the Russian president to resign. The authoritative English publication Financial Times (with reference to unnamed senior NATO intelligence officials) reported that Bashar al-Assad refused this proposal. Sergun's visit was unsuccessful.
Opinion of foreign experts
Foreign experts, emphasizing the importance of Sergun’s work, always noted that he very sensitively felt what his immediate leadership in the Kremlin wanted from him, and acted exactly following their instructions.
Thanks to these abilities, according to most experts, the hero of our article managed to gain authority in the eyes of his superiors, organize the work of the Main Intelligence Directorate, and strengthen the position of this department after it had been in disgrace for many years.
At the same time, analyzing Sergun’s work, Western experts came to the conclusion that the prospects for Russian intelligence services look dismal as long as their leaders are rewarded solely for efficient reports and for guessing the desires of their immediate leadership.
Mysterious death
Sergun's death became known on January 3, 2016. According to official Russian sources, he died suddenly at the age of 59, while he was in the Moskvich rest home in the Moscow region, which is part of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. The cause of the officer’s sudden death was a massive heart attack.
Western media and researchers adhere to a different version. For example, a private analytical intelligence company from the United States, citing its own anonymous sources, claimed that Sergun actually died on January 1, 2016 in Lebanon.
This information was officially denied by the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov. Vladimir Putin himself brought condolences to Sergun’s family and friends. The Colonel General was buried in Moscow at the Troekurovsky cemetery.
Posthumous award
A few months after his death, it became known that Sergun had already been posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. Thus, President Vladimir Putin noted his successful service in Syria, as well as his reorganization of the Main Intelligence Directorate from 2011 to 2015.
Sergun was also credited with the high results of the military intelligence service’s activities in collecting and searching for operational information on secret military equipment and the latest weapons being developed in other countries.
The hero of our article was a candidate of military sciences and was a member of the editorial board of the authoritative journal "Military Thought".
Personal life
Sergun was married and raised two daughters. In 1990, Elena was born, and ten years earlier Olga.
It is known that Olga Sergun in 2003 received a diploma from the capital’s Law Academy with a degree in Jurisprudence. After that, she held various positions in the Moscow Department of Land Resources. For example, from 2013 to 2015 she was deputy head of the legal support department, specializing in the field of land relations.
In 2015, she received the post of general director of the state unitary enterprise "Center for Financial and Legal Support", which worked under the auspices of the department of affairs of the presidential administration.
In the summer of 2016, Olga Sergun became deputy chief of staff of the President of Russia.
Very few people in Russia understand what the destruction of the military intelligence system at the Kremlin’s instigation will mean for our country. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff is the central organ of military intelligence in Russia. Its main task is the timely detection of an impending attack or development of a situation threatening the security of the Russian Federation, and warning the country's leadership about them. Experts who can actually evaluate this do not have the right to vote or are killed. A high-ranking officer of the GRU central apparatus said at the meeting: “Professional cadres of the General Staff are being purposefully knocked out.” Generals and colonels who have their own opinions and are trying to answer the question - what is the point in destroying the institution of military intelligence? - V best case scenario they find themselves retired, or at worst, they die under unclear circumstances, as happened with GRU Major General Yuri Ivanov, who was responsible for organizing military intelligence in the Caucasus region.
Deputy Chief of the GRU, Major General Yuri Ivanov, tragically “died”
his body “surfaced” 90 km from his vacation spot in Syria off the coast of Turkey
One of the country’s two most important intelligence services is being systematically destroyed by the Kremlin with the help of the “FSB-SVR corporation.” Today it is clear that the GRU has nothing to do with the informers from the FSB, who occupied the highest command posts in this structure, and today are involved in big politics. The GRU really interferes with these informers. His employees know too much, they could have obtained documents for many transactions, they are too informed witnesses... I wonder what? Betrayal or corruption?
Betrayal of the upper echelon of power: the Kremlin, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, etc. The level for our country is prohibitive.
Corruption permeated the entire vertical of power from top to bottom, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Lubyanka. The price is hundreds of human lives. Explosion in Domodedovo (explosives were brought from the North Caucasus by bus, easily passing all checkpoints and checks for a small “magarych”). All truck drivers encounter this “magarych” every day, just like 8 years ago, when bombs were brought to the theater in Dubrovka. The consequence of corruption is incompetence—the inability of the authorities to formulate a clear, substantiated concept of national interests and to identify the real challenges of the nation. The concept of national security formulated by the Security Council (Patrushev) still sees the main enemy in NATO and the United States, completely forgetting about China. Along with this, the Kremlin orchestrated the collapse of all army systems, the eradication of career generals, the appointment of “jackets” to the post of Minister of Defense and other positions. Hence the complete chaos in the structures whose job is to obtain information about threats before they become the bloody reality of our lives.
What is happening to our security and to those who are called upon to protect it? The GRU headquarters on Khodynka is a complex of buildings with an area of more than 70 thousand square meters. meters - almost deserted. Noisy empty corridors, constant layoffs, oppressive uncertainty. The destruction of the GRU was preceded by a media campaign, which was carried out at the behest of the Kremlin and with a full range of political dirt, lies and fabrications.
After the first arrest of GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov in 2005 in connection with the assassination attempt on Chubais (popularly known as the “Red Voucher”), rumors spread that militant terrorist groups were being formed within the service. His new arrest in 2010 showed that these rumors were translated into real charges. The reserve colonel is accused of attempting armed rebellion and promoting terrorist activities. Let me remind you that Kvachkov was taken into custody on December 23, 2010 by the decision of the Lefortovo Court of Moscow at the request of the Investigative Department of the FSB of Russia. Films in the spirit of the series “Spy Games” began to appear on the screens of corrupt television, exposing traitors among the top of the GRU, organizing endless conspiracies, drawing up hit lists for oligarchs and politicians selling Russian military secrets left and right.
Naturally, they were exposed by the heroes of the Federal Security Service. (received the title of Hero of Russia on closed lists for unknown exploits in an unknown war under the Kremlin carpet). Could it be different if the one on whom there is incriminating evidence comes from this service and has been ruling the country for 12 years? All the main events took place “under the Kremlin carpet,” and citizens did not even see that a powerful propaganda campaign was underway to prepare for the liquidation of the GRU.
Today, GRU officers consider the destruction of the military intelligence system a fait accompli. Celebrating their professional holiday, veterans and active officers of the service, one after another, spoke “for the blessed memory” of the intelligence agency with which they were associated professional destinies. I appeal to all veterans and active officers of the GRU: thank Putin for this, the Minister of Defense is only a performer and, due to his feeble mind, cannot do anything without a command. The presence of a high position does not hide, but reveals the stupidity and stupidity of narrow-minded people who have nothing to do with state building. They cannot be called statesmen. By their actions, these are enemies of the Russian people!
GRU is the most secret intelligence service intelligence community of the USSR and Russia. Therefore, the enemies of our Motherland are primarily interested in its destruction!
Former head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff Valentin Korabelnikov
Today the situation is such that there is nothing to lose. When despair turns out to be stronger than the habit of living under the heading “secret”, even GRU veterans begin to openly talk about the problems of the service. Lieutenant General Dmitry Gerasimov, the former head of the GRU department who led all special forces brigades, said: “I am deeply convinced that the GRU special forces collapsed absolutely deliberately. Of the 14 brigades and two training regiments of the GRU, no more than four brigades remained. We must understand that this is no longer GRU special forces, but ordinary military reconnaissance, part of the Ground Forces.
The Berd special forces brigade said goodbye to the unit's battle flag.
One of the best brigades, Berdskaya, was liquidated, and with great difficulty it was possible to defend the 22nd brigade, which bears the high rank of “Guards”. This is the most combat-ready formation of the GRU, which fought in the most critical areas in Afghanistan, Chechnya and other “hot spots”. I can say that the so-called “osnaz” - electronic intelligence units - have also been eliminated. Essentially, we are building a military that sees and hears nothing.” Everything has been said correctly, the Kremlin also sees nothing and does not want to hear anything. And we only hear the bleating of the “tandem”, which is destroying what we should adequately support, strengthen and cherish. Intelligence is a vital necessity for any state and state leader. But in our “tandem” there is neither a leader nor a Russian state leader - just two narcissistic “narcissists” leading corruption.
Of the 7 thousand officers who served in the GRU during Soviet times, less than 2 thousand remain in the structure now. According to intelligence officers, the GRU held out until its former boss, Army General Valentin Korabelnikov, left it. After his forced resignation, the final cleansing of the system began. High-ranking employees of the central apparatus of the GRU, the General Staff, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the FSB, the SVR, the FSO, managers, specialists and developers of the electronic reconnaissance system, heads of institutes conducting developments for law enforcement agencies, on condition of anonymity, also claim that they consider the collapse of the service a targeted action .
At the first stage, the main blow was dealt to the "base", as a result of which all existing electronic intelligence centers were eliminated both on the territory of our country, with the exception of the Transcaucasian direction, and at Russian military bases. Then all the main lines of work of the GRU were reduced, from strategic and human intelligence to auxiliary units and the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trained intelligence officers both for the apparatus of military attaches and for the illegal residencies of the GRU.
Today it is known that in the specialized research institute of the GRU, all development and research work has been stopped, and the FSB cannot independently make a single development. All areas of radio intelligence have moved far ahead of the non-system radio intelligence generals who do not understand anything and do not want to understand. Everyone has their own business. Even the American radio reconnaissance vehicles that belonged to Georgia that were captured in 2008, no one took an interest in, they had to be sent under pressure. There was a team from the Kremlin, or due to their own stupidity and thoughtlessness, the most valuable equipment was thrown away like a pile of rubbish. And it’s not surprising, at about the same time I observed a picture of the brainwashing of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. The US Ambassador's vehicles, fully equipped with electronic equipment and without inspection, entered the closed territory of the Administration. Entrance N6, which houses the Security Council of the Russian Federation, administration domestic policy and presidential advisers. The whole time the negotiations with the ambassador were going on, the car stood and calmly filmed all the staff members. An FSO employee I knew passing by said: “They sold everything, bitches.”
The United States is not the opposing party for the Presidential Administration, which Putin is shouting about with foam at his lips. The people of Russia are opposed, in particular, the residents of Moscow, from whom they have fenced themselves off. This is not an isolated fact, you can give many examples and present documents on leaders who are clearly not working for our country, at best - for themselves.
At the Military Diplomatic Academy (MDA), reductions in teaching staff have begun. According to a senior official, the number of GRU “extractive units” responsible for intelligence and strategic intelligence on the territory of foreign countries has been reduced by 40%.
Apparently, the Minister of Defense has his own views on intelligence work, about which he understands nothing. Today, a huge number of intelligence officers performing official duties outside of Russia already know that they actually have nowhere to return. This deprives their further work of meaning, and turns them into potential targets for recruitment by foreign intelligence services, which is what the Kremlin seems to be seeking.
Massive layoffs are taking place among the most experienced GRU officers, who are being dismissed to nowhere not even due to reaching the age limit, but according to ministerial desires and brainless orders. The peculiarity of the GRU is that, unlike the SVR, which has a large number of specialized educational institutions, the specifics and traditions of the GRU require that only the most experienced military officers, whose age at the time of joining the GRU is at least 30 years old, be selected for military intelligence. The irresponsible, headless dismissal of such specialists is not stupidity, it is a betrayal of the state interests of our homeland and the Russian people, sabotage of the Kremlin and the government, an obvious waste of the “gold reserve” of professional personnel of Russian military intelligence.
Today, GRU combat employees can be found both in expensive offices and at train stations, where they work as loaders, in shops, among repairmen or general workers. They mostly speak obscenities about the reform of their former service, the Minister of Defense and the “tandem,” but sometimes they squeeze out correct definitions of where the “tandem” should go.
“The GRU empire is dying,” said an analyst with extensive human intelligence experience. He fought in Afghanistan, is fluent in several European languages and Arabic, and has traveled to more than 70 countries. Now unemployed, fired as unnecessary, he helps translate specialized texts, writes articles, and conducts analytical research.
Computer assembler - space intelligence officer. Assembles and installs computers and household appliances. Frankly he says: “It’s disgusting to see how our pathetic attempts to save at least something from the Soviet cosmonautics are passed off as achievements of recent years.” This Serdyukov advertises Resurs satellites. “They are still made in the Soviet Union and are stored in warehouses. And they were made not for the military, but for oil workers. The equipment is obsolete, there is no licensing ability, it’s difficult to distinguish a cruiser from an aircraft carrier.”
“The GRU and military intelligence are two very different things, but the GRU special forces were merged into the Ground Forces. It was the GRU units that were the most productive.” Senior GRU special forces officer, awarded military orders and medals. Extensive experience in special events around the world. At one time they met with him in Yugoslavia, after Yugoslavia he fought for many years in the North Caucasus, today the Kremlin no longer needs him.
(The Kremlin does not need anyone, neither GRU intelligence officers, nor radio intelligence, it does not need generals of the General Staff, it does not need the ZIL and Moskvich automobile plants, it does not need the Samara Aviation Plant, the Ulyanovsk Aviation Plant, it does not need fundamental science, defense institutes, it does not need Russian culture and the Russian people.)
The heaviest blow fell on the GRU agents. Against the backdrop of public support for the SVR after the huge scandal and failure of the illegal foreign intelligence network associated with the name of Anna Chapman, nothing is being done to protect GRU agents captured on the territory of Georgia and other states. These political s... simply betrayed everyone, they protect their money, stolen from the state budget, they placed the Stabilization Fund in the USA, but they don’t need people.
All the latest military intelligence failures provoked are used only to justify the ineffectiveness of the GRU, and no one talks about the leak of information from the highest echelons of power. Why? Why, as a result of this approach, a number of agents recruited on the territory of the states of South-West Asia have already been executed; who handed them over to the Kremlin and the government? Where did the information labeled “Top Secret” come from and who from the leadership of our country spilled the beans and handed over operational data obtained at the risk of their lives?
The reason for the Kremlin’s systematic attack on the GRU was the army’s unpreparedness for an armed conflict with Georgia. According to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General A. Nogovitsyn, who commanded the group Russian troops During the Russian-Georgian war, the General Staff was completely surprised by the fact that the Georgians had Soviet air defense systems such as the Buk air defense system and modern American radio reconnaissance and airspace control systems, which made it possible to inflict serious damage on the Russian Air Force.
Acting officers of the central apparatus of the GRU called Serdyukov a complete “m...ock”, who, at a meeting of the leadership team following the war, did not mince words in accusing military intelligence of not having the necessary information. Meanwhile, the Kremlin king, who dragged Russia into the war with Georgia, when assessing the operational situation and making decisions, not only did not consider GRU information, but pointedly ignored it. And what would it change: one is a would-be lawyer, another is a couch potato, a third is a club spy, the head of the SVR is just a misunderstanding. Intelligence sent all the necessary information, including information about the supply of modernized Buk systems by Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense and the country's top leadership were aware. And the fact that they only read “playboy”...
The goofballs in the Kremlin would be aware of everything if they paid attention to the GRU reports. But the dwarfs of the “tandem” imagined themselves to be the heads of big politics, and the head of military intelligence lost the right to directly report personally to the President. Information sent by the head of military intelligence now passes two filters - the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense. I watched the documents addressed to the President of Russia go through. These cheerful “sofa people” adjust documents to suit themselves in conditions military reform, removing “jambs” and “hang-ups” and other shortcomings from the documents, completely emasculating the data and “clarifying” reliable information. Today, when there is a redistribution of resources and big money, when generals of different branches of the military are fighting to maintain their posts and feeders, the one who has direct access to the “ear” of the president’s stupid head can win.
The GRU is the main competitor of the FSB and the SVR, access to the “dwarfs” was blocked at the command of the “dwarfs” themselves, don’t ask why. And those generals who have own opinion, die under unclear circumstances, as happened with GRU Major General Yu. Ivanov.
The corpse of General Ivanov, the country’s most important secret keeper, who, according to the official version, was on vacation in Syria, was strangely discovered in the coastal waters of Turkey, and the corpse floated a very long distance against the current. Apparently this is an assassination attempt. In the context of military reform, intelligence officers of this level rarely die naturally. The main business of the Kremlin, which is the customer of the so-called GRU reform, is related to money laundering and offshore companies. Only the GRU strategic intelligence could pose a threat to this business, since it had the ability to control and monitor such actions. And at the same time she did not belong to the FSB-SVR connection. A “special service” has been formed in Russia, serving the interests of a narrow group of people running the country. The people secretly working for this structure are scattered and serve in different units of the Russian special services.
In order to control and successfully maintain the functioning of the Masonic “network system of the elite”, the “Kremlin dwarfs” need to solve only one task: destroy everything alternative sources intelligence information and leaders capable of independent comparative analysis. The selfish interests of the leadership of the FSB and the SVR are to protect the country's top leadership, close to these special services (Security Council - FSB General Patrushev, the Presidential Administration - FSB General Ivanov, the government - FSB Lieutenant Colonel Putin, Transneft - FSB General Tokarev, etc.). The interests of the GRU are alien to these people, and its awareness simply frightens them. The ability to provide a competitive advantage to the Kremlin’s “friends” is more important than solving real government problems, including intelligence ones. For example, to ensure the interests of very influential non-military groups related to unresolved hotbeds of tension, for example, in the Caucasus with its huge sources of funding. There is a certain specificity of the actions of special forces groups and their (actions) are fundamentally different from the tactics of military reconnaissance officers. The main advantage of the GRU special forces is the combination of operational work to obtain information with combat operations, including the use of special means and latest technologies. Special forces intelligence officers, unlike military intelligence officers, are capable of operating both in the city - as an illegal underground, and in the forest - as a classic sabotage unit. Operative employees of such a unit, as a by-product of their activities, always gain access to very confidential information about real channels and sources of funding, about the contacts of their “wards”, about secret accounts, about contracts for the supply of weapons with multimillion-dollar kickbacks, about the theft of weapons from army warehouses and subsequent explosions on them, illegal financial flows involving high-ranking officials, the printing of counterfeit currency, the export of diamonds and precious metals, transit routes, channels and corridors on the border, the complete drug logistics scheme. There are documents on Moscow, the Kremlin, the government, the Ministry of Finance, how and to whom they leave budget apartments and how finances, schemes, accounts, kickbacks, routes, thefts are carried out, including the cars of the “rich Pinocchio”, etc. and so on. What kind of affairs and business do the wives of the “tandem” do, how do they receive kickbacks in managing the affairs of the president, which of the overthrown rulers of states keeps money in Russia, etc. It turns out that there are no saints either in the Kremlin, or in the government, or in the Union State, there are corrupt thieves, I say this with full responsibility. There is one thing the Kremlin does not have - guarantees of the loyalty of GRU intelligence officers to competitors from the Lubyanka, covering up any information.
In fact, the destroyed GRU electronic intelligence network shows that the Kremlin does not understand the importance of electronic intelligence, which is why the Russian Federation cannot play the role in world politics that belonged to the USSR. The scope is not the same and the caliber is too thin. The strategic and intelligence intelligence of the GRU is a resource that Russia cannot lose. The GRU had a huge information and analytical service. Several thematic directorates and departments worked within NATO alone. Today NATO is quietly preparing to base itself in Ulyanovsk, to the applause of the corrupt “tandem”.
According to the most conservative estimates, the GRU lost 75% of its personnel. The new starting point for the collapse of the GRU was 2009, when the Kremlin appointed Shlyakhturov as head of intelligence. Stupid instructions were given from above, and the general carried them out according to the principle “trust a fool to pray to God, he’ll even break his forehead.” His zeal is described in one phrase: “If I don’t destroy it, I’ll destroy it!” Entire scientific groups that were developing tactics for new reconnaissance actions were liquidated. All development and research work at the GRU Research Institute has been stopped. There have been reductions in teaching staff at the Military Diplomatic Academy. And now the corrupt and corrupt higher authorities are striving to turn the GRU into a puppet structure completely controlled by its interests.
The GRU is a spotlight that, regardless of the Kremlin, highlighted contract killings in the center of Moscow, “suicides” and disappearances of FSB officers, kickbacks and distribution of funds during the Chechen war, has information about “golden” planes exporting the wealth of our homeland, about imported under the guise of medicines, drugs, etc. For the corrupt Kremlin with its corrupt vertical of power, extra eyes and ears capable of watching and listening to what is being done in the government, the Kremlin, Gazprom, Rosneft, Rosvooruzhenie and Rosatom are not needed.
Now the Ministry of Defense is doing everything to ensure that the GRU actually does not work. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense is generally incompetent in matters of management, development of the armed forces, procurement of military equipment and weapons, and many others. The government's incompetence infected the already severely shell-shocked Leningrad leadership of the Ministry of Defense. GRU veterans would not go on reconnaissance with either Shlyakhturov or Serdyukov; there is nothing to say about the tandem. The GRU special forces recruit highly specialized professionals who are capable of disabling enemy strategic targets in a minimum amount of time. At the same time, some officers specialize in airfields, others in communication centers, and still others in nuclear attack weapons. In these conditions, the reduction carried out by the Kremlin and the subordination of special forces units to the commanders of military districts looks like a deliberate blow to the country’s combat capability and a betrayal of the Russian people.
Such reforms are unacceptable, no matter what considerations they come from. As the military and political history of many centuries shows, the state must receive information about the enemy and the situation as a whole from more than one intelligence source. Today, the Kremlin has become the source of disinformation in the country. And the people of Russia are victims of the incompetence of their rulers or treason in the ranks of the Kremlin!
Despite their external similarity, the goals and objectives of the SVR and the GRU are largely different. The GRU collects information in the interests of the armed forces, providing data to the General Staff, which builds plans for the country's defense based on the information received. Political intelligence, which is handled by the SVR, does not solve these problems, and with the merger of the two intelligence services, the army leadership will be faced with a shortage of necessary information.
Apparently, a lack of understanding of the real situation in the Armed Forces, and even more so in such a specific department of the General Staff as the GRU, pushed the Kremlin to carry out hidden sabotage, covering up its actions with fictitious “sensations” about Colonel Kvachkov. After all, according to the Kremlin, terrorist and extremist organizations pose the greatest danger. They say that their actions are characterized by extreme cruelty, and the terrorist attacks are carried out in peacetime. Therefore, in its work, the FSB pays special attention to obtaining proactive intelligence information about the plans and actions of such groups... This chatter is needed by the Kremlin and the FSB for the timely adoption of measures, including those of a forceful nature, that “neutralize terrorist threats.”
But speaking to the point, it should be emphasized that even using all the capabilities of the FSB, the Kremlin does not control the situation in those areas from where our country could actually be attacked or military actions organized against the people of Russia. Such information must not only be obtained, it must be analyzed, conclusions drawn, and then reported to the highest state and military leadership of the country, who do not read this information. Most important documents The GRU are sent to the president (who does not understand anything), the chairman of the government (who is engaged in business) and the Security Council (retired Patrushev is the head of a public organization).
Mole in the Kremlin
Veteran of the Main Intelligence Directorate I.I. Parinov, who served there for more than thirty years, said: “Putin was recruited by the West long ago and, apparently, became the biggest success of Western intelligence services.” And he further explained that spies of this scale are taken outside the scope of intelligence; there are many other, more professional and more inconspicuous services. What kind of service Putin was recruited from is not important today. The main thing is that this man works for the entire West. As for his “decisive struggle against Western influence” and “against the collapse of Russia,” this is the appearance of a “struggle against.” This is a cover. The time has come to learn to distinguish slogans from real actions. What spy would loudly admit that he was an enemy agent? Or will the spy applaud louder than anyone else the cry “Forward, Russia!”, but secretly do everything to destroy the country? Let's see, there is a significant drawback in intelligence information - over time, it becomes outdated. A new secret part, obtained by a spy at the risk of his life, will be of no use to anyone five years later. The country's defense plans will be outdated in ten years. Information about the mistress of an ambassador or military attache is of no interest to anyone the day after the ambassador retires. We see that most intelligence successes are short-term. But using a spy of Putin’s caliber to achieve short-term goals is irrational.
Let's say you recruited a person who in the future became the president of a country potentially hostile to you (not without your help, of course). How will you use the resident? Demand from him lists of plant nomenclature and military transportation schedules? Or quietly, imperceptibly, you will begin the process of transforming the power into a country submissive to you, and submissive at that for a long time, for the foreseeable future, for generations to come? How is Putin’s “anti-Americanism” expressed? In his statements about the machinations of the Americans? In absurd and funny hints about how Russian space program Are they plagued by failures because the Americans secretly shoot down Russian satellites and drop GLONASS satellites? In his loud denunciations of “human rights violations in the USA”, which no one notices either in the USA or even in Finland?
In the fiction, how people dissatisfied with his rule go to rallies, it turns out, because they are all bought up en masse by enemies, and do not like Putin only because they are paid for this “dislike”? Then we were obviously surrounded, we were at the rally, but they didn’t give us any money. True, no one promised. It’s time for the city of Tolyatti, whose car plant will be an assembly line for screwdriver assembly, to rise up to rallies. All social services and auxiliary production will not be needed along with the workers. Samara, with dying factories and an aircraft plant that was destroyed in peacetime, is already ready for protests. Izhevsk, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Ufa, Vladivostok - there are countless cities that are preparing for rallies against unemployment, poverty and rising prices for housing and communal services, gasoline, and food. Putin sold a controlling stake in AvtoVAZ to foreigners, and promised to purchase new technologies and create new jobs. Instead of new technologies in Togliatti there will be a NATO base in Ulyanovsk.
Is it really not clear that all these statements are being made with the obvious goal of creating a country completely dependent on the United States, an appendage of America, its fiefdom. “Anti-Americanism” is only a cover—the thief shouts “Stop the thief” louder than anyone else. The Russian economy is collapsed, industry does not exist, the Kremlin points to an “external enemy”, which means there is no need to fix anything at home. There is no need to look for mistakes in the government and the organization of unfortunate reforms, there is no need to redirect funding, there is no need to fire quitters and incompetents and replace them with qualified specialists, there is no need to change the atmosphere of intrigue and squabbles in the Kremlin.
You don't have to do anything! After all, the enemies are to blame for everything. It is enough to strengthen security measures, and everything will immediately improve! After Putin’s order to blame all failures on the Americans, things were left to chance. Opportunists and corrupt officials who tricked their way into the highest positions in the state will not be removed. Smart heads will not get promoted, the release of unnecessary laws, national projects, useless reforms, the beating of science and education will continue. The whole vicious system will continue to develop viciously.
Result? Complete lag, degradation and marking time, Russia's subordination to America even in space - one of the most important areas of development for the next hundred years! Scientists, engineers, mathematicians are leaving, whoever stays will have to work under the guidance of cunning people and sycophants who see their goal only in seeking out the enemy and in intrigue.
To be continued...
According to many, in Russia for several years now, in the course of large-scale military reform, the systematic destruction of the GRU, a specific structure created at the dawn of Soviet times, has been carried out. The reform, of course, affects other types of armed forces, and not just military intelligence, but it is intelligence that is being destroyed primarily as a result of giving it a so-called “new look.”
Researchers agree that it is absolutely impossible to leave everything as it was, however, analysts have a very ambiguous attitude towards the ongoing reforms. Many consider the indicative fact that 70 thousand square meters of the complex of buildings on Khodynka, built for the GRU General Staff, once the second most important and powerful intelligence service after the KGB and FSB, to be a negative result of the reforms. 9.5 billion rubles were spent on their construction.
What is GRU
GRU GSH stands for the Main Intelligence Directorate, organized under the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Throughout the post-revolutionary period and to this day, this body has been the central governing body of the Russian Armed Forces. The GRU reports to the Chief of the General Staff, as well as the country's Minister of Defense. The department is in charge of all types of intelligence, which is carried out in the interests of the Armed Forces. This includes, among other things, reconnaissance:
- space,
- radio-electronic,
- agent
The latter is given priority in the GRU. It is the agents who obtain secret materials and the latest models of foreign weapons.
As Emperor Alexander III said almost 150 years ago, Russia has only two true allies - its army and its navy. Today, in 50 or 150 years, this statement will remain an axiom. Russia will not be able to exist without these strong and loyal allies, and they will not be strong without developed and powerful military intelligence.
Can the GRU story end?
A Brief History of the GRU
The birthday of the GRU is considered to be November 4, 1918. It was then that the Registration Directorate was formed as part of the Field Headquarters of the Soviet Red Army. The order for its creation was signed by the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic, who was then Leon Trotsky. He appointed Semyon Aralov, a veteran of Russian intelligence, as the first head of the GRU. This legendary personality was formed in the period before the First World War.
Initially, the GRU was called RUPSHKA - Registration Directorate of the Field Headquarters of the Red Army (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army). The purpose of its creation was to coordinate the efforts made by intelligence services on all fronts and in the armies, obtaining information for the General Staff of the Red Army.
From the very beginning of its activities, the GRU was engaged in:
- strategic and operational intelligence,
- obtaining military-technical information,
- obtaining information about the latest scientific achievements in the field of aircraft.
A few years after its birth, RUPSHKA became the 4th Directorate of the General Staff. In official documents it was designated as military unit N44388. It was renamed to the GRU General Staff on February 16, 1942 by order of the People's Commissar of Defense. At the same time, serious personnel changes and structural changes took place.
Another major milestone in the history of management development occurred on November 22, 1942. It was then that military intelligence was withdrawn from the GRU by order of the People's Commissar of Defense. From now on, human intelligence was no longer conducted by the intelligence departments of the fronts, and the department itself began to report to the People's Commissar of Defense, and not to the General Staff of the Red Army.
His main task at that time was conducting human intelligence abroad. First of all, these were the Nazi-occupied territories of the USSR. At the same time, the RU - Intelligence Directorate appeared within the General Staff, whose task was to manage military intelligence.
The legendary structure, which is known to everyone as, appeared in the post-war years. His birth is considered to be 1950. From 1955 to 1991, the GRU was called the GRU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Since 1991, it received its modern name, i.e. GRU General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. One can only speculate about its structure and numbers, since this is a state secret.
What's happening with the GRU these days?
Despite the top secrecy, some data is still disclosed. In 2009, management leadership was changed to a more accommodating one. As everyone is assured, this was done in order to prevent the complete collapse of the GRU. The reform, however, has rather tragic consequences.
According to known data, the organization before the reform included 12 main departments, as well as 8 auxiliary departments and departments. Currently, key departments have been reduced to a critical minimum, most of which have been liquidated with the dismissal of thousands of specialists. The research and development (R&D) departments that existed in the specialized management research institutes known as the 6th and 18th Central Research Institutes ceased their work.
According to inaccurate data, every second officer was dismissed, and this led to the loss of the opportunities that existed within the department. Thus, out of 7 thousand officers there are currently less than 2 thousand left. The final “cleansing” took place after the resignation of V.V. Korabelnikov, who was the head of the GRU from 1997 to 2009.
Electronic reconnaissance has been almost completely destroyed. As reported by The New Times, on the territory of foreign countries there has been a 40% reduction in the number of so-called “mining units” in the management. They were responsible for human and strategic intelligence.
Things are also difficult with the education of new personnel, since the training of illegal agents was completely curtailed after the liquidation of the specialized faculty. Professors and teachers of the Military Diplomatic Academy, which previously had three faculties, were massively dismissed:
- agent-operational intelligence;
- strategic human intelligence;
- operational-tactical reconnaissance.
The faculty involved in training military attaches has also undergone extreme reductions. The analytical apparatus of the GRU was liquidated. Foreign intelligence units are gradually being transferred to the subordination of the SVR.
Even the most experienced officers are subject to dismissal for fairly formal reasons, for example, due to length of service. The specifics of military intelligence suggest that only experienced army officers can become specialists, and this, of course, leads to the fact that already accomplished military men aged 30-35 years come to the GRU, and the older they become, the more they should be valued . The waste of the real “golden fund” of the specific Russian intelligence community is obvious.
Such radical changes have led to the fact that, at present, from a unique strategic instrument in its essence, capabilities, and scale, the GRU was forcibly turned into an amorphous, purely secondary structure. Against the backdrop of such degradation, the next optimization management reform will most likely occur.
Apparently, the Ministry of Defense is relying on the special forces center “Senezh”, which was previously removed from the subordination of the department, which was subordinated directly to the Chief of the General Staff. Astronomical sums are allocated for its development. The Minister of Defense oversees the center; they order non-standard, even exotic, foreign-made weapons and equipment for it. The desire is obvious: something similar to the cinematic American “Delta” is being created. For most analysts, this position of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense causes slight bewilderment, since the place where specialists are trained is also a recreation center for senior management.
