Gorbachev's era: pros and cons. Gorbachev named the pros and cons of the anti-alcohol campaign. What was foreign policy like in the Gorbachev era according to the testimony of those who created it? What is its assessment by historians

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Gorbachev himself presents this problem differently, arguing that this issue was the subject of wide discussion in party circles: “Even during the years of perestroika, we wanted to social-democratize the CPSU (our italics - V.P.). A corresponding program was prepared for the planned XXIX Congress. But the putsch and the policies of Boris Yeltsin, which actually banned the CPSU, made its implementation impossible” (See: Unfinished History. Conversations of Mikhail Gorbachev with political scientist Boris Slavin. M., 2001, p. 106).

According to D. Volkogonov, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union, like an ancient knight at a crossroads, stood at a “historical crossroads”, from which three possible ways: radical reforms, liberal development, conservative restoration. Gorbachev chose a middle path, trying, according to Volkogonov, to create a model that would include “the best socialist and capitalist elements.” Gorbachev had to act “according to the situation,” there was “no one to learn from,” and hence the “indecisiveness and half-heartedness” of many of the steps taken. Volkogonov emphasizes that perestroika caused “very profound changes in public attitudes,” myths about the CPSU, the “advantages of the socialist system,” the “democracy” of the Soviet system, and many others gradually disintegrated. Volkogonov believes that the results of perestroika were also affected by the personal factor, which he uses to explain the so-called Gorbachev paradox. In his opinion, the Secretary General “is a man of great intelligence, but of weak character.” Therefore, having started perestroika under the slogan of the renewal of socialism, Gorbachev, “in spite of his will and desire,” six years later came to its liquidation. (See: Volkogonov D. Seven Leaders: Gallery of Leaders of the USSR. M., 1995, Book 2, pp. 310-312; 320-323; 330-331).

Not all historians agree with the above description, attempts to find an explanation in the gentle nature of the Secretary General for the “political inarticulateness” of the first stage of perestroika. Thus, A.S. Grachev refers to the following opinion of E. Ligachev: “We often hear that Gorbachev is a weak-willed person. This is wrong. This is the apparent impression.” He also cites Gorbachev’s remark to his assistant: “I will go as far as necessary, and no one will stop me.” According to Grachev himself, Gorbachev’s apparent indecisiveness was due to the fact that in his policy he was under pressure from two forces - conservative (represented by the ruling nomenklatura, which had survived many reformers and reforms and did not want to go beyond “refreshing” the socialist façade) and radical, pushing the leader towards populist improvisations and using administrative resources to the fullest for this purpose. Gorbachev tried not to follow the lead of either force, and therefore “earned the reputation of a wavering and indecisive politician” (See: Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, pp. 151-152).

Vorotnikov described this feature of Gorbachev as a politician very figuratively in his memoirs: “Serious disputes often arose at Politburo meetings. After listening to everyone, Gorbachev in general phrases, calls to think again (our italics - V.P.), to work on the comments, as if bringing different positions together, curtailed the discussion" (See: V.I. Vorotnikov. And it was like that... From the diary of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. M ., 1995, p. 165).

The problem mentioned in the title seems to be one of the most controversial in the literature on perestroika. Naturally, success means the completion of perestroika in the interests of the entire society, and not just the Soviet elite. Most scientists believe that the fate of political projects (including perestroika) is ultimately determined by the “structure of society,” i.e. representatives of various “interest groups” exercising power.

According to Academician T.I. Zaslavskaya, in the Soviet Union there were two forces “most interested” in perestroika and “ready to fight for it.” The first was represented by the reformist wing of the nomenklatura - the “younger, educated, westernized” wing, which was dissatisfied not only with its position in the power system “on the sidelines,” but also with the general state of affairs in the country. The second force was the intelligentsia, “deeply interested” in democratic rights and freedoms. According to another scientist M. Castells, the fate of perestroika in the USSR was determined by representatives of the following “interest groups”: communist ideologists, the ruling elite of the state, Soviet and party apparatus, heads of large state enterprises and a network “formed by the nomenklatura and the bosses of the shadow economy.” By fighting representatives of these groups in the course of his reforms, which contradicted the “selfish interests” of the state bureaucracy and party nomenklatura, Gorbachev “unintentionally initiated the process of the collapse of the USSR” (See: 10 years without the USSR: Perestroika - our past or future? ... Conference materials. M., 2002, pp. 18-19; Castells M. Information era: economy, society, culture. Translated from English. M., 2000, pp. 438, 477-479).

In connection with the above, it is of significant interest to assess the content of the political reform, during which the interests of various social forces collided, primarily within the Soviet nomenklatura - the ruling class of the USSR.

In modern scientific literature, with all the variety of approaches, one of the most common definitions of the concept of “elite” is the following: “a minority that has a monopoly on power, on decision-making regarding the content and distribution of basic values in society” (See: Kodin M.I. Social -political associations and the formation of the political elite in Russia (1990-1997). M., 1998, pp. 67-68).

According to the calculations of historian A.D. Cherneva, the total number of nomenklatura workers who passed in the late 80s of the XX century. approval in the Politburo, Secretariat or departments of the CPSU Central Committee was about 15 thousand people. The same nomenklatura principle of selection and placement of leading personnel as in the CPSU Central Committee was carried out in all other party organizations in the country, down to the primary ones, which allowed the CPSU to direct the economic, political and cultural life of the country and control all spheres of Soviet society. According to a number of scientists, the definition of the Soviet elite as a “nomenklatura” indicates its fundamental feature - indivisibility into separate functional groups. At the same time, the Soviet elite had a “hierarchical character” and was “stable” thanks to its strong vertical connections between its different levels. The party elite had undisputed priority, followed by the state and economic elite. Scientists note that during perestroika the elite changed “structurally and essentially.” Instead of a monolithic nomenklatura pyramid, numerous elite groups appeared, “in a relationship of competition” with each other. New elite has lost most of the levers of power inherent in the old ruling class. As a result of the reforms, the role of economic factors to manage society, there was a need to search for allies, temporary alliances “for the sake of achieving specific goals.” These elite groups have become more dynamic, their numbers have increased sharply, and “horizontal and informal connections” between them have intensified. According to sociologist O. Kryshtanovskaya, about a third of the elite of the early 90s were members of the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee in 1988, and the remaining two-thirds came to the ruling stratum from “pre-nomenklatura” positions, which gave scientists reason to talk about a change of elites at the turn of 80 -90s as a “revolution of deputies” (See: Chernev A.D. The ruling party in the Soviet system government controlled/ Problems of national history. Vol. 8. M., 2004, pp. 168-169, 185; Kodin M.I. Socio-political associations and the formation of the political elite in Russia (1990-1997). M., 1998, pp. 74-76; Kryshtanovskaya O. Transformation of the old nomenklatura into the new Russian elite / Social sciences and modernity. 1995, No. 1, Page. 62).

To better understand this process, let us turn to historical facts. By the fall of 1987, according to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Gorbachev, there was a need to change the current system of economic management, leave only political functions to the party, and transfer state power to the Soviets. The main question was how to solve these problems: should we do it through evolutionary, gradual transformations, trying to maintain stability, or through revolutionary disruption? According to Gorbachev, those members of the Politburo who held government positions advocated the decisive liberation of the Central Committee apparatus from “unusual functions” (guardianship of defense, foreign policy), while the secretaries of the Central Committee tried to preserve their “allotments.” In this situation, Gorbachev decided to actively carry out political reform, the meaning of which he saw in the “transfer of power” from the hands of the communist party that monopolized it to the Soviets through “free elections.” people's deputies"(See: Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. M., 1995, Book 1, pp. 407, 423). The difficulty of carrying out the reform, Gorbachev noted in this regard, lay in preserving the “main levers of power” in the hands of the party-state bureaucracy, so it was necessary to organize “powerful pressure” on this bureaucracy from the radical part of society, as well as by “cutting off” conservatives from party-state environment.

In June 1988, the XIX All-Union Party Conference was held, which approved the reform of the central authorities. It was decided to recreate the Congress of People's Deputies as the highest body of representative power. The apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee was subjected to sharp criticism at the conference.

On initial stage perestroika, most of the party cadres were confident that, despite the shortcomings, “we do not have, and in the foreseeable future there is no other political force other than the Communist Party capable of implementing the planned reforms and ensuring stability for the country.” Over time, more and more people came to the idea that the party was becoming “unnecessary to society”, that party institutions were “weaving a web” around legitimate management structures - Councils, ministries, trade unions, that a head of cabbage or carrots would successfully grow “without the political leadership of the CPSU.” Often the most radically minded people asked the question: since the party, “always wisely led along the only correct, Leninist path and led to stagnation, doesn’t all this give the right to tell the party what they think about it?” (See: Party and perestroika: Discussion sheets of Pravda. M., 1990, pp. 12, 53, 85, 207-208).

In practice, political reform meant a reduction in the party apparatus by 700-800 thousand people. Historians note that with his reform, Gorbachev did not simply reduce the size of the apparatus, in fact, he “destroyed the stability of the ruling class of the USSR.” His attempt to carry out the “denationalization” of the party, to rid it of supervision over the activities of state bodies, meant the risk that neither the party nor the state “would survive this operation.”

The previously unified party apparatus began to stratify, realizing that perestroika was a threat, first of all, to its well-being. The majority of ordinary members stopped paying party dues and left the party en masse: if in 1988 18 thousand people handed over their party cards, then in 1989 - 137 thousand. More than half of those who left the party were workers.

However, unlike previous practice Soviet era, parting with the party under Gorbachev did not at all mean the decline of a career for yesterday’s nomenklatura. Perestroika opened up previously unprecedented opportunities: in 1990, about 1 million people took part in cooperative activities alone, a shareholder boom developed, and commercial banks began to be created, accumulating significant funds by laundering money received from the state budget. And the former Soviet nomenklatura did not stand aside from the market processes that were gaining strength, but actively participated in them, fully using their administrative resources. A significant part of the hierarchs of the past moved to the private sector.

Historians note that part of the former nomenklatura moved to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and began to form into an “aggressive anti-perestroika force”, another - into the democrat camp, and the regional elites, freed from fear of the center, “turned towards the now safe nationalist and separatist movements” (See. : Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, pp. 237, 241-243).

The most visible split within the ruling class Soviet Union manifested itself during the August 1991 coup, which became the last act of the tragedy of the collapse of the USSR.

Author's opinion

We fully share the opinion of those historians who believe that during perestroika, the ruling class of the Soviet Union as a whole turned out to be incapable of anything other than defending its own privileges. The quality of the Soviet elite turned out to be very low - even among Gorbachev’s inner circle, gradually, as difficulties grew, personal ambitions and political claims took precedence over national interests - therefore, the task of restructuring society in the interests of this society was beyond the capabilities of the Soviet nomenklatura, which for the most part remained the same , who only knew how to order and obey orders. Not only was society unprepared for perestroika, most of which displayed the familiar traits of social dependency from previous years and were still waiting for instructions from above on the question of “how to live further,” but also the ruling bureaucracy, since the loss of power of the CPSU in fact meant the loss of the only the power she possessed, the directive control.

What “ruined” perestroika: politics or economics?

There are at least two aspects to this topic that continue to give rise to much controversy and discussion. And not only in the scientific community.

The first aspect is expressed in the works of economists who are convinced that in the Gorbachev era, without political changes, it was “impossible economic reforms». A striking example- works by economist, professor at Moscow State University, and then People's Deputy of the USSR and Mayor of Moscow G.Kh. Popova. This figure is symbolic in many ways: the evolution of his views and political activity reflected the moods and views of a significant layer of the capital's intelligentsia, which became one of the leading forces of perestroika. In the first years of perestroika, G. Popov saw the main task of economic science in “refining the model of socialism.” The slogans of his election platform as a candidate for the post of people's deputy of the USSR included a bizarre mixture of the new and the old: “socialist property - the owners”, “land for those who cultivate it”, “income - from labor”, “republics and regions - economic independence” , “prices are regulated by the market,” but, at the same time, he demanded “stability” of state retail prices and the preservation of state orders for essential items. In this matter, he was ready to even “introduce cards.” However, in December 1989, he considered the issue of property to be the central issue requiring submission to the Supreme Council - “we must recognize the pluralism of all types of property.” In words, he had not yet broken with socialism, although he admitted that administrative economics “has not and cannot solve,” using Lenin’s expression, the fundamental task of socialism - “to create higher labor productivity in comparison with the previous system.” At the same time, G. Popov is convinced that it is “impossible” to carry out real economic transformations in the current political system, i.e. in his priority scale political aspect reforms took first place in comparison with the economic one. This transformation of an economist into a politician occurred when it became clear to the majority of the population of the Soviet Union that among the entire package of reforms, it was the economic achievements of perestroika that turned out to be minimal - the people began to live worse than in previous years. It was necessary not only to explain this fact, but also to find those responsible. The roots of the economic failures of perestroika began to be seen in the imperfections of the Soviet political system. The involvement of many active participants in perestroika in the political confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin also had an impact. Largely for these reasons, in December 1990, Popov considered the main thing in the democratic program to be “overcoming the omnipotence of the Soviets, de-Sovietization.” In his opinion, when will they appear different types property, the market, new classes of society, their parties - then “the conditions for a normal democratic mechanism will be created.” This democratic platform was the voice of the policy of Gorbachev’s main competitor - B.N. Yeltsin (See: Popov G.Kh. Selected works. T. 8. Gorbachev’s perestroika. M., 1996, pp. 153, 179, 438-439, 441-443, 454, 484, 508-509, 540, 642-643).

Another point of view on the problems of economic reform of the Soviet system is represented mainly by the works of politicians, many of whom are convinced that “if it had been possible to induce M. Gorbachev to subordinate everything else to economic tasks, the fate of the Soviet Union would undoubtedly have developed in the same way.” to another." Thus, the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Falin, being one of the conductors of Gorbachev’s policy, in memos addressed to the main reformer of the country tried to prove that the time of state socialism is irrevocably gone and it is “dead”, that the previous forms of “production, distribution and exchange” should be abandoned. , which give rise to the main antagonism in Soviet society - “the alienation of man from property and power.” One of the main measures proposed was the “immediate” introduction of free trade and “real equality of all types of property.” Without this, the author warned, perestroika is “doomed to the terror of imbeciles and clever villains.” (See: Falin V. Conflicts in the Kremlin: Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 69, 243-245, 269).

Thus, despite the painful search for a way out of the crisis, the theoretical thought of the reformers revolved primarily around the ideas of Marxism-Leninism - not having other ideological guidelines, the leaders of perestroika tried to adapt “socialism in Lenin’s version” for their purposes.

The refrain that the country’s economic problems were brought about by Gorbachev “to please his personal political interests” was also repeated many times in the memoirs of V. Pavlov, N. Ryzhkov, V. Vorotnikov and many other associates of Gorbachev. Thus, Vorotnikov argued that only in December 1989 did the government develop and present a “comprehensive, balanced program for economic reform of the country’s economy,” and before that there were only conversations regarding “private economic problems” (See: V.I. Vorotnikov And it was like this... From the diary of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. M., 1995, p. 322).

By this time, socialist thought in the West had developed a critical approach to assessing the Soviet experience. Thus, in 1982, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, the thesis was formulated that “the phase of development of socialism, which began with the October Revolution, has exhausted its driving force, the abilities of these countries for political, economic, cultural renewal have entered a state of crisis.” It was emphasized that we are not talking about a simple lag, but rather about a crisis, about the historical futility of “state socialism” (See: The World History economic thought. T. 5, M., 1994, pp. 283 - 286). These ideas became popular during the years of perestroika in the Soviet Union.

Both foreign and Russian scientists are characterized by several points of view on the issue raised.

First, it highlights the approach according to which the idea of “improved” or market socialism “is completely far-fetched and unrealistic.” The only effective economy is considered to be a capitalist market economy, and the modernization of Soviet-style socialism is “doomed to failure.” In its most complete form, this point of view was expressed back in 1922 by the famous economist B. Brutskus, who argued in his works that socialism as a positive system is “impossible”, and the economic problem of socialism is “unsolvable”, since this system “does not have a mechanism to bring production into line with social needs.” All the most important elements of economic freedom (economic initiative, freedom to organize consumption and freedom of labor) in a socialist society take place only in the form of “state coercion”. By direct order of Lenin, Brutskus was expelled from Soviet Russia as an ideological opponent of Bolshevism (See: Brutskus B.D. Socialist economy. Theoretical thoughts on the Russian experience. M., 1999, pp. 48-49, 58, 68-69, 72). Brutskus' point of view is shared today by many modern domestic economists, but not all.

The second direction are those who argued that reforming the Soviet economy is possible, but extremely complex and contradictory, that the reform process will inevitably entail “difficulties and temporary deterioration”, therefore success requires “persistence and gradualism” both on the part of the people and and the political elite. Thus, Ryazanov believed that all post-war economic reforms in our country should be characterized as a period of breakdown of the administrative-command system and a real revival of commodity-market relations. In his opinion, by 1985 the Soviet economy was “virtually a mixed, multi-sector economy with limited action of market mechanisms,” which manifested themselves primarily in the market for goods and services. He believed that in the 70s the Soviet Union missed a historical chance in implementing the urgent technical modernization of the national economy, which consisted in rational use the huge export revenue received by the USSR from the export of energy resources (oil, gas, electricity). Ryazanov believed that one of the main reasons for the failures of perestroika in the economic field was that the implementation of economic reforms led to the “revival” in Russia of the strategy of catch-up development, imitation and use of the economic forms of leading countries in our country. Thus, in his opinion, the “historically outgoing” type of early industrial capitalism was reproduced. The long-term goal, in his opinion, should be associated with a focus on the manufacturing industry and “especially” high-tech products (See: Ryazanov V.T. Economic development Russia. Reforms and Russian economy in the XIX - XX centuries. M., 1998, pp. 390, 392-393, 432-434, 449).

As a rule, the scientists emphasized, supporters of this approach focused attention on the mistakes of Gorbachev and his colleagues, which allowed them to justify the correctness of their own theoretical constructions.

Adherents of the third direction viewed the crisis of the Soviet economy as a result of “ unsuccessful attempt“adapt the socialist system to the needs of the post-industrial era - the state government tried to use the previous mobilization model “to break through the boundaries of industrialism,” but the Soviet economy “failed” to adapt to the challenges of the time (See: Economy in Transition: Essays economic policy post-communist Russia. 1991-1997. Edited by E. Gaidar. M., 1998, pp. 55-57.).

A group of economists led by E.T. Gaidara drew attention to the fact that the choice of the model for reforming the Soviet economy in the 80s was explained by two main points. Firstly, there was an ideological alternative between the mobilization (war communism or accelerated industrialization) organization of economic life and the liberal (with elements of decentralization and market). The economic successes achieved during these years in the USA, Great Britain and Chile, Gaidar believes, were considered by public opinion in the USSR as the results of the implementation of a “liberal course”. Thus, the penetration of liberal ideology among the Soviet scientific intelligentsia created a real basis for reform. Secondly, the choice of a specific program was related to political circumstances, the practical experience that had been accumulated by communist countries by that time. The Soviet leadership, led by Andropov, was more inclined to favor the Czech-Hungarian model rather than the Chinese one. By the time of Gorbachev’s reign, the USSR already had a reform program, Gaidar believes, although “not in the form of a coherent document,” but in the form of numerous notes to decision-making bodies. One of the most famous is the closed report of academician T. Zaslavskaya in 1983, which gained scandalous fame thanks to its publication in the West (See: Economics of the transition period. Essays on the economic policy of post-communist Russia. 1991-1997. M., 1998, pp. 58- 65).

Scientists note that Gorbachev adopted the ideas that formed the basis of the program for “improving the economic mechanism”, distinctive features which were: intensification of the activities of enterprises and workers; the presence of the State Planning Committee and other decision-making bodies ensuring the “balance” of the Soviet economy; a ban on the problem of “property reform”, which was completely passed over in silence. The unresolved problem of ownership left program developers with the hope that the “wise center” would intervene and correct market processes “when they fail.”

Thus, the program tried to combine the advantages of two systems - planned socialist and market capitalist, which, according to economists, initially made this program "inconsistent and internally contradictory." Many elements of this program were known to Gorbachev when he was at the head of the Stavropol Territory. It was then that the experience of introducing team contracting and “full cost accounting” in primary labor collectives led to a sharp increase in labor productivity and earnings. Despite this, as Gorbachev’s assistant on economics N. Petrakov believed, in the General Secretary’s own baggage of economic knowledge there was only an “empty suitcase” that still had to be filled. Gorbachev did not hide from his colleagues in the Politburo what they knew without him: “the country is standing in queues; we live in constant shortages - from energy resources to women's tights; only the military sector fattens; technological records from the West are accumulating.”

Economists believe that when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet elite was not aware of the fact that not only the economy, but the entire Soviet system was in crisis. Therefore, Gorbachev’s first steps towards acceleration in the field of the national economy were determined by the usual logic of the “mobilization approach” - the machine-building complex should be intensively developed. By October 1985, in the USSR, based on the concept of acceleration, drafts of a new edition of the party program and the main directions for the twelfth five-year plan and for the period until 2000 were prepared, approved at the 27th Party Congress. Essentially, the new course replaced the directive contained in the previous Khrushchev edition of the program about building the “foundations of communism” in 20 years. At the same time, the reference to the “communist perspective” as the highest phase was preserved. At the congress it was also proposed to “overcome prejudices regarding commodity-money relations”, the principle of cost accounting was declared, according to which enterprises and associations are “fully responsible for the break-even of their work”, and the state “is not responsible for their obligations” (See: Materials of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU M., 1986, pp. 5, 139-140, 39-41, 147, 331).

The famous economist L. Piyasheva believed that the idea of economic independence of state-owned enterprises was to transfer them to a regime of self-sufficiency and self-financing, but “without excommunication” from the budget and the introduction of an inexorably operating bankruptcy mechanism for all “non-self-sustaining” enterprises. For this reason, the implementation of the idea did not provide either economic growth or additional income for the budget. The only winners were the directors of enterprises who used the resulting freedom to “satisfy their personal needs.” The concept provided for the division of products produced at state-owned enterprises into “planned” (socialist) and “above-plan” (commercial). As soon as state-owned enterprises had the opportunity to sell part of their “above-plan” products through the cooperatives they opened, an outflow of resources immediately began from the main industries to the “subsidiaries”, and through them into the sphere of personal consumption of those who “sat” on resources, property and money. “It was inevitable,” notes Piyasheva, because The funds received from the commercial sale of “above-plan” products could not be legalized and they had to go “into the shadows.” In her opinion, Gorbachev's attempt to implement economic reform was untenable, since in Russia there was “no right” for everyone to be a private owner and freely engage in entrepreneurial activity. In addition, Piyasheva notes, Gorbachev did not undertake more radical reforms “out of fear of mass unemployment” that could begin as a result of privatization (See: Russia: 21st century... Where are you going? M., 2002, pp. 78-81) .

On the pros and cons of Gorbachev's foreign policy

As D. Volkogonov aptly noted, for the West, Gorbachev’s popularity was associated primarily with the fact that he became “a symbol of the departure of the Bolshevik monster from the political scene” (See: D. Volkogonov. Seven Leaders. Gallery of Leaders of the USSR. Book 2, M ., 1995, p. 362).

In December 1990, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but the situation within the country did not allow the president to go to receive the prize awarded to him. A considerable part of the population wondered: why was Gorbachev given the prize? The country is in ruins - and he gets a bonus! It was towards the end of 1990 that the gap between the president's foreign policy triumph and the consequences of his policies at home became obvious to many. The situation remained tense in Tbilisi, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, Chechnya, and the Baltic states. At the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze, who resigned, issued a warning about the impending coup. Prime Minister N.I. also spoke at the congress about the activities of destructive forces with “far-reaching goals.” Ryzhkov. At the congress, it was also proposed to include on the agenda the issue of no confidence in the President of the USSR, which indicated serious dissatisfaction with Gorbachev’s policies in internal and external affairs. Observers noted the president's break with the progressive part of his circle. In December, the Moscow City Council decided to ration the distribution of food products. A budget crisis arose; the USSR entered the new year of 1991 without a plan or budget. These are just a few touches that characterize the situation of the outgoing 1990.

According to the testimony of his assistant Chernyaev, during these days the General Secretary received “stacks of telegrams” from the population, in which Gorbachev was congratulated on the “imperialist prize” for having “destroyed” the Soviet Union, “betrayed” Eastern Europe, and “gave” resources to the Americans , and the media - to the “Zionists” (See: Chernyaev A.S. Six years with Gorbachev: According to diary entries. M., 1993, p. 384).

Against this background and foreign policy Gorbachev began to lose support within the country. Describing the situation of those days, Shevardnadze noted that the “shadow” government was regaining surrendered positions, emerging from the shadows and beginning to act openly.” If democratic forces had been united, he notes, this offensive could have been “stopped.” However, the lack of “unanimity” among like-minded people forced him to resign. Political opponents of the retired Minister of Foreign Affairs explained his voluntary resignation by “the desire to evade responsibility for miscalculations allegedly made in foreign policy” (See: Sheverdnadze E. My choice. In defense of democracy and freedom. M., 1991, pp. 20-21 ).

What was foreign policy like in the Gorbachev era according to the testimony of those who created it? What is its assessment by historians?

The biographer of the first president of the USSR, Grachev, notes that back in the spring of 1985, Gorbachev had a list of priority foreign policy tasks to be solved. In the Secretary General’s work notebooks, among the priorities were: “end the arms race”, “leave Afghanistan”, “establish relations with the USA and China” (See: Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, p. 179). The biographer points out that Gorbachev had to reckon with the foreign policy stereotypes that had developed between the two superpowers - to look at each other “through the embrasure.” By encroaching on this strategic “balance of fear,” Gorbachev, his biographer emphasizes, knocked out one of the most important pillars from under his own chair. If earlier the Soviet people put up with their wretched life and voluntarily gave up their last for defense, then the transformation of yesterday's enemy into a partner also changed their consciousness - they turned their dissatisfaction with their lives on those who controlled them.

Gorbachev’s opponents blamed him for the fact that while carrying out perestroika, he and his associates “did not care about the ideological, socio-economic, political and historical systemic foundations” of the Soviet system, that the doom of perestroika lay in its “top-level” nature, as a result of which “ power gradually became a foreign body within the system, primarily in relation to its foundations,” that behind the façade of perestroika “there was an energetic process of changing guidelines,” in which Yakovlev and Shevardnadze played the first fiddle. Among the main and, in the opinion of these opponents, “destructive” slogans of perestroika for the Soviet system were the following: universal human values and their priority over class ones, which led to a revision of the results of the Second World War, violation of the agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Helsinki Conference, which declared the inviolability of the post-war borders, caused the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, CMEA, the GDR and “prepared” the collapse of the USSR; entry into world civilization, which became possible for our country only “after the collapse” of the socialist system; democratization of society, which led to the “decentralization and disintegration of power” of Russia; rethinking of history, which in fact turned into “spitting on the past”, into a reliable mechanism for “destructing the historical memory of the people” (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). Vol. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M. , 2000, pp. 572-573, 617-618).

Soviet leaders, primarily Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, were criticized "for losing" of Eastern Europe and Germany, for the isolation and weakening of the country, for erasing through unreasonable political actions the results of the war and its conquests, for which entire generations paid an exorbitant price, for the needlessly “blood shed by the Soviet people in the name of liberating Europe from Nazism.” At the ceremony of signing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal D. Yazov said in a narrow circle: “We lost the third world war without firing a single shot” (See: J. Boffa. From the USSR to Russia: The History of an Unfinished Crisis. 1964- 1994. M., 1994, p. 202).

Responding to such accusations, in particular that Gorbachev “surrendered the socialist countries,” the former President of the USSR wrote that these thoughts were put forward by “adherents of imperial ideology,” for whom the right of the strong to dispose of foreign countries as their own is customary, “to play with the destinies of peoples.” " Turning to the recent history of relations between the USSR and the countries of the “socialist commonwealth,” Gorbachev pointed out that in these countries we implanted a modified “Stalinist model of socialism,” and all attempts by these countries to break out of the “friendly embrace” of the superpower were “strictly suppressed.” As an example, he cited the events in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (See: Gorbachev M.S. Life and Reforms. Book 2, M., 1995, pp. 474-475).

There was no unanimity regarding Gorbachev’s political line among the leaders of the “socialist camp.” Kadar and Honecker did not believe in the “irreversibility” of perestroika and took a wait-and-see approach, Zhivkov warned, citing Khrushchev’s policies, that perestroika could “destabilize the socialist community,” and the leader of the Romanian communists, Ceausescu, took an openly hostile position.

A.V. Kozyrev, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia in 1990, when he was an employee of the USSR Foreign Ministry, saw his main task during the years of perestroika as participating in the “dismantling of outdated ideological dogmas.” “The essence of the matter,” he writes in his memoirs, “was to promote into official Soviet documents, right up to speeches on foreign policy issues by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, “seditious” formulations that, if not immediately, then potentially, would open up opportunities for undermining and then a complete revision of communist dogma." He called E.K. his opponents in the Politburo. Ligacheva, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - G.M. Kornienko, and by his supporters - G.Kh. Shakhnazarov and A.S. Chernyaev, with the “leading role” of A.N. Yakovlev and E.A. Shevardnadze. In his opinion, Gorbachev, with his statements about new political thinking, “created a kind of cover for such far-reaching interpretations.” Kozyrev was skeptical of Gorbachev and his followers, believing that by 1989 they had exhausted themselves, primarily because they “sought at all costs to remain faithful to the socialist choice, to renew and modernize the Soviet system with a complete lack of understanding of its doom.” Kozyrev saw the origins of the new Russian concept of national security in “the ideas of A.D. Sakharov,” which, in his opinion, combined the thesis of curbing the nuclear arms race with the solution to the problem of “the relationship between man and the state in our country” (See: Kozyrev A. Preobrazhenie. M., 1995, pp. 42-46, 72) .

Soviet diplomats objected to such a simplified approach to assessing the most complex foreign policy problems facing the Soviet Union at the turn of the 70s and 80s. So, according to the same G.M. Kornienko, it was precisely during these years that there were opportunities to reach a compromise with the West in the field of disarmament. He called A.A. Gromyko is a “convinced supporter” of the disarmament line, the “main generator” of ideas in this area. It’s a different matter, Kornienko noted, that when it came to developing specific positions, and the military was against this or that decision, Gromyko “did not enter into conflict with them.” In general, he believed that Soviet foreign policy was characterized by “underestimation” and sometimes “ignoring” of the possibilities of strengthening the security of the state by “political means”, rather than by further increasing already excessive defense spending (See: Akhromeev S.F. , Kornienko G.M. Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat: A critical look at the foreign policy of the USSR before and after 1985. M., 1992, pp. 40-45).

The XXVII Congress of the CPSU officially proclaimed the country's new foreign policy course and identified three main areas of activity: overcoming confrontation between East and West, resolving regional conflicts, abandoning ideological preferences in relations with other states and recognizing the existing world order. To solve the first problem, the meetings of M.S. were of utmost importance. Gorbachev with US President R. Reagan in Geneva in 1985, in Reykjavik and Washington in 1986, in Moscow in 1988. The result of the first meetings was the signing of a joint statement stating that “nuclear war is unacceptable” because “it there can be no winners,” and that “the parties will not seek military superiority over each other.” In December 1987, an agreement was reached on the elimination of Soviet and American medium- and short-range missiles in Europe; the agreement was supplemented by the establishment of a system of mutual control. In addition, the USSR eliminated some of its medium- and short-range missiles located in Siberia and the Far East. The military, primarily the Chief of the General Staff S. Akhromeev, completely shared the position of President Gorbachev.

Western historians and politicians emphasize the fact that it was largely thanks to Gorbachev's foreign policy that the Cold War and the arms race were ended.

In February 1988, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which began on May 15, and in February 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. This decision was not easy for Gorbachev. Even under Brezhnev in 1981, the Politburo decided to “lead the matter towards leaving,” but the whole question was only how, when and on what conditions to leave. According to Soviet data, our country spent 1 billion rubles annually on the Afghan adventure. Gorbachev was worried not only about the decline in the authority of the USSR in the countries of the “third world”, but, as he put it: “We won’t pay our people back: why were so many people killed?” Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov confirmed that “it is impossible to win the war by military means.” Gorbachev's decision to leave Soviet troops from Afghanistan was supported by the Politburo and his closest associates - Ryzhkov and Ligachev. However, even having made the decision to leave, Gorbachev set, as the development of subsequent events in this region showed, an impossible task - not only to “restore a friendly and neutral country,” but to make sure that “the United States does not settle in Afghanistan with its bases.”

During this period, the opposition came to power in almost all socialist countries. In March 1991, the Warsaw Pact Organization officially ceased to exist. Thus, for the first time since 1945, the Soviet Union found itself without military allies in Europe.

The most important event of this period was the unification of Germany. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had divided the German people for more than thirty years, came down. On September 12, 1990, in Moscow, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, France, the USSR, Great Britain and the USA signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement in Relation to Germany. Article 1 stated that a united Germany would include the territories of the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany and “the whole of Berlin.” This treaty also confirmed the “final nature of the borders” of a united Germany, that it “has no territorial claims against other states” and will not make such claims “in the future.” The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic confirmed their renunciation of the “production, possession and disposal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons” and stated that a reunified Germany would also adhere to these commitments. The agreement provided for the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR and Berlin. The right of a united Germany “to participate in unions” was established, the country acquired “full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs” (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). Vol. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M ., 2000, pp. 621-623).

How could this significant event happen, what is its assessment in modern historical literature?

According to Western researchers, the problem of the post-war reconstruction of Germany was “central” in the relations between the victorious powers and it also became an “obstacle” to the alliance of the USSR with the Western powers. When the cohesion of one of the opposing military-political blocs - the Warsaw Pact Organization - “began to collapse,” the factors of the split in Germany began to seem “less significant” to German society than the factors of reunification, and the speed and political force of the reunification process “overthrew all resistance” (See. : Ennio Di Nolfo. History of international relations (1918-1999). In 2 volumes. Translated from Italian. Vol. 2. M., 2003, p. 726).

Russian historians noted that when the German issue moved to the level of a practical solution, neither Gorbachev, nor the country’s political elite, nor Soviet society itself “were ready for such a turn of events.” Initially, Gorbachev limited himself to “general discussions,” but then at a narrow meeting in January 1990, the Soviet leadership put forward the idea of the “six” - the formation of a special negotiating mechanism consisting of the four victorious powers (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France) and two German states (GDR and FRG) to discuss international aspects of the unification of Germany. At the same time, according to Russian historians, the Soviet leadership feared the situation would get out of control and an armed conflict would arise in Europe; it was also “unwilling” and “unable” to apply military force to prevent German reunification. An important role was played by the fact that in the context of the deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was counting on receiving foreign loans, including from German banks. Historian Narinsky believes that Gorbachev and his associates “overestimated” the willingness of Western partners to play by the new “rules of the game”, and therefore “did not record an agreement” to abandon NATO’s subsequent expansion to the east. His general assessment of the reformer’s activities in foreign policy is as follows: Gorbachev made a “great contribution” to the completion of cold war, but “failed (or did not have time)” to lay the foundations of a new world order (See: Narinsky M.M. M.S. Gorbachev and the unification of Germany. Based on new materials / New and recent history. 2004, No. 1, p. 14 -thirty).

According to Falin, on final stage Neither the Security Council, nor the Presidential Council, nor any other government bodies participated in the development of decisions on the unification of Germany. “The new military-political map of Europe 1989-1990,” Falin wrote in his memoirs, “was cut by Western standards by M. Gorbachev and his friend (E. Shevardnadze - V.P.).” He wrote that he tried to warn Gorbachev against huge concessions from the USSR to the West on the German issue; in particular, in his opinion, the treaty should have provided for “the non-participation of a united Germany in NATO.” To this proposal, Gorbachev said: “I’m afraid that the train has already left.” There were other alternatives to solving the German problem, Falin is convinced, and no worse than those implemented by Gorbachev (See: V. Falin. Conflicts in the Kremlin. Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 180-193).

According to the Italian historian J. Boff, German unity in practice meant “annexation East Germany from the Federal Republic of Germany" (See: J. Boffa. From the USSR to Russia: The History of the Unfinished Crisis. 1964-1994. M., 1996, p. 198).

There is an opinion expressed by members of the Soviet intelligence services that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the GDR came as a surprise to everyone, that no one in the world could have foreseen such a development of events. Therefore, the widespread version that “everything went according to Gorbachev’s plan,” that “he is a traitor,” seems absolutely “absurd.” “It is clear from all of Gorbachev’s actions,” wrote KGB officer I. Kuzmin, “that he did not want the collapse of the GDR, tried to preserve it, but acted indecisively” (See: M. Karpov. The Fall of the Berlin Wall. Even the Chekists did not expect this // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1994. November 5).

Was there a “putsch”?

On August 18, 1991, a group of USSR leaders arrived in Foros to visit President M.S. Gorbachev, who was on vacation. The next day, the USSR announced the transfer of power to the State Committee for the State of Emergency, which went down in history under the name GKChP. Troops were deployed to Moscow and other major cities of the Soviet Union. Thus began a three-day coup that led to the ban of the CPSU and ultimately to the end of the USSR. This phenomenon gave rise to a huge flow of literature, mainly from the pens of the participants in the events. However, as Gorbachev told reporters immediately after his return from Foros, “you will never know the whole truth!” The Dictionary of Foreign Words defines a putsch as “an opportunistic attempt by a small group of conspirators to carry out a coup d’état.” To what extent did the events that occurred more than ten years ago correspond to the above concept? How is this phenomenon perceived by today's Russian population? What opinions exist on this matter among historians?

A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in the summer of 2003 on the topic “How do you assess the dramatic events of twelve years ago?” showed that the majority of respondents (48%) consider everything that happened then “an episode of the struggle for power in the top leadership of the country.” Another foundation, ROMIR-Monitoring, asked respondents about their personal attitude towards the main participants in the events of those years. Sympathy was distributed as follows: today Yeltsin would be supported by 13% of respondents, the State Emergency Committee - 10%, President Gorbachev - 8%. 54% of respondents refused to support all the heroes of August 1991. For some, the events of August 1991 are a phenomenon of global significance, when the issue of “changing the political system” of the country and “the impossibility of returning to socialism” was finally resolved. For others, it is “a tragedy not only for our people, but also for the entire world community,” which caused “bloody upheavals throughout the world.” For others, it is only “the beginning of the collapse of the USSR” and a missed opportunity to “carry out deep democratic transformations within the framework of the existing Union” (See: Three days of fear // New Izvestia. 2003. August 19).

On August 19, at six o'clock in the morning, the radio began broadcasting an announcement about the introduction of a state of emergency in some regions of the USSR, a decree of the Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev on his assumption of duties as President of the USSR in connection with Gorbachev's ill health, a statement from the "Soviet leadership" on the creation of the State Emergency Committee situation in the USSR, the State Emergency Committee's appeal to the Soviet people. By its resolutions, the State Emergency Committee announced the suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that “prevent the normalization of the situation,” the disbandment of power and management structures that acted contrary to the Constitution of the USSR, the ban on rallies and demonstrations, and the establishment of control over the media. Troops and military equipment occupied key points on the highways leading to the center of Moscow and surrounded the area adjacent to the Kremlin. At about 12 noon, several dozen tanks came close to White House government of the RSFSR.

These incidents were preceded by the following event: on August 18, Boldin, Baklanov, Shenin, Varennikov and the head of the security service of the KGB of the USSR Plekhanov arrived in Foros. According to Boldin, at the end of the conversation Gorbachev said: “The joke is on you, do as you want!” - and even gave some advice on how best, from his point of view, to introduce a state of emergency.” The purpose of creating the State Emergency Committee, according to Boldin, is “to take over the key points of control, to restore order in the country” (See: Boldin V. Collapse of the pedestal: Touches to the portrait of M.S. Gorbachev. M., 1995, 15-17; State failure // Kommersant power. 2001. August 21, pp. 9-10).

Former Prime Minister Pavlov, referring to the testimony of Moscow visitors present at the Foros meeting, wrote that Gorbachev “no one suggested that he resign,” he was only asked “either to agree to sign himself, or to instruct G. Yanaev to sign the declaration of a state of emergency and the convening of a session Supreme Soviet of the USSR". According to the retired prime minister, Gorbachev’s real goal and position, which they initially interpreted as agreement to introduce a state of emergency, was to “deal with Yeltsin with our hands, pushing us to bloodshed. Then, as the President of the USSR, deal with the perpetrators of this bloodshed, that is, with us. As a result, the country is in ruins, division and lawlessness, he is on the throne, and everyone who could resist is in the next world or in prison.” Pavlov also refuted the generally accepted opinion that Gorbachev was isolated in Foros. As evidence, he referred to the conclusion of one of the creators of the government communications system in Foros, who stated “the statements about the complete shutdown of Foros’s communications with the outside world are fiction (our italics - V.P.). This cannot happen even with a nuclear attack.” For Pavlov this key moment throughout history, because if “there is no isolation, there is no conspiracy” (See: Pavlov V.S. August from the inside. Gorbachev-putsch. M., 1993, pp. 32-33, 47, 72-73).

Anti-alcohol campaign

The initiative came from E. Ligachev and M. Solomentsev. Alcohol prices increased by 45%. Its production was sharply reduced, which led to massive cutting down of vineyards. Sugar (the main raw material for home brewing) disappeared from stores, and cards had to be introduced for it. All this caused discontent among the population, and the state budget was shorted by about 62 billion “drunk” rubles.

The positive effect of the introduced restrictions was felt later– when statistics appeared about a sharp decline in crime and mortality rates. The increase in the birth rate was so significant that they started talking about the “Gorbachev baby boom.” The reproductive age of the children born then was in the 2000s. It is they who have ensured the steady increase in the birth rate in Russia in recent years.

The Chernobyl accident

A large-scale man-made disaster not only caused enormous material damage and led to numerous casualties. It revealed the imperfections of the public administration system and led to significant changes in public consciousness. Outrage was caused by the concealment of information about the threat of radiation from citizens. And the dedication of the liquidators became a significant factor in the growth of citizen activity.

Falling oil prices

The increase in oil production in the USSR and the USA led to overstocking of the market and a significant reduction in prices. The fatal blow came in 1985 Saudi Arabia, which lifted production restrictions. As a result, oil prices fell from $35 per barrel to $10 and below. This had catastrophic consequences for the USSR economy due to a sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings.

"Perestroika"

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in 1986, on the initiative of M. Gorbachev, the party program replaced “building communism” with “improving socialism.” The goal was set to double the economic potential of the USSR by 2000 and provide housing for all citizens.

The collapse of the USSR, which M. Gorbachev tried to avoid, became a fait accompli. On December 25, he resigned as president of the USSR, and on December 26, 1991, the Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (transitional authority) adopted a declaration “on the cessation of the existence of the USSR, in connection with the formation of the CIS.”

Bottom line

The transformations in the USSR, called “perestroika,” were dictated by the difficult economic situation in which the country found itself in the mid-80s. The policy of “tightening the screws” at this moment would only aggravate the situation.

M. Gorbachev failed due to a combination of external and internal factors that he could not influence. Among them: disunity political elites USSR, personal ambitions of some members of its team, interethnic conflicts in the union republics, accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the unconstructive position of the US leadership and many others.

Historical meaning

The Gorbachev era became a kind of gateway between the USSR and the new post-Soviet states. During this time, people freed themselves from ideological pressure, joined market relations and civil liberties. The anti-alcohol campaign and “new thinking” had significant positive consequences, which made it possible to end the Cold War.

Thanks to the efforts of M. Gorbachev, the collapse of the USSR took place according to a relatively mild scenario, in contrast to another union state - the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose leadership acted harshly.

Video: Gorbachev: “The collapse of the USSR is my drama” (BBC interview)

References:

Appeal to the Soviet people of the State Emergency Committee [Electronic resource] / Pravda. – 1991 – http://www.agitclub.ru/gorby/putch/gkcpdocument.htm
Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States [Electronic resource] / Moscow News. – 1991 – http://www.agitclub.ru/gorby/putch/dogovor.htm
Agreement on the creation of the CIS [Electronic resource] / Rossiyskaya Gazeta. – 1991 – https://rg.ru/1991/12/19/sng-site-dok.html

Please tell me what were the pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule? and got the best answer

Answer from Yatyan Sharapova[guru]
minus - prohibition,
pros - perestroika, glasnost, acceleration
ps Gorbachev did not collapse the USSR, it was destroyed by senior officials and heads of government of the three union republics:
Boris Yeltsin and Gennady Burbulis (RSFSR),
Stanislav Shushkevich and Vyacheslav Kebich (BSSR),
Leonid Kravchuk and Vitold Fokin (Ukraine).
Source: Bialowieza Agreement

Answer from -=Boatswain=-[master]
+he dissolved the USSR, -destroyed the Berlin Wall.

Answer from Experienced[guru]
the collapse of a great state... there are no advantages.

Answer from Yovetlana[guru]
There are no pros, only cons! Breaking is not building! broke. everything that could be broken and nothing was built to replace it. Stake him!!

Answer from Trust[guru]
neither one nor the other existed, Gorbachev was none and the government was the same

Answer from Konstantin Petrov[guru]
for the advantages of Guider and praises addressed to you -1

Answer from Sergey Semenkov[guru]
The women listened to him so much that the men were even wary of drinking))

Answer from Mikhas[guru]
One of the advantages was the emergence of cooperatives.
Of the minuses - racketeers :)

Answer from Imur Ivanov[guru]
I respect Gorbachev, but you can’t ask him to make political miscalculations. As a politician he turned out to be useless. However, we must give him his due, he was a good man, and most importantly, his thoughts were completely bright. He wished the best for Russia...

Answer from Alexander Guzhvenko[guru]
A huge plus for gypsies. I heard it myself that the gypsies were ready to cast a monument to him from gold, in gratitude for the speculation in vodka.

Answer from Vladimir Gribov[guru]
He said a lot, even correctly, did a lot, but wrongly. The result was the collapse of the USSR.

Answer from Heinrich Zhukov[guru]
Big minus! Inability to govern the country! And when the “caudla” chooses but not the people, it will always be a collapse

Answer from User deleted[guru]
Not a single plus!.. It was as if he was doing everything the other way around on purpose! Firstly, with his fucking liberalization, he destroyed the ENTIRE SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY! Could it be possible to do without this? Of course yes! The main problem of Socialism in the USSR is LOW LABOR PRODUCTIVITY!...Where did it come from? There are two reasons for this - outdated equipment, productive technology that did not correspond to the times and low interest of the worker in the results of his work.... from each according to his ability, to each according to his work! It was not possible to implement this principle???? As for the outdated material and technical base.... there were resources.... for example, the military-industrial complex regularly updated weapons and military equipment in the army.... In terms of the quality of army equipment, we were ahead of the rest! So what prevented the creation of such a complex on the SCALE of the WHOLE (and not just the army) ECONOMY?? ? As a last resort, it was possible to direct a significant part of the resources of the military-industrial complex to modernize the economy... We had a COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE management system and liberalizing it is tantamount to SUICIDE! (a simple example... plant A was obliged to supply plant B with components... but since now it does not owe anything to anyone, it is looking for a more profitable “buyer” of its products... this can also lead to the fact that plant B fails to fulfill its obligation to C, and that, in turn, to A... that is, the one who started this process suffered from it... and so throughout the economy... the refusal of one enterprise to fail to fulfill its obligations could cause a chain of failures paralyzing an entire industry!) This Hunchback COULD NOT UNDERSTAND!! ! Was he hoping for the consciousness of citizens?? ? I doubt... Strange behavior... Having SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES... WE ARE REMOVING THE IDEOLOGICAL SHIELD... and thereby opening ourselves up to the enemy!! FOR WHAT?? ? WHAT IS THE GOAL?? ? Why destroy the FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIETY if you only wanted economic prosperity?... and much, much more.... looking at the era of Gorbachev-Yeltsin, you come to the conclusion that the NATIONAL ECONOMY WAS CONSCIOUSLY AND PURPOSELY DESTROYED.... in many ways this process is still continues!... I really, really want to know when this process will stop and we will start CREATING?!

Good day, dear friends!

Today, to review the material on the perestroika period, I present to you our systematic table for this period. Recommendations for working with it are accordingly the following: If you are taking the Unified State Exam in the near future, I recommend printing out the material and hanging it in a visible place. For teachers, there is an option to create working materials based on the table. In the assignment you just need to erase some of the information, print it out, and give it to the students to fill in the gaps.

SYSTEMATIC TABLE - PERIOD OF RESTRUCTION:

Direction	Actions
Domestic policy
Economic reform	· Granting independence to enterprises and transferring them to self-financing – the Law “On state enterprise(association)" (1987) Beginning of the development of the sphere of private initiative - the law "On individual labor activity"(1988) · Creation of cooperatives - the Law “On Cooperatives” · Elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 26, 1986)
Attempt to transition to a market economy	· Discussion at the Supreme Council of the USSR of options for the transition to a market · Instruction to combine the programs of Ryzhkov-Abalkin and Shatalin-Yavlinsky (“500 days”)
Reform of the political system of the USSR	· Radical change in the electoral system in favor of the democrats · Transformation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR into a permanent parliament · Elimination of the CPSU monopoly on power (abolishing Article 6 of the Constitution) · The beginning of the formation of a multi-party system · Establishment of the post of President of the USSR (Gorbachev in 1990-1991) · Creation of the Cabinet of Ministers
Publicity policy	· Removal of numerous previously existing information taboos · Release of many dissidents (for example, Academician Sakharov) · Distribution of samizdat products was not suppressed · Discussion of pressing issues in the central press · Emergence of critical publications
Foreign policy
Ensuring the security and cooperation of states	Characteristic features of political thinking: · De-ideologization of interstate relations · Priority of universal human values · Recognition of general moral norms as a mandatory criterion for any policy
Improving relations with the West	Soviet-American treaties: · On the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (1987) · On the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1991) · Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990)
Refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of fraternal countries	· Unification of Germany (1990) · Fall of pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern European countries · Elimination of CMEA and Warsaw · Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (1989) and from Eastern European countries (1991)
Dissolution of the USSR	· Adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia (June 12, 1990) · Election of B.N. Yeltsin President of the RSFSR · Belovezhskaya Agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the dissolution of the USSR (December 1991)

During the period of Gorbachev's activities as head of state and leader of the CPSU, serious changes occurred in the Soviet Union that influenced the whole world, which were a consequence of the following events:

a large-scale attempt to reform the Soviet system (“perestroika”),
introduction in the USSR of the policy of glasnost, freedom of speech and press, democratic elections,
rejection of communist ideology as a state priority status and cessation of persecution of dissidents,
transition of most socialist countries to a market economy and democracy.

Regarding foreign policy, significant events are:

withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan (1989)
end of the cold war
collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw bloc.