Great ideas, complex character: what role did Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov play in the history of Russia. Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich

Period of strengthening of Germany

Last years

Curious facts

Modern

Memory of Gorchakov

Gorchakov in literature

His Serene Highness Prince (June 4 (15), 1798, Gapsal - February 27 (March 11), 1883, Baden-Baden) - a prominent Russian diplomat and statesman, Chancellor, Knight of the Order of St. Apostle Andrew the First-Called.

Lyceum. “Happy from the first days.” Carier start

Born into the family of Prince M.A. Gorchakov and Elena Vasilievna Ferzen.

He was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was a friend of Pushkin. Since his youth, “fashion’s pet, big world friend, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters to him), until late old age he was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat. In addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also had a significant literary education, which was later reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe. In 1820-1822. he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Ljubljana and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a chargé d'affaires, and in 1833 as an embassy adviser in Vienna.

Ambassador to the German States

In 1841 he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange the marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with Karl Friedrich, Crown Prince of Württemberg, and after the wedding he remained envoy extraordinary there for twelve years. From Stuttgart he had the opportunity to closely follow the progress of the revolutionary movement in Southern Germany and the events of 1848-1849 in Frankfurt am Main. At the end of 1850 he was appointed commissioner to the German Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his previous post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated the political life of Germany. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close to the Prussian representative, Bismarck. Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after Gorchakov, D. G. Glinka). Gorchakov, like Nesselrode, did not share Emperor Nicholas’ passion for the eastern question, and the beginning of the diplomatic campaign against Turkey caused him great concern; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts.

The Crimean War and the “ungratefulness” of Austria

In the summer of 1854, Gorchakov was transferred to Vienna, where he first temporarily managed the embassy instead of Meyendorff, who was closely related to the Austrian minister, Count Buol, and in the spring of 1855 he was finally appointed envoy to the Austrian court. During this critical period, when Austria “surprised the world with its ingratitude” and was preparing to act together with France and England against Russia (under the treaty of December 2, 1854), the position of the Russian envoy in Vienna was extremely difficult and responsible. After the death of Emperor Nicholas I, a conference of representatives of the great powers was convened in Vienna to determine peace terms; Although the negotiations in which Drouin de Louis and Lord John Russell participated did not lead to a positive result, partly thanks to the skill and perseverance of Gorchakov, Austria again separated from cabinets hostile to Russia and declared itself neutral. The fall of Sevastopol served as a signal for a new intervention by the Vienna cabinet, which itself, in the form of an ultimatum, presented Russia with well-known demands for an agreement with the Western powers. The Russian government was forced to accept the Austrian proposals, and in February 1856 a congress met in Paris to develop a final peace treaty.

Minister

The Peace of Paris and the first years after the Crimean War

The Treaty of Paris on March 18 (30), 1856 ended the era of Russia's active participation in Western European political affairs. Count Nesselrode retired, and in April 1856 Prince Gorchakov was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He felt the bitterness of defeat more than anyone else: he personally endured the most important stages of the struggle against the political hostility of Western Europe, in the very center of hostile combinations - Vienna. The painful impressions of the Crimean War and the Vienna conferences left their mark on Gorchakov’s subsequent activities as a minister. His general views on the tasks of international diplomacy could no longer seriously change; his political program was clearly determined by the circumstances under which he had to take over the management of the ministry. First of all, it was necessary to observe great restraint in the first years, while great internal changes were taking place; then Prince Gorchakov set himself two practical goals - firstly, to repay Austria for its behavior in 1854-1855. and, secondly, to achieve the gradual denunciation of the Treaty of Paris.

1850-1860s. Beginning of the alliance with Bismarck

In [U Gorchakov avoided participating in diplomatic measures against the abuses of the Neapolitan government, citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign powers (circular note dated September 10 (22). At the same time, he made it clear that Russia is not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but is only gathering strength for the future: “La Russie ne boude pas - elle se recueille” (Russia is concentrating). This phrase had big success in Europe and was taken as an accurate description of the political situation in Russia after Crimean War. Three years later, Prince Gorchakov said that “Russia is leaving the position of restraint that it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.”

The Italian crisis of 1859 seriously concerned Russian diplomacy. Gorchakov proposed convening a congress to peacefully resolve the issue, and when war turned out to be inevitable, in a note on May 15 (27), 1859, he called on the minor German states to refrain from joining the policy of Austria and insisted on the purely defensive significance of the German Confederation. From April 1859, Bismarck was the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, and the solidarity of both diplomats regarding Austria influenced the further course of events. Russia openly stood on the side of Napoleon III in his conflict with Austria over Italy. There was a noticeable turn in Russian-French relations, which was officially prepared by the meeting of the two emperors in Stuttgart in 1857. But this rapprochement was very fragile, and after the triumph of the French over Austria under Magenta and Solferino, Gorchakov again seemed to reconcile with the Viennese cabinet.

In 1860, Gorchakov recognized it as timely to remind Europe of the disastrous state of Christian nations subject to the Turkish government, and expressed the idea of an international conference to revise the provisions of the Paris Treaty on this issue (note 2 (20) May 1860). " Events in the West resonated in the East with encouragement and hope.”, he put it, and “ conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East" The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature.

In October of the same 1860, Prince Gorchakov already spoke about the common interests of Europe, affected by the successes of the national movement in Italy; in a note on September 28 (October 10), he hotly reproaches the Sardinian government for its actions regarding Tuscany, Parma, Modena: “ this is no longer a question of Italian interests, but of the common interests inherent in all governments; this is a question that has a direct connection with those eternal laws, without which neither order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe. The need to fight anarchy does not justify the Sardinian government, because one should not go along with the revolution in order to benefit from its legacy" Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, Gorchakov retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and unwittingly returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance. His protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

Polish question. Austro-Prussian War

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. Bismarck took charge of the Prussian government in September 1862. Since then, the policy of the Russian minister went in parallel with the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as much as possible. On February 8 (March 27), 1863, Prussia concluded the Alvensleben Convention with Russia to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising.

The intercession of England, Austria and France for the national rights of the Poles was decisively rejected by Prince Gorchakov when, in April 1863, it took the form of direct diplomatic intervention. Skillful and, in the end, energetic correspondence on the Polish issue gave Gorchakov the glory of a top diplomat and made his name famous in Europe and Russia. This was the highest, culminating point political career Gorchakova.

Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy credulity of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Gorchakov, approving French project in principle, both times objected to Congress under the circumstances. A war began, which unexpectedly quickly led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of a congress came to Gorchakov, but was immediately abandoned by him due to his reluctance to do anything unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France.

Period of strengthening of Germany

The Candiot uprising against Turkish oppression, which lasted almost two years (from the autumn of 1866), gave Austria and France a reason to seek rapprochement with Russia on the basis of the eastern question. The Austrian minister Count Beist even admitted the idea of revising the Treaty of Paris to improve the situation of Christian subjects of Turkey. The project of annexing Candia to Greece found support in Paris and Vienna, but was coldly received in St. Petersburg. The demands of Greece were not satisfied, and the matter was limited to the transformation of the local administration on the ill-fated island, allowing for some autonomy of the population. For Bismarck, it was completely undesirable for Russia to achieve anything in the East before the expected war in the West with the assistance of outside powers.

Gorchakov saw no reason to exchange Berlin friendship for any other. As L. Z. Slonimsky wrote in an article about Gorchakov in ESBE “having decided to follow Prussian policy, he chose to surrender to it with confidence, without doubts or worries”. However, serious political measures and combinations did not always depend on the minister or chancellor, since the personal feelings and views of the sovereigns constituted a very important element in the international politics of that time.

When the prelude to the bloody struggle took place in the summer of 1870, Prince Gorchakov was in Wildbad and, according to the Russian diplomatic organ, the Journal de St. Pétersbourg,” was no less amazed than others by the unexpectedness of the gap between France and Prussia. “Upon his return to St. Petersburg, he could only fully join the decision made by Emperor Alexander II to keep Austria from participating in the war in order to avoid the need for intervention from Russia. The Chancellor expressed only regret that reciprocity of services with the Berlin cabinet was not stipulated for the proper protection of Russian interests.”(“Journ. de St. Pet.”, March 1, 1883).

A Franco-Prussian war was widely considered inevitable, and both powers had been openly preparing for it since 1867; Therefore, the absence of preliminary decisions and conditions regarding such an important issue as support for Prussia in its fight against France cannot be considered a mere accident. Obviously, Prince Gorchakov did not expect that the empire of Napoleon III would be so brutally defeated. Nevertheless, the Russian government took the side of Prussia in advance and with complete determination, risking drawing the country into a clash with victorious France and its ally Austria and not caring about any specific benefits for Russia, even in the event of the complete triumph of Prussian weapons.

Russian diplomacy not only kept Austria from interfering, but also diligently protected Prussia's freedom of military and political action throughout the war, right up to the final peace negotiations and the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty. The gratitude of Wilhelm I, expressed in a telegram on February 14, 1871 to Emperor Alexander II, is understandable. Prussia achieved its cherished goal and created a powerful new empire with the significant assistance of Gorchakov, and the Russian chancellor took advantage of this change in circumstances to destroy the 2nd article of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispatch of October 19, 1870, notifying the cabinets of this decision of Russia, caused a rather sharp response from Lord Grenville, but all the great powers agreed to revise the said article of the Treaty of Paris and again grant Russia the right to maintain a navy in the Black Sea, which was approved by the London Treaty. convention of 1871.

Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev noted this event in verse:

The power of Germany. Triple Alliance

After the defeat of France, the mutual relationship between Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German Chancellor outgrew his old friend and no longer needed him. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in the East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September 1872, put the Russian foreign policy depending not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, that is, essentially the same Austrian, interests, the circle of which was increasingly expanding on the Balkan Peninsula.

In minor or extraneous issues, such as the recognition of the government of Marshal Serrano in Spain in 1874, Prince Gorchakov often disagreed with Bismarck, but in essential and important matters he still trustingly obeyed his suggestions. A serious quarrel occurred only in 1875, when the Russian chancellor assumed the role of guardian of France and the general world from the encroachments of the Prussian military party and officially informed the powers of the success of his efforts in a note on April 30 of that year. Prince Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria and, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

The diplomatic context of the Russian-Turkish war and the Berlin Congress

In April 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of authority from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. He promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England, Shuvalov was instructed to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests. Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19 (March 3), 1878 created a vast Bulgaria, but increased Serbia and Montenegro with only small territorial increments, left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule and gave nothing to Greece, so that almost all the Balkan peoples and precisely those who made the most sacrifices in the fight against the Turks - Serbs and Montenegrins, Bosnians and Herzegovinians. The Great Powers had to intercede for the offended Greece, make territorial gains for the Serbs and arrange the fate of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, whom Russian diplomacy had previously given under the rule of Austria (according to the Reichstadt Agreement on June 26 (July 8), 1876). There could be no question of avoiding the congress, as Bismarck managed after Sadovaya. England was apparently preparing for war. Russia proposed to the German Chancellor to organize a congress in Berlin; between Russian Ambassador In Great Britain, Count Shuvalov and the British Foreign Minister the Marquis of Salisbury reached an agreement on May 12 (30) regarding issues to be discussed between the powers.

At the Berlin Congress (from June 1 (13) to July 1 (13), 1878), Gorchakov took part in few and rare meetings; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; Prince Gorchakov also spoke out in favor of occupation (meeting on June 16 (28). Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as the main culprit for Russia's failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna.

Which of us needs the Lyceum Day in our old age?
Will you have to celebrate alone?

Unhappy friend! among new generations
The annoying guest is both superfluous and alien,
He will remember us and the days of connections,
Closing my eyes with a trembling hand...
Let it be with sad joy
Then he will spend this day at the cup,
Like now I, your disgraced recluse,
He spent it without grief and worries.
A.S. Pushkin

Last years

In 1880, Gorchakov could not come to the celebrations on the occasion of the opening of the monument to Pushkin (at that time, of Pushkin’s lyceum comrades, only he and S. D. Komovsky were alive), but gave interviews to correspondents and Pushkin scholars. Soon after Pushkin's celebrations, Komovsky died, and Gorchakov remained the last lyceum student. These lines of Pushkin turned out to be said about him...

The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, in March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

Died in Baden-Baden.

He was buried in the family crypt at the cemetery of the Sergius Seaside Hermitage (the grave has survived to this day).

Curious facts

After the prince's death, Pushkin's unknown lyceum poem "The Monk" was discovered among his papers.

Famous diplomat, Russian State Chancellor; genus. July 4, 1798; He was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was a friend of Pushkin. In his youth, “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), G., until his late old age, was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat; but, in addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also possessed a significant literary education, which was subsequently reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe. In 1820-22 he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Laibach and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a charge d'affaires, in 1833 - as an embassy adviser in Vienna. In 1841, he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange the proposed marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with the Crown Prince of Württemberg, and after the wedding, he remained there as envoy extraordinary for twelve years. From Stuttgart he had the opportunity to closely follow the progress of the revolutionary movement in Southern Germany and the events of 1848-49. in Frankfurt am Main. At the end of 1850, he was appointed commissioner to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his previous post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated the political life of Germany. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close friends with the Prussian representative, Bismarck. Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after G., D. G. Glinka). G., like Nesselrode, did not share the passions of Emperor Nicholas on the Eastern issue, and the diplomatic campaign that had begun against Turkey aroused great fears in him; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts. In the summer of 1854, G. was transferred to Vienna, where at first he temporarily managed the embassy instead of Meyendorff, who was closely related to the Austrian minister, Count. Buol, and in the spring of 1855 he was finally appointed envoy to the Austrian court. During this critical period, when Austria “surprised the world with its ingratitude” and was preparing to act together with France and England against Russia (under the treaty of December 2, 1854), the position of the Russian envoy in Vienna was extremely difficult and responsible. After the death of the emperor. Nicholas, a conference of representatives of the great powers was convened in Vienna to determine the conditions of peace; but the negotiations in which Drouin de Louis and Lord John Rossel participated did not lead to a positive result, partly thanks to the art and perseverance of G. Austria again separated from the cabinets hostile to us and declared itself neutral. The fall of Sevastopol served as a signal for a new intervention by the Vienna cabinet, which itself, in the form of an ultimatum, presented Russia with well-known demands for an agreement with the Western powers. The Russian government was forced to accept the Austrian proposals, and in February 1856 a congress met in Paris to develop a final peace treaty.

The Treaty of Paris on March 18/30, 1856 ended the era of Russia's active participation in Western European political affairs. Count Nesselrode retired, and Prince G. was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (in April 1856). G. felt the bitterness of defeat more than anyone else: he personally endured the most important stages of the struggle against the political hostility of Western Europe, in the very center of hostile combinations - Vienna. The painful impressions of the Crimean War and the Vienna conferences left their mark on G.'s subsequent activities as a minister. His general views on the tasks of international diplomacy could no longer seriously change; his political program was clearly determined by the circumstances under which he had to take over the management of the ministry. First of all, it was necessary to observe great restraint in the first years, while great internal changes were taking place; then Prince Gorchakov set himself two practical goals - firstly, to repay Austria for its behavior in 1854-55, and secondly, to achieve the gradual destruction of the Paris Treaty.

In 1856, Prince. G. avoided participating in diplomatic measures against the abuses of the Neapolitan government, citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign powers (circ. note 22/10 September); at the same time, he made it clear that Russia was not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but was only gathering strength for the future: “La Russie ne boude pas - elle se recueille.” This phrase had great success in Europe and was accepted as an accurate description of the political situation in Russia after the Crimean War. Three years later, Prince. G. stated that “Russia is leaving the position of restraint that it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.” The Italian crisis of 1859 seriously worried our diplomacy: G. proposed convening a congress to resolve the issue peacefully, and when war turned out to be inevitable, he kept the minor German states from joining the policy of Austria and insisted on the purely defensive significance of the German Confederation (in note 15/27 May 1859). From April 1859, Bismarck was the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, and the solidarity of both diplomats regarding Austria did not remain without influence on the further course of events. Russia openly stood on the side of Napoleon III in his conflict with Austria over Italy. There was a noticeable turn in Russian-French relations, which was officially prepared by the meeting of the two emperors in Stuttgart in 1857. But this rapprochement was very fragile, and after the triumph of the French over Austria under Magenta and Solferino, G. again seemed to be reconciled with the Viennese cabinet. In 1860, he considered it timely to remind Europe of the disastrous state of the Christian nations subject to the Turkish government, and expressed the idea of an international conference to revise the provisions of the Paris Treaty on this subject (note May 20/2, 1860); He expressed at the same time that “events in the West responded in the East as encouragement and hope” and that “conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East.” The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature. In October of the same 1860, Prince. G. already speaks of the general interests of Europe, affected by the successes of the national movement in Italy; on the note 10 Oct. (Sept. 28) he hotly reproaches the Sardinian government for its actions regarding Tuscany, Parma, Modena: “this is no longer a question of Italian interests, but of the common interests inherent in all governments; this is a question that has a direct connection with those eternal laws, without of which neither order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe. The need to fight anarchy does not justify the Sardinian government, because one should not go along with the revolution in order to take advantage of its inheritance." Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, G. retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and involuntarily returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance; but his protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. At the head of the Prussian government in September. 1862 Bismarck rose. Since then, the policy of our Minister has paralleled the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as far as possible. Prussia concluded a military convention with Russia on February 8. (March 27) 1863 to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising. The intercession of England, Austria and France for the national rights of the Poles was decisively rejected by the prince. G., when it took the form of direct diplomatic intervention (in April 1863). Skillful and, in the end, energetic correspondence on the Polish issue gave G. the glory of a top diplomat and made his name famous in Europe and Russia. This was the highest, culminating point of the prince’s political career. G. Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy gullibility of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Book G., approving the French project in principle, objected both times to the practical expediency of the congress under the given circumstances. A war began, which with unexpected speed led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of a congress came to the prince. G., but was immediately abandoned by him, due to his reluctance to do something unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France.

The brilliant success of Prussia in 1866 further strengthened its official friendship with Russia. Antagonism with France and mute opposition from Austria forced the Berlin cabinet to firmly adhere to the Russian alliance, while Russian diplomacy could completely retain freedom of action and had no intention of imposing on itself unilateral obligations beneficial exclusively for the neighboring power. The Candiot uprising against Turkish oppression, which lasted almost two years (from the autumn of 1866), gave Austria and France a reason to seek rapprochement with Russia on the basis of the eastern question; the Austrian minister Count Beist even admitted the idea of revising the Treaty of Paris for the general improvement of the life of Christian subjects of Turkey. The project of annexing Candia to Greece found support in Paris and Vienna, but was coldly received in St. Petersburg. The demands of Greece were not satisfied, and the matter was limited to the transformation of the local administration on the ill-fated island, allowing for some autonomy of the population. For Bismarck, it was completely undesirable for Russia to achieve anything in the East before the expected war in the West with the assistance of outside powers. Prince G. saw no reason to exchange Berlin friendship for any other; Having decided to follow Prussian policy, he chose to surrender to it with confidence, without doubts or worries. However, serious political measures and combinations did not always depend on the minister or chancellor, since the personal feelings and views of the sovereigns constituted a very important element in the international politics of that time. When the prelude to the bloody struggle broke out in the summer of 1870, Prince G. was in Wildbad and - according to our diplomatic organ, the Journal de St. Petersbourg - was no less amazed than others by the unexpectedness of the break between France and Prussia. “Upon his return to St. Petersburg, he could only fully join the decision made by Emperor Alexander II to keep Austria from participating in the war in order to avoid the need for intervention from Russia. The Chancellor expressed only regret that reciprocity of services had not been agreed upon with the Berlin cabinet, for proper protection of Russian interests" ("Journ. de St. Pet.", March 1, 1883). The Franco-Prussian war was considered inevitable by everyone, and both powers had been openly preparing for it since 1867; Therefore, the absence of preliminary decisions and conditions regarding such an important issue as support for Prussia in its fight against France cannot be considered a mere accident. Obviously, Prince G. did not foresee that the empire of Napoleon III would be so brutally defeated; and yet the Russian government took the side of Prussia in advance and with complete determination, risking drawing the country into a clash with victorious France and its ally Austria and not caring about any specific benefits for Russia, even in the event of the complete triumph of Prussian weapons. Our diplomacy not only kept Austria from interfering, but diligently protected Prussia's freedom of military and political action throughout the duration of the war, until the final peace negotiations and the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty. The gratitude of Wilhelm I, expressed in a telegram on February 14/26, 1871 to the Emperor, is understandable. Alexander II. Prussia achieved its cherished goal and created a powerful new empire with the significant assistance of Prince G., and the Russian chancellor took advantage of this change in circumstances to destroy the 2nd article of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispatch of October 17/29, 1870, notifying the cabinets of this decision of Russia, caused a rather sharp response from Lord Grenville, but all the great powers agreed to revise the said article of the Treaty of Paris and again allow Russia to keep a navy in the Black Sea, which was what happened approved by the London Conference in 1871

After the defeat of France, the mutual relations between Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German Chancellor outgrew his old friend and no longer needed him. From this time on, a series of bitter disappointments began for Russian diplomacy, which gave a sad, melancholic hue to the entire last period of G.'s activity. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September. 1872, made Russian foreign policy dependent not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, i.e., essentially the same Austrian, interests, the range of which was increasingly expanding in the Balkan Peninsula. Having bound himself to this system of preliminary agreements and concessions, Prince G. allowed or was forced to allow the country to be drawn into a difficult, bloody war, with the obligation not to derive any corresponding benefit from it for the state and to be guided in determining the results of victory by the interests and desires of alien and partly hostile cabinets. In minor or extraneous matters, such as the recognition of the government of Marshal Serrano in Spain in 1874, Prince. G. often disagreed with Bismarck, but in the essential and most important things he still trustingly obeyed his suggestions. A serious disagreement occurred only in 1875, when the Russian chancellor assumed the role of guardian of France and general peace from the encroachments of the Prussian military party and officially informed the powers of the success of his efforts in a note on April 30 (May 12) of the same year. Book Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

In April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of authority from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. Prince G. promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England it was entrusted to gr. Shuvalov to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests. Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19 (March 3), 1878, created a vast Bulgaria, but increased Serbia and Montenegro with only small territorial increments, left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule and gave nothing to Greece, so almost everyone was extremely dissatisfied with the treaty Balkan peoples and precisely those who made the most sacrifices in the fight against the Turks - Serbs and Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Herzegovinians. The Great Powers had to intercede for the offended Greece, make territorial gains for the Serbs and arrange the fate of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, whom Russian diplomacy had previously given under the rule of Austria (according to the Reichstadt Agreement of July 8/June 26, 1876). There could be no question of avoiding the congress, as Bismarck managed after Sadovaya. England was apparently preparing for war. Russia proposed to the German Chancellor to organize a congress in Berlin; between gr. Shuvalov and the Marquis of Salisbury reached an agreement on May 30/12 regarding issues to be discussed between the powers. At the Berlin Congress (from June 1/13 to July 1/13, 1878), Prince G. participated in the meetings little and rarely; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; book G. also spoke out for the occupation (meeting on June 16/28). The German Chancellor supported every positively stated Russian demand, but could not, of course, go further than Russian diplomats in protecting Russia's political interests - and our diplomacy, from the beginning of the crisis to the end, acted without clearly defined goals and without deliberate methods of implementation. Blaming Bismarck for our military-political mistakes and shortcomings would be too naive; he himself was confident that Russia would put an end to the eastern question this time and would be able to take advantage of the “beati possidentes” principle, giving Austria and England a certain share of participation in the Turkish inheritance. Prince G. cared primarily about the consent of the powers, about the interests of Europe, about the selflessness of Russia, which, however, did not require such bloody and difficult evidence as war. The destruction of individual articles of the Treaty of Paris, which was more a matter of diplomatic pride than a serious state interest, came to the fore. Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as allegedly the main culprit of our failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna. The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He died in Baden on February 27. 1883. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, in March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

To correctly assess Gorchakov’s entire activity, it is necessary to keep in mind two circumstances. Firstly, its political character was developed and finally established during the reign of Emperor Nicholas, in that era when it was considered obligatory for Russia to take care of the fate of various European dynasties, to work for balance and harmony in Europe, even to the detriment of the real interests and needs of its own country . Secondly, Russian foreign policy is not always directed solely by the foreign minister. Next to Gorchakov, although under his nominal leadership, Count Ignatiev and Count acted on behalf of Russia. Shuvalov, who had little agreement with each other and hardly agreed in many ways with the chancellor himself: this lack of unity was expressed especially sharply in the drafting of the Treaty of San Stefano and in the way it was defended at the congress. Book G. was a sincere supporter of peace and, nevertheless, had to, against his will, bring matters to war. This war, as was stated frankly in the Journal de St.-Pétersbourg after his death, “was a complete overthrow of all political system book Gorchakov, which seemed to him mandatory for Russia for many years to come. When war became inevitable, the Chancellor stated that he could guarantee Russia against a hostile coalition only under two conditions - namely, if the war was short and if the goal of the campaign was moderate, without crossing the Balkans. These views were accepted by the imperial government. Thus, we undertook a half-war, and it could only lead to half-peace." Meanwhile, the war turned out to be real and very difficult, and its comparative futility was partly the result of the half-policy of Prince Gorchakov. His hesitations and half-measures reflected, as it were, a struggle between two directions - the traditional, the ambitious -international, and practical, based on an understanding of the internal interests of the state. This ambiguity of the initial point of view and the lack of an exact practical program was revealed primarily in the fact that events were never foreseen in advance and always took us by surprise. Bismarck's sober, life-like methods did not have a noticeable impact on the diplomacy of Prince Gorchakov. The latter still adhered to many outdated traditions and remained a diplomat of the old school, for whom a skillfully written note is a goal in itself. The pale figure of G. could seem bright only due to the absence of his rivals in Russia and the calm course of political affairs .

Since with the name of the prince. G. is closely related political history Russia during the reign of the Emperor. Alexander II, then information and discussions about him can be found in every historical work related to Russian politics for this quarter of a century. A more detailed, although very one-sided, characterization of our chancellor in comparison with Bismarck was made in the famous French book by Julian Klyachko: “Deux Chancelliers. Le prince Gortschakoff et le prince de Bismarck” (P., 1876).

L. Slonimsky.

(Brockhaus)

Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich

d.s. t., member of the State Court. owls from April 15 1856, chancellor; R. 1799, † 27 Feb. 1883 at 84.

(Polovtsov)

Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich

(1798-1883) - a famous Russian diplomat and statesman, from April 1856 - Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and from 1867 - State Chancellor. He was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum and belonged to the galaxy of brilliant high-society youth of the times of Alexander I. From a young age he devoted himself to a diplomatic career. G. received his first acquaintance with the big politics of European courts during the era of restoration and reaction. His first impressions were the congresses in Troppau, Laibach and Verona (1820-1822), which passed resolutions Holy Alliance. His boss was Nesselrode(see), his teachers and examples - Metternich And Talleyrand and a society of high-quality diplomats, where impeccable manners, elegant French speech and subtle wit were combined with a significant dose of aristocratic ignorance and a firm belief that the fate of peoples and states was decided by a skillful game of diplomacy in the recesses of diplomatic offices. After the congresses, G. was secretary of the embassy in London (until 1827) and Rome (until 1828), counselor of the embassy in Berlin (from 1828), charge d'affaires in Florence and (from 1833) counselor of the embassy in Vienna. Having been envoy extraordinary in Stuttgart since 1841, he witnessed the German revolution of 1848. From 1850 he was Russia's representative at the Federal Diet in Frankfurt am Main. In 1854 he was transferred to Vienna as a temporary envoy, and in 1855 he was confirmed as envoy. With the change in the throne and the retirement of the elderly Nesselrode, Gorchakov was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (April 1856). “A pet of fashion, a friend of the great world” (as A. S. Pushkin, G.’s comrade at the Lyceum, once called him), a man not devoid of literary talents and powers of observation, a diplomat who had gone through a great school, G. was well versed in the international situation at that moment when he took over foreign policy Russia, and was smart enough to draw appropriate practical conclusions. After the defeat at Sevastopol, Russia lost its prestige in Europe and was busy internally with the liquidation of the Nicholas regime. G. managed to find a beautiful formula that covered up the difficult experience of the war that had just happened (La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille, i.e. “Russia is not sulking, it is gathering its strength”). But the position of the new minister was very difficult. His task was to maintain the façade of the dilapidated Russian building. absolutism; for the sake of preserving it, again take on such enterprises that, in the international situation of his time, could hardly count on success, despite all the diplomatic dexterity of the minister. Without being a major politician, there would have been nowhere to develop such a thing in Russia at that time. creative activity, - G. was still a talented representative of the diplomatic craft, capable of warning the most dangerous consequences political steps, the absurdity of which lay in the nature of the system tending to decline. G. skillfully got out of difficult situations more than once. His famous "phrases", his brilliant circulars and notes created his fame in Europe. But in the moments of the most difficult international situations, the results of his successes were more than doubtful; his diplomatic victories were sometimes political defeats. And this was not at all explained by a lack of his art, but by the fact that the policy of the Western European powers reflected the upward movement of industry better than the policy of Russian absolutism. capitalism, which in the West is also incomparably more powerful and influential than in Russia. Even before his appointment as minister, G. was a supporter of rapprochement with France. A strong France, in his opinion, should be a counterweight to England and a guarantee of the dismemberment of Germany. G. understood that Russia's liberal policy in Poland strengthens this rapprochement and strengthens Russia's position in relation to the participants in the Polish partitions - Austria and Prussia. But the Russian-French rapprochement was blocked by the strong economic connection between Russia and the German Customs Union, headed by Prussia (the export of Russian grain to Germany and the import of German goods to Russia). The Russian-French friendship, cemented by the Stuttgart meeting (1857), began to weaken the very next day after Magenta and Solferino, because G. was afraid of too great a defeat for Austria and the strengthening of Prussia in Germany. Gorchakov's liberal flirtations with Poland ended in nothing for the same reason. Economically interested in its Polish provinces, Prussia proactively declared its friendship in suppressing the Polish uprising of 1863 and finally thwarted the Russian-French rapprochement. Gorchakov could only go with the flow and speak the language of the emerging Russian. nationalism led by Katkov. As a result, G. found himself connected with Prussia more tightly than it seemed appropriate to him. Bismarck cleverly used Russia for German purposes. the unification that the Russians so feared. G. was forced to stay b. or m. an indifferent witness to the defeat of Austria in 1866 and an involuntary, albeit passive accomplice in the defeat of France in 1870. At the same time, he had to be satisfied with the ambiguous promise of future benefits from Bismarck and actually receive the abolition of the resolutions of the Paris Congress that prohibited Russia from having a fleet in the Black Sea. In the 70s, especially with the beginning of complications in the Balkans (Bosno-Herzegovina uprising), Georgia's policy was aimed at preparing the diplomatically inevitable Russian intervention in Balkan affairs and, if possible, using the new power - Germany - to support the Russians. lust in the East (straits - Constantinople) for the “services” that Russia provided to the German unification. And along the way, bitter disappointments awaited him. A witness to Sevastopol, G. was afraid of a new anti-Russian coalition and was far from a fan of the war with Turkey. But the fear of loss of prestige pushed the Russian. absolutism to small wars of conquest. G. saw himself forced to put up with the agitation of Pan-Slavism and its agents, who were pursuing their own policies behind the back of the government. The result was the Russian-Turkish War, which G. did not want, the Peace of San Stefano, concluded contrary to all previous treaties and agreements with Austria and England, and the “dock” at the Berlin Congress, where the decrepit G. suffered a miserable, sometimes just a funny role. The Berlin Congress was the de facto end political activity Gorchakova. In vain did he warn against a new rapprochement with Germany (the Alliance of the Three Emperors, negotiations began in 1879). They didn’t listen to him, they didn’t take him into account. Due to his illness and constant absences abroad, the management of affairs passed already from 1879 to Giers, who in 1882 was officially appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. G. died in Baden on 27/II 1883.

GORCHAKOV, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH(1798–1883), Russian statesman, diplomat, His Serene Highness Prince. He came from an ancient princely family, one of the branches of the Rurikovichs. Born on June 4 (15), 1798 in Gapsala (modern Haapsalu, Estonia) in the family of Major General M.A. Gorchakov. Received an excellent home education. He studied at the gymnasium in St. Petersburg. In 1811 he entered the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum; classmate of A.S. Pushkin, A.A. Delvig, V.K. Kuchelbecker, I.I. Pushchin.

Having graduated from the Lyceum in 1817 with a gold medal, he was accepted into the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the rank of titular adviser. At the end of 1819 he received the rank of chamber cadet. In 1820–1822 – secretary of the head of the Russian foreign policy department K.V. Nesselrode; participant in the congresses of the Holy Alliance in Troppau (October-December 1820), in Laibach (modern Ljublana; January-March 1821) and in Verona (October-December 1822). From December 1822 - first secretary of the embassy in London; in 1824 he received the rank of court councilor. In 1827–1828 - first secretary of the diplomatic mission in Rome; in 1828–1829 – adviser to the embassy in Berlin; in 1829–1832 - chargé d'affaires in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and in the Principality of Lucca. In 1833 he became an adviser to the embassy in Vienna. At the end of the 1830s, due to tense relations with K.V. Nesselrode resigned; lived in St. Petersburg for some time. In 1841 he returned to the diplomatic service; was sent to Stuttgart to arrange a marriage Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna (1822–1892), second daughter of Nicholas I with Hereditary Grand Duke of Württemberg Karl Friedrich Alexander. After their wedding, he was appointed envoy extraordinary to Württemberg (1841–1854). From the end of 1850 he also served as envoy extraordinary to the German Confederation in Frankfurt am Main (until 1854); made efforts to strengthen Russian influence in small German states and tried to prevent them from being absorbed by Austria and Prussia, which claimed to be the unifiers of Germany; during this period he became close to O. Bismarck, the Prussian representative to the German Confederation.

During the Crimean War of 1853–1856 he tried to prevent the rupture of Russia's relations with Austria and Prussia. As temporary manager of the embassy (1854–1855), and then ambassador plenipotentiary in Vienna (1855–1856), he tried to keep the Austrian government from joining the anti-Russian coalition. Represented Russia at the Vienna Conference of Ambassadors in the spring of 1855; contributed to the preservation of Austrian neutrality; without the knowledge of K.V. Nesselrode entered into separate negotiations with France with the aim of splitting the Anglo-French alliance.

After the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War and the subsequent resignation of K.V. Nesselrode, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on April 15 (27), 1856. Being a champion of Europeanism (the priority of pan-European interests over national ones), he was nevertheless forced, in the conditions of the collapse of the Holy Alliance system, to pursue a policy that primarily met the state needs of his country. It pursued two main goals: to restore Russia's position in the international arena and to avoid major foreign policy complications and military conflicts in order to ensure the possibility of carrying out reforms within the country. The most pressing task was the fight for the abolition of the restrictions imposed on Russia by the Paris Peace Treaty of March 18 (30), 1856.

In the second half of the 1850s, he set a course for rapprochement with France and isolation of Austria, which dealt Russia a “stab in the back” at the final stage of the Crimean War. In September 1857, a meeting between Napoleon III and Alexander II took place in Stuttgart. Russian diplomacy supported France and Sardinia during their war with Austria in 1859. Like France, Russia was hostile to the unification of Italy in 1860. However, attempts by Paris to put pressure on Russia during the Polish uprising of 1863 led to a cooling of Franco-Russian relations. At the end of 1862, Russia rejected Napoleon III's proposal for joint intervention by the European powers in the American Civil War on the side of the southerners, and in September 1863 it held a naval demonstration in favor of the northerners, sending two of its squadrons to the North American coast.

From the beginning of the 1860s, the Balkan and Western European ones became the two main directions of A.M. Gorchakov’s policy. Russian diplomacy has renewed pressure on Ottoman Empire in defense of the interests of the Christian population in the Balkans: in 1862 she came out in support of the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians, in 1865 - the Serbs, in 1868 - the Cretans. As for Western Europe, here Russia reoriented itself towards an alliance with Prussia: in exchange for Russia’s promise not to interfere with the unification of Germany under Prussian supremacy, O. Bismarck pledged to assist St. Petersburg in revising the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty. Russia maintained neutrality in the Danish-Prussian War of 1864 and provided diplomatic assistance to Prussia during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. The defeat of France, the main guarantor of the Paris Peace, in 1870 allowed A.M. Gorchakov to openly raise the question of its revision: on October 19 (31), 1870, he announced his refusal to comply with the restrictions imposed on Russia (“Gorchakov’s circular”); At the London Conference in January-March 1871, the great powers were forced to agree to the abolition of the “neutralization” of the Black Sea. Russia's sovereign rights in the Black Sea have been fully restored.

Diplomatic successes and the growth of Russia’s international authority in the 1860s and early 1870s strengthened A.M. Gorchakov’s position in ruling circles Empire. In 1862 he became a member of the State Council and vice-chancellor, in 1867 - chancellor, in 1871 - his Serene Highness.

From the beginning of the 1870s, the Balkan issue became the focus of his policy. In an effort to organize an anti-Turkish coalition of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary and to agree with the latter on the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans, he contributed to the creation in 1873 of the Union of Three Emperors - Alexander II, Wilhelm I and Franz Joseph. However, not wanting to establish German hegemony in Europe, in the spring of 1875 he decisively opposed its plans to start new war with France (“Gorchakov’s telegram”); this seriously worsened Russian-German relations.

During the period of aggravation of the situation in the Balkans ( Eastern crisis 1875–1877) preferred diplomatic methods of pressure on the Ottoman Empire: he was opposed to a large-scale war, fearing the unification of European powers against Russia. When the Russian-Turkish war became inevitable, he managed to ensure the neutrality of Austria-Hungary by concluding the Budapest Convention with it on January 3 (15), 1877. At the end of the war of 1877–1878 at the Berlin Congress (June-July 1878), he had to, despite the victory of Russian weapons, make serious concessions in the face of a united front of the Western powers, in particular, agree to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary (called the Berlin Congress is the “darkest page” in his biography). At court and in public opinion, the prestige of A.M. Gorchakov was significantly undermined. Since 1879 he actually retired; in 1880 he went abroad for treatment. Officially resigned in March 1882.

He died in Baden-Baden on February 27 (March 11), 1883. He was buried near St. Petersburg in the cemetery of the Trinity-Sergius Primorskaya Desert in the Gorchakov family crypt.

In 1998, the bicentennial anniversary of the birth of A.M. Gorchakov was widely celebrated in Russia.

Ivan Krivushin

Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov is one of the best diplomats in Russian history. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he managed to keep the Russian Empire away from acute European conflicts and return his state to its former position as a great world power.

Rurikovich

Alexander Gorchakov was born into an old noble family, descended from the Yaroslavl Rurik princes. Having received a good education at home, he brilliantly passed the exam and was admitted to the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum. This was the first intake of the educational institution, which in the future included the most prominent people of their time. One of Gorchakov’s friends from the Lyceum was Pushkin, who wrote about his comrade “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of the customs.” For his excessive zeal and ambition, Sasha Gorchakov received the nickname “dandy” at the lyceum. The liberal lyceum atmosphere cultivated valuable qualities in the future diplomat, which in the future affected his internal and foreign policy convictions. While still at the Lyceum, he advocated the introduction and spread civil rights and freedoms and restrictions on serfdom.

Already at the Lyceum, Gorchakov knew what he wanted and confidently set his sights on the diplomatic service. He was well educated, distinguished by his excellent knowledge of several languages, wit and breadth of outlook. In addition, young Gorchakov was extremely ambitious. He recalled his younger self with irony and claimed that he was so ambitious that he carried poison in his pocket if he was passed over. Fortunately, Alexander did not have to use poison; he resolutely began his career. Already at the age of twenty-one, he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Tropau, Ljubljana and Verona. Gorchakov's career developed rapidly. By that time he hardly remembered about the poison in his pocket.

After the Crimean War

Gorchakov's main achievements in the diplomatic service are associated with his work in resolving international politics after the Crimean War, in which Russia's defeat put the country in a disadvantageous and even dependent position. The international situation in Europe changed after the war. The Holy Alliance, in which Russia played a leading role, collapsed and the country found itself in diplomatic isolation. Under the terms of the Peace of Paris, the Russian Empire practically lost the Black Sea and lost the opportunity to station a fleet there. According to the article “on the neutralization of the Black Sea,” Russia’s southern borders remained exposed.

Gorchakov urgently needed to change the situation and take decisive steps to change Russia’s place. He understood that the main task of his activities after the Crimean War should be to change the conditions of the Paris Peace, especially in the matter of neutralizing the Black Sea. The Russian Empire was still under threat. Gorchakov needed to look for a new ally. Prussia, which was gaining influence in Europe, became such an ally. Gorchakov decides to make a “knight’s move” and writes a circular in which he unilaterally breaks the Paris Peace Treaty. He bases his decision on the fact that the remaining countries do not comply with the terms of previous agreements. Prussia supported the Russian Empire; it already had enough weight to influence the international situation. France and England were, of course, unhappy with this, but during the London Conference of 1871, the “neutrality of the Black Sea” was abolished. Russia's sovereign right to build and maintain a navy here was confirmed. Russia rose from its knees again.

Great Power Neutrality

The policy of neutrality became the credo of Gorchakov’s foreign policy. He himself repeated more than once: “There are no divergent interests that cannot be reconciled by zealously and persistently working on this matter in a spirit of justice and moderation.” He managed to localize the flaring up wars, preventing them from growing to a continental scale, when crises broke out - Polish, Danish, Austrian, Italian, Cretan... He knew how to keep Russia away from acute conflicts, protecting it from military involvement in European problems, for more than twenty years old. Meanwhile, Europe was rocked by endless conflicts: the Austro-Franco-Sardinian War (1859), the War of Austria and Prussia against Denmark (1865), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Austro-Italian War (1866), the Franco-Prussian War (1870). –1871).

Resolution of the Polish crisis

The key link in European politics in the 60s of the 19th century was the Polish crisis, which erupted as a result of the strengthening of national liberation movements. Events in Poland served as a pretext for the intervention of France and England in Polish affairs: the governments of these countries demonstratively demanded that Russia meet the demands of the rebels. A noisy anti-Russian campaign developed in the English and French press. Meanwhile, weakened after the Crimean War, Russia could not afford to lose Poland as well; abandoning it could lead to the collapse of the Russian Empire. The culmination of the diplomatic battle came on June 5, 1863, when English, French and Austrian dispatches were handed over to Gorchakov. Russia was asked to declare an amnesty for the rebels, restore the constitution of 1815 and transfer power to an independent Polish administration. The future status of Poland was to be discussed at a European conference. On July 1, Gorchakov sent reply dispatches: Russia denied the three powers the legitimacy of their third-party suggestions and vigorously protested against interference in its own internal affairs. The right to consider the Polish question was recognized only by the participants in the partitions of Poland - Russia, Prussia and Austria. Thanks to Gorchakov’s efforts, another anti-Russian coalition did not take shape. He managed to play on the Anglo-French contradictions around the Vienna Convention of 1815, and on Austria's fear of getting into a new war. Poland and France were left alone. Overcoming the Polish crisis through classical and public diplomacy is considered to be the pinnacle of Gorchakov’s political career.

Finding a new ally

Against the background of the betrayal of Austria and the unfriendly neutrality of Prussia during the Crimean War, as well as international isolation following the conflict, the Russian Empire had an urgent need to find a new ally. It turned out to be the USA, one of the main enemies of England, which at that time was engulfed in the Civil War between North and South. In 1863, Alexander II authorized a very risky action - the hidden transition of two squadrons Russian fleet to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, thereby demonstrating support for the North. For the fragile American statehood, the certainty of Russia's position turned out to be very useful. According to the organizers of the campaign, the expedition was designed to show the whole world Russia's self-confidence, despite the threats made against it in connection with the Polish events. It was a real challenge. Nevertheless, this bold step, at that time, gave Russia a new promising ally, to whom, subsequently, on Gorchakov’s initiative, Alaska would be sold. Today, this political move seems unjustified, but in the second half of the 19th century it made it possible to complete Alexander’s reform reforms and restore the country’s economy.

Spouse Musina-Pushkina, Maria Alexandrovna [d]

Lyceum. “Happy from the first days.” Carier start

Alexander Gorchakov was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was a friend of Pushkin. From his youth, “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), until late old age he was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat. In addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also had a significant literary education, which was later reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe.

In 1819, Gorchakov was awarded the court title of chamber cadet. In 1820-1822. he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Ljubljana and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a chargé d'affaires, and in 1833 as an embassy adviser in Vienna. In July 1838 he was forced to resign due to marriage (see section “Personal Life”), but in October 1839 he returned to service. During the period of resignation, Gorchakov, as an exception, retained the court title of chamberlain, which he received in 1828.

Ambassador to the German States

At the end of 1850, he was appointed commissioner to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his former post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated the political life of Germany. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close to the Prussian representative, Otto von Bismarck.

Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Sejm after Gorchakov, D. G. Glinka). Gorchakov, like Nesselrode, did not share Emperor Nicholas’ passion for the eastern question, and the diplomatic campaign that had begun against Turkey caused him great concern; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts.

The Crimean War and the “ungratefulness” of Austria

« Events in the West resonated in the East with encouragement and hope.”, he put it, and “ conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East" The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature.

Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, Gorchakov retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and unwittingly returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance. His protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

Polish question. Austro-Prussian War

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. Bismarck took charge of the Prussian government in September 1862. Since then, the policy of the Russian minister went in parallel with the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as much as possible. On February 8 (March 27), Prussia concluded the Alvensleben Convention with Russia to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising.

Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy credulity of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Gorchakov, while approving the French project in principle, both times objected to the congress under the given circumstances. A war began, which unexpectedly quickly led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of a congress came to Gorchakov, but was immediately abandoned by him due to his reluctance to do anything unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France. Honorary member of Moscow University (1867).

Period of strengthening of Germany

The power of Germany. Triple Alliance

After the defeat of France, the mutual relationship between Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German Chancellor outgrew his old friend and no longer needed him. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in the East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September 1872, made Russian foreign policy dependent not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, that is, essentially the same Austrian, interests, the circle of which was increasingly expanding on the Balkan Peninsula.

Chancellor Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria and, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

The diplomatic context of the Russian-Turkish war and the Berlin Congress

In April 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of powers from Europe, so that the paths to independent and open defense of Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifices of the two-year campaign were cut off in advance. He promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England, Shuvalov was instructed to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests.

Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. Treaty of San Stefano February 19 (March 3) July 8

At the Berlin Congress (from June 1 (13) to July 1 (13), Gorchakov took part in meetings little and rarely; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; Prince Gorchakov also spoke out in favor of occupation (meeting on June 16 (28). Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as the main culprit for Russia's failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna.

Which of us needs the Lyceum Day in our old age?
Will you have to celebrate alone?

The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, from March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

Gorchakov, in order of award, was one of the pensioners - Knights of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called (800 rubles per year) and pensioners - Knights, the niece of his boss D. P. Tatishchev, a Moscow beauty with whom Pushkin was infatuated, thus acquiring a stepdaughter and 4 stepsons, including Alexander Musin-Pushkin. For the sake of this marriage, he had to resign and leave the diplomatic service for some time. The couple had sons Mikhail (1839-1897) and Konstantin (1841-1926).

Here is how Prince P.V. Dolgorukov wrote about his resignation in “Petersburg Sketches”: “Tatishchev did not want his niece, who had no other fortune except the seventh part after her (however, very rich) husband, to marry a man who did not who had absolutely no fortune. Tatishchev’s dislike for this marriage was still skillfully inflated by the then ruler of Austrian politics, the famous Prince Metternich; he did not love Prince Gorchakov for his Russian soul, for his Russian feelings, for his intransigence, always covered by an excellent knowledge of decency, the most elegant politeness, but nevertheless very unpleasant for Metternich; in a word, he tried with all his might to quarrel between Tatishchev and Prince Gorchakov and remove the latter from Vienna. The thing was a success. Tatishchev resolutely rebelled against the wedding. Prince Gorchakov, faced with the inevitable need to choose between his beloved woman and a service that was very tempting for his ambition, did not hesitate: despite his enormous ambition, he retired in 1838 and married Countess Pushkina.” Later, the family connections of the Urusovs, his wife's relatives, helped him return to service and resume his career.

The descendants of Konstantin Gorchakov, who died in Paris, live in Western Europe and Latin America.