The beginning of the formation of Tatar military units in Eastern Front can be considered a proposal by German Foreign Ministry employee von Hentig, in which he substantiated the need to form a Tatar legion. In his message, he also proposed creating a Caucasian legion of three national battalions. The headquarters of the emerging Turkic legion was created in the Polish city of Rembertov (in the summer of 1942 it was transferred to the city of Radom). Since January 23, 1943, this headquarters was called the “Headquarters of the Commander of the Eastern Legions.”

The separation of natives of the Volga and Ural regions from the rest of the mass of Soviet prisoners of war began in the camps already in the fall and winter of 1941-1942. The official order to create the Tatar Legion was issued on August 15, 1942. The document prescribed the creation of a legion of Tatars, Bashkirs and representatives of the peoples of the Volga region who spoke Tatar. The Tatars enrolled in the Turkestan Legion were to be transferred to a new formation. Other Tatar prisoners of war had to be urgently separated from the rest and sent to a collection camp in the city of Sedlec. It was planned to use the newly created legion against the partisans.

The path of the Tatar volunteers passed through three camps.

The first (preliminary) was located in Ostrów Mazowiecki, 2nd. Sedlec "A", its commandant for some time was the former Soviet colonel Sh. Alkaev, 3rd camp. qualifying in Jedlin. Even before the order was issued, there were 2,550 people in the Siedlce camp.

In September 1942, the commander of the military district of the General Government, von Guinant, gave instructions on the rules for the direct organization of field national battalions. In accordance with this order, the training period for legionnaires at the first stage was 4 weeks and classes were held individually and in groups. The second stage of training (6.8 weeks) took place in companies and platoons.

In the summer and autumn of 1942, the formation of the legion was largely completed. It included representatives of the Volga region peoples. Ufa and Kazan Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurts, Mordovians. Already on September 6, 1942, the legion was solemnly presented with a banner, and two days later the headquarters of the eastern legions together with the commander of the military district of the General Government took command of it.

The commander of the Volga-Tatar legion was a native of Moscow, the elderly Major von Zickendorff. The major spoke Russian, English, French and Chinese. On May 12, 1944, he was forced to give up his post to Captain Kelle. This was the result of dissatisfaction among Hitler's elite with the policy that Sickendorff pursued towards his legionnaires. After leaving the legion, Zickendorff served at the headquarters of the eastern legions, then was appointed to the post of commander of the school of officers and interpreters of the eastern formations in Neuhammer. After that, he headed a similar school in Munsingen, where it was transferred from France. As a result of the intrigues of his opponents, Zickendorff was about to retire, but unexpectedly Oltssha stood up for him and recommended him to serve in the SS Hauptamt.

The Volga-Tatar Legion included the 825th, 826th, 827th, 828th, 829th, 830th, 831st Tatar battalions. The 825th battalion was formed by December 25, 1942 and consisted of a headquarters, headquarters and four rifle companies. Already on February 18, 1943, the battalion arrived in the Vitebsk region in the village of Belynichi. Here some of the battalion members agreed with the partisans about the time and place of the battalion’s transition to the forest.

An hour before the planned uprising on February 23, 1943, its leaders were arrested, but nevertheless the signal for action was given. Most of the battalions went over to the side of the partisans with weapons in their hands. This came as a surprise to the German command, which had pinned its hopes on the Tatars during Operation Ball Lightning. During the uprising, most of the German personnel were killed. The driver of the battalion commander, Major Zechs, who remained loyal to the Germans, saved his boss by taking him out in the trunk of a car.

The Abwehr was investigating the reasons for the battalion's transition to the partisans. From Zechs's testimony it followed that the reason for this was the weak ideological education of the legionnaires, the presence of a strong enemy conducting intensive propaganda. The report on the results of the investigation stated that the transition of the legionnaires became possible as a result of the activities of “individual intelligent Tatars.” In total, 557 legionnaires went over to the enemy side. The Tatars who remained loyal to the Germans were sent to the rear and merged into other units. The 2nd battalion of the legion (826th) was formed in Jedlin on January 15, 1943. The battalion commander was Captain Shermuli. The battalion operated in Holland. According to a contemporary, an uprising was also being prepared in the battalion. 26 people from the battalion were shot, 200 were transferred to punishment camps. The 3rd battalion of the legion (827th) was formed in Jedlin on February 10, 1943. Commander. Captain Pram. The battalion fought against partisans near Drohobych and Stanislav, where 50 people from it went into the forest. In France, the battalion was attached to the 7th Army and was located in the area of ​​Lanyon.

According to information from former serviceman R. Mustafin, an uprising was being prepared in the battalion, as a result of which two platoons and a penal company went over to the partisans, but the leader of the uprising, Senior Lieutenant Miftakhov, was captured and killed by the Germans. Transitions continued in France as well. The commanders of the penal unit and the 2nd company and with them 28 legionnaires went to the partisans. At the end of 1943, the battalion was placed at the disposal of the commander of the German group of forces in Belgium and Northern France and guarded important installations. The 828th battalion of the legion was formed by June 1, 1943 in Jedlin under the command of Captain Gaulinets and did not escape the sad fate of other Tatar units. On the territory of Western Ukraine in November 1943, 2 company commanders went into the forest, January 7.9, 1944. 8 legionnaires, from January 14 to 17. 9 legionnaires. At the end of the month, 30 legionnaires on duty at the customs post removed its guard, killed one squad commander, wounded another and went into the forest to join the partisans. In addition to the transitions, the battalion suffered heavy losses in prisoners who did not want to fight against the partisans and surrendered at the first opportunity.

G. Tessin reports that in 1944.1945. The battalion was called a construction and sapper battalion and was stationed in West Prussia. The 829th battalion of the Volga-Tatar Legion was formed by August 24, 1943. Battalion commander. Captain Rausch.

Later, the battalion was mentioned in German registration documents as a non-combat unit assigned to the 829th Field Commandant's Office. On August 29, 1944, the battalion was disbanded by order of the commander of the military district of the General Government, and its personnel were recalled to Krakow. The 830th battalion guarded facilities in Poland and Western Ukraine. In June 1944, the Gestapo department in Radom uncovered a conspiracy in the battalion and arrested more than 20 people. At a military court hearing, 17 of them were released due to lack of evidence. Subsequently, the battalion became known as the engineer-construction battalion and some units of the 791st Turkestan battalion were added to it. At the end of the war, the presence of the 830th battalion was noted in the Vistula bend, then in Pomerania. The 831st battalion was formed in Jedlin as a guard battalion (Sicherungs-battalion) to guard the Tatar camp and was later transferred to guard duty in Legionovo.

In the fall of 1943, it was planned to form the 832nd, 833rd and 834th Volga-Tatar battalions.

After the transfer of the Tatar legion to the Western Front, the headquarters of the legion was located in the city of Le Puy. At the beginning of June 1944, Tatar soldiers acted against partisans in the Chantal department, then in the areas of Issoire and Rochefort, Clermont-Ferrand.

Some eastern and national battalions included natives of the Volga region. Thus, Tatars, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Russians and Ukrainians served in the 627th Eastern Battalion, formed at the end of 1942 under the central army group of German troops. Three Tatar military personnel were awarded Iron Crosses of the 3rd degree.

The I/370th Turkestan battalion consisted of 1 Tatar company, 2 Uzbek and 1 Kyrgyz companies. The 811th Turkestan battalion included 130 Volga Tatars. On January 14, 1943, the OKH issued order No. 15285/40 on the beginning of the formation of Tatar construction and supply units in the Siedlce camp on the territory of the General Government. The headquarters of the Volga-Tatar construction companies was also created here. On May 24, 1943, the headquarters was transferred to Krushina and existed here until November 30, 1943.

The headquarters was led by an officer specially appointed by the commander of the eastern units.

Each auxiliary company consisted of 3 German officers, 1 official, 9 non-commissioned officers, 6 privates and 2 interpreters. Companies were attached to large German formations.

On September 1, 1943, the following Tatar auxiliary units existed: 18th Volga-Tatar construction battalion under Major Dekker. The 522nd Volga-Tatar supply battalion was stationed near Warsaw. It consisted of 3,411 people, of which 1,220 were Turkestanis, 425 Georgians, 1,061 Volga Tatars, 352 Azerbaijanis, 242 Armenians, 111 natives of the North Caucasus. The 2nd Turkic labor battalion included 4 companies of Volga Tatars. The 3rd Turkic labor battalion during its deployment in Lvov included 3 companies of Volga Tatars. In addition to them, Georgians and Armenians served in the battalion, a total of 6153 people.

Later, the above-mentioned units joined Colonel Boller's brigade. In addition to the Tatar units, it included auxiliary units formed from natives of Turkestan, the North Caucasus, and Transcaucasia.

In the fall of 1943, most of the auxiliary units were transferred to France. The headquarters for the formation of Tatar companies in Poland was dissolved, 8 companies were assigned to Turkic labor battalions or construction companies in the vicinity of Minsk. On January 15, 1944, the 2/IV labor battalion, consisting of 735 natives of the Volga region, 120 of whom professed Orthodoxy, was disbanded in Radom.

As of March 10, 1945, the Idel-Ural committee had information about the Tatar companies: 3/78, 4/100, 5/3/592, 2/314, 3/314, 2/862, 4/18, 2 /14. Several hundred Tatars served in the 35th Police Division.

Researcher of Tatar collaborationism I. Gilyazov reports that as of October 10, 1944, 11 thousand Tatar volunteers served in 12 field battalions, 4 thousand in other formations, 8 thousand in worker battalions, there were also 5 thousand eastern workers and up to 20 thousand prisoners of war. A large number of Tatars served in the ROA. On December 14, 1944, the head of the “East” department of the SS Hauptamt, F. Arlt, told Oltsche that the number of Tatars in the ROA was 20 thousand and the same number served as “hiwis”. On March 20, 1945, the head of the Tatar mediation, Count Stamati, had information about 19,300 Tatars in the legions, combat and auxiliary units, 4 thousand eastern Tatar workers and 20 thousand prisoners of war.

In addition to the Wehrmacht, the SS troops became the main “owner” of foreign units. In addition to Heinz Unglaube, control over the activities of the Tatar emigration and military formations was carried out by SS Oberscharführer Wolf. head of abstract 6 “East Turkestan SS combat formation” of the “Politics” subdepartment, which was, in turn, part of the “Managing department. Eastern Volunteers. SS Hauptamt."

As mentioned above, in the fall of 1944, the East Turkestan SS combat unit was created, which included the Tatar military group. Due to a shortage of command personnel, in January-February 1945, H. Unglaube attempted to organize a Tatar officer school in the Tatar mediation camps on the island of Wezedom and in the city of Dargibel. The first group of graduates arrived at VTBS at the end of February 1945. In mid-March, another 11 Tatars from among the former Soviet officers were sent to Italy. Despite the failure of the VTBS project, some Tatar units took part in anti-partisan operations in Slovakia and Northern Italy.

The end of the war was as tragic for the traitor Tatars as it was for thousands of collaborators. Only a few of them, with the support of influential friends from a number of governments of Muslim countries, took refuge in the Middle East and Turkey.

Shafi Almas was detained by the USSR State Security agencies and subsequently shot by a military tribunal. The former Soviet military commandant of Baku, Colonel Shakir Alkaev, fabricated for the KGB several minutes of meetings of the secret underground group of the legion. This did not save him from prison time. He was prosecuted again in the late 1950s.

Fyodor Paimuk managed to join the advancing Soviet units and took part in the Berlin operation, for which he was awarded a medal. In February 1946, he was arrested in Cheboksary and, according to the verdict of the military tribunal of the Volga Military District, was shot. The fate of Ivan Skobelev, captured by the advanced units of the Red Army in Dargibel, was similar.

Shafi Almas's secretary S. Faizullin (Faizi) after the war worked in the Tatar editorial office of the Voice of America, since 1952 he was engaged in geological exploration, taught at Boston University, and worked in the US Department of Commerce. Died in the USA in the 1980s.

Garif Sultan for a long time worked as the head of the Tatar-Bashkir editorial office of Radio Free Europe and lived in Munich.

Mass repressions hit the Crimean Tatars. They, as well as the Armenians, Bulgarians, and Germans living in Crimea, were accused of collaborating with the occupying German authorities and participating in mass executions of prisoners of war and partisans.

After the end of the Civil War in the South of Russia, a number of Kalmyks were evacuated abroad along with the Russian Army of General Wrangel and settled in Europe and the USA. At the same time, the Kalmyk emigration could be divided into two political camps: “nationalists” and “Cossacks”.

Nationalists (Astrakhan Kalmyks) worked to unite all Kalmyks, their “political awakening.” The Russians were declared enemies.

The Cossacks mainly consisted of representatives of the Kalmyks-Donets and could not imagine life without uniting with the Cossacks. The thoughts of the Cossacks extended to the idea of ​​equal unification with the Cossacks within the framework of the Cossack Federation. The Cossacks were closely associated with the “independents”, who proclaimed their goal to be the isolation of the Cossacks and their development as a separate ethnic group.

There was its own nationalist organization “Halm Tangalin Tuk” (HTT), the honorary chairman of which was the widow of Prince Tundutov, the head of the Kalmyks during the Civil War. The leaders of HTT were Sanji Balykov and Shamba Balinov. KhTT had its own printed organ, “Feather Waves” (“Ulan Zalat”), published in Russian and Kalmyk languages.

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Kalmyks became interested in a “greenhouse” for growing “fifth columns”. Rosenberg's department. At the same time, Kalmyk emigrant leaders were in demand. Shamba Balinov, Sanzhi Balykov and others. Under the control of the Eastern Ministry and special services, the Kalmyk National Committee was created, the head of which was appointed Shamba Balynov. At the same time, work was underway to create Kalmyk units and units on the Eastern Front.

The first Kalmyk formation can be called the special unit of Abwehrgruppe-103. It was created from volunteer prisoners of war to conduct reconnaissance on the territory of the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It was headed by Sonderführer Otto Rudolfovich Verba (aka Dr. Doll). Call sign of the radio station. "Kranich" ("Crane"). Initially, the detachment was stationed in the city of Stepnoy (Elista); subsequently, the so-called “Dr. Doll’s Special Unit” was deployed at the detachment’s base. At the end of 1942, Verba already commanded the “Kalmyk Military Unit” (Kalmuken Verband dr. Doll).

Fragmentary data about Dr. Doll himself indicate that he came from Sudeten Germans and had Russian roots, lived in Russia for a long time, served in the White Army, worked in the German military mission in Odessa, and in exile became an Abwehr employee.

In August 1942, the German command instructed Doll to establish contact with Kalmyk nationalist leaders, promising them to create an independent state under German protectorate after the war. Doll rushed to the Kalmyk steppes in a passenger car, accompanied by a driver and radio operator. His mission was a success and his goal was achieved.

In mid-September 1942, the first Kalmyk cavalry squadron was formed in the 16th German motorized division from among the former Kalmyk Red Army soldiers of the 110th Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division and the local population. He conducted reconnaissance and partisan warfare, like many other Cossack units of the German army. He was armed with Soviet captured weapons; the Kalmyks’ uniform was German.

One of the Kalmyk fighting groups was formed by Azda Boldyrev. Having deserted from the Red Army, he arrived in his native village of Ketchenery, where he organized his own detachment, which later joined the Kalmyk Cavalry Corps.

Boldyrev served as assistant chief of staff until December 1943, after which he commanded the second division of the Corps with the rank of lieutenant.

A certain Arbakov, after the occupation of Elista, worked as the head of the criminal investigation department, then joined the Corps, where he held the position of commandant of headquarters, assistant chief of staff for weapons, from September 1944. Chief of Staff of the Corps. After the end of the war, Arbakov and Boldyrev found themselves in a displaced persons camp in Germany, after which they emigrated to the United States.

Natural horsemen, Kalmyks have established themselves as brave soldiers and scouts. Military leadership, supporting the initiative to create Kalmyk units, allowed the creation of similar combat units. At the same time, the Kalmyks were the first of all Germany's eastern allies to officially receive recognition and the Germans gave the Kalmyk formations the status of an allied army.

By November 1942, 4 cavalry squadrons were already operating in Kalmykia; by the end of August 1943, the Kalmyk Corps was formed, which included the following units: 1st Division: 1, 4, 7, 8 and 18 squadrons; 2nd Division: 5, 6, 12, 20 and 23 squadrons; 3rd Division: 3, 14, 17, 21 and 25 squadrons; 4th Division: 2, 13, 19, 22 and 24 squadrons; 9, 10, 11, 15, 16 squadrons were partisans behind the front line.

This Kalmyk formation was also called the “Kalmyk Legion”, “Dr. Doll’s Kalmyk Cavalry Corps”, etc. The formation was part of the 4th Tank Army and operated in the areas of Rostov and Taganrog. By May 1943, under the leadership of Major General Nering, several more squadrons were organized in Novopetrovsk and Taganrog from among former defectors and prisoners of war.

The partisan squadrons behind the front line were under the tutelage of the Abwehr, and were supplied with weapons and ammunition by air. So, on May 23, 1944, in the area of ​​the Kalmyk village of Utta. in the area of ​​operation of the Kalmyk partisan group Ogdonov. 24 saboteurs were landed under the command of Hauptmann von Scheller (“Kwast”). The group’s task was to create a mini-bridgehead for receiving other planes with Dollevites, who would subsequently launch a powerful guerrilla war in the Soviet rear. the entire Abwehr operation was called "Roman Numeral II". Soviet air defense forces detected an enemy aircraft flying to the rear, and after some time the group was neutralized. Further events developed according to the scenario already well worked out by SMERSH. The captured radio operator of the plane and Kvast himself agreed to transmit the signal of arrival, and the further existence of the group took place under the control of Soviet counterintelligence. A false airfield was equipped to receive aircraft. The second plane with thirty paratroopers was destroyed on the night of June 12, 1944 at the landing site; none of its passengers managed to escape. For some time, Soviet counterintelligence played a radio game with its enemy, and gradually it managed to convince the Abwehr of the complete defeat of the group in battles with the NKVD troops.

In September 1943, the KKK was located on the Dnieper, and in May 1944 it was incorporated into the 6th Army as the 531st Regiment. In the summer of 1944, there were 3.6 thousand soldiers in the Corps, of which 92 were men. German staff. The divisions consisted of four squadrons, each of them, in turn, numbered 150 people. Significant difference Kalmyk units from other eastern formations was that the commanders of the units were their own, and not German officers.

The Corps' armament consisted of 6 mortars, 15 hand-held and 15 easel mortars, 33 German and 135 Soviet machine guns, Soviet, German and Dutch rifles. The Kalmyk uniform did not have its own insignia and was not regulated in any way. Often, Kalmyks' uniforms included elements of folk costume. fur hats, robes, etc. According to unconfirmed information, the German officers of the KKK had their own round sleeve patch with the inscription in German and Kalmyk languages ​​“Kalmyk unit of Dr. Doll.”

In the winter of 1944-1945. The corps (at least 5 thousand people) was in Poland, where it fought against Soviet partisans and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and then fought heavy battles with advanced Soviet units near Radom.

After bloody battles, the Corps was transferred to the SS training camp in Neuhammer. "forge" of the eastern SS formations. The newly formed Kalmyk regiment was sent to Croatia, where it organically joined the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of Helmut von Pannwitz and subsequently formally became part of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. Kalmyks became the only foreign representatives in KONR.

Subsequently, the Kalmyks shared the common fate of the Cossacks; most of them were extradited to the USSR.

I. A. Gilyazov

LEGION "IDEL-URAL"

Introduction

The Great Patriotic War is gradually moving away from us into the distant past. This war, one of the bloodiest in human history, largely determined the course of subsequent historical events. It became a huge tragedy for millions of people. Its traces, perhaps, remain today in the souls of not only war veterans and those who survived the horrors of war while working on the home front, but they can probably be felt in the feelings of post-war generations, each of which in their own way is trying to understand the greatness and tragedy of this large-scale disaster. Therefore, the undying interest in military issues of modern historical science is obvious. It would seem that the topic of the Great Patriotic War has been studied far and wide by researchers. Thousands of monographs and articles have been published on the history of the war, and there are also major multi-volume studies.

And yet, war is such a multifaceted and multidimensional phenomenon that even after more than 60 years it is hardly possible to study every nuance of it with all scrupulousness and objectivity. There are also certainly subjects that have been little or insufficiently studied by researchers, the so-called “blank spots.” And indeed, for some time, topics in the history of war remained closed to study. on them in force political reasons was taboo. Historians could think about them to themselves, but they had neither the opportunity nor the permission to study them.

One of these problems is the very sensitive and ambiguously perceived topic of Soviet collaboration during the war years or the topic of military and political cooperation of a certain part of Soviet citizens with Germany - occupation authorities, Wehrmacht and SS, political institutions of the Third Reich. Obviously, many have heard about General Andrei Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Army, about the Eastern legions created by the Nazis from prisoners of war of representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the USSR, including the Idel-Ural legion. In Soviet times, these topics were mentioned in historical literature and journalism, but the information was, firstly, very dosed, and secondly, very unreliable. We should have formed the opinion that such military formations as the ROA or the Eastern Legions were pitiful, absolutely helpless appendages of the Wehrmacht, consisting entirely of traitors and renegades. If honest people joined them, then only with the clear intention of turning the weapons they received against the enemy. It turned out that the Eastern legionnaires then almost all defected to the partisans - in Belarus, Ukraine, France or Holland, that the Eastern legions initially opposed the Germans and resisted all attempts to use them in the fight against the Red Army or the partisans. But everything, it turns out, is far from so simple and smooth. Even if we pay attention only to quantitative indicators and remember that during the war there were at least 700,000 Soviet citizens in the German armed forces, mostly prisoners of war, the question naturally arises: how did this happen? Could there really be so many “traitors” and “renegades”? To explain all this as elementary betrayal would be to a large extent a simplification and trivialization of the problem. For all its painfulness and ambiguity, it should be looked at more broadly and unbiasedly.

In the post-Soviet era, when historians were able to study the past more freely, when previously closed archives were opened, topics that had previously been vetoed attracted and are attracting special and intense interest. They also evoke an interested reaction from readers. And the problem of Soviet collaboration during the Second World War really began to be studied quite intensively. Especially a lot of historical literature is devoted to the personality of General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Army - dozens of books, studies and collections of documentary materials have already been published. The history of the Eastern Legions is not ignored either.

So we can state with satisfaction that in a fairly short time, even a certain tradition has developed in the study of Soviet collaboration during the Second World War. There have been several different approaches in assessing this phenomenon. Particularly representative is the group of those researchers who, to a certain extent, continue the line of Soviet historiography and, without much doubt, equate collaboration with betrayal. But at the same time, there is an attempt in some studies to provide a more comprehensive and, in our opinion, more objective coverage of this problem.

This book is an attempt to examine the phenomenon of Soviet collaboration using the example of representatives of Turkic-Muslim peoples. Based on the sources at my disposal, I will try to present the course of historical events related to this plot, introduce the reader to its various aspects, and express my own opinions about the phenomenon of collaboration. The task of the historian in this case is not to act as an accuser or defender, but to strive to present the events that took place in the past as impartially and objectively as possible, without going to extremes. It is clear that from the heights of today it is quite easy to label and describe everything in two colors - black and white. And a war, especially one like the Second World War, is a phenomenon so complex that two colors are clearly not enough to represent all its sides. It should be borne in mind that when studying the past, we must have the broadest possible understanding of it, and not select from it only “winning”, heroic or convenient plots that at the moment seem “politically consistent” or “useful”.

This book is the result of work in archives and libraries in Germany. Of particular interest to me were the documentary materials of various institutions of National Socialist Germany, both military and civilian: materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Eastern Ministry), the Main Directorate of the SS, the command of the Eastern Legions and various military formations of the Wehrmacht. The ideological orientation of this documentation was never lost sight of. These documents were the product of cruel totalitarian regime, therefore the need for a strictly critical approach to them was obvious to me. Alas, not all of the sources from the Second World War have survived; many were irretrievably lost. And yet, the available material allows us to reproduce with sufficient accuracy one of the large-scale military-political scams of the Third Reich - an attempt to organize military and political cooperation with representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the USSR and its results.

I express my gratitude to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung), which made it possible for me to conduct a targeted and in-depth search in German archives. I am very grateful to all the colleagues whose advice helped me in writing this work - the staff of the Seminar on East European History at the University of Cologne: its then director Professor Andreas Kappeler (currently the University of Vienna), Dr. Christian Noack (currently the University of Dublin), Dr. Guido Hausmann (currently University of Freiburg), and in addition, Professor Ingeborg Baldauf (Berlin), Professor Gerhard Simon (Cologne), Professor Adolf Hampel (Hungen), Dr. Patrick von zur Mühlen (Bonn), Dr. Sebastian Zwiklinski (Berlin) ). I remember with warmth and sadness my late colleagues Professor Gerhard Hepp (Berlin) and Dr. Joachim Hoffmann (Freiburg). Many colleagues in Russia also did not stand aside - I sincerely thank the writer Rafael Mustafin (Kazan), deputy chief editor of the “Book of Memory” Mikhail Cherepanov (Kazan) and former leader Center for Public Relations of the KGB of the Republic of Tatarstan Rovel Kashapov. Options for this study were discussed at meetings in Kazan state university, and valuable comments on the text were made by many colleagues in the departments of history of the Tatar people, history of Tatarstan, modern national history and historiography and source studies of KSU - Professor Mirkasym Usmanov, Professor Indus Tagirov, Professor Alter Litvin, Professor Ramzi Valeev, Professor Rif Khairutdinov, Professor Alexander Litvin , Associate Professor Valery Telishev, Associate Professor Zavdat Minnullin, Associate Professor Dina Mustafina. In addition, the observations of professors Nikolai Bugai (Moscow) and Ksenophon Sanukov (Yoshkar-Ola) were also very important for me.

Contemporaries of the events described helped me a lot; conversations with them made it possible to more vividly and imaginatively imagine what was happening. With sincere respect I remember the late lawyer Heinz Unglaube (Lauenburg), former head of the Tatar Mediation. I wish good health to Tarif Sultan (Munich), a former member of the “Union of Struggle of the Turkic-Tatars of Idel-Ural”, an outstanding figure in the Tatar post-war emigration.

On July 16, 1941, at a meeting of the German senior leadership with the participation of Hitler, Rosenberg, Keitel, Goering and Lammers, it was stated: “The iron rule must become and remain: No one should be allowed to bear arms except Germans! And this is especially important, even if at first it may seem easy to attract any foreign, subordinate peoples to military assistance - all this is wrong! Someday it will definitely, inevitably be turned against us. Only a German is allowed to bear arms, not a Slav, not a Czech, not a Cossack or a Ukrainian!”

What was said, as we see, was very categorical and, it would seem, there should not be and will not be a revision of this strict ban. But by the end of 1941 and during 1942. Tens of thousands of representatives of the peoples of the USSR were placed under the banner of the Wehrmacht. The Eastern Legions were hastily formed from them, the main impetus for the creation of which was given by the obvious failure of the plan for a lightning war.

Other important circumstances that contributed to the creation of the Eastern Legions include the following:

– The presence of a huge number of Soviet prisoners of war in the hands of Germany.

– Conducting active German propaganda among the population of the occupied regions of the USSR and against the advanced units of the Red Army. This led to many representatives civilian population Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states collaborated with the Germans. Also, a considerable number of soldiers and officers of the Red Army went over to the German side, especially in the first period of the war.

– The position of some foreign countries, which demanded more humane treatment at least in relation to Turkic and Muslim prisoners of war. Turkish politicians showed the greatest interest in this issue. This should also include the activation of emigrant leaders from representatives of the peoples of the USSR at the beginning of the war.

When the Blitzkrieg plan failed, these factors influenced the position of the German leadership. And it, despite the difference in points of view and serious contradictions between the leaders and the highest state and military institutions of the Reich, decided to take advantage of the prevailing circumstances.

The headquarters for the creation of the Eastern Legions from February 18, 1942 was located in Poland, in the city of Rembertow, in the summer of the same year under the name “Headquarters of the Eastern Legions” it was transferred to the city of Radom, on January 23, 1943 it became known as the Command of the Eastern Legions.

The Volga-Tatar legion (or the Idel-Ural legion) was created later than all the others. Although in fact, representatives of the peoples of the Volga region were separated into special combined camps already in the fall and winter of 1941–1942. For the first time in the documents at our disposal, the creation of the Volga-Tatar Legion is mentioned on July 1, 1942 - on this day information about the emerging legions was sent to various authorities, among which the Volga-Tatar Legion was mentioned. On August 1, 1942, an order was given from Hitler's headquarters, signed by Chief of Staff Keitel, to create, in addition to the existing ones, a legion consisting of Volga (Kazan) Tatars, Bashkirs, Tatar-speaking Chuvash, Mari, Udmurts and Mordovians. The order ordered the separation of representatives of the named peoples into special camps and intensification of work with the recruitment of prisoners of war. It was noted that the status of the Volga-Tatar Legion is exactly the same as that of previously created similar formations, that the use of the legion is envisaged in areas of military operations, but especially in areas where partisans operate.

Keitel's order was, as it were, an order from above, and the practical order of the Wehrmacht High Command was signed on August 15, 1942. It already contained more specific instructions:

"1. Create a legion of Tatars, Bashkirs and Tatar-speaking peoples of the Volga region;

2. The Tatars assigned to the Turkestan Legion should be transferred to the Volga-Tatar Legion;

3. Tatar prisoners of war should be urgently separated from the rest and sent to the Siedlce camp (on the Warsaw-Brest railway line). Place them at the disposal of the Military Commander in the General Government (Militärbefehlshaber im General-Gouvernement);

4. The created legion should be used primarily in the fight against partisans.”

Practical work The creation of the Volga-Tatar Legion began on August 21, 1942. The camp in Jedlino near Radom was chosen as the place of its formation, where uniforms and weapons for the legion were received. German responsible personnel also arrived here. The Siedlce camp, located near Jedlino, had already become a collection point for prisoners of war from Turkic peoples.

The banner of the Volga-Tatar Legion was presented on September 6, 1942, so the legionnaires themselves considered this day to be the date of the final formation of the formation.

On September 8, 1942, the Volga-Tatar Legion was placed under the command of the headquarters of the Eastern Legions and the commander of the military district in the “Government General”.

Tatar prisoners of war were concentrated mainly in the Siedlce A camp, from where they were sent for training to the legion in Jedlino. Subsequently, the camp in Dęblin (Stalag 307) also played the role of a preliminary camp. And at the beginning of 1944, after the transfer of the Eastern Legions to France, the general preliminary camp was in Legionowo near Warsaw, from March 1944 - again in Siedlce B (Stalag 366) and in the Nechrybka camp (Stalag 327). A rather elderly and experienced military man, Major Oscar von Seckendorff, was appointed commander of the Volga-Tatar Legion. He was born on June 12, 1875 in Moscow, spoke Russian, English, French, and Chinese well; spoke Ukrainian worse and Spanish languages. He was later promoted to lieutenant colonel.

According to the available documents, it can be judged that Seckendorff, despite his age, took up the matter quite energetically, most of all paying attention to the issues of combat training of legionnaires. Perhaps one of the most serious problems for him (as well as for other German organizers of the Eastern Legions) was the problem of training national officers, which, by the way, was never resolved until the end of the war, although it was raised more than once.

According to the plan, the first of the battalions of the Volga-Tatar Legion, numbered 825, was supposed to be created by December 1, 1942, but it was formed even a little earlier - on November 25. The date for the formation of the 826th battalion was set at December 15, 1942, the 827th - January 1, 1943. In fact, this happened, respectively, on January 15 and February 10, 1943. In surviving documents, all three battalions are first mentioned on November 3, 1942 .as being created.

The Tatar battalions, which were created in Poland, in Jedlino, under the control and jurisdiction of the command of the Eastern Legions in the German armed forces, and which are described in detail on the basis of available documents, were not the only ones. Most likely, under separate armies or army groups, other Tatar formations were created in parallel or later, for example, during 1944. Among them were combat, construction, and supply units.

825th Battalion. This is the most famous of all created Tatar battalions. Major Tsek was appointed commander of the battalion. The exact number of Tatar legionnaires in this battalion is not indicated in the surviving documents, but, comparing it with other similar formations, it can be assumed that there were approximately 900 people in it.

The 825th battalion is known primarily for its armed action against the Germans at the end of February 1943. This fact is widely known in Russian journalistic literature. It happened as follows.

Apparently, on February 14, 1943, the battalion was solemnly sent to the front: “Before the battalion left to fight the partisans in the village. A professor, whose last name is unknown, arrived from Berlin to give a report. The report was made at foreign language. In his report, the speaker called on the legions to destroy the Bolsheviks, (spoke) about the creation of a “Tatar state” by Hitler, about the creation of a new wonderful life,” a source from among the Belarusian partisans reported about the farewell. On February 18, at night, the battalion arrived in Vitebsk, after which it was sent towards the village of Belynovichi along the Surazhskoe highway. Then the main part of it was located in the village of Gralevo on the left bank of the Western Dvina. On February 21, representatives of the legionnaires contacted the partisans.

As a result of the negotiations, an agreement was reached that on February 22 at 23:00 a general uprising of the legion would be launched, and it would go over with arms to the side of the partisans. Obviously, the Germans became aware of the plans of the underground, and an hour before the planned performance, arrests were made and the leaders of the uprising Zhukov, Tadzhiev and Rakhimov were captured. Then the commander of the headquarters company, Khusain Mukhamedov, took the initiative. A signal was sent to almost all units of the battalion located in different localities in the neighborhood - an uprising began. According to the source, two platoons of the second company failed to notify.

The legionnaires who crossed over were distributed in partisan brigades commanded by Zakharov and Biryulin.

So, the first entry into battle of the first unit of the Volga-Tatar Legion ended in failure for the German side. In German documents, albeit in a veiled form, the reasons for this are clearly visible: firstly, the activity of “individual intelligent Tatars” among the legionnaires undoubtedly affected them, who organized the battalion’s transition to the side of the partisans. Perhaps we are talking about the activities of Musa Jalil’s group, or his predecessors, but in any case, the performance of the legionnaires was organized and prepared in advance. Secondly, despite the long-term ideological indoctrination, the Germans really failed to truly attract the Tatar legionnaires to their side. The feeling of Soviet patriotism in them turned out to be stronger - the Germans, despite their efforts, remained “strangers” for the Tatar legionnaires; they saw “their own” in the Belarusian partisans.

Those former legionnaires who went over to the side of the partisans, apparently, almost immediately took part in the battles against the German army - they were especially intense on February 28, 1943 and were aimed at breaking the blockade. They continued to remain part of partisan formations in Belarus. This is confirmed, for example, by a letter from the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement dated July 2, 1943: “After the battalion went over to the partisans, its personnel were actually dispersed among partisan brigades, took part in military operations against the German occupiers, and showed themselves positive side. Some of the battalion’s personnel are still in partisan brigades.”

After these events, the legionnaires of the 825th battalion who remained on the German side were immediately sent to the rear and assigned to other formations. The uprising of the 825th battalion was a cold shower for the German command. This event played a significant role in future fate Eastern legions.

826th battalion. The organization of the 826th battalion, planned for December 15, 1942, did not take place - it was formed in Yedlino on January 15, 1943. In March 1943, after the uprising of the 825th battalion, the 826th “out of harm’s way” was transferred to the territory of Holland in area of ​​the city of Breda. Here, apparently, he served as a security guard and was also involved in other work. They obviously did not dare to involve the 826th battalion in any real military operations.

On September 1, 1943, the battalion may have been in France (there is no more precise indication), and on October 2, 1943 it was redeployed again to Holland, where it remained throughout 1943 - early 1945.

R.A. Mustafin also connects this eloquent fact with the history of the 826th battalion - an uprising was prepared in the unit, but German counterintelligence managed to thwart the plans of the underground. 26 members of the underground organization were then shot, two hundred people were transferred to a punishment camp.

827th battalion. The battalion was created on February 10, 1943 in Yedlino. His field mail number was 43645A-E. The battalion commander was Captain Pram.

Since the end of June 1943, the 827th battalion, sent to fight the partisans, was in Western Ukraine. Here the legionnaires took part in several clashes with partisans.

At the beginning of October 1943, the battalion was transferred to Lannon in France and was placed at the disposal of the 7th Army. In actions against partisans in Western Ukraine, the 827th battalion disappointed the German command. Moreover, the presence of the battalion in this territory strengthened the partisan detachments, because many legionnaires ran over to them. But even after the battalion was transferred to France, it never became a “reliable” unit for the Germans, since here too many legionnaires went over to the French partisans.

828th Battalion. This battalion was created in the period from April 1, 1943 and was finally formed on June 1, 1943. After its formation, the battalion was located in Yedlino itself for quite a long time.

On September 28, 1943, the formation was sent to Western Ukraine to replace the 827th battalion, which turned out to be “unreliable.” The Germans' hopes for the newly arrived legionnaires were in vain. Sources clearly indicate that during the entire stay of the 828th battalion in Western Ukraine, many of the legionnaires defected to the partisans.

829th Battalion. It was created on August 24, 1943 in Yedlino. Most likely, under the influence of failures with the first battalions, the 829th remained in Yedlino for quite a long time. But subsequently the battalion was also moved to Western Ukraine.

The finale for the 829th battalion came quite quickly: by order of the commander of the military district in the “Government General” of August 29, 1944, it was disbanded due to the increasing incidence of “violations of discipline” in the battalion. All these events had to be carried out before September 18, 1944. This is where the story of the 829th Tatar battalion ended.

830th Battalion. There is no exact information about the day the 830th battalion was formed. Although it is already mentioned in documents dated September 1, 1943, its existence on that day is doubtful, since even in the document dated October 26 it is mentioned as “forming.”

The Germans no longer decided to use the battalion against the partisans: it carried out security service in various settlements of Western Ukraine and Poland. These transfers were carried out to test the “reliability” and combat effectiveness of the battalion, which aroused suspicion among the Germans, and not without reason.

In June 1944, the Gestapo office in Radom managed to contact one of the non-commissioned officers of the 830th battalion, who was looking for connections with “communist gangs”. He, apparently, managed to organize 20 legionnaires to kill German personnel on the night of June 17-18, open a weapons depot, seize cars and run to the partisans with weapons. But on June 12 and 15, the initiators of the conspiracy, more than 20 people in total, were arrested. 17 of them were subsequently released by a military court due to lack of evidence. Representatives of the secret police considered that this decision was legally justified, but its consequences could be unpredictable, so it was recommended to discuss the situation in detail with the commander of the eastern detachments.

It seems that on final stage War, the 830th battalion existed as a construction and engineer battalion, at the beginning of 1945 it was stationed in the Vistula bend, and later in Pomerania.

831st Battalion. It was formed in the fall of 1943 in Yedlino. Its existence is confirmed in the second half of October. As far as can be judged from the text of the document, he provided security for the main camp of the Volga-Tatar Legion in Yedlino. The formation had to do approximately the same thing in February 1944, when it was in Legionowo near Warsaw. There are no other mentions of the 831st battalion in known sources.

Creation of battalions of the Volga-Tatar Legion by serial numbers 832, 833, 834 was planned for the fall of 1943. Most likely, they were never formed. It was not possible to find any references that would actually confirm the existence of these Tatar battalions.

On September 29, 1943, Hitler ordered the transfer of all Eastern volunteers from the East to the West, and this was reflected in the order of the German General Staff of October 2, 1943 (No. 10570/43) on the transfer of the Eastern Legions from the territory of Poland to France at the disposal of the commander Army Group West in the city of Nancy. The redeployment was supposed to be carried out in the following order:

1. Georgian Legion; 2. North Caucasian Legion; 3. Command of the Eastern Legions; 4. Officer school in Legionovo; 5. Volga-Tatar Legion and School of Translators; 6. Armenian Legion; 7. Turkestan Legion; 8. Azerbaijan Legion. Thus, we were not talking about absolutely all eastern battalions; some of them remained at the place of service. All command structures of the Eastern Legions, the so-called main camps, and some of the battalions were transferred to France.

To carry out this large-scale event, a special liquidation headquarters was created under the command of Colonel Möller. The order prescribed by the order was generally observed. For example, the main camp and command of the Volga-Tatar Legion left Yedlino on October 19, 1943, and the command and headquarters of the Eastern Legions set off on October 24. Transportation was carried out by special military trains and very quickly. And yet, in the first half of November 1943, the redeployment was basically completed: on March 1, 1944, the commander of Army Group West had, according to official data, 61,439 foreigners and eastern volunteers.

The command of the Eastern Legions in France in October 1943 was located in Nancy (Eastern France), but at the end of November it was transferred further south to Millau. Most likely, due to the unfavorable development of the military situation for the Germans, on March 15, 1944, the command of the eastern formations from Millau returned to Nancy (we are talking specifically about the former command of the Eastern Legions, and not about the command of all volunteer formations).

At the beginning of 1944, a serious restructuring of formations from the eastern nations took place in France, which, most likely, was intended to strengthen control over them and achieve their maximum combat readiness. Here, in February 1944, a new structure was formed, called the Main Volunteer Division (Freiwilligen Stamm Division) with its center in Lyon and under the command initially of Colonel Holste. At the end of March 1944, Holste was replaced by Major General von Henning. The named division was divided into a number of regiments based on nationality, including formations of Russians, Ukrainians and Cossacks. The Volga-Tatar Legion, whose command was located in the city of Le Puy, belonged to the 2nd regiment, and the formation continued to be called the Volga-Tatar Legion as part of the 2nd regiment.

Stationed in different countries and areas of Western Europe, the eastern battalions were intended not only to defend the Atlantic Wall, but also, as in the East, to fight against partisans. For example, three companies from the Volga-Tatar Legion took part in the German action against the French maquis in the department of Chantal in early June 1944; in early August, units of the Volga-Tatar Legion participated in the same actions in the regions settlements Issoire and Rochefort (in the area of ​​Clermont-Ferrand).

The Eastern legions in France generally demonstrated the same qualities as previously in the Ukraine.

Units of the Volga-Tatar Legion demonstrated stable “unreliability”. On July 13, 1944, Field Commandant's Office 588 in Clermont-Ferrand clearly stated with bitterness in its report: “The reconnaissance group of the Tatar legion could not achieve anything more than to catch several previously escaped Armenian legionnaires.” On the night of July 29-30, 1944, one Russian officer and 78 legionnaires of the Volga-Tatar Legion, according to the same commandant’s office, ran over to the partisans, and the rest were immediately returned to the barracks. There are many such examples of eastern legionnaires running over to the partisans in the last period of the war. Many such cases have already become widely known from publications in our press.

Most of the Eastern Volunteer battalions Western Front was divided and distributed among different areas and assigned to larger German formations. This isolation from each other, undoubtedly, even more noticeably increased the feeling of confusion and depression among the majority of legionnaires. So, in general, the use of the Eastern Legions and in Western Europe did not bring the results desired for the Germans. Many of the legionnaires were very afraid of being captured by the advancing Soviet troops, preferring to end up captured by the Allies. But the fate of the latter also turned out to be unenviable: according to agreements between the USSR and the Allied powers, all Soviet citizens who found themselves in the hands of British and American troops were subsequently transferred to the Soviet side. They returned to their native land, where in most cases severe punishment awaited them.

Thus, we see that German plans to use formations from representatives of the Turkic peoples of the USSR, including the Tatars, especially active in 1942–1944, ended in failure. The underground anti-fascist groups that arose among the Eastern legionnaires certainly played their role in the failure of the Nazis’ aspirations. One of the most famous such groups is the group led by Gainan Kurmashev and Musa Jalil. Apparently, this group began its activities at the end of 1942. It consisted, first of all, of Tatar officers who found themselves in German captivity. The underground members set as their main goal the disintegration of the Idel-Ural legion from within and preparation for an uprising. To achieve their goal, they used the printing house of the Idel-Ural newspaper, published by the Eastern Ministry of Germany specifically for legionnaires since the fall of 1942.

Gainan Kurmashev created and coordinated the work of the fives of the underground organization. Musa Jalil, who had the opportunity to move freely throughout Germany and Poland, organized campaigning among the legionnaires. Akhmet Simaev worked at the propaganda radio station “Vineta”, where he could receive information for the Resistance group and produce leaflets. Abdulla Alish, Akhat Atnashev and Zinnat Khasanov also took an active part in the production and distribution of leaflets.

It is safe to assume that the battalions of the Idel-Ural Legion did not live up to the expectations that the German command had for them, largely thanks to the activities of the underground members of the Kurmashev-Jalil group. Unfortunately, this activity was interrupted by German counterintelligence: in Berlin, the underground members were arrested on the night of August 11-12, 1943. In total, about 40 people from the propaganda units of the Idel-Ural Legion were captured in August 1943.

After a lengthy investigation, members of the Resistance were brought before the Imperial Court in Dresden. On February 12, 1944, by his decision, 11 people were sentenced to death penalty. These are Musa Jalil, Gainan Kurmashev, Abdulla Alish, Akhmet Simaev, Akhat Adnashev, Abdulla Battalov, Fuat Bulatov, Salim Bukharov, Fuat Saifulmulyukov, Zinnat Khasanov, Garif Shabaev. The text states “assisting the enemy” and “undermining military power” as grounds for sentencing for all. This formulation allows us to reasonably assert that the resistance group that existed in the Idel-Ural legion caused serious damage to the “Third Reich” through its actions.

The execution of Tatar patriots by guillotining was carried out in the Berlin prison Plötzensee on August 25, 1944. Gainan Kurmashev was the first to ascend the scaffold - at 12:06. The remaining members of the underground were executed within three minutes of each other.

In Berlin, at the Museum of Resistance to Fascism, a memorial plaque with the names of the group members was opened in memory of the Tatar underground fighters, and stands with materials about the heroes were installed in Plötzensee prison.

I.A. Gilyazov

Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof. Nürnberg 1949, Bd. XXXVIII, Document 221-L, S. 88.

However, attributing the creation of the Eastern Legions solely to the failure of the “blitzkrieg” plan is an oversimplification of the problem. This trend is clearly observed in our historiography (see, for example: Abdullin M.I.. The fighting truth. Criticism of bourgeois concepts of development of the socialist nations of the Volga region and the Urals. – Kazan, 1985. – P. 44). Even the creation of commissions for the selection of Turkic prisoners of war is “adjusted” to the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, although such commissions, which will be discussed below, already existed in August-September 1941 (see, for example: Mustafin R.A. What motivated Jalil? // Tatarstan.- 1993. - No. 12.- P.73)

Hoffmann, Joachim. Die Ostlegionen 1941-1943. Turkotataren, Kaukasier und Wolgafinnen im deutschen Heer. Freiburg 1976, S.30-31.

Bundesarchiv des Beaufragten für die Unterlagen des Ministeriums der Staatssicherheit der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereinafter - BStU-Zentralarchiv), RHE 5/88-SU, Bd.2, Bl. 143.

For fragmentary biographical information about von Seckendorff, see: Bundesarchiv-Potsdam, NS 31/45, Bl. 237; NS 31/55, Bl.27. In the book by S. Drobyazko, his last name is distorted as Zickerdorf ( Drobyazko S.I.. Under the banners of the enemy. Anti-Soviet formations within the German armed forces. 1941–1945. – M., 2004. – P. 151).

It became unsafe to write about the collaboration of Soviet citizens during the Second War: scientists working on this difficult topic are attacked by jingoists. Despite the campaign of harassment, research continues.

Doctor historical sciences, professor of Kazansky federal university, with whom we met at the European University of St. Petersburg, has been studying this phenomenon for several decades using the example of Russian Muslim soldiers who found themselves in German captivity during the First World War, and on the example of representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union who joined in armed formations within the Wehrmacht, in particular in Volga-Tatar Legion, into the so-called legion "Idel-Ural".

Iskander Gilyazov reports.

The creation of the Eastern Legions as part of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War came to a certain extent as a surprise to the Germans themselves

– The creation of the eastern legions within the Wehrmacht during the Second World War came to a certain extent as a surprise to the Germans themselves. At the very beginning of the war, when they were planning a military campaign against the Soviet Union, the Germans did not plan to rely on any forces from other nations at all. They had a very strict attitude: only Germans could carry weapons, and only with German weapons, with German hands, could victory be achieved. The remaining peoples, according to the Nazi anthropological racist theory, had their own “hierarchy”, classification, therefore the Germans initially, according to this theory, treated them with distrust. Of course, there were peoples a little closer to them - Scandinavian, for example, and there were the so-called Untermensch - “subhumans”: Slavs, Gypsies, Jews, etc.

The course of military operations against the Soviet Union, especially in the first months, practically pushed the Germans to the idea of ​​​​creating military formations from the eastern peoples. And, surprisingly, when there was no plan to attract these peoples, already at the end of August 1941, special commissions of Rosenberg’s Eastern Ministry began working in prisoner-of-war camps. They were engaged in a kind of division of prisoners of war on a national basis and separating them into separate special camps, which also remained, naturally, prisoner of war camps, but already concentrated representatives of various nationalities. Both emigrants and German representatives, German scientists and immigrants from the Soviet Union worked on these commissions. They seemed to be working for the future, not just hoping, but implying that sooner or later it might come in handy.

The course of hostilities against the Soviet Union prompted the Germans to the idea of ​​​​creating military formations from the eastern peoples

The idea gradually began to take shape, and the impetus for its implementation was given by the German defeat near Moscow, when the blitzkrieg fizzled out. And in fact, in December 1941, the go-ahead was given for the creation of formations from the eastern peoples. Of course, everything cannot be reduced to a blitzkrieg; here we must take into account several factors that influenced the creation of the eastern legions. This is, let's say, an unexpectedly large number of prisoners of war. It was not clear what to do with them. By the end of the summer of 1941 there were a huge number of them. There are terrifying figures: by the end of the war, the Germans registered six million Soviet prisoners of war. This is a horror, a terrible tragedy!

Moreover, we must also take into account the fact that the Soviet Union practically did not comply with international conventions on the rights of prisoners of war, and these people seemed to be abandoned to the mercy of fate by their country, according to Stalin’s well-known instruction: “We have no prisoners of war!”

In relation to prisoners of war from other countries - England, the USA - these international norms were still in effect, but Soviet prisoners of war found themselves in a terrible situation. And the Germans, realizing that no one needed them, treated them especially cruelly. It was, of course, pestilence, epidemics, terrible famine, and terrible supplies... In addition, we must take into account that representatives of the old emigration and the authorities of other countries played a certain role, who to some extent influenced the Germans, expressed some thoughts to them.

The Soviet Union practically did not comply with international conventions on the rights of prisoners of war, and these people seemed to be abandoned to the mercy of fate by their country

In the end, the Germans decided to get out of this situation and “put trust in the representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples,” first of all, because they considered (and the position of Rosenberg and the position of other ideologists was corresponding) that these Turkic-Muslim peoples were subject to the ideology of Turkic unity, that they, relatively speaking, will be just as united as the Aryans. In addition, it was believed that these peoples were colonially dependent on the Soviet Union and they initially hated Russians. In addition, they are Muslims, and the Germans had an attentive attitude towards Islam. This is a long history, it dates back to the period of the First World War, when the Kaiser’s diplomats and scientists tried to use the Islamic factor.

In the end, this whole sum of factors played a role: “Turks, Muslims, colonial dependence, they don’t like Russians, Bolsheviks.” It also seemed that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay, that if you pushed it a little, it would fall apart, especially if the national forces within it began to put pressure on it. This idea was formed by the end of 1941.

– Then did the formation of the first legions begin?

– At the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942, the formation of the first four legions began from these separated representatives, primarily Central Asian and Caucasian peoples. Oddly enough, both Georgians and Armenians fell under this wave, although they were neither Turks nor Muslims. Therefore, at first four legions were formed - Turkestan, Caucasian-Muslim, Georgian and Armenian. The Caucasian-Muslim was subsequently divided into North Caucasian and Azerbaijani. That is, five legions were formed as part of the eastern legions, which became a single military structure within the German armed forces.

The Tatar, or, as the Germans called it, the Volga-Tatar Legion, or the Idel-Ural Legion, as the representatives of the peoples of the Volga region themselves called it, included Tatars, Bashkirs, representatives of the peoples of the Volga and Urals regions. It was founded in late July - early August 1942. In reality, the banner was presented to him on September 6, and this date is considered the founding date of the legion. There were corresponding rules, there were several waves of replenishment.

At the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942, the formation of the first four legions from representatives of Central Asian and Caucasian peoples began

1942 and 1943 were the peak years for the creation of these eastern legions. Almost all of their base camps were located in Poland. Formations were constantly taking place. There were corresponding rules, a certain routine. It should be noted that in the legions it was allowed to create a military unit of no more than a battalion - this is approximately 900-950 people. These battalions included at least 50–80 Germans.

As a result, eight Volga-Tatar battalions were created. There were more Turkestan, Georgian and Armenian ones. As a result, it turned out that the Turkestan Legion turned out to be the most numerous. At least representatives of the Volga region peoples, Tatars, Bashkirs and others passed through the Idel-Ural legion, according to the most approximate ideas, about 20–25 thousand people.

– The very name of the legion "Idel-Ural" is related to the events of 1918, when in Kazan, at the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Military Congress on January 8 (21) - February 18 (March 3), 1918, a resolution was adopted on the creation of a state within Russia Idel-Ural, which includes the entire Ufa province, part of the Kazan, Simbirsk, Samara, Orenburg, Perm and Vyatka provinces?

Eight Volga-Tatar battalions were created. There were more Turkestan, Georgian and Armenian

– Most likely, it was a certain political game, because this slogan, in principle, has already remained in history, when during the Civil War the issues of national construction in the territory of the Middle Volga region, the creation of a state or the state “Idel-Ural” were discussed. Moreover, this was absolutely not a separatist movement. This state was supposed to be part of the Russian Federation, that is, it was not a secession. But, in the end, the Bolshevik leaders did not allow even this to be created. Then more soft version. As the Civil War progressed, as the Bolsheviks strengthened their power, the idea of ​​creating a Tatar-Bashkir Republic arose. In the end, already in 1920, under completely different conditions, a scanty and not fully reflecting the interests of the Tatar population of the Volga region was created - the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which, unfortunately, included only a quarter or one fifth of all ethnic Tatars. Even so, the territories where ethnic Tatars lived somehow ended up in other administrative entities. One can only guess why this happened.

Most of the political emigrants who had authority in the 20s and 30s, at least among the Tatar political emigration, were not involved in this epic with the creation of the Idel-Ural legion. The fact is that the Germans were generally very suspicious of the political emigrants of the first wave. It turned out that “more reliable people” were involved in the creation of the legion: from among defectors, from later emigrants, from some other spheres, but not from those who had authority in the 20s and 30s. This applies not only to the Tatars, but also to many other peoples, for example, Central Asian and Caucasian emigration.

As the Bolsheviks strengthened their power, the idea of ​​creating a Tatar-Bashkir Republic arose

– The relationship was specific. General Vlasov's army was created as the Russian Liberation Army; no national units were planned in it. Vlasov himself, judging by some of his speeches and some publications, adhered, I would say, to fairly democratic approaches to the national issue. For example, in one of his speeches he spoke out for the full right of nations to self-determination in the future Russia, even to the point of secession. At the same time, he noted that he believes in the power of traditions, in the power of the ties of these peoples with the Russian people, in the fact that sooner or later this centuries-old tradition will play its role, and these peoples will be together with the Russian people.

And at the same time, there was distrust of General Vlasov on the part of the national leaders of the Turkic-Muslim peoples. They even jointly signed an anti-Vlasov manifesto, in which they asked the Germans to under no circumstances unite them with the army of General Vlasov, because, as it was written there, “General Vlasov is a Russian general, and his whole train of thought is Russian. And that’s why we have - his movement, and he has his own." Although, of course, there were contacts. There were special representatives of the ROA who communicated with representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples, but no alliance worked out.

– In addition to military cooperation between the Germans and representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union, there was also political cooperation. What was it?

The army of General Vlasov was created as the Russian Liberation Army; no national units were planned in it

– In addition to military cooperation, the Germans planned to organize a kind of ideological base for all these military formations. Special so-called mediation offices were created under the Eastern Ministry of Rosenberg, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which was responsible for all this work, including with representatives of the eastern peoples. These mediations with various eastern nations were German institutions within this ministry. Turkestan mediation and Tatar mediation were created.

I will talk about the latter, which I studied more carefully. It was a German institution that dealt with the Tatars. It worked among emigrants, among workers who worked on the territory of the Reich, among legionnaires, and organized propaganda and political work among these people. This mediation was headed by an absolutely random person (I met him when he was still alive, he was over 90 years old) - lawyer Heinz Unglaube, a very cheerful, cheerful person who spoke neither Russian nor Tatar. And he was chosen for this position because, as he himself said, he once read something about the Tatars. It shocked me!

He headed this mediation almost until the end of the war. Under his auspices, a weekly newspaper for the legion and a magazine of Tatar literature in the Tatar language were created. In order to support the political efforts of other peoples, supplements to this newspaper were created. He began to publish a German-Tatar newsletter in two languages.

In addition to military cooperation, the Germans planned to organize a kind of ideological base for all these military formations

A kind of outcome of this political work was the creation of national committees, which began to present themselves as governments in exile, as political organizations. And under the auspices of Tatar mediation in the Eastern Ministry in 1944, the “Union of Struggle of the Turkic-Tatars of Idel-Ural” was created, which was simply called the “Idel-Ural Committee”. Attempts to create such a political organization began back in 1942, but it took shape only in 1944. Program documents and transcripts of this congress have been preserved. I published them partially, including translation into Russian, in the magazine “Gasyrlar Avazy” (“Echo of Centuries”).

These documents are by and large democratic, which is quite unexpected. They are not Nazi, not fascist, they are nationalist, national. But at the same time, they largely repeat the postulates of the Tatar democratic movement of 1917–1920. The Tatars, of course, spoke quite cautiously on issues of anti-Semitism, but in some of their political movements anti-Semitic notes were quite strong. This, of course, cannot be accepted.

– What was the fate of the members of the Volga-Tatar legion “Idel-Ural” after the end of the war?

95% of the legionnaires, and maybe even more, were completely random people in the legions. They weren't truly enemies

– 95% of the legionnaires, and maybe even more, were completely random people in the legions. They were not truly enemies; many joined the legion with only one purpose: to wait it out, to save their lives. And of course, we made a mistake. They cannot be blamed for becoming traitors or fascists. Any crime must be specifically proven in court.

Their fate is in many ways difficult. Those who survived and returned to their homeland migrated from one camp to another. I won’t say that they were shot immediately, but almost all of them went through filtration camps. Their files have been preserved, which were in the public domain in the 90s. I didn’t have time to work with them at that time, but there are a lot of them there – tens of thousands.

– Have you now tried to obtain permission to work with these materials?

Those who were released did not receive any rights as WWII veterans

– I didn’t even try. I've heard a lot about how difficult access is there. Those who were released did not receive any rights as WWII veterans. This is quite understandable. From a purely human perspective, I just feel sorry for these people. In many ways, these are lost people. I don’t treat such people with understanding, but at least taking into account all the circumstances.

– A year ago, on the 70th anniversary of the victory film "War of the Unforgiven" directed by Denis Krasilnikov about the Idel-Ural legion became the winner in the category “Best Feature Documentary Film” at the 11th Kazan International Muslim Film Festival. He aroused rage among Russian nationalists. You can still read negative comments about this film on nationalist websites, for example, on the Novorossiya website. This story with the film is another evidence of the process that we are witnessing today in Russia - the process of distorting history in order to achieve certain political goals. How can you comment on this situation?

People want to stand out, show themselves without understanding the sources

– I acted as a consultant in this film. I read a lot of reviews - from enthusiastic to sharply critical. Most of the critical reviews themselves don't stand up to scrutiny because the critics approach this film from a position they already know. The main leitmotif of these critical assessments is the following: “Since this film was made about the Idel-Ural legion, then it is already clearly bad and it is already clearly defending this legion.” And the fact that this film is not dedicated to the Idel-Ural legion, but is dedicated to those people who, having found themselves in captivity, being part of the legion, in these difficult conditions rose to fight against Nazism, this does not bother them.

There is already some kind of rage going on here. People want to stand out, show themselves, without understanding the sources. Therefore, I considered it unnecessary to enter into controversy with them. Now, unfortunately, this trend has begun. If in the 90s we had a surge of interest in this topic, now we again see signs of the Soviet approach (in the bad sense of the word).

Unfortunately, we again began to glorify war as a phenomenon. And war is first and foremost a tragedy

In history today we see only what we want to see. In the present, we reproject many things and transfer them to the past. Unfortunately, we again began to glorify war as a phenomenon. I do not like it. War is, first of all, a tragedy. And it seems to me that on May 9 we should not just beat the fanfare, but stop and think, remember those people who died during the war, and maybe just be silent, and not shout: “Hurray! Hurray!”

When I see stickers on cars in May that say “We’ve reached Berlin, let’s get to Washington!”, I just get scared. This is a misperception of history. Unfortunately, our society is beginning to see in war only heroism and feat, and not tragedy. But it seems to me that tragedy and horror should come first in the perception of war.

Legion "Idel-Ural" Gilyazov Iskander Ayazovich

Volga-Tatar Legion - Legion "Idel-Ural"

As shown above, a certain interest in the Volga Tatars in Germany was evident even in the pre-war years. After the start of the war against the USSR, Tatar prisoners of war began to be separated into special camps almost simultaneously with prisoners of war from other Turkic peoples. Nevertheless, the Volga-Tatar legion (or the Idel-Ural legion) was created later than all the others.

In fact, representatives of the peoples of the Volga region were separated into special camps already in the fall-winter of 1941/42. For the first time in the documents at our disposal about the creation of the Volga-Tatar Legion, it is mentioned on July 1, 1942 - on this day information about emerging legions, among which the Volga-Tatar was mentioned. On August 1, 1942, an order was given from Hitler's headquarters, signed by Chief of Staff Keitel, to create, in addition to the existing ones, a legion consisting of Volga (Kazan) Tatars, Bashkirs, Tatar-speaking Chuvash, Mari, Udmurts and Mordovians. The order ordered the separation of representatives of the named peoples into special camps and intensification of work with the recruitment of prisoners of war. It was noted that the status of the Volga-Tatar Legion is exactly the same as that of previously created similar formations, that the use of the legion is envisaged in areas of military operations, but especially in areas where partisans operate.

Legionnaire on duty

Keitel's order was, as it were, an order from above, and the practical order of the OKH was signed on August 15, 1942 (110 copies were made from it and distributed to all authorities). It already contained more specific instructions:

"1. Create a legion of Tatars, Bashkirs and Tatar-speaking peoples of the Volga region;

2. The Tatars assigned to the Turkestan Legion should be transferred to the Volga-Tatar Legion;

3. Tatar prisoners of war should be urgently separated from the rest and sent to the Siedlce camp (on the Warsaw-Brest railway line). Place them at the disposal of the Military Commander in the General Government (Milit?rbefehlshaber im General-Gouveniemerit);

4. The created legion should be used primarily in the fight against partisans.”

Practical work on the creation of the Volga-Tatar Legion began on August 21, 1942: the camp in Jedlino near Radom was chosen as the site of its formation, where uniforms and weapons for the legion were received. German responsible personnel also arrived here. The Siedlce camp, located near Jedlino, had already become a gathering point for prisoners of war from the Turkic peoples. It was divided into two parts: Siedlce-A and Siedlce-B - it was the first part that was intended to collect Tatar prisoners of war. It is known that by the end of July 1942, i.e. Even before the order to create the legion appeared, there were already 2,550 Tatars in the camp.

The banner of the Volga-Tatar Legion was presented on September 6, 1942, so the legionnaires themselves considered this day to be the date of the final formation of the formation.

Formation of the Volga-Ural legionnaires

On September 8, 1942, the Volga-Tatar Legion was placed under the command of the headquarters of the Eastern Legions and the commander of the military district in the “Government General”.

Tatar prisoners of war were concentrated mainly in the Siedlce-A camp, from where they were sent for training to the legion in Jedlino. Subsequently, the role of a preliminary camp was also played by the camp in Dęblin (Stalag-307), where, for example, on September 1, 1943 there were 1,800 Tatar prisoners of war. In addition to the Tatars, Azerbaijanis and representatives of the North Caucasian peoples also gathered here. And at the beginning of 1944, after the transfer of the Eastern Legions to France, the general preliminary camp was in Legionowo near Warsaw, from March 1944 - again in Siedlce-B (Stalag-366) and in the Nekhrybka camp (Stalag-327 ).

Sleeve patch of the legion "Idel-Ural". First option

The first statistical information from the commander of the military district in the “government general” about the Volga-Tatar Legion arrived in mid-September. This information was as follows: on September 8, 1942, 135 Tatars “expressed a desire” to enroll in the legion in the Turkestan camp Benjamin, Biala Podlaska - 27, Zaezerce - 152, Siedlce - 2315, a total of 2629 people (out of the total number of those who applied for the Eastern legions 12,130 people). In addition, 7,370 Tatar prisoners of war were sent from operational areas to Poland. In total, according to official data, there were up to 100 transports with representatives of different peoples of the USSR on the way. On September 11, 1942, the first German representatives were assigned to the legion: one officer, two employees, 54 non-commissioned officers, 18 soldiers. On September 15, translator courses for legionnaires began to function. Starting from October 1, 1942 to January 1, 1943, it was planned to fully form the first two Tatar battalions (this plan was carried out with a slight delay).

A rather elderly and experienced military man, Major Oscar von Seckendorff, was appointed commander of the Volga-Tatar Legion. He was born on June 12, 1875 in Moscow, spoke Russian, English, French, and Chinese well; I had a worse command of Ukrainian and Spanish. He was later promoted to lieutenant colonel. Few specific documents about his activities have been preserved in the archives. It is difficult to even say how long he remained as commander of the legion. The information about this is not entirely clear. On May 12, 1944, von Seckendorff gave orders for the legion, explaining that he was being transferred to the headquarters of the Eastern Legions and he was transferring command of the legion to Captain Kelle. At that time, von Seckendorff was appointed commander of the schools of the eastern formations - the Turkic school of officers and translators (located first in Rohrbach, then in Ohrdruf, and at the end of the war - in Neuhammer); schools for officers and translators for eastern peoples (first in Conflans and Saint-Minel, then in Grafenwoehr, and at the end of the war in Munsingen). It is also known that on November 17, 1944, a representative of the SS Main Directorate, R. Olsha, came out with support for von Seckendorff, who, judging by his data, the Wehrmacht command was going to retire on January 1, 1945, citing his age. However, the certificate does not indicate from which position they wanted to remove Lieutenant Colonel Zeckendorf. R. Olsha, referring to the experience, knowledge and desires of Seckendorff himself, recommended not to send him into retirement, but to transfer him to the Main Directorate of the SS, to the Eastern Department. On December 9, 1944, in a certificate from Standartenführer Spaarmann, the prospect of von Seckendorff’s transfer to the SS was again mentioned: “The day of the battle group “Idel-Ural” (it will be discussed below. - I.G.), which consists of Tatars and Finno-Ugric peoples, there is only one specialist who knows the East, as well as understands the language and mentality of the people. We are talking in this case about Lieutenant Colonel von Seckendorff, who, according to the calendar, will be dismissed from the Wehrmacht on January 1, 1945 and who would be perfect for organizational work in the battle group." It was not possible to find information about the further fate of the first commander of the Volga-Tatar Legion.

According to the available documents, it can be judged that Seckendorff, despite his age, took up the matter quite energetically, most of all paying attention to the issues of combat training of legionnaires. Perhaps one of the most serious problems for him (as well as for other German organizers of the Eastern Legions) was the problem of training national officers, which, by the way, was never resolved until the end of the war, although it was raised more than once. It is therefore of interest to see the detailed analytical paper prepared by von Seckendorff on January 25, 1943, which addresses this problem. It was actually common to all Eastern legions, but von Seckendorff’s ideas were implemented specifically in the Volga-Tatar Legion.

First, the legion commander poses the question: from whom can future officers be selected? And he himself answers: from former officers of the Red Army, from the ranks of ordinary legionnaires or from the intelligentsia. For re-education in the German spirit, the most difficult “material” was, according to Seckendorff, a simple legionnaire: it is easy to influence him politically, but he “brings with him so little intelligence and education that his re-formation into an officer is accompanied by incredible difficulties: or he ends up completely incapable, or he turns into an ignorant, bloody despot who does far more harm than good.” The candidates of the intellectual and the former Soviet officer were a little “better”, since they “due to their exalted position in the USSR are suppressed in ideological terms.” But still, the former officer has an advantage: he has military experience, tactical knowledge, and some kind of education. Therefore, von Seckendorff believed, there remained “the least evil” with whom it was necessary to work - former officers of the Red Army. To “re-educate” them, very specific proposals were made, which, obviously, were taken into account in the actual practice of the Volga-Tatar Legion:

"1. Officers, from lieutenant to captain, coming from the preliminary camp, in the legion from the very beginning are placed separately from the soldiers and even in terms of service have nothing in common with them.

2. An officer platoon is subordinate to a more experienced and senior officer of the legion, who is responsible for education under the control of the legion commander.

3. Preparation is carried out in the following areas: careful ideological influence; tactical recheck and further retraining; close personal contact between officers; daily intensive training in German; if possible, get to know the country, travel to Germany.”

Officers deemed "unfit" were sent back to the camps. After graduating from the school for non-commissioned officers (i.e., lower officers) at the legion, the officers were sent to Legionovo, where there was a general officer school. Von Seckendorff drew Special attention at a psychological moment in the training of future officers of the legion: to maintain the distance between soldiers and officers, to develop their ambition and self-confidence. He complained that there were not enough capable officers in the Volga-Tatar Legion, so he considered it necessary to intensify this work.

Sleeve patch of the legion "Idel-Ural". The second, most common option

It seems to me that this document not only shows the severity of the problem of officer training in a particular legion, but allows us to roughly imagine the internal psychological atmosphere of this formation. Von Seckendorff, a man of old, Prussian training, tried in his own way to spread his experience among the Volga Tatars, in the specific matter of training military personnel suitable for the Wehrmacht. These attempts obviously ended in failure, since even at the end of the war, almost all legion commanders constantly complained about the lack of “suitable” officers. What did this lead to? Moreover, German officers were appointed to replace those who were absent, which meant a deviation from the original principles of recruiting the Eastern Legions. German officers did not know Russian, much less other languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR, and often did not understand the psychology of their subordinates at all. As a result, the result was a completely unexpected effect for the Germans: even those representatives of the eastern peoples who actually voluntarily went over to the side of Germany began to experience psychological discomfort from this, noticing in the fact of the appointment of German officers a manifestation of distrust of the legionnaires. And the German military leadership also failed to find a way out of this vicious circle.

Sleeve patch of the legion "Idel-Ural". The last version of the patch for the legion according to the order of July 1, 1944. Practically not used by legionnaires

According to the plan, the first of the battalions of the Volga-Tatar Legion, numbered 825, was supposed to be created by December 1, 1942, but it was formed even a little earlier - on November 25. The deadline for the formation of the 826th battalion was set at December 15, 1942, the 827th - January 1, 1943. In fact, this happened, respectively, on January 15 and February 10, 1943. For the first time, all three first numbers of battalions are mentioned in surviving documents 3 November 1942 as being created.

The Tatar battalions, which were created in Poland, in Jedlino, under the control and jurisdiction of the command of the Eastern Legions in the German armed forces, and which are described in detail on the basis of available documents, were not the only ones. Most likely, under separate armies or army groups, other Tatar formations were created in parallel or later, for example, during 1944. Among them were combat, construction, and supply units. We can only find fragmentary information about them in the sources, which nevertheless complements our ideas.

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