The last battle of the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers. Sixth Company

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29-02-2016, 08:06

On February 29, 2000, the heroic battle of the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers began with superior forces of militants

In August 1999, several thousand militants invaded Dagestan - the Second Chechen War began. By February 2000, the Russian army occupied the flat territory of Chechnya and drove militant groups out of the city of Grozny.

The main forces of the militants sought to retreat to the mountainous part of Chechnya. There, in the mountains covered with dense forests in the Argun Gorge area, back in the 90s, militants, using hundreds of prisoners of war and kidnapped people turned into slaves, built dozens of fortified bases and a high-mountain road to the Georgian border, from where they intended to receive reinforcements from foreign mercenaries in the event of war. weapons and ammunition.

In the last days of February 2000, our army acted, trying to prevent the enemy from retreating to prepared bases in the mountains. The routes of movement of the militants, divided into several detachments, were unknown - separate units of the Russian army were deployed to the passes and mountain paths to detain the retreating enemy.

On February 28, the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th regiment of the 76th Guards Airborne Division received an order to occupy a height on one of the possible escape routes of the militants, near the village of Ulus-Kert, Shatoi region of Chechnya. The company was commanded by Major Sergei Molodov, but he had just recently arrived in this unit, so their superior commander, the commander of the 2nd battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin, went with him and the company on a rush through the mountains.

90 paratroopers went to the mountains. 5 kilometers from the target, the company, stopping at one of the nameless high-rises, which had only No. 776 on the headquarters map, sent forward a group of 12 scouts. Soon, reconnaissance paratroopers encountered a superior detachment of militants, and a firefight ensued.

So at 12:30 p.m. on February 29, 2000, the last battle of the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers began. No one yet knew that 90 paratroopers faced the main forces of militants under the command of Khattab, a Jordanian Wahhabi “field commander” with extensive war experience. Less than a hundred Russian soldiers, mostly conscripts, found themselves in the path of superior enemy forces.

According to our intelligence data received later, Khattab’s detachment consisted of over 2,000 well-trained, experienced fighters. According to later statements by the militant leaders, there were about a thousand of them there. In any case, the enemy outnumbered the 6th company by at least 10 times.

The mountains that day were covered with thick fog. Until the end of February 29, neither the commanders of the 6th company nor the headquarters of the Russian army commanding the operation in Chechnya knew that at height No. 776 a handful of paratroopers were confronting the main forces of militants. The fact is that in previous weeks the militants suffered heavy losses from bombs and artillery fire from the Russian army. Therefore, our command assumed that the militants would break through to mountain bases, breaking into small detachments that would be easier to avoid targeted attacks by bombers and long-range artillery.

However, the enemy who opposed our army in Chechnya in 2000 was serious and experienced - he managed not only to break out of a large encirclement, but also to quickly cover a significant distance, striking where he was not expected. At the same time, the enemy took a conscious risk, not scattering in small groups, but striking compactly with all his strength. Although this provided the enemy with overwhelming superiority over a company of Pskov paratroopers, a single large group of militants became a good target for our artillery fire.

Thick fog did not allow us to support the 6th company with helicopters, but our long-range artillery fired at suspected militant positions all day, supporting the paratroopers. The merciless battle, which began at lunchtime on February 29, lasted until three o’clock in the morning on March 1. By the beginning of the first day of spring 2000, a third of the soldiers in the company had already died, but the enemy suffered even greater losses.

One of the surviving company soldiers, Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky, later recalled that day: “At some point, they came at us like a wall. One wave will pass, we will shoot them, half an hour of respite - and another wave... There were a lot of them. They just walked towards us, their eyes bulging, shouting: “Allahu Akbar”... Then, when they retreated after the hand-to-hand fight, they offered us money over the radio so that we would let them through...”

The militants had to take height No. 776 at any cost in order to escape to the saving mountains near the border with Georgia. They were able to occupy it only by 5 a.m. on March 1, after 16 hours of almost continuous battle, using mortars brought on horseback. Of the 90 Russian paratroopers, 84 died in that battle.

On the day of February 29, it was not yet clear to the command of the Russian army that the 6th company was under attack from the main forces of the enemy, and at night it was already too late - our army, which had not yet recovered from the collapse of the 90s, did not have enough night vision devices, no other equipment or helicopters for rapid movement through the air at night. Traveling on foot in hostile mountains was fraught with ambushes, losses, and in any case, that night there was no time for help.

In a word, the reasons for the death of the heroic company of paratroopers are: firstly, the skillful actions of an experienced enemy, at least 10, or even 20 times superior in strength to the 6th company; secondly, the consequences of the Russian state crisis in the 90s, when our army turned out to be poorly equipped with the latest equipment, without which Russian troops simply did not have the opportunity to transfer sufficient forces through the forests and mountains of the Vedeno region of Chechnya within a few hours of one night.

In that battle, all 13 officers who were with the 6th company were killed. On the morning of March 1, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin, repeatedly wounded, but continuing to command the battle, called artillery fire “on himself” via radio... Later, 22 paratroopers of the 6th company were nominated for the title of Hero of Russia, 21 of them posthumously. 68 soldiers and officers were awarded the Order of Courage, 63 of them posthumously.

Khattab's detachment lost over 400 people in the battle with the heroic paratroopers. Its battered remnants managed to break past height No. 776, but this was already the agony of large forces of militants. Since the spring of 2000, they were no longer able to resist Russian troops in open battle, remaining capable only of ambushes and terrorist attacks.

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On the night of February 29 to March 1, 2000, the Russian army fought in the style of the 90s for the last time

The last battle of the 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division is perhaps the most dramatic and heroic battle of the Second Chechen Campaign.

Despite its relatively small scale, the battle at Hill 776 is without a doubt historic. For the last time, the Russian army fought a large Chechen gang in the style of the 90s: fewer in number, with poor communications, without air support and the help of comrades, compensating for the shortcomings and sloppiness of the generals with mass heroism and the lives of soldiers.

In subsequent years, the army leadership, albeit with difficulty, learned the bloody lessons of the mountains. Already in 2008, saving South Ossetia from a Georgian attack, Russia demonstrated a completely different style of introducing war.

Rats are cornered

The winter of 1999–2000 turned out to be a bad time for the Ichkerians (gangs who fought for the independence of Chechnya). Flywheel of war, spun by invasion Shamilya Basayeva And Khattaba to Dagestan, grinding down one gang after another. The federals not only stopped the invasion, burying hopes for an “imarate from sea to sea,” but also during the summer campaign they restored control over the plain part of the republic, besieged and took Grozny. As in the first campaign, having suffered defeat in the fields, the Chechen troops began to retreat to the mountainous and wooded areas in the south.

The Argun Gorge became the real lifeline for the separatists, along which their families fled to Georgia and the wounded were transported. Caravans with weapons, medicines and equipment traveled along it to Chechnya.

The Russian command perfectly understood the significance of this road and made a move: they flew border guards and paratroopers to the heights above the gorge by helicopters. The troops were delivered to positions above the heads of the gangs; They were also supplied by air.

The first landing was landed on December 17, and by the end of January the militants’ retreat routes to Georgia were completely cut off. 2,300 “border guards” and paratroopers dug in at all key heights along the border. They were given mortars and artillery.

The militants were also supported from the plain. A group of 20 thousand led an attack on Shatoi, the last regional center under the control of terrorists. The army men came from the north, west and east, forming a huge arc and breaking any resistance in front of them.

Under their attacks, about a thousand militants rolled into this area from Grozny. Another two thousand under the command of Khattab moved towards them from Itum-Kali. In addition, the area already had “its own” gang - 1,400 militants from Basayev’s group.

The mountainous and forested area helped to evade clashes with the main forces of the Russians, but strategically it was a mousetrap. Russian aviation carried out up to 200 sorties a day, destroying mountain fortresses and forest bases of militants. Special forces operated in the forests, armored vehicles and motorized rifles occupied the valleys. The militants had almost no room for maneuver, and the army had an almost unlimited supply of shells and bombs.

Thus, a situation arose in which the Russian army sought to hold and finish off the remnants of the Ichkerians in the Shatoi area. The terrorists, on the contrary, dreamed of breaking out of the military cordons and spreading throughout the republic.

Company against the Khattab gang

The 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment, although part of one of the most elite divisions of the Russian army, was by no means professional. It was staffed with contract soldiers and paratroopers from other units shortly before deployment. Some were enlisted in the company literally before loading onto the plane.

The 2nd battalion, in which the company was to fight, was also not in the best shape. Just a month before the trip, an inspection found him “not ready for battle.” Combat Mark Evtyukhin I tried to put the unit in order, but there simply wasn’t enough time for training. On February 3, the battalion was transferred to Grozny; After some time, the paratroopers were assigned to guard the base near the village of Oktyabrskoye.

In addition to the soldiers and officers of the 6th company, a group of 15 soldiers from the 4th company of the same 2nd battalion also took part in the battle. In total - 90 paratroopers. They were covered by fire from the Non division (120 mm guns).

The enemy they faced was by no means simple. The Chechen fighters decided to break out of the encirclement in two large groups. One under command Ruslana Gelayeva went to the northwest, aiming at the village of Komsomolskoye, and the other, under the command of Khattab, moved in almost the opposite direction - to the northeast. It was with them that the paratroopers of the 104th regiment had to meet.

Exactly how many thugs went with Khattab is a moot point. According to official data, there were about 2.5 thousand of them, according to terrorists - 700. One way or another, the detachment was many times larger than the paratroopers.

In addition to Chechen terrorists, the gang included a large number of Arab mercenaries. The militants were well armed and well motivated: by that time, Russian aviation was using one and a half ton vacuum bombs and cluster munitions against their positions. Apart from death, they had nothing to expect at Shatoi. At the same time, unlike the paratroopers who found themselves in this area for the first time, the militants knew the area very well.

Rota goes into eternity

February 28 commander of the 104th regiment Sergey Melentyev ordered to occupy the dominant heights of Ista-Kord. Initially, battalion commander Evtyukhin intended to send the 4th company, which had more heavy weapons and was better prepared, on this mission. However, due to equipment breakdowns, people did not have time to arrive. The 6th company of the major was ordered to become a barrier Sergei Molodov.

The paratroopers advanced to the heights on foot. The soldiers carried not only weapons and ammunition, but also tents, stoves, and a large amount of additional equipment.

Meanwhile, the militants began to probe the regiment's positions in search of a weak point. At about 11 o'clock in the morning Khattab reached the positions of the 3rd company. The militants radioed the commander, calling him by name, and offered him money for passage. The company commander responded by pointing artillery at them. Having left several corpses in front of the positions of the intractable paratroopers, the Khattabites decided to try their luck elsewhere.

At half past twelve, 12 scouts of the 6th company encountered 20 militants on Mount Isty-Kord, after which they retreated to the main forces. The company forded the Abazulgol River. The overloaded paratroopers were very tired and stretched out along the slope.

The head patrol and the command rose to the top at the same time as Chechen reconnaissance. A short but fierce firefight took place. During the battle, Major Molodov was mortally wounded, and the company was led by battalion commander Evtyukhin himself.

The Chechens retreated and regrouped. Around four o'clock in the afternoon the first powerful attack followed. The militants managed to catch and shoot the third platoon of the company on the slope, which never managed to rise. Only three soldiers from this platoon survived.

Then the assault on the summit began. Up to 1.5 thousand militants took part in the attack. The terrorists crushed the paratroopers with massive fire, and the defenders fired back. A self-propelled battalion fired at the slope; the attack was repulsed.

However, the situation was already critical: many were killed, the rest were almost all wounded. The problem was that the paratroopers could not dig out trenches in the frozen rocky soil, and the militants did not spare mortar shells and grenade launcher fire.

At about ten o'clock in the evening the second attack began. The Nonas were still hammering at the heights, but the militants had nothing to lose. Around three in the morning, 15 scouts of the 4th company, under the command of Major Alexandra Dostavalova.

For the final assault, the militants assembled a group of 70 volunteer suicide bombers. By that time, no more than 40-50 paratroopers remained at the top. The wounded died not only from bullets: many died from severe frost.

Nevertheless, the wounded and frostbitten soldiers continued to fire from the advancing horde for several more hours. At 6.01, battalion commander Evtyukhin made contact for the last time, causing fire on himself. Around seven in the morning the last shots were fired.

Brother, where is the help?

Why did the 6th company die? On the one hand, miscalculations in preparing the operation affected, on the other hand, extremely unfavorable circumstances in which the battle was fought.

The military was unable to detect the advance of large enemy forces in time. The command, with good intentions, forbade the paratroopers to conduct reconnaissance on their own outside the artillery “umbrella,” and interaction with the Vympel special forces detachments and the 45th Special Forces Regiment was not established. Therefore, when the paratroopers faced a monstrous danger, neither the commanders on the spot nor the command at headquarters understood this.

The aviation, which had been mauling the militants the other day, also could not help: throughout the entire day the area was covered in thick fog, and rain and snow fell from low clouds.

However, it cannot be said that they did not try to save the company. At night, fellow soldiers from the 1st company advanced to the besieged heights. But Khattab, who was well versed in the tactics of mountain warfare, had already placed machine-gun secrets at the fords of the Abazulgol River, which did not allow the relief group to approach the battlefield.

The only help that reached the 6th company were the same 15 scouts who were brought by Major Dostavalov, who exactly fulfilled Suvorov’s behest: perish yourself and help your comrade.

Nevertheless, the paratroopers fought to the end. No one raised their hand to surrender, no one asked for mercy. The soldiers fired back even after the company's control fell apart. The commanders shared the fate of the soldiers: all of the 13 officers who participated in the battle died. The last to give his life was Lieutenant Dmitry Kozhemyakin, covering the retreat of two wounded soldiers. Only six paratroopers survived the battle at the height.

The breakthrough through the company's positions, according to various sources, cost Khattab from 50 to 500 militants. Soon more than 200 militants surrendered to Russian troops; most of them were wounded, and many at Hill 776. The enemy paid a very high price for passing through the positions of the 6th company.

15 years ago, on March 1, 2000, one of the famous events of the war for the independence of Ichkeria took place - an encircled group of Chechen soldiers broke through the encirclement of Russian troops around Shatoi, despite the overwhelming numerical and technical superiority of the enemy. During the breakthrough at height 776 near Ulus-Kert, the 6th company of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division was completely destroyed, 84 Russian servicemen died in one night.

The commander of the operational group of the Russian Airborne Forces in Chechnya was General Alexander Lentsov - yes, the same one who is now taking an active part in the aggression against Ukraine.

It is on the conscience of Lentsov and the commander of the Eastern Group of Federal Forces, Makarov, that the death of the Pskov paratroopers lies.

The breakthrough of Basayev and Khattab was simply an amazing coincidence of a number of factors, the key of which was the fearlessness and skill of the Chechen assault detachment, as well as the mediocrity and incompetence of the Russian command.

I read a lot about this fight. I will briefly outline the details that became obvious 15 years later.

Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev on the morning of February 29 announced the capture of Shatoy, the last major stronghold of the Chechen resistance. Russian commander General Troshev said that all “Chechen gangs” had been destroyed.
According to a whole range of evidence on the Russian Internet, both Troshev and Lentsov immediately, according to Russian tradition, began celebrating the “victory”.

But the war was not over. At that moment, two large detachments of Chechen fighters broke through from Shatoi. The most dangerous route was taken by the detachment of Shamil Basayev and Khattab. Its strength was up to 1,300 people, among whom were a large number of local residents who were of no combat value. The Chechens were exhausted from two weeks of fighting, being pursued by Russian troops, being attacked by aircraft and artillery, and moving through mountainous terrain in very difficult conditions - mud, flooded rivers. There was no transport - all supplies and ammunition were carried by hand. Heavy weapons included machine guns and one or two mortars with a small supply of mines. The wounded were also carried away in their arms. They walked through the mountains from Shatoy to height 776 over 30 kilometers, and were completely exhausted.

On February 29, by order of the Airborne Forces commander Lentsov, the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers was transferred to height 776. This decision was very strange - the company had to cross the widely flooded Argun River, and thus it could not receive the support of the main reserves, and could not retreat anywhere. The height was right next to the river. Only one battery could provide support to the paratroopers, but it was at the limit of its range, and the accuracy of the fire adjustment turned out to be low. However, not far away on another peak there was another company of Pskov paratroopers. and one could count on her support.

Since the company was transferred hastily, it did not have time to gain a foothold and dig in. The Chechens attacked while the company was concentrating at a height. The paratroopers, wet and exhausted after the forced march, who also carried all their weapons, simply did not have time to deploy and organize a defense.

Chechen commanders showed outstanding fighting qualities. Their detachment was exhausted and weakened, and did not have the opportunity to conduct offensive operations right off the march. Moreover, the height itself was difficult to achieve and had steep slopes. Therefore, Khattab created an assault unit of experienced volunteers, which was supposed to pave the way at any cost.

The task looked hopeless. But the Chechens had no other option - either they would miraculously capture the peak, or the entire detachment of Basayev and Khattab would die under the height.

The battle began at 12.30 on February 29, the Chechens fired at the heights and advanced under fire, taking cover in the folds of the terrain. The high level of combat training of the Chechen infantry, coherence of actions and readiness for self-sacrifice were of decisive importance.

The paratroopers did not have time to deploy defenses and establish artillery fire control. They did not have time to dig reliable shelters. and therefore the fire of grenades and mortars caused losses to the 6th company, which was squeezed at a height and did not have support from the flanks. The key thing was that the Chechens, under the cover of darkness, approached close to the top, and made artillery fire ineffective. And in close combat at night, the Chechens turned out to be stronger.

The command forbade the neighboring 4th company of the Pskov division to go to the aid of their dying comrades.

Russian artillery was unable to cover the companies, despite the consumption of 1,200 shells.

On the contrary, apparently due to errors when shooting at maximum range, a number of dead Russian soldiers were covered with their own fire.

Troshev, Lentsov and Makarov did not provide support to the paratroopers and did not allow them to withdraw, because they either received a large bribe, as Melentyev believed, or considered that the Chechens had completely lost their combat capability after the mountain march and could not destroy an entire company of fresh and trained fighters.

Despite its advantageous tactical value, Hill 776 did not become a fortress, but became a place of slaughter.

The Chechen assault company captured the peak at 5 am. During the battle, the Russian command did not send any serious reinforcements there. Aviation did not fly either. The Chechens occupied the top and destroyed the company, from which only 6 soldiers were saved, and 84 were killed.

The Chechens said that they lost 25 fighters during the assault. And they had to leave another 42 seriously wounded in Vedeno, where they were captured by federal forces - they finished off all the wounded. Official Russian history says that at least 500 Chechens were killed, but most likely this is not true - there are no traces of such large burials. In addition, a relatively small number of wounded were captured, but if several hundred soldiers had been killed, there would have been twice as many wounded. If the Russian version of the Chechen losses was close to reality, then the entire Basayev detachment should have remained there under the height. But in fact, it is now known that most of the Chechen soldiers successfully broke through the encirclement. Thus, the Chechen version of losses is much more realistic.

And the loss ratio actually fully corresponds to the battle conditions. The paratroopers did not have heavy weapons; they did not have time to organize reconnaissance or interaction with artillery. They did not have time to equip shelters. The photographs show that no trenches were dug at all - natural shelters became defensive positions. The third platoon of the company did not even have time to reach the height - it took the battle on an open slope and was almost completely destroyed on the approach. The top of the height itself had no natural shelters, and had a small area - it was not difficult to cover it. Many Russian sources say that most of the paratroopers' losses were caused by the fire of their own artillery, which allegedly hit the top at the call of the company commander. The height was bare, and it was impossible to camouflage there. In these conditions, only a maneuver could help the paratroopers, but they could not maneuver, since the command ordered them to turn around at a height near the river, and they could not retreat. In addition, Lentsov and Makarov demanded that they hold their position and lie that reserves were approaching the 6th company.

The last words of the commander of the 6th company, Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin, over radio communication were: “You are goats, you betrayed us, bitches!” [Wiki]

As is customary in Russia, they tried to completely hide the losses of the paratroopers so as not to bear any responsibility for people’s lives. Information about the death of the 6th company was received only 10 days later, since the relatives of the fighters lived nearby, in Pskov, and came together to demand information about their loved ones.

Putin promised to come to the company’s funeral, but did not want to spoil his image before the elections. Instead, all the dead and surviving participants in the battle were awarded, given as many as 22 Heroes of Russia. Two films, two TV series and even a musical were made to present the defeat of the 6th Company as an outstanding military feat, and to pretend that the command supposedly provided all possible support. This lie is exposed by all participants in the battle on the Russian side and eyewitnesses, but 84% continue to believe in the lie.

Considering the situation, the capture of Hill 776 from a military point of view is an example of the high fighting qualities of a unit of Chechen volunteers and the determination of the command. If Russian units had been able to gain a foothold on the top and establish artillery support, the outcome of the battle would have been completely different. But a quick attack and individual preparation completely changed the situation.

To avoid responsibility for the death of an entire company and the successful breakthrough of the Chechens, Lentsov made the commander of the 104th Airborne Regiment, Melentyev, the “switchman”. Melentyev requested permission for the paratroopers to withdraw 6 times, but the generals forbade the withdrawal. Subsequently, Melentev stated that the Chechens bribed the Russian command for 17 million dollars: “Don’t believe anything they say about the Chechen war in the official media... They exchanged 17 million for 84 lives.” Details here.

11 years have passed since the death of 84 Pskov paratroopers in an unequal battle with militants in the Argun Gorge.
The official investigation into the tragedy has long been completed, its materials are classified. No one is punished. But the relatives of the victims are sure: the 6th company of the 104th Airborne Regiment was betrayed by the command of the federal group

By the beginning of 2000, the main forces of Chechen militants were blocked in the Argun Gorge in the south of the republic. On February 23, the head of the united group of troops in the North Caucasus, Lieutenant General Gennady Troshev, announced that the militants were finished - supposedly only small gangs remained, only dreaming of surrendering. On February 29, the commander hoisted the Russian tricolor over Shatoy and repeated: Chechen gangs do not exist. Central television channels showed Defense Minister Igor Sergeev reporting to the acting President Vladimir Putin about the “successful completion of the third stage of the counter-terrorism operation in the Caucasus.”

At this very time, non-existent gangs with a total number of about three thousand people attacked the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment, which occupied height 776.0 near the village of Ulus-Kert, Shatoi region. The battle lasted about a day. By the morning of March 1, the militants destroyed the paratroopers and marched to the village of Vedeno, where they dispersed: some surrendered, others went to continue the partisan war.

Ordered to remain silent

On March 2, the Khankala prosecutor's office opened a criminal case into the massacre of military personnel. One of the Baltic TV channels showed footage filmed by professional cameramen from the militants: a battle and a pile of bloody corpses of Russian paratroopers. Information about the tragedy reached the Pskov region, where the 104th Parachute Regiment was stationed and where 30 of the 84 dead were from. Their relatives demanded to know the truth.

On March 4, 2000, the head of the OGV press center in the North Caucasus, Gennady Alekhin, said that the information about the large losses suffered by the paratroopers was not true. Moreover, no military operations took place during this period at all. The next day, the commander of the 104th regiment, Sergei Melentyev, came out to journalists. Five days had passed since the battle, and most families already knew about the death of their loved ones through colleagues in the Caucasus. Melentyev clarified a little: “The battalion carried out a blocking mission. Intelligence discovered a caravan. The battalion commander moved to the battlefield and controlled the unit. The soldiers fulfilled their duty with honor. I'm proud of my people."

On March 6, one of the Pskov newspapers reported on the death of the paratroopers. After this, the commander of the 76th Guards Chernigov Air Assault Division, Major General Stanislav Semenyuta, prohibited the author of the article, Oleg Konstantinov, from entering the unit’s territory. The first official to admit the death of 84 paratroopers was the governor of the Pskov region, Evgeny Mikhailov - on March 7, he referred to a telephone conversation with the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel General Georgy Shpak. The military themselves remained silent for three more days.

Relatives of the victims besieged the division checkpoint, demanding that the bodies be returned to them. However, the plane with the “cargo 200” was not landed in Pskov, but at a military airfield in Ostrov and the coffins were kept there for several days. On March 9, one of the newspapers, citing a source at the Airborne Forces headquarters, wrote that Georgy Shpak had had a list of the dead on his desk for a week. The commander was reported in detail about the circumstances of the death of the 6th company. And only on March 10, the silence was finally broken by Troshev: his subordinates allegedly did not know either the number of dead or what unit they belonged to!

The paratroopers were buried on March 14. Vladimir Putin was expected to attend the funeral ceremony in Pskov, but he did not come. The presidential elections were just around the corner, and zinc coffins were not the best “PR” for a candidate. It is more surprising, however, that neither the head of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, nor Gennady Troshev, nor Vladimir Shamanov came. At this time, they were on an important visit to Dagestan, where they received the titles of honorary citizens of the Dagestan capital and silver Kubachi sabers from the hands of the mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov.

On March 12, 2000, Presidential Decree No. 484 appeared on awarding 22 dead paratroopers the title of Hero of Russia, the rest of the dead were awarded the Order of Courage. President-elect Vladimir Putin nevertheless came to the 76th division on August 2, Airborne Forces Day. He admitted the guilt of the command “for gross miscalculations that have to be paid for with the lives of Russian soldiers.” But not a single name was named. Three years later, the case of the death of 84 paratroopers was closed by Deputy Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky. The investigation materials have not yet been made public. For ten years, relatives and colleagues of the victims have been collecting the picture of the tragedy bit by bit.

Height 776.0

The 104th Parachute Regiment was transferred to Chechnya ten days before the tragic battle. The unit was consolidated - it was staffed on the spot with fighters from the 76th division and airborne brigades. The 6th company included soldiers from 32 regions of Russia, and special forces major Sergei Molodov was appointed commander. He didn’t even have time to meet the soldiers before the company was already sent on a combat mission.
On February 28, the 6th company and the 3rd platoon of the 4th company began a 14-kilometer forced march towards Ulus-Kert - without preliminary reconnaissance of the area, without training young soldiers in combat operations in the mountains. A day was allotted for the advance, which is very little, given the constant descents and ascents and the altitude of the terrain - 2400 meters above sea level. The command decided not to use helicopters, allegedly due to the lack of natural landing sites. They even refused to throw tents and stoves at the deployment point, without which the soldiers would have frozen to death. The paratroopers were forced to carry all their belongings on themselves, and because of this they did not take heavy weapons.

The goal of the forced march was to occupy height 776.0 and prevent the militants from breaking through in this direction. The task was obviously impossible. Military intelligence could not help but know that about three thousand militants were preparing to break through the Argun Gorge. Such a crowd could not move unnoticed for 30 kilometers: at the end of February there is almost no greenery in the mountains. They had only one way - through the gorge along one of two dozen paths, many of which went straight to the height of 776.0.
“The command gave us arguments: they say, you can’t put a company of paratroopers on each path,” said one of the servicemen of the 76th division. “But it was possible to establish interaction between units, create a reserve, and target the routes along which the militants were waiting. Instead, for some reason, the positions of the paratroopers were well targeted by the militants. When the battle began, soldiers from neighboring heights rushed to help, asked for orders from the command, but the answer was a categorical “no.” There were rumors that the Chechens bought passage through the gorge for half a million dollars. It was beneficial for many officials on the Russian side to break out of encirclement - they wanted to continue making money from the war.
The first clash between scouts of the 6th company and militants occurred on February 29 at 12.30. The separatists were surprised to meet paratroopers on the way. During a short firefight, they shouted that they should be let through, because the commanders had already agreed on everything. It is no longer possible to verify whether this agreement actually existed. But for some reason all the police checkpoints on the road to Vedeno were removed. According to radio intercepts, the head of the militants, Emir Khattab, received commands, requests, and tips via satellite communications. And his interlocutors were in Moscow.
Company commander Sergei Molodov was one of the first to die from a sniper bullet. When battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin took command, the paratroopers were already in a difficult position. They did not have time to dig in, and this sharply reduced their defense capability. The start of the battle caught one of the three platoons rising to a height, and the militants shot most of the guardsmen like targets at a shooting range.
Evtyukhin was in constant contact with the command, asking for reinforcements, because he knew: his paratroopers were standing 2-3 kilometers from height 776.0. But in response to reports that he was repelling an attack by several hundred militants, he was calmly answered: “Destroy everyone!”

The paratroopers say that the deputy regiment commander forbade entering into negotiations with Evtyukhin, because he was allegedly panicking. In fact, he himself was panicking: it was rumored that after a business trip to Chechnya, Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin was supposed to take his position. The deputy regiment commander told the battalion commander that he had no free people and called for radio silence so as not to interfere with the work of front-line aviation and howitzers. However, fire support for the 6th company was provided only by regimental artillery, the guns of which operated at maximum range. Artillery fire needs constant adjustment, and Evtyukhin did not have a special radio attachment for this purpose. He called fire via regular communication, and many shells fell in the paratroopers’ defense zone: 80 percent of the dead soldiers were later found to have shrapnel wounds from foreign mines and from “their” shells.
The paratroopers did not receive any reinforcements, although the surrounding area was filled with troops: the federal group within a radius of one hundred kilometers from the village of Shatoi numbered over one hundred thousand troops. The commander of the Airborne Forces in the Caucasus, Major General Alexander Lentsov, had at his disposal both long-range artillery and high-precision Uragan installations. Height 776.0 was within their reach, but not a single salvo was fired at the militants. Surviving paratroopers say that a Black Shark helicopter flew to the battle site, fired one salvo and flew away. The command subsequently argued that helicopters could not be used in such weather conditions: it was dark and foggy. But didn’t the creators of “Black Shark” buzz the ears of the whole country that this helicopter was all-weather? A day after the death of the 6th company, the fog did not prevent the helicopter pilots from seeing with the naked eye and reporting how the militants were collecting the bodies of dead paratroopers at altitude.

At three o'clock in the morning on March 1, when the battle was already going on for about 15 hours, fifteen guardsmen from the 3rd platoon of the 4th company, led by Major Alexander Dostovalov, arbitrarily broke through to the encircled people. It took Dostovalov and his soldiers forty minutes to reunite with the battalion commander. Another 120 de-

Santnikov, under the command of the chief of reconnaissance of the 104th regiment, Sergei Baran, also voluntarily withdrew from their positions and crossed the Abazulgol River, moving to the aid of Evtyukhin. They had already begun to rise to the height when they were stopped by an order from the command: stop advancing, return to their positions! The commander of the Northern Fleet marine group, Major General Alexander Otrakovsky, repeatedly asked for permission to come to the aid of the paratroopers, but never received it. On March 6, because of these experiences, Otrakovsky’s heart stopped.
Communication with Mark Evtyukhin stopped on March 1 at 6:10 am. According to the official version, the battalion commander’s last words were addressed to the artillerymen: “I call fire on myself!” But his colleagues say that in his last hour he remembered the command: “You betrayed us, bitches!”
The feds appeared at the height only a day after this. Until the morning of March 2, no one fired at height 776.0, where the militants were in charge.
They finished off the wounded paratroopers, dumping their bodies in a heap. They put headphones on the corpse of Mark Evtyukhin, installed a walkie-talkie in front of him and hoisted him to the very top of the mound: they say, call or don’t call, no one will come to you. The militants took with them the bodies of almost all of their dead. They were in no hurry, as if there was no army of a hundred thousand around, as if someone guaranteed that not a single shell would fall on their heads.

After March 10, the military, who hid the death of the 6th company, fell into patriotic pathos. It was reported that at the cost of their lives, the heroes destroyed about a thousand militants. Although no one to this day knows how many separatists were killed in that battle. Having broken through to Vedeno, the Chechens threw off ballast: several dozen wounded surrendered to the internal troops (they categorically refused to surrender to the paratroopers). Most of them soon found themselves free: local police officers gave in to persistent requests from local residents to return their breadwinners to their families. At least one and a half thousand militants went into the mountains to the east through the places where the federals were deployed. How they managed this, no one has figured out. After all, according to General Troshev, all that remained from the bandit formations were scraps, and the dead paratroopers came in very handy for the authors of the version: they say, these heroes destroyed all the bandits. It was agreed that the 6th Company, at the cost of its life, saved Russian statehood, thwarting the plans of the bandits to create an Islamic state on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan.

President Putin compared the feat of the 6th company with the feat of the Panfilov heroes and spoke in favor of creating a monument to the paratroopers. The military took notice, and on August 3, 2002, the grand opening of a 20-meter structure in the shape of an open parachute took place near the checkpoint of the 104th regiment in Cherekhe.
84 autographs of fallen soldiers were engraved under the dome.
“Almost all the children’s relatives and the Pskov authorities objected to this version of the monument,” says Tatyana Koroteeva, mother of Private Alexander Koroteev. “But the military did what they needed to do.” At first it was somehow strange for us to lay flowers on the parachute, but then we got used to it.

Vasily Dostovalov, the father of Hero of Russia Major Alexander Dostovalov, was not invited to the opening of the monument. At first, he traveled from Simferopol to Pskov several times a year to visit his son’s grave, but by August 2002, money became tight. The funds for the journey were raised by the Crimean paratroopers, who found the old man - of course, Dostovalov’s own father lives with them in Ukraine!
But Vasily Vasilyevich was not allowed to speak at the opening of the “parachute”. Dostovalov got excited: they say, my son made it to the surrounded hill, but I won’t be able to get onto the podium? But the officers stood in his way: what if the old man blurted out something wrong? No one spoke from parents or widows. But those who were solemnly invited to the podium did not even bother to inquire about the history of the battle near Ulus-Kert. None of the speakers mentioned any of the dead by name. And the vice-speaker of the Federation Council proposed to honor the memory of “those who died in a short-lived battle.” The same thing happened again in March 2010, on the tenth anniversary of the feat of the 6th company. Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern District Ilya Klebanov arrived, took a piece of paper out of his pocket and read it. After him, his colleagues spoke. The current regiment commander was shaking, he could only say: “Eternal memory to the guys!”
Some old people did not have the opportunity to come to the opening of the monument or to the 10th anniversary of the feat of the 6th company. Their children's poor colleagues collected money for them.

The dead children of Zagoraeva and Koroteeva were from the 4th company - one of those who, without orders, broke through to the rescue of their surrounded comrades together with Major Dostovalov. All 15 fighters died, only three were given the Hero of Russia. Before the opening of the monument, relatives of the victims were gathered in the officers’ house and told: “We will have a separate conversation with the parents of the Heroes, but the rest, please go for a walk.” The conversation was about benefits and payments. It cannot be said that the authorities turned their backs on the relatives of the paratrooper heroes. Many families received apartments. But so far not a single family has received compensation for the deceased, which in 2000 amounted to 100 thousand rubles. Some of the heroes’ close friends are trying to sue this money through the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights.
The families of the victims created the organization “Red Carnations” to preserve the memory of the children and try to find out the truth about their deaths.
“The guys from the regiment came to me and said that you couldn’t tell them everything,” says Alexandra Zagoraeva. “They showed on the map where they were sitting with weapons in their hands, ready to rush to the rescue of the company. But there was no order. The person who opened a criminal case into the death of the company was fired. He told me that he knew how the guys died and would tell us when he retired. Many people told us that the trail with our boys was sold. We will probably never know who sold it. Three years later, we wanted to get acquainted with the investigation materials, but we were not allowed to read them.

The commander of the 104th regiment, Sergei Melentyev, was responsible for the death of the heroes, who during the battle six times asked the commander of the Eastern group, General Makarov, to allow the company to retreat. Melentyev was transferred to Ulyanovsk with a demotion. Before leaving Pskov, he went to every house where the families of dead soldiers lived and asked for forgiveness. Two years later, Melentyev passed away - the 46-year-old colonel’s heart gave out.

The fates of the six surviving paratroopers were not easy. Many in the regiment considered them traitors. There were rumors that two of them even had greased guns, with full magazines: supposedly they had sat out somewhere while the battle was going on.
“They helped me with an apartment in Tatarstan, and I started looking for work,” says Alexander. “But they didn’t want to take the Hero of Russia, who was entitled to benefits, vouchers, and sanatorium stays anywhere.” I hid the star and immediately got a job.

For ten years, the Motherland has not forgotten its heroes, having discovered in them a rare potential for PR today. In 2004, the premiere of the musical “Warriors of the Spirit” took place in Luzhniki, designed, according to the creators, to perpetuate the memory of the 6th company. The premiere was preceded by the appearance on stage of all six surviving paratroopers. The plot is supposedly about them: an 18-year-old guy, for whom all roads in life are open, is tempted by the Provider, the devil from the Internet, with the help of a virtual monster, a Superhero. Demons try to seduce the conscript with the delights of consumer existence, but in the struggle for his soul they are opposed by the Combat, whose prototype was Mark Evtyukhin. And the young man moves into eternity, towards military brotherhood and heroic death. Despite the participation of several well-known film actors, the musical was not particularly successful.
The patriotic films “Breakthrough” and “Russian Sacrifice”, as well as the TV series “I Have the Honor” and “Stormy Gates” were also made about the feat of the 6th company. At the end of one of these films, helicopters fly in to help the paratroopers who have crushed hundreds of militants and save everyone. The credits cynically state that the film is based on real events.

Soldiers of the 6th company. Photo: sovsekretno.ru

Soldiers of the sixth company of the 104th regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division