Less than a month before the elections, Vladimir Zelensky continues to be the leader of the Ukrainian presidential race. February surveys of the country's most famous sociological institutions - the Razumkov Center, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the Socis Center for Social and Marketing Research, the Sofia Center for Social Research - unanimously confirm this.
Business
On March 4, journalists from OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project), whose Russian partner in the investigation was Meduza, in the article “The Troika Laundromat” reported that the private investment bank of Ruben Vardanyan and his partners, Troika Dialog, was sold to In 2011, Sberbank created a network of dozens of companies through which, from 2006 to the beginning of 2013, $4.6 billion passed with the participation of “criminal schemes.”
Interview
The gradual pattern of European countries joining in the expulsion of Russian diplomats after the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury has practically left Moscow alone on the European continent. About how Italy's position may change based on the results of difficult coalition negotiations, which are now being conducted by the winners of the parliamentary elections On March 4, the right and left forces, in an interview with Politkom.RU, says Eliseo Bertolasi, co-chairman of the Veneto-Russia association and researcher at the Institute of Higher Education of Geopolitics and Related Sciences (Milan).
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05/16/2006 | Boris Makarenko, Alexey Makarkin
Liberals in modern Russia
It is impossible to determine the boundaries of the “liberal segment” of the expert community without defining the concept of liberalism in general and the history of its “arrival” in Russian social thought in particular. In a narrow sense, “liberalism” is one of the three “big ideologies” (along with conservatism and socialism). In a broad sense, “liberalism” is a meta-ideology that defines the entire structure of liberal democracy in the West, from which conservatism sprang off at a certain historical stage (after the French Revolution) and to which social democracy gradually “drifted.” It is liberalism that forms the basis of the expanding zone of consensus between these three ideologies, as well as their many convergences and hybrids. Like the other two ideologies, liberalism has many schools and shades, which are perhaps inappropriate to consider in the context of this article.
All three Western “big ideologies” were initially alien to the Soviet socio-political environment, but this “foreignness” was different in nature. Liberalism could fall on an “open field”, in the sense that this ideology is universalist in nature, and its principles had to be introduced practically from scratch. Conservatism has one of its foundations “protective principle”, protection of established state and public institutions. There was a lot of “protection” in Russian thought, but it was not the usual protection of established relations of private property and the social interests built on it: at first there simply weren’t any, and they still haven’t become established. Therefore, from conservatism, only one variation has received visible development - libertarianism a la F. Hayek or M. Thatcher (“Gaidar boys”), which puts the maximization of individual freedom in the economic sphere at the forefront (this school is often incorrectly attributed to liberalism, whereas in in fact it is neoconservative). Those liberal experts who are close to large national capital, the so-called, also approach conservatism. “oligarchs” - this layer already has “something to conserve.”
However, both liberalism and conservatism at least implied the creation of a new social order in Russia. In contrast, socialism in Russian social thought in the overwhelming majority of cases was built by the method of “subtracting from communism” its most odious features in the name of preserving a significant part of the Soviet legacy (state property, state regulation, equal distribution), and only secondarily by borrowing modern developments from Western countries. socialists. If liberalism and conservatism can be blamed for insufficiently taking into account Russian realities and dominating borrowed ideas, then socialism can be blamed for an excessive emphasis on preserving the old way of life and insufficient modernization. In this sense, socialism has been a conservative ideology in Russia over the past decade and a half.
At all times, the “liberalism” of an expert strongly depended on his position in relation to the authorities: an expert independent of the authorities determined the extent of his liberalism and interpretation of political events to the extent of his own convictions. The “expert in power” inevitably weighed his assessments against the interests of his “patron,” sometimes for tactical reasons (not wanting to “expose himself”), sometimes his involvement in the political struggle forced him to adjust his beliefs (for example, G. Satarov’s position in favor of canceling elections in 1995) An expert close to liberal opposition, sometimes toughened his position, criticizing the authorities, sometimes, on the contrary, he restrained himself (as the “Gaidarites” moderated criticism of the authorities in the political field in order to promote economic liberalism).
During the 90s, the main opponents of the liberals were representatives of the socialist political tradition (communists). The real danger of communist revenge was then considered quite obvious. Accordingly, one of the signs of Russian liberalism during this period was anti-communism, and various representatives of the liberal camp adhered to only different versions of it - tougher (up to proposals for lustration or a ban on the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) or soft. In recent years, the relevance of discussions between liberals and communists has decreased significantly, since the political influence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has sharply decreased, and the discussions themselves still do not lead to any positive results.
Recently, the main opponents of liberals have become conservatives (including from among recent liberals), who believe that the interests of the state should prevail over the interests of the individual, recognize the objectivity (and even the necessity) of reaction, that is, a partial revision of the liberal foundations of the political course of the 90s years, but reject the possibility of communist revenge. Many representatives of liberalism underwent evolution in a conservative direction - this process began in the first half of the 90s (“Conservative Manifesto” by V. Nikonov and S. Shakhrai as the ideological platform of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord), and continued in the future - with another example there may be a movement “Forward, Russia!” B. Fedorov, even the name of which is copied from the conservative “Forward, Italy!” S. Berlusconi. In recent years, this process has become even more active.
Political structure
It's obvious that political system for a liberal, it is a liberal democracy with the rule of law (often incorrectly called the rule of law), guarantees of human rights, and a developed civil society. The problem and subject of dispute for liberals was not these postulates themselves (unlike supporters of other ideologies, they never questioned them), but the pace of approach to them, the assessment of specific political decisions and moves, etc. This, of course, was strongly influenced (as indicated above) by the expert’s positioning relative to power. In the “Putin era,” especially in the last year and a half, part of the “once liberals” associated with the government went so far in the pro-government interpretation of these topics that, justifying the pro-government position, they actually went beyond the “field of liberalism.”
Desirable economic, social and cultural structure:
This point marks one of the conceptual divides in the liberal camp. T.N. “economic liberals” take libertarian positions, that is, (see above) strictly speaking, they are not liberals, but conservatives. However, the largest of these figures are not limited to economic sphere, speaking on a wider range of issues (E. Yasin, E. Gaidar), and on other topics, they often turn out to be consistent liberals.
Those liberals for whom the main thing is the political system, as a rule, do not have a detailed economic position. The consensus for them seems to be general concepts on the desirability of a market economy, the promotion of private property and the protection of property rights, the elimination of administrative barriers and the development of competition. Significant disagreements among liberals are noted on the issue of the political and economic role of the “oligarchs.” Recently - clearly as a result of the electoral defeats of the liberal parties - the liberals have finally started talking about social justice.
Russian culture, from the point of view of liberals, should be fit into the global context and be as open as possible to external influences. Defending creative freedom and priority creative personality over the social (state, public) order, liberals come into conflict with representatives of both socialist and conservative traditions, who occupy “protective” positions in relation to culture.
National question
The national question for Russia has two different meanings, both related to liberalism: “Russian national” and the position of national minorities in Russia. It was the liberals who raised the topic of modern Russian identity: “Russian national” became an alternative to “Soviet” for them. Subsequently, liberals (in general) adhered to the principle of building a nation state in Russia, although they recognized that Russia, with its imperial multinational destiny, was not very suitable for this. This concept was seriously developed by V. Tishkov, who proposed the “French model” of building such a state (we got France, now we will make the French), the late A. Salmin argued with him. But in principle, liberals raised the “Russian national” topic less and less: when Russian statehood was established and gained legitimacy, they lost interest in it. They saw “statism”, “patriotism”, “power” as tools of their ideological opponents, who, not without reason, suspected of hypocritical intentions to use such terms to cover up illiberal and openly authoritarian intentions. And for these reasons, liberals lost the initiative in the discourse about the “national,” which became one of the main reasons for their weakening in the first decade of the new century.
There is another extremely important point. Liberals were and remain, almost without exception, “Westerners.” While the general political atmosphere in Russian-Western relations was generally favorable, “Westernism” in domestic political issues was not just “politically correct”, but also advantageous. However, with the change in the foreign policy climate, especially after the “Orange Revolutions,” the “Westernization” of liberals is becoming increasingly problematic. As for the topic of national minorities in Russia, liberals (as well as the overwhelming majority of conservatives and socialists - supporters of “universalist” doctrines) remained "assimilators". While advocating respect for human rights (including specific ethnic ones) and equality, they nevertheless, unlike their European colleagues, paid little attention to the real situation of minorities, believing that the elites of most national republics (especially Muslim ones) were anti-modernization, and therefore represent a brake on the path of “Europeanization”.
Desirable position of religion
Regarding religion, liberals have always been united in their satisfaction with the degree of freedom of conscience in post-reform Russia, and for them this freedom certainly implied equality of religions and confessions, which actually denied the dominance of Orthodoxy and its rapprochement with the state. Within the Orthodox Church, the liberal movement in recent decades has constituted a clear minority , advocating a tolerant attitude towards other faiths, the development of ecumenical dialogue (mainly with Catholics and traditional Protestants). The most famous representative of this trend was Archpriest A. Men (died in 1990), the names of the late Archbishop Mikhail (Mudyugin), Archpriest A. Borisov, priest G. Chistyakov and others can also be mentioned. In the mid-1990s, some representatives of this trend (for example, priest G. Kochetkov) were persecuted by the church leadership, but in recent years the official authorities have paid little attention to their activities, since they do not see real competitors in them. On the contrary, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces appear as such, considering most of the hierarchy to be secret supporters of liberals (which seems like an obvious stretch). For some church liberals, the framework of the Russian Orthodox Church turned out to be too tight, which led to their search for alternative jurisdictions. This is associated with the transition of some of them to marginal religious organizations (G. Yakunin, excommunicated and anathematized), as well as Catholicism - this appears to be associated with the high authority of Pope John Paul II among Russian church liberals.
Methods and mechanisms for achieving the desired state
For modern Russian liberals, the absolute priority is to achieve their goals through participation in elections: in this they are close to their historical predecessors - the Cadets, who expected to come to power not through revolution, but through the quiet rustling of ballot papers. The commitment of Russian liberals to democratic values makes them have a negative attitude towards any violent actions, since they hinder the modernization development of the country. Another distinctive feature of Russian (as well as any other) liberals is respect for procedure, which is opposed to outwardly expedient but illegal measures.
At the same time, for liberals, the possession of an expert resource has traditionally played a significant role, which ensured their relevance to the authorities. Even when liberal parties suffered political defeats, the value of this resource allowed them to maintain apparatus positions and direct access to power structures. This contributed to both the achievement of individual career goals and the promotion of legislative initiatives and political projects.
When solving specific political problems Over the past decade and a half, liberals have repeatedly found themselves faced with a dilemma - principles or expediency. The first time this happened was in 1993, when various representatives of the liberal political camp and the expert community disagreed diametrically on the issue of their attitude towards the dissolution of parliament by Boris Yeltsin. Then most of the liberals (“Gaidarites”) supported the president, believing that he acted in conditions of extreme necessity, and the parliament was hindering the modernization of the country. A minority - both politicians (the future founders of Yabloko) and experts (M. Gefter) - condemned the president’s actions: in their opinion, the illegal actions of the head of state contradicted democratic norms.
For the second time, the positions of the liberals diverged due to the attitude towards a forceful solution to the Chechen problem in 1994. – then the difference between “pragmatists” and “idealists” was most clearly revealed. The third time the discrepancy between principles and expediency appeared during the 1996 election campaign. Then the threat of communist revenge forced the liberals, who supported the president during the September-October crisis, not only to again identify with him (despite the increased number of disagreements, including on the Chechen problem), but also to “turn a blind eye” to the obvious discrimination of the opposition candidate.
The attitude of liberals towards the political regime of “Putin’s Russia” is deeply contradictory. In the period 2000-2003, most liberals experienced ambivalent feelings - a number of government measures were perceived by them purely positively as a continuation of the implementation of the reform agenda of the 90s. Against this background, other actions of the Kremlin (such as establishing de facto state control over federal television) were perceived as negative, but, in principle, “tolerable” phenomena.
In 2003, the situation changed - the increasingly noticeable gap between the authorities and the elite of the 90s (in which liberals occupied much more “weighty” positions than in society as a whole) led to a sharp decrease in the demand for liberals by the Kremlin. The actions of the authorities are increasingly at odds with the aspirations of liberal-minded politicians and experts. In this situation, liberals again faced a choice: either continue to focus on the government, which is becoming less liberal, or reconsider their attitude towards it. Different attitudes to this issue polarize even members of the same political party - serious disagreements within the Union of Right Forces are typical. The dissonance between the authorities and the liberals, as well as the example of Ukraine and Georgia, led not only to an increase in opposition, but also to the growth of “orange” groups among them. moods. Some liberals begin to perceive the government as an unconditional enemy and express sympathy for all political forces that are in opposition (a characteristic change in their attitude towards the “Limonovites”). At the same time, some liberals believe that any revolutionary change in the current government will lead to the victory of reactionary political forces and a complete rollback of reforms.
Historical doctrine, “axial” events of Russian and world history
The historical views of liberals are inextricably linked with the concept of progress, evolutionary modernization development. Unlike socialists, they consider reforms in the best possible way modernization of social relations, and the revolution is perceived as a path fraught with significant costs, which is permissible only in the most extreme case, when the current government has become openly authoritarian (in the Western tradition - “usurper”) or has completely lost its reform potential. Hence the contradictory attitude of liberals towards revolutionary cataclysms - such as the English and French revolutions. The American War of Independence, perceived as a liberation movement against “usurpers,” evokes a much more positive reaction. In the liberal tradition, the bloodless “Glorious Revolution” in England of 1688, which stopped the reaction without any significant social cataclysms, is considered “ideal.” In a completely different historical situation, “ velvet revolution» late 80s in Central and Eastern Europe, which also received a purely positive assessment from liberals.
Liberals' attitude to key periods Russian history is closely related to their ideological choice. Peter’s reforms are assessed positively from the point of view of the overall modernization of Russia (“The Bronze Horseman” was the emblem of Gaidar’s “Russia’s Choice” movement), but more reserved when it comes to their social costs. But the “Great Reforms” of the mid-19th century evoke a purely positive attitude. Unlike communists, liberals have a sharply negative assessment of the October revolution, and unlike conservatives, they are not inclined to condemn the February revolution.
Contextualization
Modern liberal politicians pay little attention to their ideological predecessors. The classics of philosophical liberalism - J. Locke, J. Hobbs, as well as domestic ones (B. Chicherin, P. Struve) are not very popular (the only one who tried to systematically comprehend the domestic liberal heritage is A. Kara-Murza). Karl Popper is mentioned a little more often.
The classics of liberal economics are more in demand, but almost exclusively along the libertarian line - from Adam Smith to Friedrich Hayek, while the “social liberal” John Keynes is clearly not in favor. But the authorities are politicians, moreover of a conservative persuasion - M. Thatcher, R. Reagan. Russians communicated irregularly with European liberal politicians. “Economists” (and they were not the only ones) preferred “right-wingers” and libertarians; Only Yabloko members communicated with the Liberal International; policy documents of European liberals - the Oxford Manifestos of 1947 and 1997. are practically unknown in Russia (even to liberals).
Modern Russian liberals consider reformers and modernizers to be their historical predecessors - from M. Speransky and the brothers D. and N. Milyutin to S. Witte and P. Stolypin. At the same time, little attention is paid to the fact that not all of them adhered to liberal views: Stolypin was a consistent conservative, Witte was rather a pragmatist (however, the determining factor for liberals was their contribution to the modernization of the country). The Cadets can be considered the direct ideological predecessors of modern liberals, with all the diversity of their ideological shades - from the left liberalism of Milyukov to the conservative liberalism of Maklakov, which objectively adjoined the “Vekhi” tradition. The Octobrists, with their desire to combine sovereignty and liberalism, can relate to the predecessors of modern liberals only with a large degree of convention.
The pre-Soviet liberal tradition was interrupted by the Bolsheviks coming to power and the subsequent repressions of the civil war and the late 1920s. Its revival is associated with the phenomenon of dissidence, when in the 60-70s there was a departure of some of its representatives (A. Sakharov, S. Kovalev, R. Pimenov, etc.) from ideological searches within the framework of the socialist paradigm and a revival of interest in classical liberalism. Currently, the dissident tradition is continued by liberal human rights activists, such as L. Ponomarev, V. Abramkin and others.
At the same time, the preservation of tradition in Soviet times was facilitated by historical studies of the problems of Russian liberalism by P. Zayonchkovsky, K. Shatsillo, V. Dyakin, far from oppositionism (and from politics in general), as well as works on the history of the social movement of such a “cult” author as N. Eidelman (currently his tradition is continued by S. Ekshtut).
In modern Russia, two complementary parts of the liberal field can be distinguished. These are liberal experts and liberal politicians (there are figures belonging to both groups - such as E. Gaidar, V. Ryzhkov, V. Lysenko).
Liberal experts were those intellectuals who, at the stage of the collapse of the communist system, accepted “transit to democracy” as a normative model for the country’s development, regardless of the path by which they came to this choice. For some it was an ideological choice, dictated by the experience of inclusion in Russian politics (G. Satarov, S. Markov), for others it was a rational choice based on academic knowledge of international relations (S. Karaganov, S. Rogov), regional studies (G. Diligensky, A. Salmin, I. Bunin, K. Kholodkovsky, V. Nikonov), economic science (E. Yasin, E. Gaidar and his team) or sociology (Yu. Levada, B. Grushin), jurisprudence ( M. Krasnov, A. Obolonsky). The first had to “gain” knowledge based on the basics of liberal theories, the second had to translate scientific material about foreign countries into Russian realities, and both had to create a language of expert knowledge, be it academic or applied. However, the main thing was precisely the choice of democracy as a normative model desirable for the political development of Russia.
Liberal politicians came from the intelligentsia (both metropolitan and provincial) environment and appeared on the political arena, as a rule, in the late 80s - early 90s as activists of informal organizations and political parties created in those years. Currently, some of them have been “examined” (the most striking example is E. Gaidar), some have moved into the executive branch, and some are in opposition.
Current institutional localization of the position
The most famous representatives of modern Russian expert liberalism:
Political science: A. Salmin, I. Bunin, G. Satarov, SKaraganov, Rogov, K. Kholodkovsky, A. Ryabov.
Economics: E. Yasin, E. Gaidar, A. Illarionov.
Jurisprudence: S. Alekseev, M. Krasnov, A. Obolonsky.
National issues and federalism: V. Tishkov, A. Zakharov.
Religious studies: A. Krasikov, N. Mitrokhin, S. Filatov.
Institutes:
Center for Strategic Research
High School of Economics
Center for Political Technologies
INDEM Foundation
Moscow Carnegie Center
Moscow School of Political Studies
Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS
Institute for Economics in Transition
Liberal Mission Foundation
Institute for the Study of Religion in the CIS and Baltic Countries
Research Center for Private Law under the President of the Russian Federation
Russian School of Private Law
Information and analytical center "Sova".
Publications:
Gaidar E.T. State and evolution. St. Petersburg, 1997.
Gaidar E.T. For a long time. Russia in the world: Essays economic history. M., 2005.
Zakharov A.A. E pluribus unum. Essays on modern federalism. M., 2003.
Krasnov M.A. Cage for power. M., 1997.
Liberalism in Russia. Collection of articles / Kapelyushnikov R.I., Salmin A.M., Bunin I.M., Urnov M.Yu.,
Masarsky M.V., Khakamada I.M., Pappe Ya.Sh. M., 1993.
Mitrokhin N.A. Russian Orthodox Church: current state and actual problems. M., 2004
Obolonsky A.V. Man and power: crossroads of Russian history. M., 2002.
Ryzhkov V.A. “The Fourth Republic” (essay on the political history of modern Russia). M., 2000.
Salmin A.M. Modern democracy: essays on formation, M., 1997.
Sekirinsky S.S., Filippova T.A. Pedigree of Russian freedom. M., 1993.
Senokosov Yu.P. Power as a problem. Experience of philosophical consideration. M., 2005.
Modern Russian politics / Bunin I.M., Karaganov S.A., Nikonov V.A., Ryzhkov V.A., Salmin A.M., Satarov G.A.. M., 2002.
Chkhartishvili G.Sh. Life for the king, or Crown for the horse. Lament for enlightened absolutism / Today. 2.02.96.
Ekshtut S.A. In the service of the Russian Leviathan: Historiosophical experiments. M, 1998.
Yasin E.G. New era - old worries. Political Economy. M., 2004.
Yasin E.G. New era - old worries. Economic policy. M., 2004.
Yasin E.G. Will democracy take root in Russia? M., 2005.
Somehow, imperceptibly, the realization has come into our everyday life that 2019 and 2020 will be lost for us for development. Again, as in previous years, we will target inflation and catch the ruble exchange rate. These will be years of adaptation of the population and the economy to the deafening and shocking impacts of the so-called “unpopular” decisions of the economic bloc of the Russian government.
This refers to another increase in prices and excise taxes, taxes, retirement age, bank credit interest and measures of external sanction pressure. The fall in incomes of the population and enterprises, entailing a fall in demand and, accordingly, the rate of economic development, is an inevitable consequence of government economic recipes on the advice of the IMF. And government forecasts tell us that the situation will begin to level off only at the beginning of 2021.
That is, if in 2017 people believed that after the 2018 elections vigorous actions in the economy would begin, which simply did not begin due to the pre-election situation, and at the beginning of 2019 everyone would already see changes that would take shape in 2020 growth, and the guarantee of this is the May Presidential Decrees, then after the shock of the pension reform we are already being told that now there will be a series of shock impacts that are necessary due to a lack of money in the budget, and the negative consequences caused by this will gradually pass by the end of 2020. And then that same growth will begin, the need for which ministers so often spoke about.
“I’ll wear myself out, I’ll become the best, just wait for that occasion,” was such a perky song in the mid-60s. Our ministers sing something similar to us, while torturing us, not themselves. Because there is no guarantee that in 2021 we will not have to raise prices and taxes again and ask for another two years to target inflation and stabilize against a negative wave.
And the reason is ironclad - there is no money in the budget. Unfavorable trends, evil machinations of enemies, infrastructure projects in the middle of readiness, poor demographics, oil fluctuations, election results in the United States - a lot of reasons in favor of the fact that everything will happen again in 2021, and practically no reason that it will begin in 2021 Finally, growth. Everyone understands that if in the last 10 years the trend was exactly like this, falling, despite all the growth forecasts and promises, then, undoubtedly, in the next two years there is an almost one hundred percent probability that the trend will extend to this period. In the science of forecasting, this method is called the extrapolation method, transferring trends of the past to the period of the near future.
Everything is simple there. If everything went this way for 10 years, then for the next 2 years the probability of trends continuing is almost 80-90%. Businesses build their forecasts and business plans on precisely these principles. If the forecast is for the next 5 years, the probability of current trends continuing is 50-60%. If for the next 7 years, then 30%. And if there is a 70% probability of a change in trends, then, taking it as 100%, 70% of this probability is a change for the worse and 30% for the better. This is how business works, and it cannot be fooled by propaganda campaigns in the media. Businesses have their own analysts and indicators. Business cannot afford to be mistaken.
Both business and government operate on the same forecasting principles - this is the rule of forecast conservatism. That is, they assume that the most likely are the most negative scenarios. The budget is being prepared for the most negative scenario. It will be better - good, it will be worse - we are ready for it. Both the country's budget and the company's budget are compiled using this method. Those who work differently go bankrupt and leave the market.
But the government cannot explain its actions to the people by saying that it is guided by the rule: “Everything will be bad and will never end.” From the times of Gaidar to the times of Siluanov-Medvedev-Kudrin-Nabiullina, we are led through life precisely by the assurances that if we endure today, then tomorrow will be better than yesterday. As long as the West didn’t run out of pressure and one could live by clinging to its source of credit, everyone was happy with everything. When the West had problems and decided to use force, Russia had to resist. The Crimean referendum - and the West turned off the credit valve. And everything collapsed.
Russia's problem is not that it is unable to obtain the necessary technologies under sanctions. She'll get them. The problem for Russia is that the existing economic system, which relies on world capital, is not suitable for financing investments, that, they say, “the master will come, the master will build for us.” And, accordingly, the system that ensures the functioning of this economic system political system. Figuratively speaking, everything that we have built over 28 years is unsuitable in the current conditions and must be urgently dismantled and replaced. Can you imagine the challenge?
That is, the president must gather all the elites and announce to them that since it is no longer possible to live like this, a revolution will begin in the country from Monday at eight in the morning. All the rules change. Money will be taken from other places, for this purpose other organizations will be created and other people will work there. Thanks to everybody, you're free.
The elite in Russia, as elsewhere, resemble spiders in a jar. Scientifically it is called this - it has a high conflict potential according to the property criterion. However, it so happens that there is also a regional conflict among the elite. Traditionally, Moscow was ruled by the “Moscow people”, who always traditionally did not like the “St. Petersburg people”. The St. Petersburg people paid them in full reciprocity. This conflict is well reflected in the statements and memoirs of the former head of Yeltsin’s Security Service, Alexander Korzhakov.
He does not mince words and says what the “Moscow” people who have been pushed aside by them think about the “St. Petersburg people.” And, of course, with the coming change of power, the “Moscow ones” will make every effort to take revenge, and the “St. Petersburg” ones will make every effort to preserve all their acquisitions and prevent the “Moscow ones” from taking revenge. The “American” and “British” are actively playing between the “Moscow” and “St. Petersburg”.
If you do not describe the components of the conflict, then you may not see its sources and, accordingly, will not be able to localize it. Or not understanding where it will develop and failing to prepare.
Points of conflict in Russia are multiplying and overlapping each other, creating the effect of a draft fanning the flames. In addition to the conflict of the elite within itself on property and regional grounds, there was added a conflict between the elite and society on prices, taxes and the pension issue. And in general on inequality. Plus the conflict between Russia and the West over the issue of choosing one’s destiny. And this led to a local crisis in Ingushetia, which was actually caused by the ulterior motives of the participants and was not warned in a timely manner. The intra-elite crisis of local elites threatens to grow and tighten its vortex both the Center and its neighbors - if someone there makes a mistake.
This concentration of conflicts indicates that the existing management system is not able to deal with conflicts correctly. It is reactive, not proactive, and sometimes even inappropriately reactive. Gradually, from a series of isolated conflicts as problems unresolved in time, a general principle- inability of the management system to manage and cope with tasks.
In such a situation, the system is subjected to an increasing number of shocks. And the more blows, the more silent the system goes into defense. Whereas salvation in this case is precisely the opposite - a more active struggle to seize the initiative. But when there is no strength for activity, dull defense arises. Where the defender is ultimately finished off. The judo and aikido techniques just don’t work here - you can intercept and parry only the first one or two blows, but when they come in series, the “defensive” strategy loses to the attack. Salvation lies only in an immediate counterattack. Reactivity loses to proactivity.
In the conflict between the elites and the conflict between the elite as a whole and the people, the president finds himself in a very difficult position, threatening isolation. He cannot take any side and thereby becomes an irritant to all sides. Whether Putin prevents pension reform or leaves it, he will certainly become the object of discontent on one side or the other.
This happens because the operational management system intervenes in the conflict at its hot stage, at the stage of a war of interests. And in war it is impossible to extinguish the conflict. You can work with a conflict either before or after escalation. Any negotiator-mediator, which in the system of power is the president, trying to stand between the “firing guns” risks coming under fire from both sides and cannot stop them until the ammunition runs out and they become tired and exhausted. But given that in our case the battlefield is our state space, such a war destroys, first of all, the state itself.
No head of state is able to bring about change when society and the elite are at war, this is the way to go cold war. The elite in Russia is liberal or crypto-liberal and, one way or another, it does not like the people, and the people in return do not like the elite. The clinch between them is a stalemate that lasts until a third force appears that can separate the conflicting parties and impose its decision on them.
If liberals seriously hope that they will be able to continue their experiments on the people until 2024, and the people will continue to remain silent, then this is a fatal mistake. Which has already shown itself in the fact that the management system built by liberals does not see conflicts and does not know how to work with them. The accumulated rage of the masses does not manifest itself outwardly until an incident that instantly explodes the system, and the authorities are always taken by surprise. The masses are always harnessed slowly, but then driven quickly. Let's make up simple map conflict and assess where we are now.
Detonators of conflict in Russian society:
1. Information distortion. Society is confident that the information coming from the elite is incomplete and contains distortions, concealments and substitution of facts. If before the pension reform this was the argument of the Orange opposition, now such conviction has begun to penetrate the people. Distrust of the authorities serves as a detonator of conflict.
2. Behavioral inconsistencies. Representatives of the elite behave in such a way (“star parachutes,” the behavior of wives, children, mistresses, etc.) that this further irritates the population. The elites either remain silent where words are expected from them, or they say such words that it would be better for them to remain silent. Behavioral incongruity causes alienation of the masses from the political, administrative and commercial elite.
3. Value inconsistencies. This division becomes more and more glaring at a time when the needs and distress of the people are greater than usual. It seems that the elites and the masses pray to different gods and there is a religious war going on between them.
4. Coincidence of circumstances. Elections in Primorye, Khabarovsk and other regions showed that the candidates for power are people who found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. By the way, the counter-elite election winners leave this impression even more.
5. Self-importance, dominance and selfishness. The government evokes this feeling among the people in greatest quantities. The elite either ignores the masses or uses the following tools in conversation with them: ultimatums, threats, accusations; ridicule, sarcasm, mockery; boasting, categoricalness, moralizing; inattention, interruption, disrespect.
Remember any speech by any representative of the liberal economic elite. Gaidar, Chubais, Chernomyrdin, Yakunin, Gref, Kudrin, Khristenko, Shuvalov, Dvorkovich, Siluanov, Oreshkin, all former and current representatives of the economic bloc of the current government (meeting of the State Council before the elections in Primorye) - all these people have difficulty feigning respect for Putin and cannot hide all of the above qualities even in a conversation with him, not to mention others. They simply breathe prosperity, serene confidence in the future and incredible material wealth, and people catch this breath even on television. Representatives of the governor's corps exhibit the same qualities.
All these manifestations of the detonators of the conflict have not been extinguished for years, and from the accumulation of tension after the incident, the jump in gasoline prices and pension reform brought the elite and society to the stage of confrontation. At this stage we have successfully passed: 1. Accumulation of negativity. 2. Avoiding dialogue. 3. Small claims. 4. Grumbling. 5. Mockery and sarcasm. and 6. Formation of an image of the enemy. Both the elite and the people already see each other as an enemy. At each of these stages it was necessary to begin to work with the conflict, but this was never done. Item 5 from the list of detonators was interfering. Self-importance, dominance, selfishness.
If we want to know what awaits us at the next next stage, then everything is clear. After the next incident leading to a surge in tension, there will be another escalation, the content of which will be: 1. Mutual accusations, 2. Actions against (increased rally activity, the stage of transition of the confrontation to the street phase, as in Armenia), 3. Political provocations with coverage in the world media, interception of the initiative in domestic propaganda from government media to foreign ones.
Next comes the phase of the conditional “Maidan”. Depersonalization of the enemy, his dehumanization and dehumanization, the desire to cause damage even at the expense of oneself, a war of annihilation (all or nothing). At this phase there is no longer power, there are political adventurers, strike committees and revolutionary expediency. Putsch, coup, revolution, conspiracy - call it what you want. Ukraine before our eyes. At this point there is no longer any government control. Then begins the disintegration of territories, a parade of sovereignties and a civil war with the disunion of the former regions of Russia under the so-called “agiles of the UN”.
The most important thing is that with timely diagnosis of the conflict, it was possible to work with it at many preliminary stages and prevent it from growing into what it has grown into. But the previous team did not do this for reasons of maintaining a balance of power, and the current one is forced to react like a fireman, not having time to build new system work in a calm environment.
Because to properly seize the initiative, actions such as collecting information and auditing conflicts, diagnosing them, drawing up a conflict map and building a conflict management strategy are required. Under conditions of restrictions, such work cannot be done efficiently. What are these restrictions? There are many of them: sometimes you can’t touch someone, sometimes elections are just around the corner and you need to prepare for them, sometimes there’s a fire somewhere and you urgently need to run and put it out. Common hardware problems. But in this case, as it turns out, conflicts get out of control and threaten high political risks.
The most negative scenario for the development of the situation in the country was presented above as one whose implementation must be prevented by all available means. Naturally, we cannot limit ourselves to stating some scenarios, otherwise in this case such a scenario itself will add fuel to the fire. Therefore, below we offer a positive program for exiting such a scenario.
The country needs a new party-political system, which will bear the brunt of the entire reboot of the public administration system. The practice of pouring new wine into old leaky wineskins will not produce results. You can fill United Russia and other parties with young technocrats raised in an incubator as much as you like, but this is a palliative and a complete rebranding of the entire system is needed.
It is very simple: in negotiations between the people and the government, the structures of the party in power are no longer perceived by the people as a party to the negotiations. There will be no more negotiations with United Russia. Considering the general crisis of confidence in all parliamentary parties, people will either ignore the elections en masse, or they will overwhelm all candidates and choose the most ridiculous ones. The point is not that such an expression of protest puts the authorities in an illegitimate position, but that there will simply be no local authorities.
The conflict between government and society is counterproductive for both sides. The responsible government can no longer afford to ignore this. Under any pretext, it is necessary to start a movement in support of reforms with the creation of new parties and social forces. Either the government will do it, or its opponents will do it. The experience of perestroika shows that it would be better if the authorities did this. And in a proactive rather than reactive manner.
Avoidance tactics in a ripe conflict lead to the conflict unfolding in unfavorable conditions. If liberals are not removed from economic and political levers, even at the cost of exacerbating all types of conflicts, then the development of the situation will lead to the death of the management system following the example of the USSR. Liberals will substitute goals for us until there is no more country. It’s time for the patriots to seize the initiative so that the leader of the country sees that he has someone to rely on.
Alexander Khaldey
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Those who do not remember kinship: who were the ancestors of Russian liberals
Here is an incomplete list of famous journalists, politicians, and public figures who made a name for themselves through their categorical rejection of the Soviet past and way of life. In recent years, some of them, contrary to the official line, support projects like "Immortal barracks", criticizing large-scale celebrations of Victory Day and other dates that are associated with the Soviet period of Russian history. Mikhail Shakhov decided to remind about names, positions and merits ancestors modern Russian liberals.
Evgenia Albats
Russian liberal journalist, political scientist, public figure and writer. She became famous during Perestroika as the author of Moscow News. Editor in Chief The New Times. Until May 2016, she was the host of her own program on the Ekho Moskvy radio station.
Father– Mark Efremovich Albats. Soviet intelligence officer, radio operator engineer. In 1941, he underwent training at the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, acted as an illegal intelligence officer in Nikolaev, living in a safe house according to documents in the name of Grigory Basiliy. After the war, he worked “at the terribly secret Research Institute 10, developing radio systems for ballistic missiles launched from submarines.” According to some (for obvious reasons, unconfirmed) data, Albats rose to the rank of intelligence colonel.
Grandfather– Mark Mikhailovich Albats. Candidate member of the CPSU. After studying at the Institute. Bauman was sent to “adopt the experience of building electric railways” in the USA, then to purchase equipment in Italy. Before the arrest and execution in 1937 he managed to achieve a high position at that time as head of the Sverdlovsk railway junction.
Anton Antonov-Ovseenko
Journalist, writer, researcher, author of the collection of poetry “Classics of Russian Erotica”, the revealing book “Bolsheviks: How a bunch of people crushed the Empire”, as well as the monograph “German money in the Bolshevik press”. He worked in the apparatus of the Komsomol, Union ministries of the USSR. Now the head of the public reception office of the Yabloko party in Moscow, he speaks on talk shows on federal channels.
Grandson of the revolutionary Vladimir Aleksandrovich Antonov-Ovseenko (pseudonyms in the party - Bayonet and Nikita).
V. Antonov-Ovseenko- Russian and Ukrainian revolutionary, Menshevik until 1914, in 1917 he joined the Bolshevik Party, after October revolution became a party, state and military leader. It was he who declared the Provisional Government overthrown. In 1937, Antonov-Ovseenko was recalled from Spain, after which he was arrested by the NKVD. February 8, 1938 sentenced to execution for belonging to a Trotskyist terrorist and espionage organization. Before his death, he said the words: “I ask whoever lives to see freedom to tell people that Antonov-Ovseenko was a Bolshevik and remained a Bolshevik until his last day.”
Konstantin Borovoy
Deputy of the Duma of the 2nd convocation, ex-chairman of the Party of Economic Freedom, chairman of the political party “Western Choice”. First president of the Russian Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange (1990). He involved the exchange staff in the confrontation between Yeltsin and the Emergency Committee, organized barricades and street actions. Close associate of Valeria Novodvorskaya. In 1991 - president of the bankrupt investment pyramid "Rinako". Author of numerous scandalous statements addressed to Russia and its leadership, incl. "Vilnius ultimatum to Putin."
The son of the writer, secretary of the Association of Proletarian Writers Nathan Efimovich Borovoy, and the chief special officer of the Zheleznodorozhny District Party Committee, employee of the KGB of the USSR Elena Konstantinovna Borovoy.
Sergey Buntman
First deputy editor-in-chief of the Ekho Moskvy radio station, author of the slogan “Listen to the radio - the rest is appearances.” Came to Echo from the French editorial office of the Soviet Foreign Broadcasting. He claimed that Russia committed aggression in Georgia.
Grandfather Buntman - Petros Artemyevich Bekzadyan. Since February 1921 - Secretary of the Plenipotentiary Mission of the Armenian SSR to the Government of the RSFSR. Since March 1923 - Leningrad representative of the Armenian representative office. He worked as a senior consultant at the representative office of the Georgian SSR in Moscow. Arrested in 1937 and convicted by the Military Collegium Supreme Court USSR for participation in a counter-revolutionary nationalist organization. Shot and rehabilitated.
Alexey Venediktov
Journalist, permanent editor-in-chief, co-owner (18% of shares) and presenter of the Ekho Moskvy radio station.
On his father's side: grandson of Nikolai Andrianovich Venediktov.
N. Venediktov – military prosecutor, member of the Military tribunal. From the official presentation to the Order of the Red Star:
“Comrade Venediktov [...] directs his punitive policy towards a merciless fight against traitors, spies and traitors to the Motherland. Dozens of traitors were convicted by him and received a well-deserved punishment. He is merciless towards the enemies of the Motherland and teaches this to the workers of peripheral tribunals. The blows to the criminals are sharp. With its judicial punitive policy, it helps to strengthen iron military discipline.”
Maria Gaidar
Russian and Ukrainian political figure. Former member of the federal political council of the Union of Right Forces. She filled government positions as deputy chairman of the government of the Kirov region (2009-2011) and deputy governor of Saakashvili in the Odessa region.
There is a popular version that this branch of the Gaidarov family is not the blood heirs of the legendary red commander and children's writer. It is known that Arkady Petrovich Gaidar (Golikov) took paternity issues lightly, and adopted at least one child (a girl, Evgenia, in his third marriage). In turn, Gaidar's second wife, Timur's mother and Yegor Gaidar's grandmother, Rakhil Lazarevna Solomyanskaya, broke up with the writer around 1931 to marry the secretary of the Shepetovsky regional committee of the RCP(b) Israel Mikhailovich Razin (later repressed). Officially in the USSR, it was the descendants of Solomyanskaya who were considered “heirs to the name of Gaidar.”
In any case, Maria Gaidar’s grandfather is Timur Arkadyevich Gaidar, head of the military department of the Pravda newspaper, her own correspondent in a number of countries. During his service at the newspaper, he was promoted several times, reaching the rank of rear admiral.
Maria Gaidar's father, Yegor Timurovich Gaidar, managed to make a communist career before the collapse of the USSR - he served as editor and head of the economic policy department in the journal of the CPSU Central Committee "Communist". In addition, following the example of his father, he headed the department of the Pravda newspaper.
Vasily Gatov
In the 90s - producer of television programs for BBC, ABC News, ZDF, press secretary of the Soros Foundation. Since 1996 – Deputy General Director of the REN-TV channel. The author of the statement “the leaders of Service “A” of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR are crying in their special hell, watching the stories of the Russia-1 TV channel.” In his own words, “in the early 90s he investigated the life of his grandfather.” The former deputy head of RIA Novosti during the time of Svetlana Mironyuk, after his dismissal, moved for permanent residence to the United States of America.
Grandfather Gatova - Ivan Samsonovich Sheredega, Soviet statesman and military leader, lieutenant general, 4th commander of the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR. He held the position of head of the Higher Officer School of the NKVD, then - head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate for the Sakhalin Region. He led the operation to resettle the Crimean Tatars, participated in repressions in Ukraine and the arrest of Beria.
Second grandfather– Moisey Lvovich Gatov (1902-1939) – awarded the badge “Honored Worker of the Cheka-GPU”, acting head of the 4th department and 5th department of the Main Economic Directorate (GEU) of the NKVD of the USSR, major of state security. Shot in 1939 and was not rehabilitated.
Maria (Masha) Gessen
Russian and American journalist, former director of the Russian service of Radio Liberty, author of books about Stalin, Putin and Pussy Riot, activist of the LGBT movement. Lives in the USA, legally married to Svetlana Generalova (better known to the general public as photographer Svenya Generalova).
Masha’s paternal grandmother, Esther Yakovlevna Goldberg (married Gessen), was a translator and memoirist who worked for the magazine “Soviet Literature.” Her maternal grandmother, Rozalia Moiseevna Solodovnik (born 1920), was a career employee of the MGB, and worked as a telegram censor at the Central Telegraph in Moscow.
Dmitry Gudkov
Russian opposition politician, deputy of the State Duma of the sixth convocation on the list of “A Just Russia” (later expelled from the faction for his anti-Russian position and participation in the preparation of sanctions lists). Member of the Coordination Council of the Opposition, co-owner of family businesses - a security holding company and a collection agency.
Father– former deputy Gennady Gudkov. He was deputy secretary of the Komsomol committee of the university. At the age of seventeen, he wrote a letter to Andropov to find out how he could start serving in KGB. Since 1982 he worked in the state security agencies of the USSR. Graduated from the counterintelligence school, KGB Institute named after Andropov. In 1993 he was dismissed without the right to wear a military uniform. Reserve Colonel.
D. Gudkov’s great-grandfather (Gennady Gudkov’s grandfather) is Pyotr Yakovlevich Gudkov, one of Nikolai Bukharin’s assistants. During the Civil War, my great-grandmother worked at the headquarters of Army Commander Mikhail Frunze.
Tikhon Dzyadko
Russian television and radio journalist, former deputy editor-in-chief of the Dozhd TV channel. In August 2015, he left the Dozhd TV channel to begin his work on the Ukrainian Inter TV channel in Washington. Has two brothers - Timofey and Philip, who headed the magazines Forbes And " Big city" respectively.
The Dzyadko brothers are the children of Zoya Feliksovna Svetova, a journalist (Radio France, newspaper Liberation, magazine The New Times) and a famous human rights activist.
Dzyadko’s great-grandfather is Grigory (Zvi) Fridland, revolutionary, member of the Central Committee of the Jewish Social Democratic Party “Poalei Zion”. In 1917, he actively worked in the Petrograd Soviet, then was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic. After the revolution, he was a Soviet Marxist historian, studied at the Institute of Red Professorships, and became the first dean of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University ( shot in 1937).
Victor Erofeev
Contemporary Russian writer, literary critic, radio and television presenter (“Echo of Moscow”, “Radio Liberty”). In January 2014, he took part in the scandalous broadcast of the “Amateurs” program on the Dozhd TV channel, where he stated that Leningrad should have been surrendered to German troops.
The son of the Soviet diplomat Vladimir Ivanovich Erofeev (personal translator of Joseph Stalin in French, assistant to the 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR V. Molotov, assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, deputy head of the 1st European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Senegal and Gambia, from 1970 to 1975 - deputy general director UNESCO).
Evgeniy Kiselev
Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian TV presenter. Author of the proposal “kidnap citizens of the Russian Federation” to exchange for Nadezhda Savchenko. In 1981-1984 he taught [Persian] at the Higher School KGB USSR named after Dzerzhinsky. From 1993 to 2001 he worked for NTV, while the channel remained under the control of media tycoon Gusinsky.
Father - Alexey Alexandrovich Kiselev (1911-1988) - Soviet scientist, laureate of the Stalin Prize of the second degree (1946).
Father-in-law - Geliy Alekseevich Shakhov, was one of the leaders of the USSR State Television and Radio (editor-in-chief of Foreign Broadcasting in the USA and Great Britain; among other things, he supervised Vladimir Posner and interviewed Kerensky in 1966).
Kiselev’s biography includes the great-grandfather of the Dzyadko brothers, Grigory Fridlyand, a revolutionary and the first dean of the Faculty of History at Moscow State University. His granddaughter is Masha Shakhova, the wife of Evgeniy Kiselyov.
Irena Lesnevskaya
Journalist and one of the leading Russian television producers of the 90s. Founder REN-TV, magazine publisher The New Times. In 1991, she was an assistant director in the Kinopanorama program, but “she left television under Swan Lake so as not to work under the State Emergency Committee.” In March 2016, she sent a letter to Vladimir Putin, calling for an amnesty for Nadezhda Savchenko. In his own words, “he considers Putin his ideological enemy.”
Grandfather - Jan Lesniewski. Political prisoner, Bolshevik, friend and associate of Dzerzhinsky, organizer of workers' strikes, member of the strike committee (1903). Shot during the years of repression.
Alexander Nevzorov
Reporter, TV presenter, producer, director, publicist. Author and presenter of the perestroika program “600 Seconds”. Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of four convocations. A zealous atheist and a regular participant in Echo of Moscow programs.
Nevzorov’s maternal grandfather, MGB officer Georgy Vladimirovich Nevzorov, headed the department for combating banditry in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR in 1946-1955. Mother - Galina Georgievna Nevzorova, journalist of the newspaper "Smena", the printed organ of the Petrograd Provincial Committee of the Komsomol, then - the Leningrad Regional Committee and the City Committee of the Komsomol.
Andrey Piontkovsky
Russian opposition journalist. Former member of the Bureau of the Political Council of the Solidarity movement. Member of the Opposition Coordination Council. book author "Unloved Country", articles “The Kremlin gopnik has beaten the West again” and an appeal to NATO with a call to introduce into the alliance’s military doctrine “a limited nuclear strike to ensure the destruction of the highest Russian political and military leadership.”
Son of Andrei Andreevich Piontkovsky, a Soviet jurist, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (a specialist in the criminal legal views of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach). A. Piontkovsky - vice-president of the International Association of Criminal Law, honorary doctor of the University of Warsaw, judge of the Supreme Court of the USSR during the reign of I. Stalin (from 1946 to 1951). He was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.
Ilya Ponomarev
Entrepreneur, deputy State Duma 5th and 6th convocations, member of the “A Just Russia” faction, member of the “Left Front” Council. Currently wanted in the case of fake lectures for Skolkovo. He is hiding abroad, where he is seeking strengthening of international sanctions against the Russian Federation in various institutions.
Step-nephew of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, hero of socialist labor, academician Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev. In 1934-37 Ponomarev was the director of the Institute of Party History at the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, then an assistant to the head of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Georgiy Dimitrov, from 1955 until Perestroika - the permanent head of the Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties - the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.
Also worthy of attention is the grandfather of Ilya Ponomarev - Nikolai Pavlovich Ponomarev, a Komsomol and party worker, an honorary railway worker, a diplomat, in the late 70s - the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in Poland, an honorary citizen of this country, who mediated negotiations with the Solidarity trade union.
Vyacheslav (Slava) Rabinovich
Executive Director management company Diamond Age Capital Advisors, former employee Hermitage Capital Bill Browder, liberal Facebook blogger, Ukrainian media expert on the collapse of the Russian economy, her domestic policy and issues of overthrowing Putin.
Grandfather - musicologist David Abramovich Rabinovich. In 1919 in Kharkov he was among the first Komsomol members. Served in Cheka. He moved to Moscow and by 1930 graduated from the Moscow Conservatory, while teaching political economy there. He was an editor, then a manager. book editor and deputy manager of the state publishing house "Muzgiz". From 1933 - consultant, later - head of the music sector of the All-Union Radio. In 1937 - head. performing department of the newspaper "Music", in 1938 - music department of the newspaper "Soviet Art". In 1945-1947, art consultant at the Sovinformburo.
Excerpts from the speeches of Comrade David Rabinovich in the 30s have been preserved:
“Comrade Blum in his letter accuses the Association of Proletarian Musicians of allegedly preaching the ingrowth of bourgeois music into socialism. This is nonsense. But what does Comrade propose? Bloom? He preaches the growth of socialist proletarian music from the depths of capitalism. Completely groundlessly, he accuses the Association of “shameless Menshevism.” And what is this if not the most shameless Menshevism, if not the most open McDonaldism? I ask whether the thesis of Comrade. Bloom from McDonald's? – It’s no different. This is the most shameless Menshevism, the most shameless social-fascism on the musical front...”
In 1948, during processes that logically followed from similar “ideological disputes” of the late 30s, Rabinovich was arrested. Upon returning from the camp in 1955, he no longer held official positions, but quickly restored his reputation as one of the leading music critics. In 1958, he received an apartment in the famous “Composer’s House”, and actively hosted students there - inviting them “to get acquainted with some record received from abroad.” At the end of his life, Rabinovich became one of the largest philophonists in Moscow, heading the corresponding section at the Union of Composers; he promoted collecting and studying recordings.
Nikolai Svanidze
Named after grandfather - shot in 1937, party leader Nikolai Samsonovich Svanidze, head of the Abkhaz city committee of the Party, sibling Joseph Stalin's first wife - Kato Svanidze.
Father - Karl Nikolaevich Svanidze, despite his repressed father, made a career, becoming deputy director of Politizdat under the CPSU Central Committee. He was one of the compilers of the collection “The Goals and Methods of Militant Zionism.”
Mark Feigin
Zhirinovsky about the plans of Hasidic Jews in Russia
Liberals in power are the main problem in Russia
All the liberal scum gathered in Lithuania to discuss how to make things worse in Russia
More details and a variety of information about events taking place in Russia, Ukraine and other countries of our beautiful planet can be obtained at Internet Conferences, constantly held on the website “Keys of Knowledge”. All Conferences are open and completely free. We invite those who are waking up and interested...
8 answers
I tried to figure it all out... It turns out who knows what! In general, we have a very funny political system; you can defend a dissertation on Russian political science.
We have liberals in power (according to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Khazin, etc.), but they do not consider themselves liberals, at the same time, they call liberals those who belong to non-systemic opposition, at the same time, powerful liberals use the word “liberals” as an insult, and non-systemic liberals are proud to be liberals and call on people who hate liberals to support them. Sometimes another group of liberals appears who sigh and regret that there is no liberal patriotic party (Borshchevsky, Dorenko, etc.). And then there is the LDPR, who are liberals, but at the same time, they hate all other liberals and are trying to return the Soviet Union, taking away the initiative from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who are 100% not liberals, but socialists, who for some reason in Russia are right, not left. And if I understand correctly, those who vote for liberals in the United States are very reminiscent of those whom Ukrainian pro-European nationalists call vatniks because they are not liberals. This is a madhouse after all)
Maybe Nolan's chart will help you:
There are two key parameters: economic freedoms and personal freedoms. For liberals, in theory, both are important, although this term itself is interpreted differently, in some places this is what they call the right, in others, on the contrary, in the left. If both parameters are at their maximum, you get libertarianism. The right has a maximum of economic freedoms, a minimum of personal freedoms; the left has, on the contrary, if all freedoms are at a minimum, the result is totalitarianism.
If we take some specific examples in Russia, then Maxim Katz can be considered a liberal in both respects - he is for the expansion of personal and political freedoms, and against totalitarianism, and at the same time for market mechanisms everywhere - his love for paid parking, for example, respect for Chubais and Gaidar. Well, in general, big businessmen in this value system are great.
Navalny and his associates will clearly be to the left, closer to the center. On the one hand, they are for capitalism, but at the same time they pay a lot of attention to inequality. Here Chubais with his privatization and Rusnano is not such a great guy, not to mention all of Putin’s rich friends.
Apple will be even further to the left of Navalny. Well, they themselves say that they have a left-liberal ideology. They raise the topic of social injustice even more, and accordingly, personal freedoms are more important than economic ones; the latter require more restrictions.
Our communists are generally kind of strange. They are clearly in favor of limiting economic freedoms, progressive taxes, everything cheap or free, high pensions (which are not very clear where to get them from). This, of course, contains more populism and speculation on the Soviet theme. At the same time, they certainly do not fight for any personal freedoms, and therefore it is difficult to call them leftists. You can ask for fun what they think, for example, about gays :)
“Systemic liberals” who are in and around the government, such as Gref, Nabiullina, Kudrin, Ulyukaev, are clearly for economic freedoms. Livanov is also included there, he is in favor of ensuring that everything in education is regulated to hell by the invisible hand of the market. At the same time, as far as political freedoms are concerned, all these dudes are silent. Because if they had said anything about this topic, they would have been kicked out of the government for nothing.
In general, our regime turns out to be right-wing totalitarian, and with a lot of ideological manipulations. Therefore, liberals call everyone who says something about political and personal freedoms, and those who can be made scapegoats in the government.
Well, the Republicans in America are just Right-wing. For big business, private property and against all hippies and Muslims.
To understand who the real liberals are in Russia, you need to decide who the real liberals are in general. If under the criterion of “authenticity” we use loyalty to the ideals of classical liberalism, then libertarians will be closest to them. Of these, I can only remember Andrei Illarionov, Putin’s former economic adviser and the person thanks to whom we have a flat income tax. Kasyanov and his party declare loyalty to similar values. They differ little from the ideological core of the moderate Republican Party, which is “fiscally conservative, socially liberal,” that is, for moderate taxation, a small role for the state in the economy and for the freedom of individuals to do everything that does not contradict the freedom of others.
I don’t quite understand about the rightness of our socialists, but there are very few left socialists, that is, those who are in favor of a planned or at least nationalized economy in the West, and if they exist, they are perceived as outright populists (see, for example, Labor led by Jeremy Corbin)
There are a lot of answers, and there will be more. I'll try to participate. and alas, it won’t work out as briefly as I like.
The fact is that the classical concept of liberals dates back to the beginning of the 19th century, when they opposed the ideology of royalist conservatism. There are two forces: the big bourgeoisie on one side, and representatives of the old aristocracy on the other. In today's world, liberalism is no longer an independent ideology, but, in general, part of basic human rights, inalienable for most countries, at least on paper.
In Russia, the concept of “liberal” is closely related to the concept of “democrat”, and most people perceive them as synonymous, but this is by no means the case. So, the majority of the Russian so-called. The “non-system opposition” is democrats, not liberals. I will try to explain the difference using the example of the Great French Revolution. After the events of 1789, two main political groups emerged in the struggle for power - the Girondins and the Montagnards. The Girondins were bourgeois of various stripes, their program boiled down to the fact that we will give the people more freedoms, but we will not give them power. The Montagnards were more radical, they demanded power from the people first of all, and of course the radical faction of the Montagnards - the Jacobins - showed in practice what this was. Here is the key difference - a liberal is for freedom for all, and a democrat is for power for all, and these things can either be combined or not.
After the evolutionary victory of the liberals in 19 in the advanced European countries, another problem surfaced. Liberalism in pure form, is not a powerful enough support to maintain social balance. The liberals, having won and broken the foundations of class society, defended first of all themselves, that is, the bourgeoisie. They gave freedom to everyone, but not everyone could put it into practice. The masses were subjected to severe exploitation, and this provoked the birth of a new political movement - the socialists.
Naturally, nothing is clear yet, so I will try to break down the spectrum of political trends characteristic of the first half of the 20th century. Liberals are for complete freedom, the strongest must win, if you want something in life, get it for yourself, no one owes you anything, the state is the army, the police and the court. Democrats - the state is obliged to regulate class relations, the state is obliged to provide a decent standard of living to all residents of the country, so that everyone has the opportunity to realize themselves, the state is the people who delegate their representatives to it through elections. Socialists - the state ensures complete equality of classes, is the highest dictate of social justice, taking upon itself all management of society as a whole, in all spheres of life. Anarchists - the state is the main form of exploitation, even if it eliminates the exploitation of man by man, he still remains not free, therefore society must consist of fragmented communes that resolve all issues of their existence within themselves by direct democratic methods. It’s very primitive, but in general it’s true.
In their pure form, these ideologies did not exist. Liberalism was different, democrats and socialists too. In each country, based on its current characteristics, these ideas were mixed and transformed. Therefore, an American liberal, a French liberal and an English liberal are slightly different things. Ideologists also formed their own schools. There were liberals for whom the ideal was almost Darwinian conditions of competition, other liberals advocated that the state should still be an arbiter, others advocated that the state should largely control the economy and social life, support anti-monopoly laws, maintain a healthy society competition, and protect it from social explosions, revolutions and crises.
Parties were formed at the intersection of ideologies. The average spectrum looked like this. The liberal parties of large industrial and financial capital are liberals. Parties of medium and small businesses, intellectuals - democrats. The parties of the working masses are socialists.
I’ll say something about conservatism. Conservatives began to be considered supporters of evolutionary development, without forced and radical reforms. For example, a liberal in the USA in the mid-20th century, in relation to a socialist, was a conservative. And a socialist in the Russian Federation in the early 90s was a conservative in relation to a liberal. Here, I hope it became clearer?)
All three branches have pros and cons. Liberalism is the ideal of a person who works for himself and who depends on himself; this is the position of a strong personality. And here mutual language can be found by a billionaire tycoon, and the driver of his own tractor, who turns the steering wheel himself. They seem to be different layers, but often the programs of the liberals, with low tax burdens, are closer to both of them equally, and here they are allies. At the same time, the state limits medical provision to the population, educational and science programs, and here a teacher and a low-skilled worker can become allies, giving their vote to the Democrats. Socialists in most countries have merged with democrats, abandoning their radical goals, and each country has its own social democrats who advocate the development of public institutions and the maintenance of broad social programs, naturally at the expense of taxes. Separately, no party can be effective, some give an economic breakthrough, but the standard of living of the masses falls, others, on the contrary, pull the standard of living up due to a decrease in economic indicators. A system of checks and balances is being formed, which underlies the political systems of all advanced countries. In other words, no party or ideology can monopolize power in the country and dictate living conditions. Again, I’m not giving examples, this is a diagram.
Now I’ll move on from the diagram to specifics. Republicans in the USA are a party that is based on liberal values. There was no conflict between liberals and conservatives in the 19th century in the United States; it was founded by liberals. Therefore, when the Social Democrats became stronger, the liberals looked like conservatives in relation to them. I hope you're not confused. A new breath of liberalism occurred during the structural crisis of the 70s. In the post-war world, in the second half of the 20th century, social democrats became stronger, and in advanced countries the process of establishing social states was underway. The following appeared and became an integral norm: an 8-hour working day, old-age and disability pensions, free medicine and education, and unemployment benefits. The state went further and began to support even unprofitable industries ( classic example- miners in England) defending the right to work for all citizens, fearing unemployment. The result was a sharp decline in advanced economies, and a serious crisis occurred. Here the ideology of neoliberalism appears, which breathed new strength into the parties of liberals and conservatives that had faded into the background (which was almost the same thing in the 70s). They set a course for tough and effective reforms. Margaret Thatcher, by a strong-willed decision in the UK, closed unprofitable mines and threw thousands and thousands of workers onto the streets, but organized retraining courses. The state now strictly controlled social spending, created conditions for business development, and a breakthrough in new technologies for the market, which led to a dramatic modernization of all spheres of life. In the United States, a similar course was pursued by the icon of all Republicans, R. Reagan, whose policy was even nicknamed Reagonomics.
Now let's finally move on to Russia. In our country, after the fall of the socialist regime, reforms began according to a similar scheme, that is, neoliberal ones. However, on our soil, the population turned out to be completely unprepared for such changes in life, and the name of the program “shock therapy” fully justified itself. The result was not so favorable, but here, however, well-known political changes intervened, which used rising energy prices to maintain living standards, and almost replaced the real economy, and almost abandoned further liberal reforms in this economy, the result of which we experienced firsthand we feel it today.
Now let’s look at who our liberal is - a systemic liberal, for example, Kudrin. Outside the system, for example, Khodorkovsky. The democrats have it the hardest of all; the non-systemic democrat today is, of course, Navalny, and Yashin. Liberals, as a rule, are more economists, for them politics is a kind of background, for democrats it is of greater importance, because it does not allow big business to break away from the problems of the entire population (they say you feed on our labor, so do not forget about your obligations). Socialists are more comfortable with internal confrontation with systemic liberals, they defend their ideal of the dominant state, here the bright representative is Putin, while we have the historical experience of a socialist empire, which makes socialists imperials at the same time (which is complete game for Europeans), which is why they have ideologically somewhat right-wing. It’s easiest to call Udaltsov a non-systemic socialist, but here we need to make allowances for history, we have different shades, and our socialists are most often called communists, which is not entirely correct.
Given that there is a deficit of liberalism and democracy in Russia, liberals cannot declare their program without significant democratic changes, and democrats, without significant liberal ones. This causes a confusion of concepts, and the difference between such a system and the system in the United States (that is, Republicans advocate democracy, and Democrats have nothing against liberalism, they just put emphasis in different places).
That is, a liberal who comes to power in the Russian Federation will bring democratic reforms, without which he will not implement the program, but he will take as many of them as he needs, no more, no less. The Democrats will bring to democratic, well, or their social-democratic programs and liberal reforms, because some kind of economy is needed to milk taxes for these programs. In the USA, democracy and liberalism are indisputable dominants, and the conflict of parties concerns a huge mass of details of the social and economic life of the country. The USA does not require radical reforms, therefore the change of Democrats and Republicans does not have such a noticeable impact on ordinary life in the USA.
Look like that's it.
Liberal values: personal freedom, private property and unalienable rights. The danger with the concept of “private property” is that it focuses attention and life goals person on the material and individual. It kills the spiritual and creative in him. He exalts his own, the personal, over the general. A person turns into a kind of rodent, whose main task is to carry and carry more grain into his hole. Compete with other rodents, defend their reserves. And nothing more is required from a person
So, in order:
1. A liberal is anyone who considers human life to be the highest value. If we talk about more or less large political parties, then Apple is classical liberalism.
2. Republicans are generally not considered liberals in the USA. In a broad sense, democrats are considered liberals; in a narrow sense - progressive socialists. Libertarians, for example, are considered social liberals and economic conservatives. The fact is that philosophical liberal thought in the USA and Europe has been developing towards socialism since the mid-twentieth century.
3. In the post-Soviet tradition, it was believed that communists were leftists, liberals were rightists. A similar division is still sometimes used, but gradually nationalists began to be called right-wing, as in the Western tradition. If we talk about the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, since the nineties they have been playing the nationalist and conservative card, there is essentially no communism there, rather Stalinism - they are, indeed, more right than left. Although, right and left, this is absolutely symbol, this is where the confusion comes from.
US Republicans are not liberals - they are staunch conservatives who support the American dream, free enterprise, Protestantism, the right to bear arms, and prohibit abortion and euthanasia. If it weren’t for all the liberals, they would have preserved slavery. In general, we would do everything to preserve the country the way the “founding fathers” created it. Just as one cannot traditionally call socialists right - because socialism is based on completely leftist ideas of universal equality. Feminism, LGBT rights, freedom of religion, the pension system, trade unions - these are all left-wing ideas that have made their way into the constitution.
Try to separate left-right and liberal-conservative ideas. There are definitely no real liberal parties in our country anymore. If you look at the current members of parliament, everyone is fighting to preserve traditional values. Some even defend values that replaced the current traditional values about 100 years ago. We don’t have right-wing parties either. Even Alexei Navalny is not an ardent supporter of right-wing ideology. He defends the idea of the inviolability of private property, but at the same time is a supporter of decent social guarantees from the state. Which is difficult to implement in reality, unfortunately. In their election programs, absolutely everyone competes on who will pay the largest pensions, who will impose the largest taxes on large businesses (and this is also non-market, since small businesses do not want to become big), who will defeat corruption, etc.
If you really want to figure out where to look for right-wing liberals or right-wing conservatives in our country, then just use Google and look at the difference between the currents, but without mixing them. It lies in how this or that movement answers a certain list of questions. And then look at how parties or individuals do it. The problem with Russian politics is that there are no different views on solving problems, but there are different people who want to solve the same problems in the same way, which is due to the homogeneity of the electorate - grandmothers and state employees go to the polls, and we have very few business representatives and they are not too rich so that they can cooperate and lobby their interests in politics.
Anatoly Chubais:
“Why are you worried about these people? Well, thirty million will die. They didn’t fit into the market. Don’t think about it - new ones will grow up.”
“Imagine if truly fully democratic elections were organized in the country, based on the will of the working people with equal access to the media and money... The result of such elections would be an order of magnitude worse, and perhaps simply catastrophic for the country.”
“I re-read all of Dostoevsky, and now I feel nothing for this man except physical hatred. When I see in his books ideas that the Russian people are a special people, chosen by God, I want to tear them to pieces.”
Yegor Gaidar:
“There is nothing terrible in the fact that some pensioners will die out, but society will become more mobile.”
“Russia as a state of Russians has no historical perspective”
“At the beginning of the reforms, I told Gaidar: You are looking for a middle class. But there is one: these are teachers, doctors, technical and creative intelligentsia. And I heard in response: this is not the middle class, but dependents.” (Oleg Poptsov, “Moment of Truth”, TVC, 06.23.2006)
“... in Zelenograd, our medicine recorded 36 deaths due to hunger. Gaidar responded simply to this: radical transformations are underway, money is difficult, and the passing of people who are unable to resist these transformations is a natural thing.”
Vladimir Varfolomeev, deputy editor-in-chief of Ekho Moskvy:
"... it is better for corrupt and not the most bloodthirsty bureaucrats to remain in power (even through additions) than for Stalinists and dense nationalists to come to power"
Valeria Novodvorskaya:
“Russians cannot be allowed into European civilization with rights; they were put at the bucket, and they did the right thing. The pathetic, spiritually insolvent, cowardly sleep at the bucket and have no rights. If such people are given rights, they will degrade general level humanity"
“If Russia dies, in general, in principle, I personally will not complain”
Mikhail Khodorkovsky
"...It's a shame not to steal from such a state"
"Corruption started with us, and it must end with us"
"Our attitude towards the authorities? Just a few months ago, we considered it good to have power that would not interfere with us, entrepreneurs. In this regard, Mikhail Gorbachev was the ideal ruler. At that stage of our development, this was enough. Now that the entrepreneurial class has gained strength and it is no longer possible to stop this process; our attitude towards the authorities is also changing. It is no longer enough to implement the principle: whoever pays the piper calls the tune."
“Have we earned reproaches for feasting when the masses are sick? Isn’t our feast ultimately beneficial to the same people?!”
Lev Ponomarev, head of the human rights movement “For Human Rights”:
“People with democratic views and a high degree of civic engagement will always find the strength and courage to support those who disagree, including supporters of the legalization of cannabis and gay pride parades.”
Igor Yurgens, head of INSOR:
“What innovations there are, what an industry! The destiny of Russia is to export oil and other raw materials! Forget about the rest!
About the province. “It will take a long time for ICTs to reach regions with little prospects for business and to “unpromising” social strata.”
“Russia is being hampered by Russians - the bulk of our compatriots live in the last century and do not want to develop... Russians are still very archaic. In the Russian mentality, the community is higher than the individual... Most (of the people) are in partial deskilling... The other part - general degradation."
Evgeniy Ikhlov, expert of the Human Rights Movement:
“...General Vlasov was right: the best fate for our country is to be divided into ethnic states, the highest achievement of which will be integration into Western Europe as hard-to-educate younger brothers.”
“The Constitution says whatever you want” (in the context of “it is not necessary to do it”)
Headshotboy quotes:
Valery Panyushkin: It would be easier for everyone in the world if the Russian nation ceased. It would be easier for the Russians themselves if tomorrow they no longer had to form a national state, but could turn into a small people like the Vodi, Khanty or Avars.
Boris Stomakhin: Kill, kill, kill! Russia can only be destroyed. And it MUST be destroyed - this is a measure of preventive self-defense of the human race from the savage devilry that Russia carries within itself. Russians must be killed, and only killed - among them there are no normal, smart, intelligent people with whom one could talk and whose understanding one could hope for.
Boris Khazanov: In this country, goats with plucked sides graze, and mangy inhabitants timidly make their way along the fences. I am used to being ashamed of this homeland, where every day is humiliation, every meeting is like a slap in the face, where everything - the landscape and the people - offends the eye. But how nice it is to come to America and see a sea of smiles!
