In December 1991, the heads of the republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia signed Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement on the creation of the JIT. This document actually meant the collapse Soviet Union. The political map of the world began to look different.
First, you need to decide what caused the global catastrophe in order to try to objectively assess the situation. There are many such reasons. This includes the degradation of the power elites of the “era of funerals,” which turned a powerful state into a not very powerful one, and problems in the economy that have long required effective reforms. This also includes strict censorship, deep internal crises, including increased nationalism in the republics.
It is naive to believe that the stars aligned and the state collapsed due to coincidental events. The main political opponent of the Soviet Union was also on the alert, imposing an arms race in which the USSR, given all the existing problems, did not have the opportunity to succeed. We must pay tribute to the intelligence and insight of Western geopoliticians who managed to undermine and destroy the seemingly unshakable “Soviet machine.”
The USSR collapsed into 15 states. In 1991, the following countries appeared on the world map: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan.
The Cold War, which resulted in the collapse of the USSR, was by no means reduced solely to indirect skirmishes on various fronts in countries such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The Cold War took place in the heads and hearts of citizens of the USSR and the USA. Western propaganda was more sophisticated. The United States and its allies turned all their mass riots and discontent into a show. Hippies could preach love instead of war, and the authorities calmly allowed them to express their point of view, nevertheless continuing to pursue their policies. In the Soviet Union, dissent was harshly suppressed. And when they were allowed to think “otherwise,” it was too late. The wave of discontent fueled from outside (and the fifth column took an active part) was unstoppable.
There were many reasons for the collapse, but if we simplify everything, we can come to the conclusion that the USSR collapsed because of jeans, chewing gum and Coca-Cola. There were too many “forbidden fruits” that in reality turned out to be empty.
Options for resolving the situation.
It was probably possible to prevent the collapse of the USSR. It is difficult to say what solution would be ideal for the state, for the country, for the people, without knowing all the unknown factors. As an example, we can consider the People's Republic of China, which, thanks to the flexible actions of the authorities, managed to overcome the crisis of the socialist system.
However, do not underestimate the national component. Although both the Soviet Union and the PRC are multinational states, the peoples of China and the Soviet Union are by no means identical. The difference in culture and history makes itself felt.
We needed an idea for the people. It was necessary to come up with an alternative to the “American Dream”, which was teasing Soviet citizens from overseas. In the 30s, when the inhabitants of the USSR believed in the ideals of communism, the country turned from an agricultural one into an industrial one in record time. short time. In the 40s It was not without faith in a just cause that the USSR defeated the enemy, who was stronger in military power at that time. In the 50s people were ready to raise virgin soil with sheer enthusiasm for the common good. In the 60s The Soviet Union was the first to send a man into space. Soviet people conquered mountain peaks, performed scientific discoveries, broke world records. All this happened largely because of faith in a bright future and for the good of his people.
For more than 20 years, according to most economic and social indicators, the newly formed countries have rolled back significantly.
Then the situation gradually began to worsen. The people began to understand the utopian ideals of the past. The country's government blindly continued to follow its line, without thinking about possible development alternatives. The aging leaders of the USSR reacted primitively to Western provocations, getting involved in unnecessary military conflicts. The outrageously expanding bureaucracy thought primarily about its own welfare rather than about the needs of the people, for whom all these “people’s” bodies were originally created.
There was no need to “tighten the screws” where the situation did not require it. Then " forbidden fruits“would not have become so desirable, and the intriguers of the West would have lost their main weapon. Instead of mindlessly following obviously utopian ideals, it was necessary to pay attention in time to the needs of the people even at that time. And under no circumstances should you alternate “thaws” and other liberalities with strict prohibitions. Domestic and foreign policy had to be pursued justifiably strictly for the benefit of national interests, but without excesses.
For a long time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was, along with the United States of America, one of the two superpowers. In many important economic indicators, it ranked second in the world, second only to the United States, and in some cases even surpassed them.
The USSR achieved enormous success in the space program, in mining, and in the development of remote areas of Siberia and the Far North. Its collapse occurred very unexpectedly in December 1991. For the same reasons this happened?
The main socio-ideological reasons for the collapse of the USSR
The USSR included 15 national republics, which differed greatly in all indicators, industry and agriculture, ethnicity, languages, religion, mentality, etc. Such a heterogeneous composition was fraught with a time bomb. For unity, consisting of so much various parts, a common ideology was used - Marxism-Leninism, which declared its goal to build a classless society of “abundance”.
However, everyday reality, especially since the second half of the 70s of the last century, was very different from program slogans. It was especially difficult to combine the idea of future “abundance” with commodity shortages.
As a result, the overwhelming majority of residents of the USSR stopped believing in ideological cliches.
The natural consequence of this was apathy, indifference, disbelief in the words of the country's leaders, as well as the growth of nationalist sentiments in the union republics. Gradually, more and more people began to come to the conclusion that they could continue to live like this.
The main military-political reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed
The USSR actually had to bear the gigantic burden of military expenses alone in order to maintain the balance of the Warsaw Pact it headed with the NATO bloc, since its allies were immeasurably weaker economically.
As military equipment became more complex and expensive, such costs became increasingly difficult to bear.
Prerequisites for the crisis of the system
The USSR was formed as a great one in 1922. At first it was an entity, but over time it turned into a state with power concentrated exclusively in Moscow. The republican authorities, in fact, received orders to carry out from Moscow. The natural process was their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, timid at first, over time turning into open confrontation. The surge occurred during perestroika, for example, events in Georgia. But even then the problems were not solved, but were pushed even further inside, the solution to the problems was postponed “for later”, information about discontent was inaccessible, because it was carefully hidden by the authorities.
The USSR was initially created on the basis of recognition of the right of national republics to self-determination, that is, the state was built on the national-territorial principle. This right was enshrined in the Constitutions of 1922, 1936 and 1977. It was precisely this that prompted the republics to secede from the USSR.
The collapse of the USSR was also facilitated by the crisis that overtook the central government in the late 80s. The Republican political elites decided to take advantage of the opportunity to free themselves from the “Moscow yoke.” This is exactly how the actions of the central Moscow government towards them were considered in many republics of the former Soviet Union. And in modern political world The same opinion still exists today.
The significance of the collapse of the USSR
The significance of the collapse of the USSR cannot be overestimated even after more than 20 years. Yes, of such a scale, their possibility or impossibility is difficult to determine “hot on the heels.” Today we can say that, most likely, the collapse of the Union was irreversible due to the fact that the catalysts were many processes occurring during the 60-80s. 20th century.
Video on the topic
At twenty, turning forty seems so far away. But there comes a time when a woman after thirty “something” begins to ask herself questions whether at forty years old it is possible to still look twenty. What should you do so that others do not notice your age and continue to address you exclusively with the word “girl”?
Instructions
In reality, nothing is impossible. It has been proven that the correct selection and use of hormonal contraceptives for a long time gives a woman a second youth. Including external, not only physical. Women who have used new generation oral contraceptives for a long time experience skin aging at a much later age than those who were protected by other types of contraception. But here it is very important to choose the right reliable hormonal drug that is right for you. And this needs to be done with the help of a gynecologist-endocrinologist.
At thirty, you should definitely take a blood test at least once a year to determine the state of your hormonal levels. Menopause and its consequences, when the skin of the body inexorably ages, can occur in early age. And normal levels of hormones in the blood will prevent its occurrence. If the state of hormones in a woman’s blood is not at the proper level, the doctor will select hormonal drugs for her that will supplement the body with the missing hormones. In this case, rejuvenation and the postponement of old age will not keep you waiting.
When a woman believes that without difficulty, just on genetics alone, she will be able to keep her appearance “in check,” she is mistaken. Stick to a normal diet that contains an abundance of vegetables, fruits, berries, and herbs. Drink plenty of your usual every day drinking water, at least one and a half liters. Water maintains water balance inside the body and saturates skin cells with moisture.
After thirty years, purchase cosmetics with anti-aging effects. It is advisable to use creams, tonics and masks of the same line. If it seems weak to you and does not suit your skin, change the cosmetics manufacturer. Cleanse your face and neck of makeup and dirt every day in the evening, refresh it in the morning with pieces of ice from herbal infusions or water with drops of lemon juice.
Avoid visiting solariums and prolonged exposure to the sun. These procedures significantly age the skin. And if at 20 years old it will be practically unnoticeable, then at 30-40 you will notice that with an intense tan you look older than your age. If you go outside, always apply sunscreen to your face.
At forty, reconsider your makeup. Talk to your stylist about how best to take care of your skin and apply decorative cosmetics to it now. Makeup truly works wonders and can either add years to its owner or rejuvenate her face by several years.
Haircut and hair color will play a huge role in your appearance for visual rejuvenation. Do not suddenly change your color from dark brown-haired or brunette to blonde. If you decide, do it gradually, tone by tone. And on the contrary, do not dye light curls deep dark colors. As for hair length, there is an opinion that a short haircut reduces age. However, this is a misconception. Elongated hair hides the emerging double chin and neck skin, which becomes flabby over time. Choose a short haircut only if your hair has thinned and deteriorated over the years.
Be sure to lose weight to a normal weight. In turn, you should not lose weight from your body norm. Excess weight and severe thinness visually add extra years to a woman’s appearance.
Perestroika, initiated by Gorbachev, was not a transition of the state to another. Socialism should have stayed state system. Perestroika was understood as the global modernization of the economy within the framework of the socialist economic model and the renewal of the ideological foundations of the state.
The leadership did not understand that a movement should be started, although there was a collective confidence in the need for change. Subsequently, this led to the collapse of a huge state, which occupied 1/6 of the land. However, one should not assume that if reforms are carried out effectively, sooner or later this collapse will not occur. Society was too much in need of new trends and changes, and the level of mistrust was at a critical level.
Consequences for the state
During perestroika, it became clear that the model of socialism created in the Soviet Union was practically unreformable. A perfect attempt to reform the system initiated a deep economic crisis in the state, which subsequently led the country to a dead end. Changes in policy that made it possible to make the country more open and free only led to the fact that the accumulated long years discontent among the masses was more than splashed out.
The belated perestroika of 1985-1991 is a disastrous example of what can happen to the state if the government hesitates to carry out reforms.
Mikhail Gorbachev is confident that the breakthrough made during perestroika is still relevant for most post-Soviet countries. New states still need powerful impulses and active actions authorities aimed at democratizing society, which will have to complete the processes begun back in 1985.
It is generally accepted that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable, and this point of view is held not only by those who considered it a “prison of nations”, or “the last of the endangered species - a relic” - a “multinational empire”, as an expert on problems of interethnic relations in the USSR put it M. Mandelbaum in the preface to the almanac of articles published by the American Council on Foreign Relations on the eve of the collapse of the USSR.* However, it is more correct to apply the term “dismemberment” to what happened, although it carries a certain charge of emotional assessment. Disintegration, that is, natural separation from a body that has not become a single fused organism, could be called a process in which the state would lose precisely those ethno-territorial units, those that existed before the entry into Russia of statehood, which were collected during Russian history. However, the division occurred in the overwhelming majority of cases not along those historical seams, which almost everywhere have almost completely dissolved, but along completely different lines. It can hardly be denied that, despite the abundance of problems, a certain blow was dealt along those lines that had already been cut by an arbitrary decision on the body of the state and many of its peoples in accordance with the historical ideology and political tasks of the creators of the socialist federation. It is appropriate to quote A. Motyl’s judgment that “contrary to widespread belief, the peoples of the Soviet Union are not so much awakening themselves as they are awakening them. They are asserting themselves to the point of demanding independence because perestroika forced them to do so. Ironically, none other than Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, a home-grown proletarian internationalist par excellence, should be considered the father of nationalism in the USSR."
In 1991, the main argument for recognizing the existing internal borders between the union republics as international and inviolable was the thesis of the need for peaceful and conflict-free dismantling, as well as the doctrine of the right of self-determining nations to secede. However, in the real conditions of a centuries-old unified state and the political ambitions of the elites, these tools turned out to be unsuitable for a consistent legitimate and conflict-free solution.
Thus, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, the blood in Bendery and the categorical reluctance of Transnistria to submit to the dictates of Chisinau, the war between the Abkhazians and Georgians, the persistent reluctance of the Russian population of Crimea to turn into Ukrainians showed that it was the adopted approach that inherently contained the potential for conflict and clash of interests, which continues to characterize the geopolitical the situation on the territory of the historical Russian state. Each of the union republics, in fact, represented a reduced copy of the Union - also a multinational entity. Moreover, unlike the country as a whole, which took shape over centuries, some republics were often created not at all along the boundaries of the ethnic or historical unity of the population. The titular nations of these republics, having proclaimed their right to self-determination, showed complete unwillingness to grant the same right that they achieved for themselves to nations falling into the position of national minorities within previously non-existent states.
The explanation for this, as a rule, came down to the impossibility of following the path of endless fragmentation of the country, although in reality such a prospect would not affect all republics. But it was obvious that dismantling the USSR by leaving it through a constitutional procedure would objectively contribute to a greater extent to the interests of Russia, the Russians and the peoples gravitating towards them. In this case, the Russian Federation itself would not even be affected. Contrary to the widespread illusion, the Russian Federation did not declare secession from the USSR, and even if everyone else declared secession, it would remain its legal successor, and its autonomy would not have the right to secede under the constitution, and the problem of choice would legally arise only before the peoples of the secessionists republics
From the very beginning, the CIS did not inspire hope that its institutions would implement a mechanism with the characteristics of a subject of world politics, preserving in a new form the geostrategic appearance of the historical state of Russia or the USSR. The reasons lie in the non-random amorphousness of the original legal instruments, and in the deep centrifugal tendencies that have become obvious. Nevertheless, the potential of the centripetal impulses of the peoples included in it, contrary to popular opinion, is also obvious. However, the specifics of registration of new entities international relations in 1991, it was such that it was the integration potential that was constrained, if not legally paralyzed, since the peoples gravitating towards Russia (except Belarus) were deprived of legal personality. This by no means accidental reality not only made it difficult for Russia to maintain its geopolitical area, which immediately became an object foreign policy surrounding interests, but also made new states internally unstable, gave rise to armed conflicts, and inconsistency among governments.
It is now quite obvious that one of the deep and hardly removable reasons for both tragic clashes and contradictory integration and disintegration trends in the CIS is the double (in 1917 and 1991) redrawing of the historical Russian statehood, carried out according to the doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination, adopted by both Bolshevism and militant liberalism, two doctrines that historically strive for the destruction of nations and borders. “From the days of Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin throughout the century, the idea that ethnicity gives the right to lay claim to cultural and political rights and territory has had a wide resonance,” admits the American author R. G. Suny.
The national principle of organizing the Soviet state by identifying a titular nation on an arbitrarily defined territory and endowing it with special rights ( official language, priority in the development of culture, the formation of governing bodies, the management of resources and capital, tax revenues) is a natural fruit of both the teachings of Locke and historical materialism as a philosophy, as well as the specific political doctrine of building “the world’s first state of workers and peasants”, carried out by the Russian Bolsheviks and liberals on the rubble historical Russia, declared a “prison of nations” for the success of the revolution.
The theory and practice contained antinomies and mutually exclusive tasks. On the one hand, the political slogan was to ensure identity, preservation and “level playing field” for state development of all large and small nations, although equal representation of small and large people meant the opportunity for tiny nations to dictate their will to multi-million peoples. However, both from the point of view of small and from the point of view of the interests of large nations, the separation of titular nations did not eliminate, but only aggravated the problem, since not a single ethnic group is localized within one autonomous entity, and is sometimes specifically divided for political reasons.
“Socialist nations” and “socialist peoples” were constructed on the basis of real or imagined ethnocultural differences and “attached to a certain territory,” writes M. Strezhneva, and “members of the ethnic nation, which gave the name to the corresponding republic ... belonged to the titular population if they lived in "their" republic, and to national minorities if they permanently lived elsewhere within the Union. At the same time, ethnic Russians were essentially a transnational Soviet ethnos and the category of non-titular population in the Soviet Union consisted primarily of Russians." In the territories of these formations, not only Russians, but also many other peoples fell into the second class. In many formations, Russians made up the majority, and in some the titular nation was even in third place (in Bashkiria, for example, there are fewer Bashkirs than Russians and Tatars).
However, this problem was of little interest to architects, because historical materialism does not consider the nation to be a subject of history and assigns it only temporary significance, based on the movement towards a single communist model until the merger and disappearance of all nations. Therefore, the creation of quasi-state autonomous and republican formations along arbitrary borders with the Marxist goal of universal leveling of the spirit while preserving only the national form (the slogan of culture is socialist content - national uniform), combined with the never-abandoned slogan “about the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession”, at the beginning of the twentieth century laid a charge of enormous destructive force into the very foundation of Russian statehood.
It must be borne in mind that the number of peoples and nationalities once united in the Russian Empire was much greater than the number of arbitrarily designated “socialist” autonomies and quasi-state entities. With multiple redistributions of republican borders, both the Russian people and some other peoples, either completely or in parts, found themselves arbitrarily included in the newly created federal subjects, in violation of the agreements they had once independently concluded with Russia. These are the cases of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which independently entered Russia and were then made part of socialist Georgia, the dismemberment of the Lezgin people, the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the obvious situation of Crimea and Transnistria. Such an arbitrary division did not have a decisive significance for life in the USSR, but it turned into a drama of separation from Russia or the dismemberment of the nation in two during its collapse. This must be taken into account when judging the causes of conflicts, the prospects for the entire geopolitical space of the CIS, the relationships between its participants, and the role external forces, very interested in drawing new subjects into their orbit and using conflicts between them for their own purposes.
Treating the dismemberment of the USSR as an accomplished fact of history, one cannot help but realize when considering the processes in its space that the circumstances of its liquidation largely laid the foundation for many of today’s conflicts and trends, and also programmed the most interested participation of the outside world in the processes. Strictly according to legal norms, the seceding union republics could be considered constituted as states only with the consensus of all their constituent peoples and after procedures that ensured that on the territory of the union republic that declared the desire for independence, each people and territory had the opportunity to freely choose their state affiliation.
In some republics the situation generally satisfied these criteria, but in a number of them the situation was far from such from the very beginning. Nevertheless, these new formations were immediately recognized by the international community, and the conflicts that arose precisely on the issue of secession from the USSR and the constitution of an independent state, which arose before the fact of recognition and formalization of independence, were declared “separatist”, as if they had arisen on the territory of long-established and legitimate recognized states.
Failure to provide a constitutional procedure for secession from the Union allows parties to conflicts today to challenge the historical fate imposed on them. It is for these reasons that the process of national-state reorganization of the post-Soviet space in these states themselves is not considered complete by everyone, but the territorial and legal status of its former republics - final. But one way or another, and this is also a given, Moscow, in accordance with the internal political circumstances of its own chosen method of liquidating the USSR, as well as in connection with external pressure, recognized the existing administrative borders as international.
Thus, the potential for conflict was inherent in the ongoing process of disintegration of a single state along non-historical borders. It has not been overcome, only changing its forms and dynamics depending on the orientation of new states on the world stage. Here we come to a very important and defining aspect of the problems of the CIS and the entire geopolitical area of the historical Russian state.
It makes no sense to deny that the revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 had internal preconditions. However, it is also indisputable that the external context in 1991 played a greater role in the internal political life of Russia than at any other time in history. Moreover, in the twentieth century. “Realpolitik,” unlike the times of “tyrants,” hides under ideological clichés, as demonstrated by communist universalism, and now repeated by the “one world” philosophy.
Parallels with the revolution are obvious in the policies of the West, especially Anglo-Saxon interests. It is curious that the United States responded to the dramatic events of 1991 in the spirit of its strategy of 1917 and welcomed the destruction of the communist power with the same words as the collapse of the Russian power at the beginning of the century. The policy of omnipresent American interests in the mid-90s showed distinctly “neo-Wilsonian” features. When the protagonist of “freedom and democracy” in Moscow, Kiev and Tbilisi, President Bush, having promised recognition to Ukraine, blessed the Belovezh Accords, when the United States recognized Georgia without waiting for the legitimization of the Tbilisi regime, we involuntarily recalled the times of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, House and W. Wilson with their Program from XIV points, Lloyd George's plan for the dismemberment of Russia, an attempt to immediately recognize all the "de facto" existing governments on the territory of the "former" Russian Empire etc. But behind all this is H. Mackinder’s scheme - a belt of small and weak states from the Baltic to the Black Sea, confirmed by the conclusion of the American Council on Foreign Relations of August 1941 on the need for a “buffer zone between the Slavs and the Teutons,” controlled by the Anglo-Saxons through multilateral structures and supranational mechanisms .
WAS THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION INEVITABLE?
- 1 WHAT WE LOST AND WHAT WE GAINED AS A RESULT OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR
Some believe that the Soviet Union simply kept silent about such terrorist acts. But you can’t hide an awl in a bag. Why do we not hear today about terrorist attacks in countries such as China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea? You haven’t heard of terrorist attacks in Belarus either, but in Iraq and Russia they are regularly repeated?
In Iraq, after the removal of Saddam Hussein as head of state, the complete incapacity of the current regime and inability to manage the situation in the country are revealed. And in Russia, with the election of Putin as president, the same picture is observed: incapacity and inability to govern or unwillingness to take control of the situation in the country gave rise to armed banditry and brutal terrorism.
In the USSR, as today in China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, built a socialist society. And power belonged to the working people in the form of Soviets. Socialist gains in the USSR guaranteed everyone the rights to work, rest, housing, free education and medical care, confidence in the future, social optimism of the people, their creative growth in all spheres of life. Land, mineral resources, fuel and energy resources, factories, factories were considered public property. And all this in general did not leave room for the outbreak of armed conflicts and rampant terrorism in the USSR.
As a result of Gorbachev's perestroika and Yeltsin-Putin reforms, the power of labor was replaced by the power of capital. All the socialist gains of the working people were liquidated. Under the conditions of the ruthless domination of money and wealth, Russian society was led along the path of unprecedented impoverishment and complete lack of rights for the majority of the population, bloody armed conflicts, the monstrous rampant terrorism, unemployment, hunger, spiritual and moral degeneration. Land, mineral resources, fuel and energy resources, factories, factories were allowed to be acquired as private property. And only now all citizens of the former Soviet Union felt for themselves that private property divides, and public property unites peoples. And in Belarus, where up to 80 percent of the country's economy is in the hands of the state, and not in private ownership, and the president defends the interests of workers, there is no place for terror.
Liberal Democrats have brought Russian society to a state where today every person in our country faces violent death. Today it has become dangerous to live in your own home, it is dangerous to be in an office. Death awaits in the entrances of houses, on the threshold of an apartment, in an elevator, on staircase, in a car, in a garage, in public transport, at train stations and entrances, on streets and squares, at any day and hour, on every meter of Russian soil.
Today, deputies of the State Duma and regional legislative assemblies, heads of administrations, and civil servants are being killed. Entrepreneurs, academics and students, military personnel and law enforcement officers, war and labor veterans, boys and girls, old people and teenagers, women and children are killed. And as the events in Beslan showed, even schoolchildren, preschoolers and newborns are not spared.
Today, violence and sadism, banditry and terror, cynicism and drug addiction have made Russia a society where general fear and an atmosphere of desperate hopelessness, defenselessness and helplessness reign. This is the price for a moratorium on death penalty.
And in these conditions, when, through the prism of the tragedy in Beslan, you remember what Yeltsin promised in the event of the ban of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR, you feel indignation not so much at the thought that Yeltsin could exist, but at the fact that such a thing could exist. a society that looked at him without indignation. Which today also looks at Putin, who has moved from “We will kill the bandits in toilets” to “We must catch the bandits alive, if possible, and then judge them.” He said the first in 1999, and the second in 2004 in connection with the well-known events in Ingushetia on June 22. And since there is a moratorium on the death penalty in Russia, this means that Putin is calling for the lives of bandits who, as a last resort, will be sentenced to life imprisonment. But they will be alive. And if you and I continue to elect criminals into power structures, then tomorrow these bandits will be free. And these are not just words, because among the terrorists in Beslan they identified some people who were considered at that time to be detained by law enforcement agencies.
So what kind of streams should human blood flow on our land so that supporters of maintaining the notorious moratorium in the literal sense of the word would choke on the blood of millions of innocent people killed, and the tears of their relatives and friends? How many more “Beslan tragedies” must be repeated for the Russian people to finally understand that without the restoration of socialism, Soviet power, a unified Union State, there will be no improvement for the majority of the population, it is impossible to eradicate terrorism and banditry, we will finally lose national security and independence, which means , the death of the Russian people will come.
After the tragedy in Beslan, society finally saw the true face of the current government and I am sure that now it will insist on changing the country’s leadership. Today, Russian society has realized that restoring peace, ensuring peace and security for the country's citizens is possible only by solving the following urgent tasks: at the first stage, impeach President Putin and dismiss the Fradkov government, which have shown complete incapacity and inability to manage the situation in the country. After this, form a government people's trust, which will have to review the results of privatization from the point of view of their compliance with the laws of the Russian Federation, the procedure for its implementation, the interests of citizens of the Russian Federation and state national security. And only then restore Soviet power, socialism and a single Union State.
Citizens of the Soviet Union have not yet forgotten that only the Soviet government has repeatedly proven its ability and ability to maintain and strengthen peace on the land of our multinational state, to ensure the protection of its citizens. And they understand that only by consolidating the working people around the Communist Party of the Russian Federation can the prosperity of Russia and its people be achieved.
- 2 WAS THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR INEVITABLE?
According to the defenders of the 1991 Belovezhskaya Accords, the USSR itself collapsed without their participation. But, as we know, the collapse of any state becomes inevitable only if economic conditions, accompanied by social upheavals, mature for this. It is from these positions that we will consider the issue of the collapse of the largest state in the world, the first in Europe and the second in the world (after the USA) in terms of economic development what the USSR was like before 1991.
The social prerequisites for the collapse of the Union should have been that the “lower classes” no longer wanted to live in single state, and the “tops” could not (just do not confuse it with the concept “did not want”) to govern the state in the created economic conditions. The All-Union referendum held on March 17, 1991, i.e. nine months before the collapse of the USSR, showed that more than three-quarters of the population were in favor of a single union. And the rest either ignored him or actually spoke out against the union, but they found themselves in a significant minority. Consequently, it cannot be argued that the “lower classes” no longer wanted to live in a single state.
From an economic point of view, the USSR looked like this: over the last 5-7 years before the collapse, the country produced a third of the world's scientific output, was one of the three most educated countries in the world, extracted 30 percent of the world's industrial raw materials, was one of the five safest, most stable countries in the world, having full political sovereignty and economic independence.
From 1986 to 1990, collective and state farms and private farms of the USSR annually increased food sales to the state by an average of 2 percent. Agriculture produced 2 times more wheat and 5 times more barley than US agriculture. The gross rye harvest in our fields was 12 times greater than in the fields of Germany. The amount of butter in the USSR over the last three five-year plans increased by a third and amounted to 21 percent of world production. And our share in world meat production was 12 percent with a population not exceeding 5 percent of the world's population.
Our performance in industry looked even better. The USSR produced 75 percent of the world's production of linen, 19 percent of wool, and 13 percent of cotton fabrics. We produced 6 times more shoes than in the USA, and 8 times more than in Japan. In the global production of durable goods, our country's share was: for televisions - 11 percent, for vacuum cleaners - 12 percent, for irons - 15 percent, for refrigerators - 17 percent, for watches - 17 percent.
If, knowing all these figures, we also take into account that the USSR had 22 percent of world steel production, 22 percent of oil and 43 percent of gas, if we take into account that in the Soviet Union ore, coal and timber per capita were 7-8 times more than in such developed European powers as, for example, France, then the conclusion cannot be avoided: neither in 1985 with the beginning of Gorbachev’s perestroika, nor later with the beginning of the Yeltsin-Putin reforms, there was no crisis in the Soviet economy. Save her with the help of some emergency measures was not required. The USSR was the world's largest producer of both raw materials and essential goods. Its 290 million citizens - 5 percent of the planet's population - had everything they needed for a normal life and needed not to increase production, but to improve the quality of goods and streamline their savings and distribution. Consequently, economic preconditions did not contribute to the collapse of the USSR.
But what did the policy of the leaders of a socialist state look like against this background? In the seventies, especially at the very beginning, meat and meat products were freely sold in our grocery stores at fixed prices. There was no shortage of meat in the USSR because its surplus on the world market amounted to 210 thousand tons. In the eighties, the picture changed. In 1985, the shortage of meat on the world market was 359 thousand tons, in 1988 - 670 thousand tons. The more the rest of the world experienced a shortage of meat, the longer our queues for it became. In 1988, the USSR, which was second only to the USA and China in the amount of meat produced, sold it to its citizens 668 thousand tons less than it produced. These thousands of tons sailed abroad to make up for the shortage there.
Since the early seventies, the USSR has increased the production of butter from year to year. In 1972, it could be bought in almost any grocery store in the country, since Western Europe and the USA had plenty of their own oil. And in 1985, the shortage of oil on the world market amounted to 166 thousand tons. And in the USSR, with the continued growth of oil production, queues appeared for it.
During the entire post-war period, we never had problems with sugar. It did not exist until the West began to pay close attention to health and became convinced that our yellow beet sugar is healthier than cane sugar. And then we, having produced 2 times more sugar than the United States, were left without sweets.
The main reason for the food shortage that arose in us in the 80s was not a production crisis, but a huge increase in exports from the country. There is no other way to explain the disappearance of the above-mentioned products from our stores, nor the fact that we, having produced 32 percent of the world's output of canned milk and 42 percent of canned fish, harvested 30 percent of the world's apples, 35 percent of cherries, 44 percent of plums, 70 percent apricots and 80 percent of melons, were left without canned food and without fruit. Consequently, policy should have been directed not at the collapse of the USSR, but at eliminating unequal trade exchanges with foreign countries and stopping the huge leakage of our raw materials, food and industrial products there for next to nothing, because there were queues for everyday goods that appeared in our stores in the late 70s - the beginning of the 80s, were caused not by a reduction in their production (it was growing all the time), but by an increase in the export of Soviet goods abroad.
The tightness of the queues in our stores depended primarily on the state of affairs not in the domestic, but in the foreign economy. Western countries have long abandoned the increase in total production volume and concentrated all their efforts on producing high-quality products and environmentally friendly products. The West preferred to receive the missing mass of goods from underdeveloped countries and from the Soviet Union. He managed to do this through bribery of the highest nomenklatura, which controlled both the production and distribution of goods in the USSR. Corrupt Soviet officials filled second-rate shortages in the West by emptying our stores, and thus helped the Western powers successfully solve their problems of super-profitable production. If in the USSR the total mass of all goods grew steadily from year to year, then in the West it decreased annually. Over 19 years - from 1966 to 1985 - the rate of gross domestic product per capita in developed capitalist countries decreased by more than 4 times. But at the same time, life in the West became better and better, because he satisfied the growing demand for exquisite goods himself, and received goods that were necessary, but not prestigious, from third world countries and from the USSR.
It should be admitted that thanks to the policies of our leadership, the economy of the former USSR worked quite productively for the well-being of the West. However, everyone there understood that this productivity was rather shaky unless the socio-economic system in the USSR was changed. And so the West was faced with a task: how to rebuild the Soviet Union in order to directly, and not through bribery of political leaders, and on a larger scale, use the Soviet republics as colonial appendages to develop their economy. And everything that the team of presidents of the former Soviet republics is doing today is nothing more than the fulfillment of this task.
Consequently, in the collapse of the USSR main role politics played a role. And therefore, without changing it for the state as a whole, one cannot expect any positive results from the current reforms, the thrust of which is mainly aimed at preserving and continuing “erroneous” actions in the leadership of the country.
- 3 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR
The first phase of communism is distinguished by the fact that private ownership of the means of production is eliminated and public, socialist property is established, and at the same time the exploitation of man by man disappears. However, here Marx notes that “in all respects, economic, moral and mental, the birthmarks of the old society from the depths of which it emerged still remain.”
So from this point of view we will look at the education and development of socialism in the USSR.
Let us note that for the USSR, the decrees of October were of decisive importance in the formation of socialism, which opened economic and political paths for subsequent socialist development: the elimination of private ownership of the means of production; the abolition of the previous state-legal structures, the demolition of the old apparatus and the establishment of the principle of self-government, the absolute power of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies; transfer of land to peasants, and factories to workers.
Thus, since October, socialism has existed in our country in the sense and to the extent that as a result of the revolution, the initial positions of socialism were outlined, its initial economic, political, ideological foundations and some of its elements were created.
However, at the same time, such a “birthmark of capitalism” as the division of labor turned out to be preserved, which cannot be destroyed by any decrees as a result of the revolution. And if so, then commodity production should also be preserved, but one that should not become “undividedly dominant,” as happens under capitalism. Then the question arises: what objects of production under socialism should act as goods, and so that their production does not become “undividedly dominant”?
Since under socialism the division of labor is still preserved, society is forced to distribute products among people according to the quantity and quality of their labor. And if so, then there is a need to take into account the measure of labor and the measure of consumption. And the instrument of such accounting is money, with which everyone can purchase goods they need for their personal use. Consequently, under socialism commodity-money relations are preserved, and goods should only be items of personal consumption.
However, the economic science of the development of socialism in the USSR explained the need to preserve commodity production by inheriting from capitalism an insufficiently high level of development of the productive forces. And she argued that the exchange of products would lose its commodity form if an abundance of material and cultural goods was created.
Let us note that socialism first won in Russia, a country that is known to be economically underdeveloped. Therefore, in the first years after the revolution, during the unfolding socialist construction, the main emphasis was placed on restoring the economy destroyed by the war, on the creation of large national economic facilities that would make it possible to overcome centuries-old backwardness. And the world's first socialist country had to live and work in extreme, extraordinary conditions.
And then there was the Great Patriotic War, when the whole country lived under the slogan: “Everything for the front - everything for victory!” After the victory, the main emphasis was again on restoring the economy destroyed by the war.
Under these conditions, the socialist economy of the USSR was faced with the task of feeding everyone to their fullest with at least bread and potatoes, and providing them with basic clothing and shoes. At this level of development of socialism, the needs of a cleaning lady and a professor were not much different.
But the most tragic and dramatic times for our country are behind us. People began to earn more, industry began to produce many goods that no one had even imagined existed until recently. So what happened? The needs of workers began to rapidly individualize both within one social group and between them. And then a problem arose: how to please everyone when everyone has become so different?
It began to seem that if everything was produced per capita as much as in the richest capitalist countries, then the problem of consumption would be automatically and successfully solved. This view of things has been enshrined in official documents since the reign of N.S. Khrushchev. Thus, the issue of creating a specific, independent mechanism for socialism for setting economic development goals was removed from the agenda, thereby pragmatically setting a course for importing the flawed consumption model that has developed in developed capitalist countries.
There was confidence that it was enough to “catch up and surpass” the United States in per capita production of grain, meat, milk, electricity, machinery, machine tools, cement, cast iron, and all social problems would be solved at once. Based on this conviction, all ministries and departments received a clear guideline for the development of the industries they supervised. Solemnly and joyfully, they now began to report on the degree of their approach to the “ideal” of those indicators that could not help but fascinate our business executives and politicians after so many years of hunger, half-starvation and devastation in the country. This is how the principle of planning “from the achieved level” was born in our economy, which deeply undermined our economy.
Why? So let's figure out “why”.
Of course, along with the growth in the production of electricity, gas, oil, coal, steel, cast iron, shoes, etc., with this (“mirror”) approach to setting goals for economic development, they were introduced into our socialist soil and received accelerated development. many of those negative social phenomena that accompany the development of production under capitalism: environmental pollution, urbanization, excessive migration from the countryside, illnesses from mental overload. In this sense, our conditions turned out to be even somewhat more favorable for the development of these painful production processes. Why? Because the level of development of production in a particular capitalist country is limited by the desire of any operating enterprise to have a certain amount of profit from its activities, the high cost of natural and labor resources, as well as intense external competition. Our ministries and departments could not pay attention to these “little things”. And so production for production’s sake gradually becomes their goal. What this led to, in particular, was reported, for example, by Pravda on July 11, 1987: “There are now three million tractors working in our fields! We produce much more of them than in the USA. Due to the lack of tractor drivers in many republics, cars stand idle. Every 100 units are idle: in Estonia – 21, in Armenia – 17, in Latvia – 13. Only due to a technical malfunction, 250 thousand cars stopped working across the country by July 1.”
And what is most absurd about this is that in these conditions the Ministry of Agriculture is insisting on the construction of another tractor plant, costing several billion rubles. The State Planning Committee proves the inconsistency of such a decision. But the ministry, which is only interested in increasing production in its sector, without caring about the sales or profitability of its products, does not want to come to terms.
The loggers behaved in exactly the same way: just to cut it down, just to give it a boost, just to quickly “catch up and overtake” it, but how to attach this forest to business is not the main thing for them, not their concern.
Power engineers behaved in the same way, flooding meadows, pastures, arable lands, cities, villages with their artificial seas, also without tiring themselves with calculations to what extent their labor increased the national income and national wealth of the country. The whole country is passionate about working hard to quickly “catch up and surpass” the developed capitalist countries in terms of their type of products. And since concern for the “shaft” replaces concern for national income - and this is the main thing when production works for the benefit of people! - then gradually his growth decreased and it became more and more difficult to “catch up”, and even more so “overtake” him. And this was felt in everything; besides, playing tag with the West slowed down technical progress in the USSR.
Of course, when in the USSR the economic capabilities of socialism to satisfy the material and cultural needs of the working people grew immeasurably, we were unable to create conditions that would ensure the comprehensive, harmonious development of the individual. We failed to realize that by building what is not needed or not really needed, we are not building what we desperately need! Precisely because billions and billions of rubles are frozen in colossal unfinished construction, in insane excess stocks of means of production at enterprises and construction sites, in supposedly reclaimed lands, in a huge mass of slow-moving goods lying around in our stores, in many, many other things that complement the pyramid wasted labor and materials that could have been used for the benefit of man, which is why we were so painfully short of housing, hospitals, meat, shoes, etc. and so on.
Of course, we could have produced all this in abundance even then, at that level of industrial development, if only we knew what and how much we really needed. But the drama of the situation lies precisely in the fact that we not only did not know this, but we did not even know how to learn to recognize it. And at the same time, life itself suggested that only on the basis of expanding contacts and business ties with the world community - let us remember Lenin’s words that “it is better to trade than to fight” - it was possible to find out what and in what quantity a person needs so that he can feel complete.
And further. Under socialism, people still continue to live in the “realm of necessity,” and not in the “realm of freedom,” as it will be under communism. That is why any attempts to bureaucratically impose a consumption model (according to the principle “eat what they give, not what you want”), i.e. planning the structure of production without taking into account the structure of effective demand, led to huge material losses either in the form of unfinished construction or accumulation unsold goods, or to the emergence of a “black” market, deforming not only the socialist principle of distribution according to labor, but also the moral foundations of society.
A deeper analysis of the development of the socialist economy in the USSR revealed the following reasons that led to the collapse of socialism.
Firstly, the existing practice of managing the socialist economy in the USSR turned out to be ineffective in the new conditions, primarily because it lacked a mechanism for setting goals adequate to socialism, i.e. “everything for the good of man.”
Secondly, the spontaneously established procedure for determining production tasks was bureaucratic, hierarchical, and undemocratic. This is where conditions arose for manipulating the will of the consumer, and this is where the consumer’s insecurity from the aggressive behavior of departments, free to foist on him a product of any quality and at any price, arose.
Thirdly, the mechanical imitation of capitalist countries in setting economic goals based on the practice of planning from the “achieved level” forced the country to take the capitalist path of development in order not to be catastrophically overwhelmed with unsold, unclaimed goods.
The explanation for this is contained in the following philosophical explanation. With the October Revolution in the USSR it was established socialist form states, and content of the economy Over time, they were reoriented along the capitalist path of development. But, as you know, content and form are inextricably linked aspects of each subject. Categories of content and form reflect the objective aspects of reality. The organic unity of content and form is contradictory and relative. At the first stage of development of a phenomenon, the form corresponds to the content and actively contributes to its development. But the form has relative independence, a certain stability, the content is radically updated, but only minor changes occur in the form, it remains old. In this regard, a contradiction arises and becomes increasingly acute between the new content and the outdated form, which hinders further development. Life resolves this contradiction - under the pressure of new content, the old form is destroyed, “reset”; a new form arises and is approved, corresponding to the new content.
And since content plays a leading role in the dialectical interaction of content and form, it was the capitalist content of the USSR economy that was the main reason for the change from the socialist form of statehood to the capitalist one.
Thus, the main reason for the collapse of socialist society in the USSR was laid in the policy of planning economic development “from the achieved level.” And what happened to the USSR and other socialist countries in Europe at the end of the 20th century suggests that one of the forms of building a society of social justice “perished,” but not the idea of socialism itself. And if so, then with firm confidence today we can put forward the slogan: “not back, but forward to socialism!”, in which all conditions will be created to ensure the comprehensive, harmonious development of the individual!
etc.................
The collapse of the Soviet Union, which occurred in December 1991, was perhaps one of the most surprising and pivotal events of the 20th century. The unexpected end of the Cold War at that time led to the emergence of a new world, new opportunities and challenges. Despite the year-and-a-half process that led to the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, the collapse of the mighty communist superpower caught many by surprise, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union itself. Russian President Vladimir Putin considered the fall of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."
However, was the collapse of the Soviet Union inevitable? These days it is common knowledge that by the end of 1991 it was impossible to preserve the USSR in the form in which it existed for decades after 1922. According to the currently accepted opinion, the political, economic and socio-cultural processes that have taken place in the country since 1986 ultimately tore it apart, and the relatively quick end of the largest state on the planet was preferable to other possible outcomes. However, the Soviet government tried to prolong the existence of its own country, using new approaches to its governance. In Russia, discussions are still ongoing about possible alternatives to what happened, and Russian politicians, intellectuals and nationalists are trying to understand whether something could have been done to keep the country intact, and whether there was a need for it. Will we be able to find the answer to this question by more carefully studying the events that preceded the collapse of the USSR?
What happened
The Constitution of the USSR included Article 72, according to which the republics that were part of it had the right to secede from it. However, let's be honest - if this were the case in reality, this process would have begun long before 1990. The Soviet authorities would never have allowed the republics to independently leave the country as independent entities. This would have led to the weakening of the Soviet state in the “zero-sum game” that was cold war.
All 15 Soviet republics were interconnected by a complex matrix economic relations, thanks to which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic found itself at the center of all significant industrial, economic and political processes in the country. We are still faced with echoes of this system in the complex relations between Russia and Ukraine. Even in the middle of a war between these countries Russian troops continue to rely on the products of the Ukrainian military industry, and Ukrainian factories and industrial associations make money by selling their technologies to the Russians. Only recently did Moscow announce that, starting in 2018, it would be ready for “import substitution” of Ukrainian military products. The Soviet Union held its vast regions and republics together through a system of subsidies and fixed economic quotas in which less developed regions received Soviet technology and consumer products in exchange for raw materials and agricultural products. In some cases, Moscow provided both finished products and raw materials in order to make up for the underdeveloped industrial base of some regions.
When the Soviet economy showed signs of significant decline in the 1980s, the population of the USSR and many of its legislators became worried. The recent push for political freedom and transparency unleashed forces that undermined the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party and undermined the very foundation of the state. Fast forward to December 8, 1991. The collapse of the country became possible thanks to the so-called Belovezhskaya Agreement, signed in Belarus. The heads of three Soviet republics - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - signed a document that formally put an end to the existence of the USSR. When signing, reference was made to the previously mentioned Article 72 of the constitution, which allowed for a “peaceful” secession from the country. It is worth noting that this decision was made without taking into account the opinion of the population, who had been in the dark over the previous months. While the shock from what happened in Belovezhskaya Pushcha was still reverberating throughout the world, on December 21 there was a new meeting, this time in the capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty. There, the heads of 11 Soviet republics (except Georgia and the Baltic states) finally dissolved what remained of the Soviet Union. Without a doubt, this second meeting became possible thanks to the Bialowieza Agreement that preceded it, which laid the legal basis and final precedent for the further and irreversible collapse of the USSR. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet flag lowered in the Kremlin, which was replaced by the current one, became a kind of Christmas gift for the United States and its allies. Russian tricolor and heralded the end of the Cold War and the birth of a new and unpredictable world.
What could have happened
It is now clear that the majority of Soviet citizens wanted to preserve the USSR in one form or another. However, this required a different paradigm of governance and a more decisive government apparatus, ready to eliminate competition from alternative political or ethnonational models. Before the August 1991 coup that fatally weakened then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and brought Boris Yeltsin to power, Soviet authorities debated the merits of a Union of Sovereign States (USS). March 17, 1991 at nine Soviet republics- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan - a popular referendum was held. The majority of voters supported maintaining the Soviet federal system. On April 23, 1991, following the referendum, the central Soviet authorities signed an agreement with nine republics, according to which the USSR was to become a federation of independent republics with a common president, a single foreign policy and the army. It is difficult to say how this agreement would have worked in reality, given the massive political and social changes taking place across the country. By August 1991, all nine republics except Ukraine had approved the draft of the new agreement. Unfortunately for Gorbachev, a coup carried out by Soviet conservatives in August 1991 finally removed him from the political scene and ended any further attempts to reform the country.
Was this possible?
Perhaps the idea of the JIT was viable, but it was undermined in advance by the same political forces that tore the USSR apart. In 1986, Gorbachev began two processes that ultimately led to the death of the country under his leadership. Glasnost meant political transparency, while perestroika meant political and economic reorganization. Although their task was gradual liberalization individual elements government administration and interaction with the population, in fact both weakened the ability of the Soviet authorities to control and oversee, leading to political and economic chaos, as well as the growth of nationalist and separatist sentiments in many republics. Probably, in light of these events, the participants in the Bialowieza Agreement considered their actions inevitable and therefore justified. But what if Gorbachev had carried out reforms differently? What if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began liberalizing the USSR's economy while maintaining firm control over political ideology?
There was already precedent for such measures. In 1921, following the Soviet victory over the Tsarists and anti-Bolshevik forces in the civil war of 1918-1920, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced. While the country's economy was in ruins, the authorities allowed private enterprises to coexist with the nascent state industry. Although with varying degrees of success, the NEP did lead to an almost complete restoration of the national economy to pre-World War I levels until it was abruptly curtailed by Stalin in 1928. One can only speculate about the possible fate of the Soviet Union if the NEP had been allowed to continue. Small industry, like agriculture, would belong to the private sector. The "pillars" of the economy, such as heavy industry and mines, would be controlled by the state. If this sounds like modern China, perhaps it is - the Chinese economic miracle occurred under the tight control of a Communist Party that did not tolerate dissent.
For such a scenario to work in the late 1980s, Gorbachev would have needed to convince his party comrades that his new policies would not undermine its position and reputation. In fact, in the late 1980s, the Soviet population's cynicism and distrust of party slogans and governance reached its peak. The loss of confidence in the government's ability to properly govern the country and provide for the interests of citizens caused the rise of alternative ideologies and movements, ultimately leading to the Belovezhsky and Alma-Ata agreements. But what if Gorbachev had managed to convince his colleagues that improving the economic situation in the Soviet Union would lead to the restoration of public confidence in the party and the state? The results of the March 1991 vote showed that many Soviet citizens still wanted to live in a single state. An updated economic plan would leave medium and large enterprises in the hands of the state, while allowing the country's population to engage in small economic activity, especially in the field of agriculture. In such a scenario there would be no place for glasnost, open criticism of the state, recognition of the dark Soviet past and the rise of ethnic nationalism in distant republics. The Soviet authorities would have given the nascent business class access to small commercial loans, allowing its most successful representatives into the party, allowing the government to interact with its most enterprising citizens. Such a strictly economic approach would redirect the energy of many people from anti-government activities and protests to making a living, as it later happened in China, although with some notable exceptions. In the mid-80s, Soviet society was already ready for such gradual economic changes, and could accept greater economic freedom. However, all this is based on the assumption that the state would be able to successfully carry out such an economic transformation. It is tempting to think that, despite the many flaws of the Soviet system, the absence of significant political competition for Gorbachev would allow the gradually reforming Soviet Union to overcome internal problems and survive 1991 in a renewed and healthier way. Without the separatist movements in the Baltics and the Caucasus, and without the August coup, the plan to economically liberalize the Soviet Union might have succeeded.
New union?
Would such a renewed country be able to effectively compete on the world stage with the United States, Western Europe and a rising China? Perhaps, years and decades later, the Soviet communist party would begin to liberalize, as is happening in China, which is persistently trying to rethink communist ideology in step with a developing society. Would this new union (let's call it "NA" for short) scale back its many international obligations in order to conserve resources and currency? It is quite possible that this is exactly what would have happened, as well as the subsequent exit of Eastern Europe from the Warsaw Pact. It might also be necessary for the new union to withdraw from active involvement in African and Latin American politics - although if this new Soviet country were able to implement economic reforms similar to those of 1928, the West would eventually face a powerful and unified Soviet state. seeking to maintain its place as a competitive superpower.
Likewise, it is difficult to predict how the NA would interact with a rising China, since it would be in direct competition as the communist overseer of a liberalizing economy. Perhaps they could reach an understanding, given the similarities in their public administration. With countries adopting or considering adopting the Chinese model of state capitalism in 2017, it is easy to imagine the emergence of the Soviet model of state capitalism as a competitor to the American, Western European and Chinese ones. However, the survival of the NS after the 1990s would require a confident and strong communist government willing to accept difficult decisions for the sake of the public good. The Chinese themselves were forced to make similar choices in 1989, when the army crushed democratic protests in Tiananmen Square. In addition, the success of the NEP in the 1920s was made possible by the entrepreneurial class, which experienced October Revolution and the Civil War. However, by the 1980s, these people and their business experience had long since sunk into oblivion, and Soviet authorities there were not enough experts of a level sufficient to succeed in the free market.
Today it is generally accepted that, despite Gorbachev's willingness to use violence to suppress protests in the Baltics, he could not hold the country together by force alone. Perhaps he was in the right place at the wrong time - had he come to power later, when the National Assembly was trying to make the transition to state capitalism, his talents and vision could have made him a good manager. It is also worth noting that, despite the euphoria among the Western world that followed 1991, the collapse of the USSR was not predetermined. The events of December 1991 caught most experts and analysts by surprise. Consequently, if the NA had survived, it would have faced the same hostile American and NATO policies designed to contain Moscow. Despite the gradual introduction of market principles in the country, the National Assembly would remain a communist state, for which reforms would be a reasonable step towards a global confrontation with the West.
It was probably impossible to save the Soviet Union given the circumstances in which the country found itself by the end of the 1980s. At that time, its internal mechanisms and political processes made it difficult to implement even those decisions with which the majority agreed. The idea of a reformed Soviet Union can be continued today in the form of a series of economic, military and political alliances concluded by Russia (the official successor to the USSR) with the former Soviet republics in its neighborhood. The Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and the close ties between Russian and Armenian militaries, are reminders of the Soviet legacy. The USSR may not have been destined to survive intact, but questions and speculation about its possible fate will continue to occupy us in the years to come.
Twenty-five years ago in Viskuli, the then leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine stated that the Soviet Union “as a subject international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist.” How did it happen that literally with one stroke of the pen several people “buried” an entire country? Historians, apparently, have yet to solve this one of the greatest mysteries of the last century. But was the collapse of the USSR inevitable and what lessons should we learn from this event? This is discussed by the director of the Center for Sociological and Political Research of BSU David Rotman, head think tank“Strategy” Leonid Zaiko, professor of the Faculty of Economics of BSU Valery Baynev and research director of the “Liberal Club” Evgeny Preygerman.
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David Rothman. |
Leonid Zaiko. |
Valery Baynev. |
Evgeny Preygerman. |
Valery Baynev: Unfortunately, the collapse of the USSR was inevitable. Figuratively it looks like this. Imagine that a hundred years ago the whole world, including us, rode on creaking wooden carts. And suddenly we were given a spaceship from above - powerful, strong, swift. We saddled him and rushed upward, performing such miracles that the world was simply amazed. In a matter of years, we reached second place in the world. The American Ambassador to the USSR Joseph Davis in 1937 expressed his impressions of Soviet industrialization as follows: “The Soviets managed to do as much in seven years as America did in 40, starting in the 80s of the last century.” Unfortunately, people are divided into two categories: some dream of the stars, others bake lentil soup. When we had inspired dreamers at the helm of the starship, we succeeded in everything: creating, designing, launching factories. During the Great Patriotic War It was the dreamers who volunteered to go to the front, were the first to attack and, alas, died. The gluttons did not take risks, trying to settle down closer to the kitchen or warehouse, but it was better to sit in the rear. It was they who survived and gradually came to power in the USSR. As a result, the starship was smashed to pieces, and its remains were sold for scrap.
In other words, losing to us in a fair competition, the collective West, through the hands of Hitler, meanly inflicted an insidious wound on the USSR, and the Cold War completed the job. As a result, we were objectively unable to control the starship. That great gift of fate that history gave us and which Europe came to much later than us, we mediocrely exchanged for coppers.
Leonid Zaiko: By 1991, none of my colleagues, including foreign ones, predicted the collapse of the USSR. But back in the 1980s, I built such a series in my lectures. 1956 The world socialist system is facing an internal crisis. Not unknown events happened in Hungary. 12 years later everything happened again in Czechoslovakia. Add another 12 years and we get protests in Poland. Then I wrote 1992 on the board and put a question mark: who is next? The USSR was next. What happened in 1991 had to happen. Because the system itself was genetically flawed, was closed, did not allow alternatives, and did not develop.
V.B.: How come it didn’t develop? The short post-war period was the only one in the history of Slavic civilization when we challenged the primacy of the West in scientific, technical, and intellectual progress. It was in the USSR that the first artificial satellite and lunar rover were created, a man was launched into space, spacecraft landed on Venus and Mars, the first nuclear icebreaker, the first nuclear power plant, the world's first laser, the largest hydroelectric power plants, and the first synthetic rubber appeared. We were at the forefront of progress.
L.Z.: Wherein toilet paper the country produced 29 times less than in Germany or France.
David Rothman: Let's not forget that the Cold War was at its height. And the international situation was aggravated not by the USSR, but by those states that, for various reasons, feared the growing strength and power of the Soviet Union. We were forced to respond to these challenges in order not to fall behind and not lose. Unfortunately, countries Western Europe and the United States were in closer relationship with each other politically, economically and militarily. We could not withstand this competition, which immediately affected the economy and weakened our potential, including in the field of public administration. The authorities were not ready to adequately respond to many processes that, thanks to destructive information leaks, began to influence society in different republics.
Evgeniy Preygerman: You cannot always live in mobilization and emergency conditions. In the problem of the predetermination of the collapse of the USSR, I see at least several layers. First the revolution, then Civil War, heroic labor feats, Great Patriotic War. When society entered the phase of stable peaceful life, it turned out that the existing system of economic management in the context of other world processes was simply uncompetitive. This was manifested in the lack of full-fledged incentives for creative creation.
A layer of national-territorial problems immediately came to light. For a long time they were contained and smoothed out by pumping monetary resources. But when they ended, the negative phenomena poured out, and it was no longer possible to stop this flow.
“SB”: Or maybe the main problem is ideology? In 1917, the task was to feed the hungry, teach everyone to read and write and build a bright future; in 1941, it was necessary to defeat fascism at any cost and restore destroyed cities and villages, then they plowed up virgin lands and explored space. There was always some kind of goal. With the beginning of perestroika, democratization and glasnost, the country turned into a clear ideological impasse. People saw the real abundance in the West and wondered: was this the right road?
L.Z.: There has always been lobbying in science and the economy of the USSR, which, against the backdrop of huge investments in the military-industrial complex and heavy industry, did not allow the development of genetics, computer science, and electronics. The systemic error was the lack of a critical approach to reality and making decisions based on scientific evidence. We are clearly late with economic democracy. Even with the arrival of Andropov, it was necessary to begin to introduce the principles of a multi-structure economy. Any freedom begins with a feeling of inner freedom. Instead of this political elite The USSR decided to convert its power from political to economic, taking over yachts and villas on the Cote d'Azur.
E.P.: In fact, the fact that the processes of democratization in society were launched without actually creating conditions for economic freedom is one of the main lessons of that period. Due to the fact that the system could not provide the opportunity for free choice, the degree of boiling water in society constantly increased. Systemic problems accumulated, and this naturally led to an internal explosion.
V.B.: Abraham Lincoln also said that a sheep and a wolf understand freedom differently. The ability to cast a ballot and say what you want is a superficial understanding of democracy. True democracy begins with respect for fundamental human rights: life, work, self-development, security, health, education, confidence in the future. I'll give you the facts. The population of the USSR over 74 years grew by 153 million people, growing by an average of 2.1 million per year. If Belarus in 1926 had less than 5 million people, then by 1991 there were already 10 million of us (an average increase of 70 thousand people per year). That is, people wanted to live in the USSR, voting for it with the most precious thing they have - their lives. With the collapse of the superpower, the nation seemed to be deprived of its vital strength, its spiritual core, and the demographic curve went sharply downward.
Even when crises were raging all over the world, factories were closing, adding to the army of unemployed, new industries were opening, free and accessible medicine and education were preserved. There was a time when we were the ones who moved the pieces on the great chessboard of history. Now, in the morning, everyone runs to their tablets and televisions to find out how much a barrel of oil costs, how much a dollar costs, and who won in America: Trump or Clinton. From being subjects, creators of history, we have become its passive objects.
“SB”: In a referendum in March 1991, the majority of citizens voted to preserve the Union. Moreover, in Belarus this percentage was higher than the Union average. Was it possible to preserve the Union and adapt it to the new reality?
L.Z.: Alas, the internal dynamics of society were such that the USSR absolutely did not fit into the country that is called socialist. Yes, in 1990 life in Belarus was somewhat better than in other Soviet republics. 117 kilograms of meat per capita were produced at a reasonable rate of 57 kilograms. Light industry worked well. In the world system of socialism, the GDR was such a leader, and in the USSR it was us. But there were other facts when, for example, people threatened not to go to the polls until the authorities connected the telephone. They lifted the city committee and the district committee to their ears and connected the device. This is how they lived and were proud of space flights. The entire economic system required adjustment along the lines of the Czech Republic and Poland. But Mikhail Suslov, the main ideologist of the country, and his entire team were scholastics. I remember that at a department meeting my colleague was reprimanded “for trying to start a discussion about developed socialism.” Such a society should have closed.
E.P.: None social phenomenon cannot be interpreted unambiguously. It is probably useful to borrow and develop much from the experience of the USSR. On the other hand, for many decades in a row, the two largest world systems were in a state of ideological, economic, and military competition. And the fact that the USSR could not withstand this competition must be critically and objectively comprehended.
“SB”: And how did such comprehension affect public opinion?
D.R.: Immediately after the events in Viskuli on December 9-10, we conducted sociological research in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine to determine whether citizens approved of the Belovezhskaya agreements. In Belarus, 69.3 percent were in favor, 9.2 percent were against, and 21.5 percent were undecided. There were similar figures in Russia and Ukraine. But the most interesting thing happened later. Exactly a year later, in December 1992, the public perception of the agreements in Viskuli changed dramatically, and only 32.2 percent of respondents supported them, while 43.4 percent were against them. The rest found it difficult to answer.
This means that the first assessment was made without sufficient understanding of what happened, on a wave of emotions, euphoria and trust in the authorities. Like, here it is, freedom and independence, now we’ll live. But after a year, most realized that something was wrong here. Economic ties began to collapse, prices rose, and it became more difficult to communicate with relatives and friends in other republics.
In 2001, they conducted the same survey for the third time and... returned to 1991. 60.4 percent approved of the collapse of the USSR and only 21.8 expressed regret about it. This was the time when independent states had already taken shape, when people began to experience national identity and saw prospects in the economy, although life was not yet the most wonderful.
In December 2011, 71.1 percent of citizens were in favor of an independent Belarus and the preservation of sovereignty. Only 7.4 percent did not approve of the agreement in Viskuli. This is direct evidence of the growth of national self-awareness and patriotism, the understanding that it is impossible and not necessary to restore the USSR. Yes, we have lost a powerful, great state that everyone took into account. But, on the other hand, we have acquired independence and sovereignty. In many countries, the formation and development of statehood took place very rapidly and ambiguously, as evidenced by revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and problems in Moldova. Even today, attempts are obvious from both the West and the East to influence these and other states. But it is extremely difficult to change or recreate something in them without the personal desire of the people of these countries. You cannot put pressure on them, impose something on them and demand. We must treat each other in a friendly manner, remembering that we once lived together as one family.
V.B.: The main thing that we inherited from the USSR is the gene of collectivism, the attitude and ability to work together for a common result - the prosperity of Belarus. As a result, our country acts as a small but unified transnational corporation. And quite successful. Security natural resources Our per capita income is 72 times lower than in Russia, which is considered the “natural storehouse of the world.” And in terms of quality of life, as measured by the UN using the Human Development Index, we are higher.
We inherited from the USSR a powerful industrial base, thanks to which (BelAZ, Belarus, MAZ) we are known today all over the world. Thanks to the collectivism gene, Belarus has avoided civil conflicts. Today our country is a stronghold of morality and true freedom, understood as respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens, and not just oligarchs. And I see this as the key to our future success.
