Commanders
Strengths of the parties
World War I(July 28, 1914 - November 11, 1918) - one of the most widespread armed conflicts in the history of mankind. The first global armed conflict of the 20th century. As a result of the war, four empires ceased to exist: Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and German. The participating countries lost more than 10 million people in soldiers killed, about 12 million civilians killed, and about 55 million were wounded.
Naval warfare in the First World War
Participants
Main participants of the First World War:
Central Powers: German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria.
Entente: Russian Empire, France, Great Britain.
For a full list of participants see: First World War (Wikipedia)
Background to the conflict
The naval arms race between the British Empire and the German Empire was one of the most important causes of the First World War. Germany wanted to increase its navy to a size that would allow German overseas trade to be independent of British goodwill. However, increasing the German fleet to a size comparable to the British fleet inevitably threatened the very existence of the British Empire.
1914 Campaign
Breakthrough of the German Mediterranean Division into Turkey
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Mediterranean squadron of the Kaiser's Navy under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon (battlecruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau), not wanting to be captured in the Adriatic, went to Turkey. German ships avoided collisions with superior enemy forces and, passing through the Dardanelles, came to Constantinople. The arrival of the German squadron in Constantinople was one of the factors that pushed the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War on the side of the Triple Alliance.
Actions in the North Sea and English Channel
Long-range blockade of the German fleet
The British fleet intended to solve its strategic problems through a long-range blockade of German ports. The German fleet, inferior in strength to the British, chose a defensive strategy and began laying minefields. In August 1914, the British fleet carried out the transfer of troops to the continent. During the cover of the transfer, a battle took place in the Heligoland Bight.
Both sides actively used submarines. German submarines acted more successfully, so on September 22, 1914, U-9 sank 3 British cruisers at once. In response, the British fleet began to strengthen anti-submarine defense, and the Northern Patrol was created.
Actions in the Barents and White Seas
Actions in the Barents Sea
In the summer of 1916, the Germans, knowing that everything large quantity military cargo arrives in Russia by northern by sea, sent their submarines to the waters of the Barents and White Seas. They sank 31 Allied ships. To counter them, the Russian Arctic Ocean Flotilla was created.
Actions in the Baltic Sea
Both sides' plans for 1916 did not include any major operations. Germany maintained insignificant forces in the Baltic, and the Baltic Fleet constantly strengthened its defensive positions by constructing new minefields and coastal batteries. Actions were reduced to raiding operations by light forces. In one of these operations, on November 10, 1916, the German 10th flotilla of “destroyers” lost 7 ships at once in a minefield.
Despite the generally defensive nature of the actions of both sides, losses in naval personnel in 1916 were significant, especially in the German fleet. The Germans lost 1 auxiliary cruiser, 8 destroyers, 1 submarine, 8 minesweepers and small ships, 3 military transports. The Russian fleet lost 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, 5 minesweepers and small ships, 1 military transport.
1917 campaign
Dynamics of losses and reproduction of tonnage of allied countries
Operations in Western European waters and the Atlantic
April 1 - a decision was made to introduce a convoy system on all routes. With the introduction of the convoy system and the increase in anti-submarine defense forces and means, losses in merchant tonnage began to decline. Other measures were also introduced to strengthen the fight against boats - the mass installation of guns on merchant ships began. During 1917, guns were installed on 3,000 British ships, and by the beginning of 1918, up to 90% of all large-capacity British merchant ships were armed. In the second half of the campaign, the British began to massively lay anti-submarine minefields - in total, in 1917 they laid 33,660 mines in the North Sea and Atlantic. During 11 months of unlimited submarine warfare, it lost 1037 ships with a total tonnage of 2 million 600 thousand tons in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean alone. In addition, the allies and neutral countries lost 1085 ships with a capacity of 1 million 647 thousand tons. During 1917, Germany built 103 new boats, and lost 72 boats, of which 61 were lost in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean.
Cruiser's voyage Wolf
German cruiser raids
On October 16-18 and December 11-12, German light cruisers and destroyers attacked the “Scandinavian” convoys and achieved major successes - they sank 3 British convoy destroyers, 3 trawlers, 15 steamers and damaged 1 destroyer. In 1917, Germany stopped operating on Entente communications with surface raiders. The last raid was carried out by a raider Wolf- in total, he sank 37 ships with a total tonnage of about 214,000 tons. The fight against Entente shipping shifted exclusively to submarines.
Actions in the Mediterranean and Adriatic
Otran barrage
Combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea were reduced mainly to the unrestricted operations of German boats on enemy sea communications and Allied anti-submarine defense. During 11 months of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, German and Austrian boats sank 651 ships of the Allies and neutral countries with a total tonnage of 1 million 647 thousand tons. In addition, over a hundred ships with a total displacement of 61 thousand tons were blown up and lost by mines laid by minelayer boats. The Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean suffered major losses from boats in 1917: 2 battleships (English - Cornwallis, French - Danton), 1 cruiser (French - Chateaurenault), 1 minelayer, 1 monitor, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine. The Germans lost 3 boats, the Austrians - 1.
Actions in the Baltic
Defense of the Moonsund Archipelago in 1917
The February and October revolutions in Petrograd completely undermined the combat effectiveness of the Baltic Fleet. On April 30, the sailors' Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Tsentrobalt) was created, which controlled the activities of officers.
From September 29 to October 20, 1917, using quantitative and qualitative advantages, the German Navy and ground forces carried out Operation Albion to capture the Moonsund Islands in the Baltic Sea. In the operation, the German fleet lost 10 destroyers and 6 minesweepers, the defenders lost 1 battleship, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, and up to 20,000 soldiers and sailors were captured. The Moonsund archipelago and the Gulf of Riga were abandoned by Russian forces, the Germans managed to create an immediate threat of military attack for Petrograd.
Actions in the Black Sea
Since the beginning of the year, the Black Sea Fleet has continued to blockade the Bosphorus, as a result of which the Turkish fleet has run out of coal and its ships have been stationed in bases. The February events in Petrograd and the abdication of the emperor (March 2) sharply undermined morale and discipline. The fleet's actions in the summer and autumn of 1917 were limited to destroyer raids, which continued to harass the Turkish coast.
Throughout the 1917 campaign, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing for a major landing operation on the Bosphorus. It was supposed to land 3-4 rifle corps and other units. However, the timing of the landing operation was repeatedly postponed; in October, the Headquarters decided to postpone the operation on the Bosporus to the next campaign.
1918 Campaign
Events in the Baltic, Black Sea and North
March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk by representatives Soviet Russia and the Central Powers signed a peace treaty. Russia emerged from the First World War.
All subsequent military operations that took place in these theaters of combat historically refer to
“The bill on the shipbuilding program for the next five years presented to the State Duma should give firm consistency and certainty to the reconstruction of the fleet and is therefore a matter of paramount importance for national defense, because the main task of the Baltic Fleet is the defense of the capital.
Petersburg is of paramount importance for the state not only as the center of all higher government institutions, but also the boards of most banks, railways, joint-stock companies and other trading and financial enterprises.
In purely military terms, the results of the long-term work of the headquarters are concentrated in St. Petersburg, i.e., all mobilization plans and the sequence of replenishment, attrition and restoration of the armed forces, stocks of maps, topographic plans, tablets and boards for their printing. The main gunpowder, cannon and shell factories are located near St. Petersburg, and pipe, cartridge and mine factories are located in St. Petersburg itself.
Huge reserves of gold are stored in St. Petersburg State Bank, the Mint, the treasures of the Hermitage, the incalculable capital of private financial enterprises, the cash reserves of the State Treasury and, finally, even the Expedition for the procurement of government securities itself is located in St. Petersburg.
From here it becomes clear that the occupation of St. Petersburg by the enemy not only ends the war in his favor, but even pays for it, for the imposition of sequestration on all state and public capital will bring such a hefty indemnity, in comparison with which the 500 million currently requested for the fleet seems an insignificant amount.
It is clear that our possible adversary, excellently informed, perfectly developing plans for his actions, is clearly aware of the significance of St. Petersburg and, of course, will choose it as the direct subject of his actions.
In an alliance with whatever powers we are, their fleets cannot penetrate the Baltic Sea. It would take a few hours to mine the Belts and the Sound; Germany would not diplomatically seek Denmark's prior consent to do so. Then the German fleet, with the exception of a few second-class ships sufficient to guard this barrier, has complete freedom of action in the Baltic Sea when it needs it.
In the explanatory note presented for the program, you see the insignificance of the force that we can now oppose to Germany; It is clear that complete mastery of the sea for Germany is a matter of several days, and it goes without saying that Germany will make every effort to achieve this, in proportion to the importance of the task.
Having mastered the sea, Germany will be able to land huge armies anywhere, just as freely as Japan did in the last war.
Imagine now the landing of a strong army somewhere on the Finnish coast, accompanied by the publication of a loud manifesto declaring the independence of Finland from the Russian yoke. This army will be provided on both flanks and rear; when it comes, it has not only railway, but also the sea, through which supplies, supplies, reinforcements are delivered to it, and on return ships - evacuation of the sick, wounded, etc. Take into account that even a medium-sized commercial steamer with 10,000 tons of cargo capacity is equivalent to ten railway trains , and there are hundreds of such ships in the German merchant fleet, not counting the 15,000 - 20,000-ton ships, of which there are dozens. Note that this army will march across the country, friendly towards it, but hostile towards us, that, having control of the sea, it can constantly disturb communications and the rear of our army, which will have to meet halfway, having at its disposal only one railway, and even then barely connected with the imperial ones.
I will not bore you with a list of possible large enemy landing operations along the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and Riga and Baltic Sea for operations on the flank and rear of our main ground forces and to support the left flank of the enemy offensive. Take a look at the map, put yourself in the place of our enemy and see how you would act, if only to distract perhaps larger number troops to protect the coast and approaches to the capital. Believe that the enemy will act better, more systematically than we can imagine, and will be able to use every unpreparedness, every oversight, every weak point of ours to our detriment.
So, you see the invaluable importance of the fleet in the defense of the state and the possible outcome of such a war, which will decide the very question of its further existence.
It is often said that for the above-mentioned main task of the fleet - the defense of the Baltic coast - it is enough to have mine ships and submarines and that large warships are not necessary.
This view is wrong. The fleet cannot receive unilateral development of some types of ships to the detriment of others; it is necessary to have ships of all types and in a certain proportion.
In fact, let us assume that we would like to base our defense only on mines and submarines; Let's see how the enemy would conduct his actions then.
Modern destroyers now carry not only mine weapons, but also relatively powerful artillery. Their speed is almost equal to the speed of a mine, so it is useless to use a mine against a destroyer - a hit is almost impossible; When they meet, the destroyers engage in an artillery battle, in which the enemy's numerical superiority ensures decisive success.
In the same way, destroyers are powerless against high-speed, so-called “small” or “light” cruisers, which, however, have now reached a displacement of 6000–8000 tons and carry 8-inch guns.
It is clear that the enemy will send his destroyers and his small cruisers against our mine fleet, with the support of which he will either destroy our destroyers or block the remaining ones in Kronstadt.
Submarines are also powerless against destroyers and fast small cruisers, and it is clear that when the sea is guarded by enemy destroyers, the submarine can only go underwater, which means moving no more than 35 miles from its base.
Thus, if we had only destroyers and submarines, they would soon find themselves driven into Kronstadt, and the enemy would be the complete master of the entire sea to a line approximately 40–50 miles, say, 100 versts from Kronstadt, and the enemy would not will deny himself the pleasure of seeing the effect of a bomb thrown from an airplane, at least on Nevsky Prospekt.
From here it is clear that in order to support our destroyers against the enemy’s we also need to have “small” fast cruisers with strong artillery weapons.
Suppose we had submarines, destroyers and “small” cruisers, the enemy would send his mine fleet, his “small” cruisers and, to support them, high-speed large armored cruisers, one type of which a “small” cruiser must avoid, to avoid being shot and drowned by 12- and 14-inch high-explosive shells from long distances. In addition, he would send several second-class battleships, which would sail with lowered nets, without fear of mines, and with their artillery would destroy the strongholds of our fleet and our submarines.
You see, then, the need for large cruisers, without which mine defense cannot be ensured.
Large armored cruisers now differ from a battleship only in their greater speed and their weaker artillery in number, not in caliber of guns; therefore, it is unprofitable for a large cruiser to engage in an artillery battle with battleships, and if the enemy’s large cruisers have support in the form of battleships, then our cruisers will have to give in to them or rely on the same support.
Thus, you see that only a planned, calculated struggle of fleet against fleet is possible, and the fleet is an organic whole, and the absence of any type of ships in it or their relative small number is not compensated by the exaggerated development of the number of ships of another type - their excessive number will not satisfy dominance over the enemy, but will only represent a waste of funds that, with a more correct ratio, would have been used more profitably.
It is necessary to say a few more words about the minefield. A minefield is valid only when it is supported by coastal fortifications or the battle fleet from minesweepers; if this is not the case, then the cautious enemy will clear his fairways and, with his patrol ships, will protect them from possible or accidental obstruction; therefore, minelayers have a very specific and very important task, but it must also be in connection with the battle fleet, and cannot be performed without it.
Having thus explained the need to have ships of all types in the fleet, attention must be paid to ensuring that the fleet is able to fight for as long as possible and with possible success against a more numerous and powerful enemy. Here success is ensured by the preparation of positions and the proximity of the base to the place of main operations.
As you can see, the immediate and main task of the fleet is to prevent the enemy from taking possession of the Gulf of Finland. The favorable position of Revel, appreciated by Peter the Great, indicates this point as a natural base for the fleet (both in the sense of supplies, repairs, shelter, and as a point of support for the fight against the enemy), therefore the creation of a base for the fleet is included in the general plan for the reconstruction of the fleet in Reval.
The fleet, at least at first not numerous, but harmoniously composed of battleships, large and small cruisers, destroyers and submarines and minelayers, based on Revel, will require very serious efforts from the enemy to take over the sea. The enemy will no longer be able to send forward only detachments of destroyers or light cruisers; he will have to conduct an offensive with the entire fleet; on a campaign he will not be able to go with his nets lowered, for he will have to always be ready for battle, or, more precisely, he will have to conduct his attack with battle. This means that then our submarines, our minefields will become fully operational and, until our fleet is completely destroyed along with its base - Revel, the coast of the Gulf of Finland will be protected from the landing of an enemy army.
In the Black Sea, the tasks of our fleet are so obvious and met with State Duma such immediate support that this program includes only those two “small” cruisers that should support the mine fleet, and then auxiliary vessels related to the equipment of the Sevastopol port and base for the fleet.
Finally, in the Pacific Ocean, the immediate task is to maintain the defense of the Vladivostok fortress from the sea - for this purpose it is planned to build submarines based in Vladivostok.
I will not bore your attention with a detailed listing of the required loans; you can see all this in the table along with a statement of the reasons for the prices made. Let me just say that a total of 502,744,000 rubles are requested, of which 392,500,000 will be used for the construction of combat ships, 15,477,000 - for auxiliary vessels, 13,133,000 - for floating facilities of ports, i.e. 421,107,000 rubles. - for shipbuilding, the remaining 81,637,000 - for equipment of plant bases.
These numbers may amaze you with their enormity, but if you compare them with the importance of the fleet for the defense of the state and if you take into account that everything will be carried out in Russia, which in shipbuilding accounts for about 80% of the payment for labor, that by appropriating these funds you are laying a solid foundation for the most urgent needs of state defense and that at the same time you will provide income to hundreds of thousands of workers to apply their ability to work in all branches of industry - then you will not refuse the half a billion that Russia needs to renew its fleet "
The so-called “experts in Duma affairs” assured, without knowing the content of the report of the Minister of the Navy, that the Ministry of the Navy was guaranteed a majority of 4 or 5 votes.
Mine transport of the Baltic Fleet (minelayer) "Yenisei"
For well-known reasons, the Baltic Fleet of the First World War is remembered in the mass memory only by the revolutionary “brothers” in machine-gun belts on armored cars and the Aurora, which, for all its merits, did not belong to the main ships of the theater of operations.
It seems that for almost three years the fleet went to rallies, chased after its own officers and sometimes, purely by chance, met the Germans in the morning fog of the Gulf of Riga.
In terms of the scale of the confrontation, the fighting in the Eastern Baltic, of course, cannot be compared with the British-German war in the North Sea and the Atlantic. But the “work” of the Baltic Fleet began even before the declaration of war. The workers of that war will be discussed below.
The tactics of combat operations were chosen based on the main task - the defense of the capital of the Empire at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and action on German communications to Sweden. The ships of the Baltic Fleet also defended the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, protected communications with Finland (then still part of the Empire) and quite successfully engaged in mine laying (including off the German coast). At a difficult moment, Britain sent submarines, which helped us a lot in the defense of the Baltic states.
The geography of the theater of military operations, and the Eastern part of the Baltic does not abound in large deep-sea spaces like the Black Sea, and the comparative weakness of the fleet made the use of large formations of surface ships ineffective. There were no naval battles, like Jutland, in Baltic waters. The sea mine became a successful Russian weapon.
Floating mine designed by E.V.Kolbasyev. 1909
“By the beginning of the war, the Russian fleet had at its disposal 15.5 thousand mines (mostly of the 1908 model), of which 7 thousand were in the Baltic, 4.5 thousand in the Black Sea, 4 thousand in Vladivostok. In addition, there were another 5,250 mines, of which 2.5 thousand were in the filling stage explosive.
The "Plan of Operations of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea" defined as a priority task: to prevent an enemy breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland during the first two weeks of the war. This ensured the mobilization of the Guards Corps and the Petrograd Military District, as well as their preparation to repel the German landing with the aim of capturing the capital.
To solve this problem, the operational plan of the Baltic Fleet provided for the creation of a Central mine-artillery position at the Revel - Porkalaudd line. The laying of mines was planned to be carried out before the start of hostilities, during the deployment of naval forces. Strictly in accordance with the plan, on July 18, 1914, five hours before the announcement of general mobilization, the minelayers Ladoga, Narova, Amur and Yenisei, under the cover of the main forces of the fleet, began laying mines. It took four and a half hours to set up a barrage of 2,129 mines.
In subsequent years, the Central mine position was strengthened several times. In total, by the end of 1917, over 11 thousand mines were displayed here, including 1158 mines of the 1908 model and “Rybka” - in an anti-submarine version, with a recess of 18.3 m.
In 1915, the Baltic Fleet began equipping a new defensive line - the Advanced Mine Position. Over the course of three years of war, over 8 thousand mines were installed here. On the night of October 28-29, 1916, 7 of the 11 destroyers of the X Flotilla of the German Navy were blown up by mines at the Forward Position and sank. German sailors called this event “Black Monday.”
Since 1915, the third major defensive line in the Baltic was the Irbe mine position, which blocked the enemy’s entrance to the Gulf of Riga. In total, Russian sailors deposited about 11 thousand mines here." Korshunov Yu. L. "Mines of the Russian Navy"
In total, during the war, the ships of the Baltic Fleet laid 38,932 mines. 69 enemy ships were blown up on them, 48 of them were killed. We are talking here only about warships. The losses of the merchant fleet of Germany and neighboring states that traded with it are not taken into account in the figure.
Map of minefields laid by the Russian fleet in the southern part of the Baltic Sea in 1914-1915.
Russian mine washed up on the German shore
Active minelaying in the Baltic turned out to be very effective. So on November 4, 1914, the armored cruiser Friedrich Karl was blown up by two mines and sank near Memel; on January 12, 1915, the cruisers Augsburg and Gazelle were blown up near Bornholm and Rügen on the same day; on November 19, at a minefield near Gotland the cruiser Danzig was blown up, on December 4, north-west of Vindava, the cruiser Bremen and the destroyer V-191 were killed, and six days later the destroyer S-177 died there.
German armored cruiser Friedrich Karl.
Cruiser "Danzig"
List of ships of the Russian Baltic Fleet that died in 1914-1917.
No. Date of destruction Name of the ship Fleet Area of destruction Note
Battleships
1 4.IO.I917 "Slava" Baltic Fleet Moonsund Strait Scuttled by the crew due to damage
Cruisers
1 09/28/1914 "Pallada" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Sunk by a German submarine
2 11/6/1916 "Rurik" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Exploded by a mine
Destroyers
1 11/29/1914 "Executive" Baltic Fleet Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
2 11/29/1914 "Flying" Baltic Fleet Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
3 08/21/1916 "Volunteer" Charity Fund Irbensky Strait
4 10/28/1916 "Kazanets" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Sunk by German square.
5 08/22/1917 "Stroyny" Charitable Fleet Gulf of Riga
6 09/26/1917 "Okhotnik" Baltic Fleet Irbensky Strait Exploded by a mine
7 10/14/1917 "Thunder" Baltic Fleet Kassarsky Reach (Moonzund Strait) Scuttled by the crew due to major damage
8 11/27/1917 "Vigilant" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Bothnia Exploded by a mine
Submarines
1 03/1/1916 "Shark" Charity Fund In the Libau region Memel
2 05/10/1916 "Som" Charity Fund In the region Åland Islands
3 05/13/1917 "Bars" BF Central part of the Baltic. seas
4 06/1/1917 "Lioness" BF In the region of. Gotland
5 06/8/1917 "AG-15" BF In the Ganges region (Gangut)
6 1.11.1917 "AG-14" BF In the Libau region
7 12/1/1917 "Cheetah" BF Central part of the Baltic. seas
Gunboats
1 08/06/1915 "Sivuch" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Riga Sunk by German ships
2 08/07/1915 "Korean" BF Gulf of Riga Scuttled by the crew due to severe damage
Interdictors
1 05/22/1915 "Yenisei" Baltic Fleet In the area of the Baltic port
Minesweepers
1 08/14/1914 "Provodnik" Charity Fund In the region of. Dago
2 9.09.1914 "Mineweeper No. 07" Baltic Fleet In the region of. Dago
3 9.09.1914 "Mineweeper No. 08" Baltic Fleet In the region of. Dago
Kireev I. A. Trawling in the Baltic Sea during the war of 1914–1917. - M-L.: Voenmorizdat NKVMF USSR, 1939.
Before the outbreak of the First World War, the great powers paid great attention to their naval forces, and large-scale naval programs were being implemented. Therefore, when the war began, the leading countries had numerous and powerful fleets. Particularly persistent competition in building up naval power was between Great Britain and Germany. The British at that time had the most powerful navy and merchant fleet, which made it possible to control strategic communications in the World Ocean and link together numerous colonies and dominions.
In 1897, the German Navy was significantly inferior to the British Navy. The British had 57 battleships of I, II, III, classes, the Germans 14 (4:1 ratio), the British 15 coastal defense battleships, the Germans 8, the British 18 armored cruisers, the Germans 4 (4.5:1 ratio ), the British have 125 cruisers of 1-3 classes, the Germans have 32 (4:1), the Germans were also inferior in other combat units.
Arms race
The British wanted not only to maintain their advantage, but also to increase it. In 1889, parliament passed a law that allocated more funds for the development of the fleet. London's naval policy was based on the principle that the British Navy should be superior to the two navies of the most powerful naval powers.
Berlin initially did not pay much attention to the development of the fleet and the seizure of colonies; Chancellor Bismarck did not see much sense in this, believing that the main efforts should be directed to European politics and the development of the army. But under Emperor Wilhelm II, priorities were revised, Germany began to fight for colonies and build a powerful fleet. In March 1898, the Reichstag adopted the Navy Law, which provided for a sharp increase in the Navy. Over the course of 6 years (1898-1903), they planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 armored cruisers, 17 armored cruisers and 63 destroyers. Germany's shipbuilding programs were subsequently constantly adjusted upward - in 1900, 1906, 1908, 1912. According to the law of 1912, the size of the fleet was planned to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines. Particularly great attention was paid to battleships: in the period from 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid down in Germany annually (in previous years, two).
London believed that Germany's naval efforts posed a great threat to Britain's strategic interests. England intensified the naval arms race. The task was set to have 60% more battleships than the Germans. Since 1905, the British began building a new type of battleship - “dreadnoughts” (after the name of the first ship of this class). They differed from squadron battleships in that they had stronger weapons, were better armored, had a more powerful power plant, greater displacement, etc.
Battleship Dreadnought.
Germany responded by building its own dreadnoughts. Already in 1908, the British had 8 dreadnoughts, and the Germans had 7 (some were in the process of completion). The ratio for “pre-dreadnoughts” (squadron battleships) was in favor of Britain: 51 against 24 German ones. In 1909, London decided to build two of its own for every German dreadnought.
The British tried to maintain their naval power through diplomacy. At the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, they proposed limiting the scale of construction of new warships. But the Germans, believing that this step would only benefit Britain, rejected this proposal. The naval arms race between England and Germany continued until the First World War. By its beginning, Germany had firmly taken the position of the second military naval power, overtaking Russia and France.
Other great powers - France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, etc., also tried to build up their naval armaments, but due to a number of reasons, including financial problems, they were unable to achieve such impressive successes.
Queen Elizabeth is the lead ship of the Queen Elizabeth series of super-dreadnoughts.
The meaning of fleets
The fleets were required to perform a number of important tasks. Firstly, to protect the coasts of countries, their ports, important cities (for example, the main purpose of the Russian Baltic Fleet is to protect St. Petersburg). Secondly, the fight against enemy naval forces, supporting one's ground forces from the sea. Thirdly, the protection of sea communications, strategically important points, especially for Britain and France, they owned huge colonial empires. Fourthly, to ensure the status of the country, a powerful navy showed the position of the power in the world informal table of ranks.
The basis of the then maritime strategy and the tactics were linear battle. In theory, the two fleets were supposed to line up and find out who the winner was in an artillery duel. Therefore, the basis of the fleet was squadron battleships and armored cruisers, and then dreadnoughts (from 1912-1913 and super-dreadnoughts) and battlecruisers. Battlecruisers had weaker armor and artillery, but were faster and had a greater range. Squadron battleships (pre-dreadnought battleships) and armored cruisers were not written off, but they were relegated to the background, ceasing to be the main striking force. Light cruisers were supposed to carry out raids on enemy sea communications. Destroyers and torpedo boats were intended for torpedo strikes and destruction of enemy transports. Their combat survivability was based on speed, agility and stealth. The Navy also included special-purpose ships: minelayers (they installed sea mines), minesweepers (they made passages in minefields), transports for seaplanes (hydrocruisers), etc. The role of the submarine fleet was constantly growing.
Battlecruiser "Goeben"
Great Britain
The British at the beginning of the war had 20 dreadnoughts, 9 battle cruisers, 45 old battleships, 25 armored and 83 light cruisers, 289 destroyers and torpedo boats, 76 submarines (most of them were obsolete, they could not operate on the high seas). It must be said that, despite all the power of the British fleet, its leadership was distinguished by great conservatism. New products had difficulty finding their way (especially those not related to the linear fleet). Vice Admiral Philippe Colomb, a naval theorist and historian, author of the book “Naval Warfare, Its Basic Principles and Experience” (1891), said: “There is nothing that would show that the laws long established by the history of naval warfare are somehow or have changed in some way." The admiral substantiated the theory of "mastery of the sea" as the basis of Britain's imperial policy. He believed that the only way to achieve victory in a war at sea was to create complete superiority in naval forces and destroy the enemy Navy in one general battle.
When Admiral Percy Scott suggested that “the era of dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts is over forever” and advised the Admiralty to concentrate its efforts on the development of aviation and the submarine fleet, his innovative ideas were sharply criticized.
The general management of the fleet was carried out by the Admiralty, headed by W. Churchill and the First Sea Lord (chief of the main naval staff) Prince Ludwig Battenberg. British ships were based in the harbors of Humberg, Scarborough, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow. In 1904, the Admiralty considered the issue of relocating the main forces of the Navy from the English Channel north to Scotland. This decision removed the fleet from the threat of a blockade of the narrow strait by the growing German Navy, and made it possible to quickly control the entire North Sea. According to the English naval doctrine, which was developed shortly before the war by Battenberg and Bridgeman, the basing of the main forces of the fleet in Scapa Flow (a harbor in Scotland on the Orkney Islands), outside the effective radius of the German submarine fleet, was supposed to lead to a blockade of the main forces of the German fleet, which and happened during the First World War.
When the war began, the British were in no hurry to approach the German shores, fearing attacks from submarines and destroyer forces. The main fighting took place on land. The British limited themselves to covering communications, protecting the coast and blockading Germany from the sea. The British fleet was ready to enter the battle if the Germans took their main fleet to the open sea.
British "Great Fleet".
Germany
The German Navy had 15 dreadnoughts, 4 battle cruisers, 22 old battleships, 7 armored and 43 light cruisers, 219 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 28 submarines. According to a number of indicators, for example, in speed, German ships were better than British ones. Much more attention was paid to technical innovations in Germany than in England. Berlin did not have time to complete its naval program, which was supposed to end in 1917. Although the German naval leaders were quite conservative, Admiral Tirpitz initially believed that getting involved in the construction of submarines was “frivolous.” And supremacy at sea is determined by the number of battleships. Only after realizing that the war would begin before the completion of the battle fleet construction program did he become a supporter of unlimited submarine warfare and the accelerated development of the submarine fleet.
The German "High Sea Fleet" (German: Hochseeflotte), based in Wilhelmshaven, was supposed to destroy the main forces of the British fleet ("Grand Fleet" - "Big Fleet") in an open battle. In addition, there were naval bases in Kiel, about. Helgoland, Danzig. The Russian and French Navy were not perceived as worthy opponents. The German "High Seas Fleet" posed a constant threat to Britain and forced the British Grand Fleet to remain constantly in the North Sea at full combat readiness throughout the war, despite the shortage of battleships in other theaters of war. Due to the fact that the Germans were inferior in the number of battleships, the German Navy tried to avoid open clashes with the Grand Fleet and preferred a strategy of raids into the North Sea, trying to lure out part of the British fleet, cut it off from the main forces and destroy it. In addition, the Germans concentrated their attention on waging unrestricted submarine warfare to weaken the British Navy and lift the naval blockade.
The combat effectiveness of the German Navy was affected by the lack of autocracy. The main creator of the fleet was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849 – 1930). He was the author of the "risk theory", which stated that if the German fleet was comparable to the English in strength, then the British would avoid conflicts with the German Empire, because in the event of war, the German Navy would have a chance to inflict sufficient damage on the Grand Fleet for the British fleet to lose supremacy at sea. With the outbreak of the war, the role of the grand admiral declined. Tirpitz became responsible for the construction of new ships and the supply of the fleet. The High Seas Fleet was led by Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl (1913-1915), then Hugo von Pohl (from February 1915 to January 1916, before that he was Chief of the General Naval Staff), Reinhard Scheer (1916-1918). In addition, the fleet was the favorite brainchild of the German Emperor Wilhelm; while he trusted the generals to make decisions about the army, the Navy was managed by himself. Wilhelm did not dare to risk the fleet in an open battle and allowed only a “small war” to be waged - with the help of submarines, destroyers, and mine laying. The battle fleet had to adhere to a defensive strategy.
German "High Seas Fleet"
France. Austria-Hungary
The French had 3 dreadnoughts, 20 battleships of the old type (battleships), 18 armored and 6 light cruisers, 98 destroyers, 38 submarines. In Paris they decided to focus on the “Mediterranean Front”, fortunately the British agreed to defend the Atlantic coast of France. Thus, the French saved expensive ships, because there was no great threat in the Mediterranean Sea - the Ottoman Navy was very weak and tied up by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Italy was at first neutral and then went over to the Entente side, the Austro-Hungarian fleet chose passive strategy. In addition, there was a fairly strong British squadron in the Mediterranean.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire had 3 dreadnoughts (the 4th entered service in 1915), 9 battleships, 2 armored and 10 light cruisers, 69 destroyers and 9 submarines. Vienna also chose a passive strategy and “defended the Adriatic”; the Austro-Hungarian fleet remained in Trieste, Split, and Pula for almost the entire war.
"Tegetthof" in the pre-war years. Austro-Hungarian battleship of the Viribus Unitis class.
The Russian fleet under Emperor Alexander III was second only to the navies of England and France, but then lost this position. The Russian Navy received a particularly big blow during the Russo-Japanese War: almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet, sent to the Far East, were lost. The fleet needed to be restored. Several naval programs were developed between 1905 and 1914. They provided for the completion of 4 previously laid down squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers and the construction of 8 new battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. But by the beginning of the war, not a single program had been fully implemented (the State Duma also played a role in this, which did not support these projects).
By the beginning of the war, Russia had 9 old battleships, 8 armored and 14 light cruisers, 115 destroyers and destroyers, 28 submarines (a significant part of the old types). Already during the war, the following were put into operation in the Baltic - 4 dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, all of them were laid down in 1909 - Sevastopol, Poltava, Petropavlovsk, Gangut; on the Black Sea - 3 dreadnoughts of the "Empress Maria" type (laid down in 1911).
"Poltava" during the First World War.
The Russian Empire was not a backward power in the naval field. It even took the lead in a number of areas. Russia has developed excellent Novik-class destroyers. By the beginning of the First World War, the ship was the best destroyer in its class, and served as a world model for the creation of destroyers of the war and post-war generation. The technical conditions for it were created by the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of outstanding Russian shipbuilding scientists A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov and G. F. Shlesinger. The project was developed in 1908-1909 by the shipbuilding department of the Putilov plant, which was headed by engineers D. D. Dubitsky (mechanical part) and B. O. Vasilevsky (shipbuilding part). At Russian shipyards, in 1911-1916, in 6 standard projects, a total of 53 ships of this class were laid down. The destroyers combined the qualities of a destroyer and a light cruiser - speed, maneuverability and fairly strong artillery weapons (4th 102 mm guns).
Russian railway engineer Mikhail Petrovich Nalyotov was the first to realize the idea of a submarine with anchor mines. Already in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, participating in the heroic defense of Port Arthur, Nalyotov, at his own expense, built a submarine with a displacement of 25 tons, capable of carrying four mines. Conducted the first tests, but after the surrender of the fortress the device was destroyed. In 1909-1912, a submarine called “Crab” was built at the Nikolaev shipyard. She became part of the Black Sea Fleet. During the First World War, the "Crab" made several combat missions with mine laying, even reaching the Bosporus.
The world's first underwater minelayer - the submarine "Crab" (Russia, 1912).
Already during the war, Russia became a world leader in the use of hydrocruisers (aircraft carriers), fortunately, this was facilitated by the factor of dominance in the creation and use of naval aviation. Russian aircraft designer Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, he worked since 1912 technical director plant of the First Russian Aeronautics Society, in 1913 he designed the world's first seaplane (M-1) and immediately began to improve the aircraft. In 1914, Grigorovich built the M-5 flying boat. It was a two-seat biplane wooden structure. The seaplane entered service with the Russian fleet as a reconnaissance aircraft and artillery fire spotter, and in the spring of 1915 the aircraft made its first combat mission. In 1916, Grigorovich's new aircraft, the heavier M-9 (naval bomber), was put into service. Then the Russian genius designed the world's first fighter seaplane, the M-11.
For the first time, Russian dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type used a system for installing not two, but three-gun turrets of the main caliber. In England and Germany, they were initially skeptical about the idea, but the Americans appreciated the idea and Nevada-class battleships were built with three-gun turrets.
In 1912, 4 Izmail-class battlecruisers were laid down. They were intended for the Baltic Fleet. These would be the most powerful battlecruisers in the world in terms of artillery armament. Unfortunately, they were never completed. In 1913-1914, eight light cruisers of the Svetlana class were laid down, four each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. They were going to be put into operation in 1915-1916, but did not have time. Russian Bars-class submarines were considered one of the best in the world (they began to be built in 1912). A total of 24 Bars were built: 18 for the Baltic Fleet and 6 for the Black Sea.
It should be noted that the Western European fleets in the pre-war years paid little attention to the submarine fleet. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, previous wars had not yet revealed their combat significance; only in the First World War did their enormous significance become clear. Secondly, the then dominant naval doctrine of the “high seas” assigned submarine forces one of the last places in the fight for the sea. Dominance in the seas was to be won by battleships, having won a decisive battle.
Russian engineers and artillery sailors made a great contribution to the development of artillery weapons. Before the start of the war, Russian factories began producing improved models of naval guns with calibers of 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm. The production of three-gun turrets began. In 1914, engineer F. F. Lender of the Putilov plant and artilleryman V. V. Tarnovsky became pioneers in the creation of a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm.
IN Russian Empire before the war, three new types of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910, 1912). They were superior to torpedoes of the same type from foreign navies in speed and range, although they had a lower overall weight and charge weight. Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes were created - the first such device was built at the Putilov plant in 1913. It provided fan-based salvo firing; Russian sailors mastered it before the start of the war.
Russia was a leader in the field of mines. In the Russian Empire, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers “Amur” and “Yenisei” were built. The construction of special minesweepers of the “Zapal” type also began. In the West, before the start of the war, they did not pay attention to the need to create special ships for laying and sweeping sea mines. This is proven by the fact that in 1914 the British were forced to buy a thousand ball mines from Russia to protect their naval bases. The Americans bought not only samples of all Russian mines, but also trawls, considering them the best in the world, and invited Russian specialists to train them in minecraft. The Americans also bought Mi-5 and Mi-6 seaplanes. Before the start of the war, Russia developed galvanic shock and mechanical shock mines of the 1908 and 1912 models. In 1913, a floating mine (P-13) was designed. It was kept submerged at a certain depth thanks to the action of an electric floating device. Mines of previous models were kept at depth by buoys, which did not provide much stability, especially during storms. The P-13 had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg and could stay at a given depth for three days. In addition, Russian specialists created the world's first river mine, “Rybka” (“R”).
In 1911, hooking snake and boat trawls entered service with the fleet. Their use shortened the time of minesweeping work, since mines that were tripped and pop-up were immediately destroyed. Previously, mines that had been swept had to be towed into shallow water and destroyed there.
The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio became a means of communication and control in battle. In addition, before the war, Russian radio engineers designed radio direction finders, which made it possible to use the device for reconnaissance.
Considering the fact that new battleships in the Baltic had not entered service, and the Germans had complete superiority in the forces of the battle fleet, the Russian command adhered to a defensive strategy. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to defend the capital of the empire. The basis of naval defense was minefields - during the war years, 39 thousand mines were laid at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In addition, on the shore and islands there were powerful batteries. Under their cover, cruisers, destroyers and submarines carried out raids. The battleships were supposed to meet the German fleet if it tried to break through the minefields.
At the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was the master of the Black Sea, since the Turkish Navy had only a few relatively combat-ready ships - 2 old squadron battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 8 destroyers. Before the war, the Turks' attempts to change the situation by purchasing the latest ships abroad were unsuccessful. At the beginning of the war, the Russian command planned to completely blockade the Bosphorus and the Turkish coast and support the troops of the Caucasian Front (if necessary, the Romanian Front) from the sea. The issue of conducting an amphibious operation in the Bosporus region to capture Istanbul-Constantinople was also considered. The situation was somewhat changed by the arrival of the newest battle cruiser Goeben and the light Breslau.” The cruiser "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the squadron battleships of the Black Sea Fleet would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" retreated, taking advantage of its high speed. In general, especially after the commissioning of the Empress Maria-class dreadnoughts, the Black Sea Fleet controlled the Black Sea basin - it supported the troops of the Caucasian Front, destroyed Turkish transports, and launched attacks on the enemy coast.
Naval arms race
Stubborn rivalry in building up naval power developed before the First World War between Germany and England. England, which owned vast colonies on all continents, ranked first in the world in naval forces and merchant fleet. The German Navy was significantly inferior to the English, as can be seen from the table.
Despite its naval superiority, England continued to build up its naval forces. In 1889, parliament passed a law increasing loans for fleet construction. This law was based on the principle that the English fleet had to be superior to the two most powerful fleets of other countries (137).
Table. Composition of the fleets of England and Germany by 1897*
| Ship types |
Quantity (including those under construction) |
Ratio |
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England |
Germany |
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Armadillos of I, II, III classes |
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Coastal defense battleships |
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|
Armored cruisers |
|||
|
Cruisers of I, II, III classes |
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|
Mine cruisers |
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|
Destroyers |
|||
|
Destroyers |
|||
*"Comparative tables of the military fleets of England, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, the USA and the republics of South America." SPb., 1897, pp. 66 - 71. The table takes into account only ships that had combat significance in 1897.
The German imperialists, who became in the last quarter of the 19th century. on the path of colonial conquest, they decided to intensively develop their navy. The special “Fleet Law” adopted by the Reichstag in March 1898 provided for its sharp increase. Within six years (1898 - 1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 large armored cruisers, 17 cruisers with an armored deck and 63 destroyers (138). Germany's shipbuilding programs expanded steadily in 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912. According to the law of 1912, it was planned to increase the size of the German fleet to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers and 72 submarines (139). The pace of construction of battleships was especially accelerated. From 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid down in Germany annually (instead of 2 in the previous period) and a corresponding number of cruisers and destroyers (140).
The English bourgeoisie understood that the decisions of the German government in the field of development navy threatened England's naval power. Not wanting to lose its primacy on the seas, England also intensified the naval arms race. She set a goal of having 60% more battleships than there were in the German fleet (141). In addition, the British government began in 1905 the construction of a new type of battleship - “dreadnoughts”, which had a significant advantage over previous ships. By building dreadnoughts, England intended to make a major leap in the development of its naval power and force Germany to admit that it was unable to shake England’s naval hegemony.
However, Germany sought not only to equal England in the number of ships, but not to be inferior to it in their quality and “to build ships so that in the event of a conflict they would be at least equivalent in combat power to the enemy’s ships” (142). Therefore, as soon as the first dreadnought was built in England, Germany began building similar ships. Already in 1908, England had 8 dreadnoughts (some of them were under construction), and Germany had 7. The ratio of old-type battleships was as follows: 51 for England and 24 for Germany (143).
In view of the growing threat to English naval power from Germany, England decided in 1909 to build two ships for every newly laid down German ship (144). The naval budget for 1909/10, adopted in March 1909, authorized the government to build up to eight dreadnoughts, not counting a large number of smaller ships. In fact, nine dreadnoughts were laid down - one ship of this type was built with funds from New Zealand (145).
England also sought to preserve its naval power through diplomatic means. After the adoption of the Naval Law of 1906 in Germany, the British government came up with a proposal to limit the scale of construction of new warships. At the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, British diplomacy made a proposal to limit naval armaments (146). But this diplomatic step of England was rejected by Germany. German diplomacy spoke out extremely sharply and rudely against any arms limitation.
Competition in the construction of the navy between Germany and England continued until the outbreak of the First World War. By 1914, the German fleet firmly took second place among the fleets of the largest maritime powers.
The frantic arms race that engulfed England and Germany signaled the approach of war. V.I. Lenin, noting this in 1911 in the article “Congress of the English Social Democratic Party,” wrote: “It is known that in recent years both England and Germany have been arming themselves extremely intensively. The competition of these countries in the world market is becoming more and more intense. A military clash is approaching more and more menacingly” (147). This scientific prediction of V.I. Lenin came true just three years later.
Other states (France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary) also sought to increase their fleets by building new, more modern ships. However, the financial and economic capabilities of these countries did not allow the full implementation of the adopted shipbuilding programs. Russia can serve as a typical example in this regard.
The tsarist government, which lost during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet, sent to the Far East, directed efforts towards the restoration and further development of the navy. For this purpose, in the period from 1905 to 1914, several shipbuilding programs were developed, which provided for the completion of the previously laid down 4 squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 4 gunboats and 2 submarines, 2 minelayers and the construction of new 8 battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. However, by the beginning of the war, none of these programs had been completed (148).
Ship classes, combat assets and weapons
The experience of the first wars of the era of imperialism, especially the Russian-Japanese War, presented new demands on various classes of ships, weapons and combat equipment of navies.
For battleships, it became necessary to strengthen the main caliber artillery of 305 - 381 mm to 8 - 12 guns and the anti-mine caliber 120-150 mm to 14-18 guns by abandoning the medium caliber, strengthening the armor of the main belt to 305 - 350 mm and expanding the armor area in order to increase the survivability of the ship in battle, increase displacement to 25 - 27 thousand tons and speed to 23-25 knots.
The first battleship of a new type, called Dreadnought, was built in England (entered service in 1907) and, in its tactical and technical characteristics, was sharply different from the squadron battleships of the Russian-Japanese War. Table 10 gives a clear idea of this.
Table 10. Tactical and technical data of the Russian squadron battleship Borodino and the English battleship Dreadnought *
|
"Borodino" |
"Dreadnought" |
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|
Year of entry into service |
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|
Displacement, t |
||
|
Machine power, l. With. |
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|
Cruising range, miles |
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|
Travel speed, knots |
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|
Weapons: |
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|
artillery (number/caliber of guns, mm) |
||
|
torpedo (number/caliber of torpedo tubes, mm) |
||
|
Reservation, mm |
||
|
onboard |
||
|
tower |
||
|
deck |
||
* A. P. Shershov. History of military shipbuilding from ancient times to the present day. M. - L., 1940, pp. 144, 241-242, 346 - 347; S. P. Moiseev. List of ships of the Russian steam and armored fleet (from 1861 to 1917). M., 1948, pp. 58 - 59.
The table shows that the English ship was significantly superior to the Russian battleship in engine power, speed, main caliber artillery and armor.
Following England, other major naval powers began building battleships of the dreadnought type.
It should be noted that in the development of the class of battleships, two trends were observed, which were most clearly manifested in the English and German fleets. They were explained by various operational and tactical considerations. The Germans, expecting an attack by a stronger English fleet near their shores, paid their main attention to strengthening armor and increasing the number of guns, neglecting to a certain extent even speed. The British, on the other hand, attached paramount importance to speed and the caliber of guns, so that they could deprive the enemy of the initiative in choosing the time and place of the battle. These trends can be traced by comparing the tactical and technical data of the English Battleship Queen Elizabeth and the German König (Table 11), which were built at the same time (1911-1914).
Table 11. Tactical and technical data of the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Koenig*
* F. Jane. Fighting Ships, 1915; IN. Weger. Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten, 1914; X.Wilson. Battleships in battle. Translation from English M., 1936, pp. 414, 422; "Operational-tactical views of the German fleet." Digest of articles. M. - L., 1941, p. 16.
French and Italian pre-war battleships also had fairly good tactical and technical elements. A characteristic feature of Italian battleships was their advantage in speed with the same power weapons and armor. The battleships of the Austro-Hungarian fleet were somewhat inferior to the French and Italian ones.
The idea of creating a new type of battleship was first developed by Russian sailor scientists and shipbuilders S. O. Makarov, A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov. But due to economic backwardness Tsarist Russia and the inertia of its ruling circles, this idea was not implemented in a timely manner. The construction of new battleships in Russia began very late and was carried out at a slow pace.
The first Russian dreadnought ships (“Sevastopol”, “Gangut”, “Petropavlovsk” and “Poltava”) were laid down in the summer of 1909 at the Baltic and Admiralty shipyards in St. Petersburg in accordance with the shipbuilding program of 1908. Their construction was delayed, and they entered went into operation only in November - December 1914, i.e. after the start of the World War (149). The Sevastopol-class battleships, designed taking into account the experience of the Russian-Japanese War and the achievements of advanced Russian shipbuilding science, were superior not only to the first dreadnoughts of England, Germany and other countries, but also to the battleships of foreign fleets that were built simultaneously with them or even later.
On the eve of the war, a new type of heavy cruiser was born - the battle cruiser, which had a high speed for that time (almost 30 knots), strong artillery (up to 12,356 mm of main caliber guns) and powerful armor (up to 300 mm). Cruisers of this type had turbine engines and could take a large number of liquid fuel. In terms of their combat qualities, they left the old armored cruisers far behind.
In Russia, the battlecruisers (Izmail, Borodino, Navarin and Kinburn) intended for the Baltic Fleet (laid down in December 1912) were the most powerful in the world in terms of artillery armament. But at the beginning of the war they remained unfinished (150).
In all navies, much attention was paid to the development of light cruisers and destroyers. An increase in the speed and anti-mine artillery of battleships and cruisers required a significant increase in speed (up to 30 knots and above) and strengthening of the artillery and torpedo weapons of light cruisers and destroyers. The older types of these ships could no longer perform their tasks in squadron combat.
In 1910, the Putilov plant began building new destroyers of the Novik class, and in 1913, light cruisers of the Svetlana class. The first destroyer entered service in 1913, but the cruisers could not be completed during the war (151) .
The experience of using mine weapons in the Russo-Japanese War revealed the need to create special ships for laying and sweeping mines - minelayers and minesweepers
However, in all fleets, with the exception of the Russian fleet, no attention was paid to the construction of such ships. It was believed that with the outbreak of war it would be possible to equip merchant ships for such ships. In Russia, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers “Amur” and “Yenisei” were built, and in 1910 the world’s first underwater minelayer “Crab” was laid down. The construction of special minesweepers of the Zapal type also began.
In the pre-war years, insufficient attention was paid to the construction of submarines in Western European fleets. This was due to two reasons. Firstly, the then prevailing naval doctrine of “mastery of the sea” assigned the submarine one of the last places in the battle at sea, since victory was achieved, as it believed, by linear forces in a general battle. Secondly, in previous wars the submarine had not yet demonstrated its combat capabilities. This happened already during the First World War. As a result, by the beginning of the war, its main participants had a small number of submarines in their fleets. France had 38, Germany - 28, Russia - 23. And only England had 76 boats, but among them there were many outdated ones. Russian Bars-class submarines, laid down in 1912, were considered one of the best submarines of pre-war projects.
In the pre-war years, work began on the creation of seaplanes in the largest imperialist states. Several types of such machines were designed and built, but almost all of them did not leave the experimental testing stage before the start of the war. Only during the war did the fleets begin to receive aircraft suitable for combat missions, among them the Avro (England), Borel (France), and Flugboat (Germany) (154).
The situation was different in Russia. Russian aircraft designer D. P. Grigorovich in 1912-1913. created several models of M-type seaplane (M-1, M-2, M-4, M-5), which immediately found practical application in the fleet. The M-5 aircraft turned out to be especially successful. It had high flight-tactical qualities (flight weight - 660 kg, payload - 300 kg, ceiling - 4450 m, speed - 128 km/h). In 1914, he was accepted into service with the navy as a naval reconnaissance aircraft. It remained part of the hydroaviation until 1921. The M-9 aircraft, created by Grigorovich in 1916, had higher flight-tactical characteristics.
Russian engineers also took care of special ships that would carry seaplanes. In 1913, engineer Shishkov designed a high-speed air transport that could accommodate up to seven aircraft. Since the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was equipped with several such air transports, the aircraft of which conducted aerial reconnaissance and covered the ships of the squadron from the air in remote areas of the sea.
The development of various classes of ships, the increase in the number of submarines in fleets and their combat capabilities, as well as the emergence of naval aviation required further improvement of all types of weapons and the creation of new means of combat. Particular attention was paid to improving the tactical and technical data of naval artillery, since it continued to remain the main weapon of the fleet. By the beginning of the First World War, the caliber of heavy guns increased to 356 - 381 mm, mine artillery - to 152 mm; anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of up to 76 mm appeared. The initial speed of projectiles also increased - up to 950 m/sec, the rate of fire of large guns - up to two rounds per minute, the firing range - up to 120 cables (156).
At the same time, the relative weight of the shells increased, their penetrating and high-explosive effects increased, as the shells began to be filled with stronger explosives; Artillery fire control methods have been improved. The art of fire control has always been the most important factor in surface ship combat.
Speaking of this, it should be noted that the English fleet entered the First World War less prepared for artillery combat than the German fleet. In terms of range, the British and German guns of the main calibers were approximately the same. But the British high-explosive shells, which had sensitive fuses, did not penetrate the armor of German ships, and if they did penetrate, they did not cause major damage. German shells penetrated the weaker armor of British ships and caused severe destruction. The British were also unable to develop their own artillery fire control system before the war. Already during the war, they realized that they were lagging behind in this matter, and used many of the Russian methods of fire control (157).
Russian engineers and artillery sailors made a major contribution to the development of artillery weapons. Before the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of caliber 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm (158). The production of three-gun ship turrets also began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov plant F.F. Lender and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky were pioneers in the creation of a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm (159).
The development of torpedo and mine weapons was particularly influenced by the Russian-Japanese War. The improvement of the torpedo went along the lines of increasing its destructive power, firing range and speed. The most common in all fleets was the 450-mm torpedo, which had a firing range of 16 cables (about 3000 m) and a speed of 29 knots. In some navies during the war, ships were armed with torpedoes of larger calibers (500, 530 and 550 mm), with a speed of 45 knots at a distance of 15 cables.
In Russia, in the pre-war period, three new types of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910 and 1912), which were superior to the same type of torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, despite the fact that they had a slightly lower total weight and charge weight (160) .
Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes appeared. The first such (three-pipe) device was produced in 1913 at the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg. It provided fan-based salvo firing, the methods of which were developed and mastered by Russian torpedo gunners before the start of the war.
The development of mine weapons was characterized by an increase in the mine charge to 150 kg, consisting of a stronger explosive (tola), improved fuses, and an increase in the speed and depth of placement. On the eve of the war, the fleets were armed with shock and galvanic shock mines. During the war, antenna mines appeared, and at the very end - magnetic mines.
The Russian fleet occupied the first place in the development of mine weapons. Before the World War, the Russian Navy developed galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the 1908 model and the 1912 model. According to tactical and technical data, these mines were much superior to foreign mines, especially in their reliability. In 1913, the floating mine “P-13” was designed, which was kept under water at a certain depth due to the action of an electric floating device. Old mines of this type were kept underwater using buoys, which did not ensure the stability of the mine, especially in stormy weather. “P-13” had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of metal and could stay in a given depression for three days. None of the foreign fleets had such a mine. Russian miners created the world's first river mine "R" ("Fish").
At the beginning of the war, Russian mine weapon designers and practical mineworkers provided great assistance to the allied English fleet in organizing the production of mines and training personnel in the use of mine weapons, since the British were far behind in this matter. At the request of the English Admiralty, a group of miners was sent to England with a supply of 1,000 mines.
The Russian fleet was ahead of foreign fleets also in creating more advanced models of minesweepers. In 1911, hooking snake and boat trawls entered service. The use of these trawls significantly reduced the time of trawl work, since mines that were cut and floated to the surface were immediately destroyed. Previously, mines that had been swept had to be towed to a shallow place and destroyed there, which took a lot of time.
The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio has become a common means of communication in the navy in general and, in particular, has found wide application in controlling forces in battle. Before the war, Russian radio engineers created radio direction finders, which made it possible to use radio as a means of reconnaissance.
Organization and management
The naval forces of the largest imperialist states (England, Germany, France, Russia, etc.) consisted of fleets (flotillas) located in different maritime theaters. The fleet (the naval forces of the theater) was the highest operational formation, which, depending on the composition of its forces, goals and the nature of the war, could solve not only operational, but also strategic tasks.
The main operational unit of linear forces (battleships, battleships and armored cruisers) in all fleets, with the exception of the Turkish one, was the squadron. Squadrons could be homogeneous, consisting of ships of the same class (for example, battleships or cruisers), or mixed, which included ships of different classes (battleships, cruisers, destroyers). If there were several squadrons in one theater, they were combined into large operational formations (for example, the British 1st, 2nd and 3rd fleets). From light surface forces (light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats), submarines and special purpose ships (minelayers, minesweepers, patrol ships, gunboats, etc.) homogeneous or mixed ones were created (again, depending on the availability of ships of these classes ) operational and tactical formations - flotillas, divisions, brigades, divisions, detachments. It should be noted that similar formations in different fleets bore different names. For example, formations of destroyers and destroyers in the English, German, French and Austro-Hungarian fleets were called flotillas, in Russian - divisions, and in Italian - brigades, regardless of the number of ships included in them. The numerical composition of the associations and formations was very diverse.
Organization of command of naval forces in different countries was also different. In England, the main body for managing the fleet was the Admiralty, which in the fall of 1911 was headed by W. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty (Minister of the Navy). The Admiralty was engaged in planning the construction of the fleet and its combat training, developing operational plans and managing combat operations on an operational-strategic scale. In the English naval forces there was also the post of first sea lord, that is, the commander-in-chief of all fleets. This post was held by Admiral Lord Fisher from October 1914. In 1912, the Naval General Staff was created, but before the start of the war it did not find its place in the fleet management system. The Chief of the Naval General Staff at the beginning of the war was Vice Admiral Sturdy, and from November 1, 1914 - Rear Admiral Oliver (163). The rights and responsibilities of commanders of individual fleets were limited to the development and conduct of combat operations on an operational-tactical scale, combat training of personnel of ships and formations and their maintenance in combat-ready condition.
The supreme command of the naval forces in Germany belonged undividedly to the Kaiser, to whom were subordinate: the Navy Ministry (the State Secretariat of the Imperial Naval Administration), headed by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet, headed by Admiral Müller, and the Admiral Staff (naval general staff) , led by Admiral Paul. The Naval Ministry was in charge of the organization, management and material support of the fleet. It did not have a direct influence on the leadership of the fleet's combat activities during the war. The Naval Cabinet dealt mainly with issues of recruiting and serving officers. The Admiral Headquarters, as the body of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Kaiser), carried out the development of operational plans and the distribution of forces among naval theaters in accordance with the tasks assigned to the fleet. The commanders of the forces in the North and Baltic seas were directly subordinate to the Kaiser. They were responsible for combat training, manning, technical condition of the ship's personnel, and in wartime, for the conduct of combat operations of their fleets (164). As can be seen from the above structure of naval command and control bodies and the functions they performed, in Germany there was virtually no high naval command that would be fully responsible for waging war at sea. This circumstance had an extremely unfavorable effect on the combat activity of the fleet.
At the head of the management of the naval forces of France was the Minister of the Navy with his own operational body - the naval general staff. The commander of the Mediterranean fleet and the commander of the Canal naval forces were directly subordinate to him. The General Staff developed plans of operations and supervised their implementation.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Fleet (also the commander of the first squadron), the Duke of Abruzzo, was subordinate to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral di Rivel, who exercised senior management of the fleet's combat activities. The Naval Ministry, with its directorates and departments, was in charge of shipbuilding, manning and mobilization, all types of weapons, the development of coastal defense, as well as the equipment of naval bases and ports and the logistics of the fleet, i.e., everything that related to general preparation of the fleet for war (166).
In Austria-Hungary, the fleet was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces. The Navy Ministry did not exist. Its functions were performed by the Naval Department of the War Ministry. The head of this department had great independence and could personally report to the emperor on all the most important issues of construction, maintenance and management of the fleet.
In Turkey, the fleet control system was disrupted before the start of hostilities in the Black Sea. With the arrival of the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, the commander of the naval forces was the German Admiral Souchon, who often gave orders over the head of the Minister of Navy Ahmet Cemal.
The governing body of the Russian naval forces as a whole was the Naval Ministry, which since 1911 was headed by Admiral I.K. Grigorovich. The Maritime Ministry included: the Admiralty Council, the chairman of which was the Minister of the Navy, the Main Naval Headquarters, the Main Naval Court, the Main Naval Vessel Directorate, the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding, the Main Hydrographic Directorate, the Main Maritime Economic Directorate and other departments, departments and divisions (169).
In 1906, the Naval General Staff was created, which was entrusted with solving strategic problems, planning the construction of the fleet, carrying out its mobilization, and managing the general preparation of naval forces for war. The establishment of the Naval General Staff was a positive factor in the restoration of the Russian naval forces. With its creation, the functions of the Main Naval Staff changed significantly, which was now in charge of the fleet personnel, combat, administrative and military training units, as well as the legislative part of the naval department (170).
In addition to naval formations and formations, the naval command in England, Germany and Italy was completely subordinated to the country's coastal defense, including sea fortresses, naval bases and military ports with their garrisons.
This had a positive effect on the organization and conduct of coastal defense in these countries. This was not the case in other states. In France, for example, there was dual system subordination of coastal defense. The entire coast of the country was divided into maritime districts, each of which was divided into several sectors. The district was headed by a naval commander, but with regard to the command of the ground forces of his district, he reported directly to the Minister of War. Naval or army officers were appointed heads of sectors, depending on which forces prevailed there. In Austria-Hungary, coastal defense was the responsibility of the War Ministry. As for Russia, before the start of the war there was no unified coastal defense system established on a national scale. The land defense of most sea fortresses and naval bases and ports was under the responsibility of the War Ministry. The commanders of naval bases (ports) and the commanders of their garrisons (commandants) were independent of each other. In Sevastopol alone, the commandant of the fortress was subordinate to the main commander of the port (171).
Picking system
There was no unified system for manning the rank and file of fleets. In some countries it was carried out through free hiring (recruitment), in others - through military service, and in others - through mixed system, partly through recruitment, partly through military service.
In England, the rank and file of the fleet was recruited through free hiring. Those who wanted to serve in the navy signed a contract for 5 or 12 years, with subsequent continuation of service with positive certification for another 6 years for the former and 10 years for the latter. Those who signed a contract for 5 years were immediately sent to ships as sailors of the 2nd article, and those who had a contract for 12 years entered the school of cabin boys, after which they were sent to ships and continued to serve there as sailors, receiving an increase in articles. The best of them were promoted to non-commissioned officers. To train junior specialists in artillery and mine specialties, there were schools for foremen, where young boys who graduated from the school were accepted. There were no schools for other specialties, either for senior officers or for senior officers. Personnel was prepared based on them in a practical way, right on the ships. After passing the relevant exams, non-commissioned officers were promoted to officers. There were special classes to improve the skills of artillerymen, miners and navigators. In England there was a Naval Academy, but with very short term training - only 4 months. Senior officers and admirals were accepted into it.
The fleet manning system adopted in England had the positive side that, as a result of long service, the personnel gained extensive experience and good seamanship. But this system did not ensure the accumulation of reserves. That is why, already during the war, the British were forced to partially introduce conscription.
The German fleet was staffed by conscription, as well as by cabin boys and volunteers. The term of service in the navy was set at three years, followed by enrollment in the reserve of various degrees until the age of 40. The junior command staff and fleet specialists were recruited from school-educated boys and volunteers after appropriate training. Mechanical engineers for the fleet were trained from persons who graduated from secondary technical schools and had practical experience in shipbuilding factories. They were sent to serve on ships, and then, after a year of training in the class of naval engineers, they passed the exam to become naval mechanical engineers. The German Naval Academy had a two-year training period.
The officers of the English and German fleets were recruited according to the class principle - from the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Only mechanical engineers of the German Navy could come from other classes.
In France, the fleet recruitment system was quite complex. The rank and file of the fleet was staffed on the basis of the so-called naval registration, the recruitment of “hunters” and general military service. The “naval record” was that the entire male population of the French coastal zone between the ages of 18 and 50 was assigned to the navy for military service. However, in practice, those “enlisted” served in the navy for no more than 45 months, and then could, at their discretion, either continue to serve or retire to the reserve. Those “recorded” enjoyed a number of privileges in receiving pensions, awards and sea fishing. In 1912, the period of compulsory service for them was reduced to 2 years. Those who remained to serve further had the right to choose to enter the schools of naval specialists and advance in service up to the rank of officer.
When recruiting “hunters,” a contract was concluded for 5 years in the naval specialty they themselves chose. The missing number of recruits after receiving the “recorded” and “hunters” was replenished through military service with a period of compulsory service of 2 years. In the French fleet, as in other fleets, there was a school for cabin boys, which provided the main contingent for the schools of junior fleet specialists.
The Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets were recruited for conscription from the population of coastal districts or persons who, before conscription, had something to do with the sea (merchant sailors, fishermen) or the fleet (shipbuilders). In the Italian fleet, in addition, there was a school of cabin boys. Duration of service: in the Austro-Hungarian Navy - 12 years, of which 4 years in active service, 5 years in the reserve and 3 years in the militia; in Italian - 4 years in active service and 8 years in reserve. There were appropriate schools and colleges for the training of junior specialists and officers (175).
The officer corps of the Austro-Hungarian fleet was formed taking into account not only class, but also national principles. The vast majority were Austrian Germans.
The rank and file included, in addition to Germans, Hungarians, Italians and representatives of Slavic peoples.
The recruitment system of the Russian fleet was almost entirely based on conscription. According to the regulations approved in 1912, all persons who had the ranks of navigators and ship mechanics, as well as those who sailed on merchant ships as sailors, helmsmen and stokers, were required to serve in the navy upon reaching conscription age and being fit for health reasons. Further, preference was given to recruits from factory workers who had specialties in metalworking and assembly, turning, boiler making and blacksmithing, motor mechanics, electricians, telegraph operators and other specialists.
Therefore, among the rank and file of the fleet there was always a significant layer of factory workers, which created favorable conditions for the development of the revolutionary movement in the navy. The missing part of the rank and file was recruited from residents of the coastal and riverine regions of the country.
The total service life for the rank and file of the fleet was set at 10 years, of which 5 years of active service and 5 years in reserve (177).
In the pre-war years, a school for cabin boys was opened in Kronstadt for the Baltic Fleet. By creating it, the Naval Ministry not only had in mind improving the quality of training of fleet personnel, but also pursued political goals. Through the school of young men, it hoped to prepare servants loyal to the tsarist autocracy, who could be used in the fight against the revolutionary movement in the navy. However, the calculations of the tsarist authorities did not come true in this case either. Despite brutal repressions and attempts to create a certain layer of trustworthy personnel among the personnel, the revolutionary movement in the navy grew increasingly stronger.
To train non-commissioned officer rank specialists in the Baltic and Black Seas, there were training detachments that included artillery and mine schools. In addition, various schools, classes and training teams were created that were not part of the training detachments: engine schools and schools for helmsmen and signalmen of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, a diving school (common for both fleets), a diving school of the Baltic Fleet, paramedic schools in Kronstadt and Nikolaev, training teams of non-combatant combatants of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, etc.
The officers of the fleet were composed of children of nobles, bourgeoisie, and officials. IN engineering schools People from other segments of the population were also accepted. Officer training was carried out in the Naval Corps, special classes and the Maritime Academy.
During the First World War, in many countries the system of manning fleets with enlisted personnel and officers underwent significant changes. The war caused a large loss of naval personnel. Recruitment and training of replacements could not be carried out according to pre-war norms and principles. The training period was shortened, some qualification restrictions on serving as officers were abolished, and admission to the officer corps was expanded for people from the petty-bourgeois strata.
Combat training
In the English and German navies, combat training was carried out almost all year round. It usually began with single ship training, followed by tactical exercises of homogeneous and heterogeneous formations, and eventually the final maneuvers of large formations and formations were carried out. In England, maneuvers were primarily operational in nature; Bilateral tactical and operational maneuvers were carried out in Germany.
In the German fleet, much attention was paid to artillery firing, which was carried out at long distances on shields equal in area to ships. In terms of artillery training, the British fleet was significantly inferior to the German one. The famous English naval historian H. Wilson later admitted that “in the first period of the war, British ships ... discovered in this regard a significant and very dangerous weakness compared to the German ones.”
In both fleets, destroyers conducted salvo torpedo firing, and German destroyers also practiced daytime torpedo attacks. The Germans laid training minefields, and then they were cleared by minesweepers equipped from outdated destroyers.
In the English and German fleets great importance was given to maritime training of personnel and training of formations in joint voyages. A major shortcoming in the combat training of both fleets was that they were not prepared for joint actions with ground forces. If we talk about the level of combat training in general, then in the German fleet it was slightly higher than in the English, especially in the field of tactics and the use of weapons. In other Western European fleets there is no combat training significant differences did not have one, except that it was carried out at a lower level compared to the fleets of Germany and England.
The Turkish fleet occupied a special position in terms of combat training. The rank and file of the fleet was recruited mainly from peasants of the Muslim faith. Cadres of junior naval and non-commissioned specialists were not being trained. The staff of officers on ships and in units was incredibly inflated. For every 10 sailors at the beginning of the war there were 8.
According to the testimony of the German officer Hermann Lorey, who served in the Turkish fleet during the war, Turkish warships were “mainly “floating barracks”, and life on them was reduced to food, uniforms and theoretical training... Only a small part of the personnel was on the ships, but even that did not sail, but spent time inactive in sheltered harbors” (180). After the war with Russia of 1877 - 1878. Turkish ships did not leave the Bosporus for the Black Sea until the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). “...Therefore,” continues Lorey, “the personnel were not accustomed to the sea and did not have any maritime experience” (181).
Further, he notes major shortcomings in the organization of certain types of combat training (artillery and torpedo firing, ensuring the survivability of a ship in battle, navigation, etc.), poor provision of the fleet with combat reserves, fuel and other types of supplies. Concluding the description of the Turkish fleet at the beginning of the war, Lorey writes that “by the time the German ships arrived, mobilization was in full swing, but neither on the ships nor in the shipyards were there noticeable preparations for military action” (182). In many ways, Lorey was, of course, right. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Lorey and other Germans who arrived in the Turkish fleet along with the Goeben and Breslau or later tried in every possible way after the war to inflate their role in the “transformation” of the Turkish fleet. The fighting in the Black Sea during the war showed that if we exclude the German ships that were part of the Turkish fleet, the latter made very little progress in its combat effectiveness.
It is necessary to dwell in somewhat more detail on the combat training of the Russian fleet, since it had some characteristic features. The advanced officers of the Russian fleet had a hard time surviving the Tsushima tragedy. They paid attention primarily to the combat training of personnel. And, I must say, we have achieved considerable results in this direction, especially in the Baltic Fleet.
In the Baltic Sea, the combat training of the fleet was led by Vice Admiral N. O. Essen, who largely adhered to the views of S. O. Makarov. Since 1906, he commanded the 1st mine division of the fleet, based at the ice-free port of Libau. The division's ships sailed all year round, regardless of meteorological conditions, which contributed to the development of endurance, courage, initiative and perseverance in the personnel in achieving their goals, i.e. those fighting qualities that were required in the war. The 1st Mine Division became a combat training school; many commanders of ships and naval formations passed through it in the pre-war years (183). In November 1908, N. O. Essen was appointed head of the united detachments of the Baltic Sea. The first important event that he carried out on the scale of the fleet was the consolidation of previously scattered ships and detachments into formations capable of solving operational and tactical tasks.
A major shortcoming in the combat training of the Russian fleet for a long period was the practice of predominantly raid exercises. Due to the saving of material resources, ships went to sea, as a rule, only in the summer, and even then not for long. Now fundamental changes have been made to the organization of combat training. A system of step-by-step training was introduced: first, a single ship was trained, then a tactical formation (division, brigade of ships), then a large formation (ship division), and finally, at the end of the campaign, maneuvers of the entire operating fleet.
Much attention in the Baltic Fleet was paid to artillery training. Russian ships of the pre-war period were somewhat inferior in the power of their artillery weapons to similar ships of the German fleet (184). Therefore, it was possible to achieve equality or superiority over the enemy only through the art of artillery shooting. The number of practical shooting sessions was significantly increased and the provision of ammunition was improved. In 1910, special devices were introduced for training artillerymen to control the fire of a single ship and devices for quickly loading guns.
An important place in the plan for the war in the Baltic Sea was given to defensive mine laying. To implement them, advance and thorough preparation was required, especially since the Baltic Fleet did not have a sufficient number of special minelayers. In the fall of 1909, a detachment of minelayers was formed, which in the spring of the following year began intensive combat training aimed at carrying out mine laying determined by the war plan. The detachment's ships and destroyers of the 1st Mine Division practiced laying training mines in areas of future defensive minefields.
Preparations for the use of torpedo weapons in a future war were no less seriously organized in the navy. New types of torpedoes (1908, 1910, 1912) were adopted for service, which required comprehensive testing. The carriers of torpedo weapons - destroyers and submarines - also became other carriers. It was necessary to develop more advanced torpedo firing methods. The center for combat training in the use of torpedo weapons was the 1st Mine Division of the Fleet. Here new torpedoes were tested and a method of salvo firing over an area from three destroyers armed with three single-tube devices was developed. Since 1910, combat training in the use of torpedo weapons also began in the submarine brigade of the Baltic Fleet.
