It is no coincidence that the author included this saying of the great Russian commander A.V. Suvorov in the epigraph of the article. Perhaps, schoolchildren’s acquaintance with the art of war begins with this Suvorov postulate. Unfortunately, for many, this is where acquaintance with military strategy and tactics ends, except for a couple or three more common Suvorov phrases like “the bullet is stupid, the bayonet is great,” “hard in training, easy in battle.” Then young man in middle school age, he becomes acquainted with touching fairy tales on military themes regarding Suvorov’s miracle heroes, the crushing victories of a handful of Russian soldiers over crowds of thousands of ferocious Turkish Janissaries. A little later, but also within the framework of the school course, the young man becomes acquainted with the assault on Izmail and Suvorov’s crossing of the Alps. And through the entire domestic historical science about the second half of the 18th century there is a statement that runs like a red thread - Suvorov always (that is, always!) fought against an enemy that was many times superior to him in numbers and always won crushing victories.
A small digression - perhaps in all the memoirs of all commanders, as an excuse for their failures or to emphasize the enormity of their victories, the thesis is given that he had to fight with an enemy many times superior to him in numbers. Moreover, this thesis is easily revealed in memoirs from both sides about the same events.
Very quickly, the conviction is deposited in the young brain that any military victory can only be considered a true victory when the commander defeated an enemy significantly superior in numbers. But if the commander created for himself a superiority over the enemy by five to six times and defeated him in a heavy battle, then this is not a victory at all, but like this - “They threw their hats and are still bragging. It’s a shame, a shame, gentlemen of the military to be proud of such a victory, not for it's Suvorovsky."
And for some reason the young man doesn’t think that just yesterday, in order to take revenge on his enemy, he invited a couple of friends with him to a showdown. He considers it quite normal that a football team that considers itself the strongest does not go to the game with half its strength and considers the hockey coach’s excuses that the team does not have enough people and at the decisive moment of the game he could not throw fresh forces onto the field quite convincing.
It turns out that when going into a street fight, it is quite worthy to create a numerical advantage for yourself. That only with fresh players in reserve can a coach count on victory. But it is a shame for the military to create a numerical superiority for itself when planning a battle. They say that one should fight only through skill and necessarily with fewer troops than the enemy. What is the skill of a commander? We will return to this issue later.
However, for some people this interpretation of this Suvorov phrase is convenient and beneficial. I mean the fifth column of journalists and writers, whose main task was to debunk the entire history of the country from 1917 to 1991, to belittle the significance of the USSR’s victory over Germany in the war of 1941-45, to dim, and if possible, to completely extinguish the shine of Stalin’s victories generals.
So books are being produced in which it is convincingly and not very well proven that the Soviet commanders did not know how to fight, that all victories were achieved only through mischief, due to the fact that Stalin’s marshals drove millions of Red Army soldiers into the fire and only flooded the onslaught of the Wehrmacht with rivers of people’s blood, instead of, like the German generals, achieving success with graceful, witty blows with obviously smaller forces. And from under these statements, the thesis creeps like a snake into the reader’s heart that the victory of the Soviet Union came at too high a price, was wasted and unnecessary. This means that this is not a victory at all, but ugh, and the whole war against Hitler is only the desire of Stalin and the communists for world domination.
This is usually proven using simple arithmetic calculations. Sometimes these calculations are primitive, deceitful and stupid, designed for the amateurism of readers. A certain military dropout, a failed intelligence officer and simply a traitor, Rezun (V. Suvorov), especially thrives here. Sometimes the calculations are more competent and, from a statistical point of view, impeccable. This is, for example, Mr. Drogovoz with his book “The Tank Sword of the Land of the Soviets,” where, against the background of completely truthful and accurate data, conclusions are drawn that are no less false, although for amateurs his layouts seem completely objective and convincing.
However, as soon as we open the works of German historians (and English, American, French too), we immediately come across their bitter complaints that the German generals did not have enough soldiers, tanks, guns, gasoline, and ammunition. In black and white, they describe the victories of the Wehrmacht and tell how the Germans managed to create numerical superiority and accumulate forces and resources. They make no secret of the fact that the first and main condition for success is the accumulation of forces superior to those of the enemy, and that successfully attacking troops stop the offensive not when they reach the goal, but when their superiority in forces is exhausted.
This is the deep meaning of the two main methods of warfare - offensive and defensive. An offensive is only possible when side A has, in one way or another, accumulated forces superior to side B. Defense is the lot of side B, which currently has smaller forces. Any military man knows that the attacker always suffers more significant losses than the defender (very often 3-4 times more). The offensive stops when the forces of side A and side B come to an approximate balance. Then there is a pause, during which both sides strive to increase their forces as quickly as possible to the level of superiority over the enemy. After which, the side with numerical superiority begins an offensive.
If it were different, i.e. success would have been achieved due to the great talents of generals, officers, and the skills of soldiers of one side over the generals, officers and soldiers of the other side, then we would have seen a completely different historical picture.
The author of this article is not a general and did not lead divisions, corps or armies into battle. Therefore, his statements and calculations are not without a certain degree of amateurism. Consequently, everything that is said above and what will be said below is not the absolute truth in its ultimate instance. The author only invites readers to think about the constituent elements of victory, the principles of strategy and tactics. As proof that it is worth thinking about issues of war and peace yourself, about the principles of strategy and tactics, and not relying on anyone else’s statements and not accepting their postulates as your own beliefs (“Many people resemble sausages - what’s stuffed into them, then they carry within themselves." Kozma Prutkov), below the author will refer to the work of Carl von Clausewitz "On War".
This is not a desire to put Clausewitz’s opinion into the readers’ heads like mincemeat into a sausage, but information for thought, because as he said in his book: "Theory should be consideration, not teaching" .
So, Clausewitz: “If we consider without prejudice the history of modern wars, we will be forced to admit that numerical superiority is becoming more and more decisive every day; therefore, we must value the rule of being as strong as possible at the moment of decisive battle at the present time somewhat more than ever before.” no matter what happened before."
However, this statement by Clausewitz does not at all mean that numerical superiority is the only condition for victory.
Here's what he writes next: “The courage and spirit of troops at all times increased physical strength, and this will continue to be the case. But we also encounter periods in history when a sharp superiority in the organization and armament of troops gave a significant moral superiority; in other periods, the same superiority was given by greater mobility of troops; further influenced by the newly introduced systems of tactics; then the art of war was carried away by the desire for the skilful use of terrain, guided by broad and comprehensive principles; on this basis, one commander from time to time managed to win significant advantages over another; however, this desire soon disappeared and had to give way to more natural and simple techniques. If we look without bias at the experience of recent wars, we will be forced to say that neither in entire campaigns, nor in decisive battles, i.e. general battles, such phenomena have almost never been observed..."
Those. Clausewitz argues that it is possible that in earlier times numerical superiority or superiority in strength played a lesser role than it does now, but neither then nor now can superiority in strength be discounted. He points out that as historical development in general, and the development of the armed forces, there is a certain standardization of military affairs and the level of military art in different countries aligned: “Armies today have become so similar to each other in weapons, equipment, and training that there is no particularly noticeable difference in this regard between the best of them and the worst. The degree of training of scientific forces, however, still, perhaps, represents significant differences, but it mainly leads only to the fact that some are the initiators and inventors of certain improvements, and others are their quick imitators.Even commanders of a subordinate order - commanders of corps and divisions - everywhere adhere to the same views and methods in relation to their profession ; thus, in addition to the talent of the commander-in-chief, which can hardly be thought of as having any constant relationship with the level of cultural development of the people and the army and which, on the contrary, is entirely a matter of chance, the mere involvement of troops in a war can still give one of the sides a noticeable advantage over the other. The more decisive the balance in all this is, the decisive influence is exerted by the numerical balance of forces.
Isn’t this the basis of Suvorov’s statement “Fight not with numbers, but with skill”? After all, this postulate was born during the wars of the 18th century between Russia and Turkey, when, according to Clausewitz, the numerical superiority of the Turkish army could be overcome by greater mobility, better training, weapons and better use of the terrain by the Russian army. Let's remember Suvorov's - "Speed, eye, onslaught." It would seem that train the army better, train it, arm it with the best weapons and it’s in the bag, that is, victory is in your pocket. You don’t need a huge mass army, it’s better to have a smaller army, but higher quality. Modern supporters of a professional contract army in Russia also emphasize this. But let's return to Clausewitz's words: “The armies of our day have become so similar to each other in weapons, equipment, and training that there is no particularly noticeable difference in this respect between the best of them and the worst.” Has anything changed in this regard at the beginning of the 21st century? And will not the one who can field a large army at the right time be in an advantageous position? Yes, in the USA, at present the army is not so large in size, but look into its “reserves”, figure out what lies behind the concepts of “Army of Reserve”, “Reserve Component”, “Army National Guard”, then I guarantee that you will discover that the US military is much larger than the public is led to believe.
By the way, when Suvorov met with an army equal in level of training, tactical techniques, weapons, namely the French, we do not see a single Suvorov battle where he, with smaller forces, would have defeated more numerous forces. Moreover, the actual betrayal of the Austrians, the loss of Rimsky-Korsakov’s corps, which deprived Suvorov of superiority in forces, forced him to retreat through the Alps.
Clausewitz cites the Battle of Borodino as evidence of the prevailing nature of the influence of the factor of superiority of forces over all others: " One has only to read without prejudice the description of the Battle of Borodino, where the first army in the world - the French - faced off against the Russian army, which, undoubtedly, in many aspects of its organization and in the degree of training of its individual units, could be considered the most backward. In the whole course of the battle there is not the slightest manifestation of great skill or intelligence; this is a calm struggle between the opposing forces, and since the latter were almost equal, nothing else could happen but a slow lowering of the scales to the side on which there was greater energy in the leadership and greater combat experience of the army. We chose this particular battle as an example because in it, more than in any other, the sides were numerically equal."
Simply put, Clausewitz argues that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino could not have been different from what it turned out to be. The forces were approximately equal in number and although french army was better trained, and its leader was an outstanding commander, the French did not achieve success precisely because of the balance of forces.
He further writes: “Bonaparte, the greatest commander of our time, in all his victorious general battles, with the exception of the battle of Dresden in 1813, always knew how to concentrate an army that was stronger or, in any case, only slightly inferior to the enemy, and where he failed, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon and Waterloo, he was defeated."
Does all of the above mean that it is enough to create a numerical superiority over the enemy and the more the better, as victory is in your pocket? Apparently, Soviet military leaders and Stalin himself thought so when in the thirties they created a tank armada, the size of which was not equal anywhere else in the world. However, the art of war does not fit into the framework of the four operations of arithmetic. This is algebra and algebra higher order. Stalin managed to create not a numerical superiority in tanks, but a big bluff that Hitler did not catch. But the “great military historian” Rezun catches his readers and admirers like stupid crucians, who excitedly counts these iron boxes, inviting everyone to consider them tanks.
No, numerical superiority is only one of the factors that makes up victory. Clausewitz writes: “...with the help of numerical superiority we not only do not achieve everything or the main thing, but may even achieve very little, depending on how the accompanying circumstances develop. But numerical superiority itself can have different degrees; it can be thought of as double, triple, quadruple, etc. Everyone understands that numerical superiority, brought to a certain high degree, must overcome everything else. From this point of view, we must agree that numerical superiority represents most important factor battle, but it must be large enough to counterbalance all other accompanying factors."
Those. we see that Clausewitz does not consider numerical advantage to be the only component of victory, but considers it to be the main factor. Superiority in the quality of equipment, training of personnel, tactical techniques, and the art of commanders to a certain extent can compensate for the insufficiency of an arithmetic advantage in numbers, but only when the difference in numbers is small.
However, as a rule, it is impossible to achieve an absolute numerical advantage of the troops of one side over the other. Clausewitz writes: "...at the decisive point it is necessary to bring into battle as many troops as possible."
The author believes that it is the ability to create numerical, precisely numerical superiority in forces in in the right place V right time and forms the basis of a commander’s talent. However, not everything here depends on the commander. What forces and at what time the state can replenish it does not depend on the commander. He can only use what he has been given to the best or worst extent.
So maybe A.V. Suvorov, when he declared, “fight not with numbers, but with skill,” meant the ability to concentrate superiority in forces in a decisive place, and not at all the requirement to replace superiority in forces with the talents of a commander? After all, even in boxing, the world flyweight champion will not enter the ring against a first-class heavyweight. Skill is skill, but the difference in weight makes up for the lack of skill.
Note that all the talents of Hitler’s generals began to rapidly melt away during the Second World War as Germany depleted its human and industrial resources. A common phrase among our writers and journalists of that time and later regarding Soviet commanders became something like this - “... during the war, the military skill of Soviet military leaders increased immeasurably...”. Well, etc. etc. It turns out interesting - Soviet military leaders gained combat experience, learned from mistakes, developed their tactical and strategic thinking, while the German generals became dumber day by day? Or maybe the reason lies elsewhere - the USSR, for many reasons, continuously increased its numerical superiority, and Germany, for the same reasons, exhausted its strength? Is this why the Soviet commanders have more and more military successes and the German commanders have less and less?
So maybe it really is that they threw hats at the Germans and covered them with Red Army blood? The book “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Statistical research” was recently published. Six hundred pages of almost nothing but tables. A very cold shower for those who like to write: “...according to my calculations...” and for those who perceive their writings as the absolute truth. A large team of statisticians worked on the country’s loss figures for several years. Reading this book, you immediately see that it is impossible to reduce everything to a few numbers. You can count and summarize results in different ways. I do not undertake to prove the truth or falsity of this book, but the abundance of numbers and their layout in many columns, tables and pages convinces that if it is a fake, then it is brilliant, and if it is true, then it is clear that it is clear to give an unambiguous answer about the number of losses as with one way or the other is impossible. Well, for example, how to count those Soviet soldiers who, having been captured, replenished the German divisions (in many German divisions in 1942, up to 15% of the number were so-called “hiwis,” i.e., volunteer assistants). But during the war there were up to a million such people. On the one hand, they are taken into account as irretrievable losses of the Red Army, on the other hand, they died along with the Germans, thus reducing the number of losses of purely Germans. How to count the military units of Finland, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, Romania? After all, they also fought against the Red Army, but many historians do not take into account the loss figures of these countries at all. In addition, many not entirely conscientious historians, when counting the losses of the USSR, take into account all losses, including civilian population(about 26 million people), and from Germany only military personnel of the Wehrmacht (about 7-8 million people).
The author, trying to find out the degree of ruthlessness of Soviet generals in relation to the Soviet “lower ranks” and the caring attitude of German generals towards their comrades in soldier’s uniform, took figures from the columns of two tables of this statistical study, which have the same name “Killed, died from wounds, disappeared without lead, non-combat losses." Those. figures directly indicating those killed in and around battles. So, the Red Army - 4 million, 559 thousand people, the Wehrmacht (and its allies) - 4 million, 273 thousand people. The numbers are approximately the same. So the statement that Stalin did not value a soldier’s life for a penny can also be applied to Hitler on the same grounds.
Concluding this reflection, I would like to again refer to Clausewitz: " So, we believe that in our conditions, as in all similar ones, the balance of forces at the decisive point is a huge matter and that, in general, for ordinary cases it is the most important of all conditions. The number of troops at a decisive point depends on the absolute size of the army and on the art of its use."
Historical and biographical information
Karl Philipp Godfrey von Clausewitz (1780-1831), German military leader, theorist and historian, major general of the Prussian army (1818).
On military service from 1792, in the Russian army in 1812-1814. Graduated from the general military school in Berlin (1803.)
Participated in the war with France 1806-07. From 1808 on the Russian General Staff. In 1808-09, head of the office of the Military Reorganization Committee. Since October 1810, he taught strategy and tactics at the combined arms military school.
At the request of patriotic generals and officers (G. Scharnhorst, A. Gneisenau, G. Boyen and others), who opposed the subordination of Prussia to Napoleon, in February 1812 he drew up a program for the national liberation of Germany by people's war in alliance with Russia against the French invaders.
In May 1812, Clausewitz joined the Russian army. During the Patriotic War of 1812 he was quartermaster of the cavalry corps P.P. Palen, then F.P. Uvarov, from October - P.H. Wittgenstein. From 1813, chief of staff of the Combined Russian-Prussian Corps.
In 1814 he returned to Prussian service, from 1815 the chief of staff of the army corps, from 1818 the director of the combined arms military school, from 1831 the chief of staff of the army on the Polish border.
Clausewitz independently studied over 180 wars and campaigns that took place from 1566 to 1815, and wrote a number of military historical works. Clausewitz's main work is the study "0 War". In the Soviet Union, this book was published only once in 1936, and again in Russia in 2002.
Literature
1. K. von Clausewitz. About war. Publishing house AST. Moscow. Terra Fantastica. Saint Petersburg. 2002
2.Viktor Suvorov. Suicide. Why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union? AST. Moscow. 2000
3.B.Liddell Hart. Second World War. AST.Moscow 1999 Terra Fantastica. Saint Petersburg.
4.Kurt von Tippelskirch. History of the Second World War. AST. Moscow. 2001
5.Kurt von Tippelskirch. Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkieges. Bonn. 1954
6. Adolf Hitler. My struggle. T-OKO. 1992
6.G.K.Zhukov. Memories and reflections. APN.Moscow. 1987.
7. N.N. Voronov. In military service. Military publishing house. Moscow. 1963
8.K.K.Rokossovsky. Soldier's duty. Military publishing house. Moscow. 1988
9. G.Goth. Tank operations. Ed. "Rusich". Smolensk. 1999
10. G. Guderian. Tanks, go! Ed. "Rusich". Smolensk. 1999
11. Military history magazine No. 3-95.
12. Combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Statistical collection No. 1 (June 22, 1941). Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Moscow. 1995
13.Adolf Hitler. "My struggle". CD "Educational Encyclopedia - Hitler".
14.Z.Westphal. Fatal decisions. Polygon. St. Petersburg. 2001.
14. G. Derr. March to Stalingrad. Test site. St. Petersburg. 2001.
15.V.A. Zolotarev. Story military strategy Russia. Polygraph resources. Kuchkovo field. Moscow. 2000
16.I.G.Drogovoz. Tank sword of the country of the Soviets. AST. Harvest. Moscow. Minsk. 2001
17. A.P. Gorkin and others. Military encyclopedic dictionary. Scientific publishing house "Bolshaya" Russian encyclopedia". Published by "Ripol Classic". Moscow. 2001.
18. G.F. Krivosheev and others. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Statistical research. Olma Press. Moscow. 2001
19.V.Keitel. Reflections before execution. Rusich. Smolensk 2000
20.E. von Manstein. Lost victories. Phoenix. Moscow. Rostov-on-Don. 1999
Superiority
Superiority noun, With., used compare often
Morphology: (no) what? superiority, what? superiority, (see) what? superiority, how? superiority, about what? about superiority
1. Superiority refer to someone's professional or moral excellence in comparison with other people. Moral superiority. | Innate superiority. | Personal excellence. | To admire someone's excellence. | To have superiority over others. | Looking at others with a hint of superiority. | Children are very reluctant to allow their peers to be superior in anything.
2. Superiority is when someone achieves an advantage as a result of competition, competition, etc.
Prove your superiority over others. | Maintain your superiority. | Recognize someone else's superiority. | The leader of the standings confirmed his superiority.
3. Superiority call someone's most favorable position, existence, compared to everyone else.
Striving for excellence. | Cultural, scientific, economic superiority. | Fascism is an ideology that asserts the superiority and exclusivity of a particular nation or race.
4. Superiority they call the achievement by someone of the highest degree of awareness and development in any competitive process.
Technical excellence. | Superiority in competition. | Technological superiority.
5. Superiority is called the numerical advantage of someone who is in a forceful confrontation with someone.
Absolute, overwhelming, triple superiority.
Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language by Dmitriev. D. V. Dmitriev. 2003.
Synonyms:
See what “superiority” is in other dictionaries:
Advantage, dominance. Wed. importance, dominance, primacy... Dictionary of Russian synonyms and similar expressions. under. ed. N. Abramova, M.: Russian dictionaries... Synonym dictionary
EXCELLENCE, superiority, plural. no, cf. (book). Possessing the highest dignity, superior qualities compared to someone else, an advantage over someone else. Show your superiority. Ushakov's explanatory dictionary. D.N. Ushakov. 1935 1940 … Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary
EXCELLENCE, ah, cf. Advantage over anyone than n. in which n. respect. Prove your P.P. in technology. Numerical item. Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary. S.I. Ozhegov, N.Yu. Shvedova. 1949 1992 … Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary
superiority- great superiority significant superiority colossal superiority undeniable superiority enormous superiority overwhelming superiority solid superiority ... Dictionary of Russian Idioms
superiority- over whom with what (obsolete before whom with what) and in what. 1. over whom than (possessing higher virtues in comparison with whom, than l.). The superiority of machine production over manual production. [Prokhor] was aware with annoyance of her superiority over himself (Shishkov). I… … Control Dictionary
superiority- SUPERIORITY1, a, cf Possessing higher merits or quantitative advantage compared to someone, than l. Prove your superiority. SUPERIORITY2, a, cf Exclusive right to use something. due to the possession of higher... ... Explanatory dictionary of Russian nouns
superiority- (Russian superiority) 1. odlika, izvoreden success (in old school) 2. prenost, nadmojnost 3. what are the titles in old times: visost, exaltation, excellence... Macedonian dictionary
Wed. 1. Possessing higher virtues and qualities compared to someone else. 2. Quantitative excess against something. Ephraim's explanatory dictionary. T. F. Efremova. 2000... Modern explanatory dictionary of the Russian language by Efremova
Excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence, excellence (
We are accustomed to the words “the reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.” However, the Red Army was not the only one that suffered defeats when it first encountered Hitler’s Wehrmacht. From 1939 to 1942, the German army invariably (except for the Battle of Moscow) won victories over any enemy. Of course, the Polish, French, and Soviet armies had their own specifics, which created some special reasons for the defeats of each of them. But still, a common feature is the successful conduct of the war by the German army. Therefore, it seemed to us that it would be more correct to consider this phenomenon in exactly the same way as we titled this article. The invasion of Poland was carried out with the overwhelming superiority of German troops in technology. In terms of personnel numbers, the parties were approximately equal. But the Germans had more than five times more tanks than the Poles, and almost four times more combat aircraft. Before the start of the decisive offensive in the West on May 10, 1940, the balance of forces was no longer so favorable for the Wehrmacht. The amount of manpower here was approximately equal (if we count together the forces of all the then Western allies - the French, British, Belgians and Dutch). In terms of tanks, the Allies were slightly superior to the Germans: 3000 versus 2600. In terms of the number of combat aircraft, the Germans had an advantage of approximately one and a half times. Military operations in the West ended in a month and a half with the complete defeat of the Allied ground forces.
Before the invasion of the USSR, the armed forces of Germany and its allies exceeded the forces of the Red Army by 1.3 times in the number of fighters. However, even in terms of the number of artillery barrels, the balance of forces was equal. As for mobile equipment, the Soviet troops outnumbered the Germans and their vassals by 2.7 times in the number of tanks, and 2.1 times in the number of aircraft. In certain areas, the Red Army's numerical superiority in technology by June 22, 1941 was even more impressive. Thus, in the zone of the Southwestern Front, the Red Army had six times more tanks than the Wehrmacht. Despite this, here too the Germans advanced successfully, although more slowly than in other directions. Of course, the number of troops and weapons is not a clear indicator. Important has quality. As armored vehicles, the Germans could only have a noticeable superiority over the Poles. The combat characteristics of most French and English tanks, on the one hand, and German tanks, on the other, were comparable. In addition, the French had a number of heavy tanks, which the Germans did not have at all. A similar situation occurred on the Eastern Front in 1941. The German “medium” tanks T-III and T-IV were only slightly superior in firepower and armor to our BT-7s (while being significantly inferior to them in maneuverability). The German light tanks T-I and T-II were approximately comparable in their combat characteristics to our light tanks. As for our T-34s and especially the KV-1, the Germans did not acquire vehicles capable of withstanding direct combat with them until 1942.
Now let's see how many tanks there were different types between the parties before the start of Hitler's invasion of the USSR. The Germans had about 1,500 T-IV and T-III tanks with a 50 mm cannon. The Red Army also had about 1,500 T-34 and KV-1 tanks, which were noticeably superior in combat characteristics. The Germans had more than 2,000 light tanks of all types, and the Red Army had over 16 thousand. However, combat operations soon showed that light tanks in a new type of war were just quickly burning trash. The Luftwaffe was noticeably superior to the Soviet Air Force in terms of the quality of its aircraft. Even the Soviet fighters of “new types” - the Yak, MiG and La - throughout the war were inferior in combat characteristics to the German Me-109 and especially the FW-190. One of the myths about the war is about the supposedly great saturation of the Wehrmacht with rapid-fire infantry weapons. In fact, according to the wartime staff in 1941, the Soviet rifle division was equipped with 1204 submachine guns, while the German division had only 486. Of course, our divisions were almost never fully equipped and armed. In fact, in the summer of 1941, there were approximately one hundred thousand submachine guns in the Red Army, and 166 thousand in the Wehrmacht. The Germans have an advantage, although clearly not overwhelming. It was only later, throughout the war, that Soviet industry produced six times more submachine guns than German industry. The same must be said about rapid-fire self-loading rifles. The Germans had 1.2 million captured Czech self-loading rifles. In the USSR in 1941-1942. Approximately the same number of SVT rapid-fire self-loading rifles were produced. By the beginning of the war there were much fewer of them. As we see, the Germans also had an advantage in this important component of weapons. Although in itself it also could not be decisive. In fact, just as most of our infantry entered the war with the “grandfather’s” Mosin rifles of the 1891 model (slightly modernized in 1930), so the majority of the German infantry fought the entire war with Mauser rifles of the 1898 model.
No less important than the quality of certain types of weapons was their reliability. New types of Soviet tanks did not overcome “childhood illnesses” and often broke down even before the battle. Thus, in the first days of the war, more than half of the T-34 and KV tanks of the Southwestern Front failed due to breakdowns during road marches. SVT rifles were sensitive to contamination and required regular careful maintenance, which was difficult for an infantryman to carry out in conditions of constant battles and marches. So, the huge (on paper) superiority of the Soviet troops in terms of the number of weapons and equipment over the invading Germans in the summer of 1941 turns into a fiction if you look at the ratio for specific effective types weapons. However, the advantage of the Germans in them was not so significant as to count on the crushing of the Red Army in the very first battles, if only... If only the Red Army had met the enemy in pre-prepared defensive positions. It should be noted that the command of the Red Army was preparing to repel a much stronger enemy than in reality. According to the General Staff of the Red Army at the end of 1940, the invading enemy forces could number up to 12 thousand tanks and 15 thousand aircraft. In reality, there were fewer than 4,500 of both in the invading army. Therefore, according to the calculations of the Soviet command, the troops concentrated at the western border were more than enough to repel the attack and defeat the invading enemy. Why didn't this happen? Answers are usually sought in miscalculations of the preparations for war on the Soviet side. We will consider this issue, but we will also pay attention to the other side - the effectiveness of preparing the Germans for war. Consequences of repressions against the command personnel of the Red Army in 1937-1941. are regarded as modern literature contradictory. Some believe that the repressions had a fatal impact on the combat effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces. Others claim that, on the contrary, repressions strengthened vertical mobility in the command structures of the Red Army, cleared it of retrogrades, and contributed to the advancement of military leaders to the upper echelon, who subsequently showed themselves brilliantly in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. It is impossible to prove this or that statement due to the lack of experimental verification. Therefore, we will simply leave this issue aside as unimportant.
An equally controversially assessed factor is the style and level of competence of Stalin’s personal leadership. And here we have different subjective judgments, in favor of and in refutation of which a lot of arguments are given. To analyze them, it would be necessary to write a whole book, which is not yet part of our plans. It seems, however, that if a certain phenomenon causes opposing assessments, then its actual influence on the course of events also most likely had ambiguous consequences. To a first approximation, it would probably be fair to assume that the positive and negative aspects of Stalin’s personal leadership of the armed forces of the USSR on the eve and during the war years, on average, mutually balanced each other. Therefore, we will not consider this issue here either. So what's left? 1) The general readiness of the USSR as a military-political organism for war; 2) readiness of the armed forces of the USSR; 3) deployment of the armed forces of the USSR in the future theater of military operations (TVD). The first point is very easy to answer. The war as such proved the high readiness of the USSR for difficult tests of this kind. However, she also confirmed the old saying: “A Russian man rides fast, but harnesses it for a long time.” It took a lot of time to adjust not only the management system in all areas, but also the psychology of people to the difficulties of wartime. But once this was achieved, victory was assured; it was just a matter of time. The main thing was to withstand the first blow, not to break, and then time worked for the USSR. The readiness of the armed forces consists of many components that can hardly be exhaustively listed. The high saturation of the Red Army with equipment was not supported by a sufficient material and technical base, such as: reliability, opportunities for quick repairs, uninterrupted supply of spare parts, high density of communications between the front and rear. The infrastructural backwardness of our country, which still exists today, had a strong impact here. It is significant that the only battle won by the Red Army without superiority in forces over the enemy was the battle for Moscow. One of the decisive factors here was the effective supply of the Red Army's theater of operations with everything necessary. In the immediate rear of our troops was Moscow with its powerful material and technical resources. The supply of troops was carried out through a rich radial network of high-quality communication routes, which became denser the closer the front came to Moscow. But the Moscow theater of operations represented the only such exception favorable for our troops in 1941-1942. Now about the quality of the fighters. No one doubts the mass heroism of the Red Army soldiers. However, heroism alone is not enough for victory, and when heroism is replaced by professional use of weapons and tactical skill, it becomes simply harmful. Meanwhile, only 12 years before the war, the unfolding industrialization of the USSR simply did not make it possible to train in sufficient numbers technically educated personnel to successfully master the skills of a soldier modern warfare. Our country was just transitioning from an agrarian society to a modern industrial one. When the Great Patriotic War began, this process was still far from completed. Therefore, not without reason, it seemed to the Germans that they were fighting against people who were personally brave, but who did not know enough how to use modern military equipment and were not skillfully led enough. In short, with a country that has lagged behind Germany and Western European countries in its socio-economic development. Although at the same time they noted that, in comparison with the First World War, Russia has noticeably approached the level of developed countries in this regard. The Red Army fighter, compared to the RIA fighter, seemed to the Germans already in 1941 to be significantly more professional and technically prepared. The country's backwardness, which had not been overcome, inevitably affected the level of competence of the command staff of the Red Army. German intelligence on the eve of the invasion noted such character traits Soviet command as “sluggishness, template, indecisiveness and fear of responsibility.” Anyone who has read the memoirs of Soviet military leaders will have to admit in good conscience the validity of such a characterization in general (despite some striking exceptions) in relation to the command staff of the Red Army in 1941, and partially later. Clausewitz also wrote that mistakes in the initial deployment of troops are very difficult to correct later, during military operations. In our time, the version that Stalin was preparing a preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht in 1941 has become widespread. The group of Soviet troops at the western border was lined up in accordance with the plans for the upcoming offensive. At the same time, the German attack found our troops in a state of regrouping and movement. As a result, they were not ready for either offense or defense, which predetermined their brutal defeat. A considerable amount of literature is devoted to the analysis and refutation of versions of this kind. Its authors, however, are often guided by ideological motives - it seems to them that the hypothesis of a “preventive Stalinist strike” is supposedly intended to justify Hitler’s aggression against the USSR. True, it is obvious that this hypothesis, first of all, eliminates many accusations of the pre-war leadership of the USSR (primarily Stalin himself) of military incompetence, neglect of intelligence reports, etc. Another thing is that this theory has no direct evidence. A more detailed analysis of it is not included in our plans now. Since the version of “Stalin’s preventive war” has not been proven, let’s look for others possible reasons unsuccessful deployment of our troops before the war. By the way, why was it unsuccessful? To the Soviet command it might have seemed completely adequate to the tasks of active defense. First, covering forces enter the battle on the border. Meanwhile, mobile groups are concentrated in the near rear to launch counterattacks against the advancing enemy. The covering forces, having completed their task of delaying the advancing enemy in the first battles, retreat to the main forces, which then enter the battle. Soviet troops launch a counteroffensive and transfer the war to enemy territory. It is easy to see that rigid defense on pre-prepared lines contradicts such a plan. And this strategy - launching counterattacks from the depths against the advancing enemy, followed by a transition to a general counteroffensive - is fully consistent with the only so far reliably known Soviet strategic plan the beginning of the war, approved by Stalin in December 1940. What went wrong? Obviously, the Soviet command (primarily the General Staff) underestimated the strength of the first strike of the German troops. It clearly overestimated the ability of the covering forces to engage the advancing enemy and delay him until the main forces of the border districts were deployed. On the very first day of the war, the Wehrmacht mechanized groups that broke through attacked our main forces, which did not have time to turn around, and began to smash them piece by piece. The Soviet command also underestimated the force of the German air strike, which immediately disrupted communications, control and transportation of troops. When everything starts to go contrary to plan, nervousness arises, reaching the point of panic. This was demonstrated by the Soviet command at all levels repeatedly during the summer and autumn of 1941. The arriving reserves are spent piecemeal in fruitless counterattacks. The desire to launch a counteroffensive as quickly as possible prevails all the time. Even on the eve of the German offensive on Moscow at the end of September 1941, commander Western Front General Konev forbids his troops to dig in, so as not to undermine their offensive spirit... Here it should be said about the objective advantages that the Wehrmacht had over any enemy in 1939-1942. First of all, the German army, created from scratch after 1933, was not burdened by old training methods, old types of weapons, old tactics. The Reichswehr, and later the Wehrmacht, had a unique opportunity to immediately put into practice the latest developments regarding the structure and doctrine of the armed forces. The strength of the traditions of the old Prussian army was reflected only in one positive aspect - the caste character of the professional officer corps. The latter was especially unattainable in our country, where the military class was twice subjected to “stratocide” (liquidation of the social stratum as such) - after the revolution and (already new) after 1937. The Wehrmacht paid great attention to the combat training of the soldier. A soldier must be, first of all, a professional fighter. Nothing should interfere with military training. Everything is just for war. Mastery of the latest weapons, modern technology, no distractions for extraneous purposes, , . The Red Army spent a lot of time on “political preparation.” In the Wehrmacht there was no “National Socialist education” (the latter was introduced only at the end of 1944 and became a symptom of the approaching collapse). Things as common in the Red Army as bringing in soldiers to harvest crops were unthinkable in the Wehrmacht even in peacetime. Chagistics, parading, and other window dressing, cultivated in all the armies of the world, including ours, were discarded in the Wehrmacht. We can say that this was the first modern professional army. It is not for nothing that after the war the United States began to build its armed forces intended to gain global dominance, largely on the recommendations of Nazi military experts. Objective advantages of the Wehrmacht over any enemy in 1939-1942. were achieved thanks to intensive preparations for the war of conquest that unfolded in Germany from 1933. The Wehrmacht was purposefully created at the level of the latest technologies of the time as a perfect machine of aggression. This has never happened in any other country. The Nazis launched their invasions with full and justifiable confidence in the complete qualitative superiority of the Wehrmacht over all opponents. At the same time, of course, the quality of the enemy’s armed forces was always carefully studied. Nazi strategists made a mistake in one thing, but the main thing. They underestimated the ability and determination of their main opponents - England and the Soviet Union (primarily, of course, the second) - to exert long-term efforts of the entire people for self-preservation. Having failed either to persuade England to peace or to conquer the USSR, while turning the USA against itself, Nazi Germany at the end of 1942, it approached the point beyond which the quantitative superiority of its opponents in material resources was to have a decisive impact. This superiority could no longer be compensated for by any professionalism, despite the fact that the Wehrmacht’s latter continued to remain higher than that of the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition, almost until the very end of the war. Literature: 1. The Great Patriotic War. In 4 books. Book 1. Severe tests. – M.: Nauka, 1998. 2. Got G. Tank operations. / lane with him. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 3. Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. / lane with him. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 4. Kinschermann G. Blood-red snow: Notes of a Wehrmacht machine gunner. / lane with him. – M.: Yauza-press, 2009. 5. Clausewitz K. About war. / lane with him. – M.: Science; Logos, 1996. 6. Lippich V. Quick fire! Notes of a German artilleryman. / lane with him. – M.: Yauza-press, 2009. 7. Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. - M.: Veche, 2002. 8. Middeldorf E. Russian campaign: Tactics and weapons. / lane with him. – St. Petersburg: Polygon; M.: AST, 2000. 9. Weapons of the Wehrmacht. / Comp. Shunkov V. - Minsk: Harvest, 1999. 10. Weapons of the Red Army. / Comp. Shunkov V. - Minsk: Harvest, 1999. 11. Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. / lane with him. – St. Petersburg: Polygon; M.: AST, 1999. 12. Fleischman G. Knee-deep in blood: Revelations of an SS man. / lane with him. – M.: Yauza-press, 2009. 13. Jacobsen H.-A. 1939 – 1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronic und Dokumenten. – Darmstadt, 1959.
Alfred Adler at the beginning of his career was one of the adherents psychoanalytic theory Freud. However, pretty soon their views diverged. At the same time, Adler not only expressed criticism of the provisions of psychoanalysis, but also created his own theoretical system, which was not inferior to Freud’s in its breadth of coverage of the main aspects of human behavior. His theory is called " individual psychology". This name reflects the main postulate of his theory - the unity and integrity of each person (the word "Individuum" in Latin means "indivisible").
Some of Adler's discoveries have become firmly established in both scientific and everyday life. First of all, this relates to his theory " inferiority complex".
From Adler's point of view, Small child, especially in the first years of life, acutely feels his weakness and dependence on powerful adults. This situation feels like inferiority. However, every person goes through a period of dependence and is characterized by feelings of inferiority. To cope with this feeling, the desire for superiority, flawlessness and perfection is used. This desire is the main motivational force in human life.
This is what the normal state of affairs looks like. However, there are cases when the feeling of inferiority experienced by a child becomes excessive. This excessive feeling is an inferiority complex. Adler emphasized that this is not just a complex, but " almost a disease, the destructive effect of which varies depending on the circumstances". Adler identified the following factors as the reasons for the development of the complex.
- Firstly, physical disability. One of Adler's early works is devoted to the study of mental compensation for physical inferiority. The weakness of any organ attracts increased attention from a person, and he strives to compensate for this weakness. For example, a weak and sick person devotes a lot of time to sports in order to gain strength and physical health. However, compensation is not always successful. If a task turns out to be beyond a person’s strength, he develops an inferiority complex.
- Secondly, excessive care or rejection on the part of parents. Excessive care leads to the child growing up not confident enough in his abilities, since others have always done everything for him. In addition, he is freed from the need to cooperate with other people, so all his desires were already fulfilled. Subsequently, it will be more difficult for him to adapt to social life. Rejected children lack confidence in their ability to be useful, loved, and appreciated.
Adler considered impatience, arrogance, and pugnacity to be external signs of an inferiority complex in children. Adults typically use statements like " Yes, but...", "I would have done this if not...". They reflect their constant internal doubts.
People with an inferiority complex also have compensation in the form of a desire for superiority. Moreover, it, like inferiority, is excessive. In this case, they talk about a superiority complex. In fact, inferiority and superiority complexes are closely related and complementary phenomena.
What is the desire for excellence? As mentioned above, it arises in response to a feeling of inferiority and is the leading motive for human activity. It is interesting that Adler did not immediately come to this conclusion. At earlier stages of his scientific journey driving force He considered human behavior first as aggressiveness, and then as the desire for power. And only the last step in his theory was the desire for superiority. Adler considered the possibilities of development under the influence of the desire for superiority to be limitless, like the desire from minus to plus. Adler considered this desire to be innate. But from birth it is present in us only in the form of a theoretical possibility, and not a real given. Each person realizes the desire for excellence in his own way. This difference manifests itself in our purposes. Adler considered a person’s life goals to be extremely important. He shared the opinion that human behavior is determined to a greater extent by ideas about the future than by events of the past. He called ideas about the future “fictitious goals.” These goals are fictitious because they either do not correspond to reality at all, or their reality cannot be verified. At the same time, fictitious goals play a huge organizing role in a person’s life. A person lives as if these goals were real. A person's purpose is formed in the fifth year of life and is the focus of the desire for excellence. Thus, the desire for superiority is the energy, the driving force of human activity, which is reflected in the fictitious purpose of man's life.
The desire for excellence has several important characteristics.
First, it represents a single fundamental motive, and not a collection of disparate aspirations.
Secondly, the goals that a person chooses for its implementation can be either positive or negative and selfish.
The desire for superiority is associated with a constant increase in tension as you move towards the goal. And, besides, people not only strive for excellence on their own, but also improve the culture of society as a whole.
It has already been noted that the desire for superiority, like the feeling of inferiority, can be excessive. Then they talk about “overcompensation” and a superiority complex. In such a situation, a person has a desire to elevate himself, while belittling others. He usually appears boastful and arrogant. This behavior masks inner insecurity and the inability to accept oneself. A person can also flaunt and exaggerate his qualities, boasting about them at every opportunity.
A superiority complex often causes a person to choose negative goals for himself, such as becoming a criminal. Adler saw the cause of crime precisely in the superiority complex, and not in the original depravity of human nature. When becoming a murderer or a thief, a person can feel like a hero, rejoicing in the fact that he humiliated or deceived other people.
The ideas of an inferiority complex and the desire for superiority are closely related to the concept of " social interest". Adler considered it obligatory to study man in his connection with society. Drawing an analogy with the animal world, Adler argued that all weak individuals unite in groups in order to more successfully defend themselves and satisfy their needs. Adler classified man as a weak individual. In addition, everyone a person has congenital deficiencies, and being in a group can reduce their effect.
Social interest is a sense of community, the desire to enter into cooperative relationships, the ability to love and respect others, and act in common interests.
Adler considered it, like the desire for superiority, to be an innate quality of a person. Initially it also exists as a potential possibility. Its development largely depends on the correct behavior of parents, who can both successfully develop social interest in a child and completely extinguish it.
The mother, by her example, should demonstrate love and good attitude towards the father, other children and people around him. Its task is not just to awaken social interest in the child, but also to help take it outside the family, spreading it to other people. If the mother is focused only on the child, he will not develop social interest, he will not have the ability to cooperate with other people, since this was not necessary in childhood. A cold or father-focused mother will make the child feel unloved, and his first attempts at showing social interest will go unnoticed and unsupported. Children of authoritarian and emotionally distant fathers also lose social interest and pursue the goal of achieving personal superiority over others. Unhappy marriage of parents, absence good relations in the family also negatively affect the development of social interest.
Adler considered social interest an indicator of mental health. Normal, healthy people always have a desire for the well-being of all people; social goals are important to them. Poorly adjusted people are self-centered, they are dominated by personal goals, they are concerned only with their own interests and self-defense.
It should be noted that all components of Adler's theory are interconnected. For example, an inferiority complex causes a person to develop an excessive desire for superiority, which, in turn, affects life goals, making them selfish, divorced from social interest. Therefore, when treating neuroses, Adler considered it very important not only to achieve the patient’s understanding of the current situation, but also to form the right goals and develop social interest.
At the same time, the concept of social interest carries with it some contradictions. For example, a person’s goal may be “very social” - improving living conditions for all people, and the methods of achieving it may be cruel and violent (terrorism). Or, on the contrary, human behavior is social (charity), but it serves the achievement of personal selfish goals (increasing ratings in elections).
Adler's theory had great importance for the development of psychology. He is sometimes considered the first social psychologist, thanks to the study of man in the context of his environment and society as a whole and the discovery of social interest. In addition, Adler is also considered the forerunner of humanistic psychology, due to the fact that he considered man " creator of your own destiny", (thanks to " Creative Self" - the most important component of personality).
Literature.
1. Kjell L., Ziegler A. Theories of personality. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 1997.
2. Adler A. The Science of Living. - Kyiv. 1998.
3. Adler A. Individual psychology as a path to knowledge and self-knowledge of a person // Essays on individual psychology. - M. 2002.
