The Soviet-Finnish war remained a “closed” topic for a long time, a kind of “blank spot” (of course, not the only one) in Soviet historical science. For a long time, the course and causes of the Finnish War were kept silent. There was one official version: the policy of the Finnish government was hostile to the USSR. The documents of the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TSGASA) remained unknown to the general public for a long time.

This was partly due to the fact that the Great Patriotic War ousted the Soviet-Finnish War from minds and research, but at the same time they tried not to deliberately resurrect it.

The Soviet-Finnish war is one of the many tragic and shameful pages of our history. Soldiers and officers “gnawed through” the Mannerheim line, freezing in summer uniforms, having neither the proper weapons nor experience of war in the harsh winter conditions of the Karelian Isthmus and the Kola Peninsula. And all this was accompanied by the arrogance of the leadership, confident that the enemy would ask for peace in 10-12 days (that is, they hoped for Blitzkrieg *).

It did not add to the USSR either international prestige or military glory, but this war could teach the Soviet government a lot if it had the habit of learning from its own mistakes. The same mistakes that were made in the preparation and conduct of the Soviet-Finnish War, and which led to unjustified losses, then, with some exceptions, were repeated in the Great Patriotic War.

There are practically no complete and detailed monographs on the Soviet-Finnish War containing the most reliable and up-to-date information about it, with the exception of a few works by Finnish and other foreign historians. Although, in my opinion, they can hardly contain complete and up-to-date information, since they give a rather one-sided view, just like Soviet historians.

Most of the military operations took place on the Karelian Isthmus, in close proximity to St. Petersburg (then Leningrad).

When you are on the Karelian Isthmus, you constantly come across the foundations of Finnish houses, wells, small cemeteries, then the remains of the Mannerheim Line, with barbed wire, dugouts, caponiers (how we loved to play “war games” with them!), or at the bottom of a half-overgrown crater by chance you will come across bones and a broken helmet (although this may also be the consequences of hostilities during the Great Patriotic War), and closer to the Finnish border there are entire houses and even farmsteads that were not taken away or burned.

The war between the USSR and Finland, which lasted from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 (104 days), received several different names: in Soviet publications it was called the “Soviet-Finnish War”, in Western publications - “Winter War”, popularly - “ Finnish War", in publications of the last 5-7 years it also received the name "Unknown".

Reasons for the outbreak of war, preparation of the parties for hostilities

According to the “Non-Aggression Pact” between the USSR and Germany, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR.

The Finnish nation is a national minority. By 1939, the population of Finland was 3.5 million people (that is, it was equal to the population of Leningrad at the same time). As you know, small nations are very concerned about their survival and preservation as a nation. "The small people can disappear, and they know it."

Probably, this can explain its withdrawal from Soviet Russia in 1918, its constant desire, even somewhat painful, from the point of view of the dominant nation, to protect its independence, the desire to be a neutral country during the Second World War.

In 1940, in one of his speeches V.M. Molotov said: “We must be realistic enough to understand that the time of small nations has passed.” These words became a death sentence for the Baltic states. Although they were said in 1940, they can fully be attributed to the factors that determined the policy of the Soviet government in the war with Finland.

Negotiations between the USSR and Finland in 1937 - 1939.

Since 1937, at the initiative of the USSR, negotiations have been held between the Soviet Union and Finland on the issue of mutual security. This proposal was rejected by the Finnish government, then the USSR invited Finland to move the border several tens of kilometers north of Leningrad and lease the Hanko Peninsula for a long term. In exchange, Finland was offered a territory in the Karelian SSR, several times larger in size than the exchange, but such an exchange would not be profitable for Finland, since the Karelian Isthmus was a well-developed territory, with the warmest climate in Finland, and the proposed territory in Karelia was practically wild , with a much harsher climate.

The Finnish government understood well that if it was not possible to reach an agreement with the USSR, war was inevitable, but it hoped for the strength of its fortifications and for the support of Western countries.

On October 12, 1939, when the Second World War was already underway, Stalin invited Finland to conclude a Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact, modeled on the pacts concluded with the Baltic states. According to this pact, a limited contingent of Soviet troops was to be stationed in Finland, and Finland was also offered to exchange territories, as discussed earlier, but the Finnish delegation refused to conclude such a pact and left the negotiations. From that moment on, the parties began to prepare for military action.

Reasons and goals of the USSR’s participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

For the USSR, the main danger was that Finland could be used by other states (most likely Germany) as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. The common border of Finland and the USSR is 1400 km, which at that time amounted to 1/3 of the entire northwestern border of the USSR. It is quite logical that in order to ensure the security of Leningrad it was necessary to move the border further away from it.

But, according to Yu.M. Kilin, author of an article in No. 3 of the magazine "International Affairs" for 1994, while moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus (according to negotiations in Moscow in 1939) would not have solved the problems, and the USSR would not have won anything, therefore war was inevitable.

I would still like to disagree with him, since any conflict, be it between people or countries, arises due to the reluctance or inability of the parties to agree peacefully. IN in this case this war was, of course, beneficial for the USSR, since it was an opportunity to demonstrate its power and assert itself, but in the end it turned out the other way around. In the eyes of the whole world, the USSR not only did not look stronger and more invulnerable, but on the contrary, everyone saw that it was a “colossus with feet of clay”, unable to cope even with such a small army as the Finnish one.

For the USSR, the Soviet-Finnish War was one of the stages of preparation for world war, and its expected outcome, in the opinion of the military-political leadership of the country, would significantly improve the strategic position of the USSR in Northern Europe, and would also increase the military-economic potential of the state, correcting imbalances national economy, which arose as a result of the implementation of largely chaotic and ill-conceived industrialization and collectivization.

From a military point of view, the acquisition of military bases in the South of Finland and 74 airfields and landing sites in Finland would make the USSR’s positions in the North-West practically invulnerable, it would be possible to save money and resources, and gain time in preparation for a big war, but in at the same time it would mean the destruction of Finnish independence.

But what does M.I. think about the reasons for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War? Semiryaga: “In the 20-30s, many incidents of various types occurred on the Soviet-Finnish border, but they were usually resolved diplomatically. Clashes of group interests based on the division of spheres of influence in Europe and the Far East by the end of the 30s created a real the threat of a global conflict and on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.

At this time, the main factor that predetermined the Soviet-Finnish conflict was the nature of the political situation in Northern Europe. For two decades after Finland gained independence as a result of the October Revolution, its relations with the USSR developed in a complex and contradictory manner. Although the Tartu Peace Treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Finland on October 14, 1920, and the “Non-Aggression Pact” in 1932, which was later extended to 10 years."

Reasons and goals of Finland’s participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

“During the first 20 years of independence, it was believed that the USSR was the main, if not the only threat to Finland” (R. Heiskanen - Major General of Finland). "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland; the Finnish people... are forever a friend of Germany." (The first President of Finland - P. Svinhuvud)

In the Military Historical Journal No. 1-3 for 1990, an assumption appears about the following reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War: “It is difficult to agree with the attempt to place all the blame for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War on the USSR. In Russia and Finland they understood that the main culprit of the tragedy It was not our peoples or even our governments that appeared (with some reservation), but German fascism, as well as the political circles of the West, which benefited from Germany’s attack on the USSR. The territory of Finland was considered by Germany as a convenient springboard for an attack on the USSR from the North. According to English historian L. Woodward, Western countries intended, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish military conflict, to push Nazi Germany to war against the USSR." (It seems to me that a clash between two totalitarian regimes would be very beneficial for Western countries, since it would undoubtedly weaken both the USSR and Germany, which were then considered sources of aggression in Europe. The Second World War was already underway and a military conflict between the USSR and Germany could lead to dispersal Reich forces on two fronts and the weakening of its military operations against France and Great Britain.)

Preparing the parties for war

In the USSR, supporters of the forceful approach to resolving the Finnish issue were: People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Mehlis, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and People's Commissar of the NKVD Beria. They opposed negotiations and any preparation for war. This confidence in their abilities was given to them by the quantitative superiority of the Red Army over the Finnish (mainly in the amount of equipment), as well as the ease of introducing troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus in September 1939.

“The anti-criminal sentiments led to serious miscalculations being made in assessing Finland’s combat readiness.”

On November 10, 1939, Voroshilov was presented with the assessment data of the General Staff: “The material part of the armed forces of the Finnish Army is mainly pre-war models of the old Russian Army, partially modernized at military factories in Finland. A rise in patriotic sentiments is observed only among young people.”

Original plan military actions was compiled by Marshal of the USSR B. Shaposhnikov. According to this plan (highly professionally drawn up), the main military operations were to be carried out in the coastal direction of Southern Finland. But this plan was designed for a long time and required preparation for war for 2-3 years. The implementation of the “Agreement on Spheres of Influence” with Germany was required immediately.

Therefore, at the last moment before the start of hostilities, this plan was replaced by the hastily drawn up “Meretskov plan”, designed for a weak enemy. Military operations according to this plan were carried out head-on in the difficult natural conditions of Karelia and the Arctic. The main focus was on a powerful initial strike and the defeat of the Finnish Army in 2-3 weeks, but the operational concentration and deployment of equipment and troops was poorly supported by intelligence data. The commanders of the formations did not even have detailed maps of the combat areas, while Finnish intelligence high accuracy determined the main directions of the Red Army's attacks.

By the beginning of the war, the Leningrad Military District was very weak, as it was considered secondary. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of August 15, 1935 “On the development and strengthening of areas adjacent to the borders” did not improve the situation. The condition of the roads was especially deplorable.

In preparation for the war, a Military-Economic Description of the Leningrad Military District was compiled - a document unique in its information content, containing comprehensive information about the state of the economy of the North-Western region.

On December 17, 1938, when summing up the results at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, it turned out that in the proposed territory of military operations there were no roads with stone surfaces, military airfields, the level of agriculture was extremely low (the Leningrad region, and even more so Karelia, are areas of risky agriculture, and collectivization almost destroyed what was created by the labor of previous generations).

According to Yu.M. Kilina, blitzkrieg - lightning war - was the only possible one in those conditions, and at a strictly defined time - late autumn - early winter, when the roads were most passable.

By the forties, Karelia had become the “patrimony of the NKVD” (almost a quarter of the population of the KASSR by 1939 were prisoners; the White Sea Canal and Soroklag were located on the territory of Karelia, in which more than 150 thousand people were detained), which could not but affect its economic condition.

Material and technical preparations for war were at a very low level, since it is almost impossible to make up for lost time in 20 years in a year, especially since the command flattered itself with hopes of an easy victory.

Despite the fact that preparations for the Finnish war were carried out quite actively in 1939, the expected results were not achieved, and there are several reasons for this:

Preparations for war were carried out by different departments (Army, NKVD, People's Commissariats), and this caused disunity and inconsistency in actions. The decisive role in the failure of material and technical preparations for the war with Finland was played by the factor of poor controllability of the Soviet state. There was no single center involved in preparations for war.

The construction of roads was carried out by the NKVD, and by the beginning of hostilities the strategically important road Svir - Olonets - Kondushi had not been completed, and the second track was not built on the Murmansk - Leningrad railway, which noticeably reduced its capacity. (The construction of the second track has not yet been completed!)

The Finnish War, which lasted 104 days, was very fierce. Neither the People's Commissar of Defense nor the command of the Leningrad Military District initially imagined the peculiarities and difficulties associated with the war, since there was no well-organized intelligence. The military department did not approach the preparations for the Finnish War seriously enough:

Rifle troops, artillery, aviation and tanks were clearly not enough to break through the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and defeat the Finnish Army. Due to the lack of knowledge about the theater of military operations, the command considered it possible to use heavy divisions and tank troops in all areas of combat operations. This war was fought in winter, but the troops were not sufficiently equipped, equipped, supplied and trained to conduct combat operations in winter conditions. The personnel were armed mainly with heavy weapons and there were almost no light pistols - machine guns and company 50 mm mortars, while the Finnish troops were equipped with them.

The construction of defensive structures in Finland began already in the early 30s. Many countries Western Europe helped in the construction of these fortifications: for example, Germany participated in the construction of a network of airfields capable of accommodating 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force; The Mannerheim line, the total depth of which reached 90 kilometers, was built with the participation of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium.

The Red Army troops were highly motorized, and the Finns had a high level of tactical and rifle training. They blocked the roads, which were the only way for the Red Army to advance (it’s not particularly convenient to advance in a tank through forests and swamps, but look at the boulders on the Karelian Isthmus, 4-5 meters in diameter!), and attacked our troops from the rear and flanks. To operate in off-road conditions, the Finnish Army had ski troops. They carried all their weapons with them on sleds and skis.

On November 1939, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border with Finland. The initial advance was quite successful, but the Finns launched highly organized sabotage and partisan activities in the immediate rear of the Red Army. The supply of the LVO troops was disrupted, tanks got stuck in the snow and in front of obstacles, and “traffic jams” of military equipment were a convenient target for shooting from the air.

The entire country (Finland) has been turned into a continuous military camp, but military measures continue to be taken: water mining is being carried out off the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the population is being evacuated from Helsinki, armed groups march in the Finnish capital in the evenings, and a blackout is being carried out. The warlike mood is constantly fueled. There is a clear sense of decline. This can be seen from the fact that evacuated residents are returning to the cities without waiting for the “aerial bombardment”.

Mobilization costs Finland enormous amounts of money (from 30 to 60 million Finnish marks per day), workers are not paid wages everywhere, discontent among the working people is growing, the decline of the export industry and increased demand for the products of defense industry enterprises are noticeable.

The Finnish government does not want to negotiate with the USSR; anti-Soviet articles are constantly published in the press, blaming the Soviet Union for everything. The government is afraid to announce the demands of the USSR at a meeting of the Sejm without special preparation. From some sources it became known that in the Sejm, most likely, there is opposition to the government..."

The beginning of hostilities: Incident near the village of Maynila, November 1939, Pravda newspaper

According to a message from the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, on November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops located a kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila were unexpectedly shot from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven gun shots were fired, which resulted in the death of three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander and the injury of seven Red Army soldiers and one junior commander.

1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state and lead to Finland losing its neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) ran just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30 at 8 a.m., troops of the Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyusti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During "perestroika" several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret unit of the NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.

From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered certain directions from Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite obstacles up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing an offensive, enveloped the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, and cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.

The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.

(Additional

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases. On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

At these negotiations, the proximity of the border to Leningrad was discussed for the first time. Joseph Stalin remarked: " We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it" The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked like this:

Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja (Finnish) Russian.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytjarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed a territorial exchange in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi. These were the territories that declared [ source not specified 656 days] independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty they remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted, and that one should not hope for German help. The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and those closest to Leningrad territories in Teriokki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939. Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.

Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and from mid-September the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - while at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and Soviet consent to armament of the Åland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.

The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions [ source not specified 937 days ] .

Causes of the war

According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably be captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Leningrad City Council was also the border between the USSR and Finland.

Already during the war, two concepts emerged that are still being debated: one, that the USSR pursued its stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second, that the true goal of the USSR was the Sovietization of Finland. M.I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war both countries had claims against each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 30s, the closure of Finnish schools, etc. The USSR, in turn, knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to “return” Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland’s unilateral rapprochement with Western countries and, above all, with Germany, which Finland agreed to, in turn, because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhuvud said in Berlin in 1937 that “Russia’s enemy must always be Finland’s friend.” In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) it began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a military solutions

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of the corps commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a corps commander group V.D. Grendal(4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: 1st Rank Army Commander S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov

9. The main task during this period was the active preparation by the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as the preparation by the command of the troops better conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day. Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy’s front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves. In the near rear, the troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

Second period of the war: Assault on the Mannerheim Line. February 11 - March 12, 1940

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification site. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola. Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay , they set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km. By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one. Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13. Mannerheim Line(Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) - a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created. In addition to the Finnish territory in the Leningrad region, areas in the region of northern Karelia and the Rybachy Peninsula, as well as part of the islands of the Gulf of Finland and the Hanko region were transferred to the USSR. Territorial changes 1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build 2. fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km. 3. Part of Lapland (Old Salla). 4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland. 5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island). 6. Lease of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years. Mannerheim Line - an alternative point of view Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify the long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the “incredibly strongly fortified” “Mannerheim Line” was firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the glorification of the line by the Finnish side in the literal sense - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla (“On the Mannerheim Line”). It is believed that the Mannerheim Line consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located along the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other, and rarely had cannon armament.

6. Expansion of the western borders of the USSR in 1939-1941. Baltic countries. Bessarabia. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. On August 23, 1939, after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed. Attached to the non-aggression treaty was a secret additional protocol, which provided for “the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe.” The sphere of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia. These documents radically changed both Soviet foreign policy and the situation in Europe. From now on, the Stalinist leadership turned into an ally of Germany in the division of Europe. The last obstacle to attacking Poland and thus starting World War II had been removed. In 1939, Germany in any case could not start a war against the USSR, since it did not have common borders on which it was possible to deploy troops and carry out an attack. Moreover, she was completely unprepared for a “big” war.

September 1, 1939 Hitler attacked Poland. The Second World War began.. On September 17, when the outcome of the battle in Poland was no longer in doubt, the Red Army occupied the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, which were part of this state.

On July 31, 1940, Hitler announced that the primary goal from now on was war with Russia, the outcome of which was to decide the fate of England. On December 18, 1940, the plan for an attack on the USSR (Barbarossa Plan) was signed. In deep secrecy, troops began to be transferred to the east. In 1939-1940. Stalin was concerned, first of all, with the annexation of the territories of Eastern Europe, assigned to him under secret agreements with Nazi Germany, into the USSR, and with further rapprochement with Hitler

On September 28, an agreement on friendship and borders with Germany and three secret protocols to it were signed. In these documents, the parties pledged to wage a joint fight against “Polish agitation” and clarified their spheres of influence. In exchange for Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship, the USSR received Lithuania. Based on these agreements, Stalin demanded that the Baltic states conclude agreements on mutual assistance and locate Soviet military bases on their territory. In September-October 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forced to agree to this. June 14-16, 1940 after the actual defeat Nazi Germany France, Stalin gave these Baltic states an ultimatum to introduce contingents of Soviet troops into their territories (to “ensure security”) and to form new governments ready to “honestly” implement the treaties concluded with the USSR. Within a few days, “people’s governments” were created in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which, with the help of local communists, established Soviet power in the Baltic states. At the end of June 1940 Stalin achieved the return of Bessarabia, occupied by Romania in 1918. Then in June 1940, at the request of the USSR, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, occupied by Romania in 1918, were returned to him. In August 1940, the Moldavian SSR was formed, into which Bessarabia entered, and Northern Bukovina was included in the Ukrainian SSR. As a result of all the mentioned territorial acquisitions, the borders of the USSR were moved west by 200-300 km, and the country's population increased by 23 million people.

7.German attack on the Soviet Union. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Activities of the Soviet government during the initial period of the war.

On June 22, at 3:30 a.m., the German army began its powerful invasion along the entire border of our country from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. The Patriotic War broke out. The aggressor's invasion was preceded by powerful artillery preparation. Thousands of guns and mortars opened fire on border outposts, troop areas, headquarters, communications centers, and defensive structures. Enemy aircraft struck the first blow across the entire border strip. Murmansk, Liepaja, Riga, Kaunas, Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir were subjected to massive aerial bombing; naval bases (Kronstadt, Izmail, Sevastopol). In order to paralyze the control of Soviet troops, saboteurs were dropped by parachute. The most powerful attacks were carried out on airfields, since air supremacy was the main task of the German Air Force. Due to crowded deployment of units, Soviet aviation in the border districts lost about 1,200 aircraft on the first day of the war. In addition, front-line and army aviation were given an order: not to fly over borders under any circumstances, to destroy the enemy only over their territory, to keep aircraft in constant readiness to withdraw from attack. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commanded by General M. Popov), and the Southern Front (commanded by General I. Tyulenev) was formed from the 9th and 18th armies. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

The sudden invasion of Germany into the territory of the USSR required quick and precise action from the Soviet government. First of all, it was necessary to ensure the mobilization of forces to repel the enemy. On the day of the fascist attack, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree on the mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918. birth. In a matter of hours, detachments and units were formed. Soon the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council

The People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution approving the mobilization national economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941, which provided for an increase in the production of military equipment and the creation of large tank-building enterprises in the Volga region and the Urals. Circumstances forced the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the beginning of the war to develop a detailed program for restructuring the activities and life of the Soviet country on a military basis, which was set out in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941 to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions. The slogan “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” became the motto of the life of Soviet people. The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Party called on the people to renounce their mood and personal desires, go over to a sacred and merciless fight against the enemy, fight to the last drop of blood, rebuild the national economy on a war footing, and increase the output of military products. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, and disrupt all their activities.” Among other things, local conversations were held with the population. The nature and political goals of the outbreak of the Patriotic War were explained. The main provisions of the directive of June 29 were outlined in a radio speech on July 3, 1941 by J.V. Stalin. Addressing the people, he explained the current situation at the front, revealed the program for defending the goals that had already been achieved, and expressed unshakable faith in the victory of the Soviet people against the German occupiers.” Together with the Red Army, many thousands of workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals are rising to war against the attacking enemy. The millions of our people will rise up.” On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed for strategic leadership of military operations. Later it was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC), headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars I.V. Stalin, who was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and then Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Military victory over Nazi Germany and its allies would have been impossible without victory on the front of economic confrontation with the aggressor. Germany began to surpass the USSR in total industrial production by three to four times. An Operational Bureau for monitoring the implementation of military orders, an evacuation council, a transport committee and other permanent or temporary working bodies were established under the State Defense Committee. The powers of local representatives of the State Defense Committee were, if necessary, received by the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, regional committees, leading economic and scientific workers.

From the first days of hostilities, four main lines for creating a coherent military economy were determined

Evacuation of industrial enterprises, material assets and people from the front-line zone to the east.

The transition of thousands of factories in the civilian sector to the production of military equipment and other defense products.

Accelerated construction of new industrial facilities capable of replacing those lost in the first months of the war, establishment of a system of cooperation and transport communications between and within individual industries, disrupted as a result of the unprecedented scale of movement of productive forces to the east.

Reliable supply of the national economy, especially industry, with workers in new emergency conditions.

8. Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

The reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war were not only that the Soviet troops, attacked suddenly, were forced to engage in heavy battles without proper strategic deployment, that many of them were understaffed to wartime levels, had limited material and vehicles and communications, often operated without air and artillery support. The damage suffered by our troops in the first days of the war also had a negative impact, but it cannot be overestimated, since in fact only 30 divisions of the first echelon of the covering army were attacked by the aggressor troops on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of three fronts - Western, North-Western and South-Western - emerged later, during counter-fighting on June 23-30, 1941 between the new and old borders. The entire course of border battles showed that our troops at all levels - from the Headquarters of the Main Command to the tactical level command staff - were for the most part not prepared not only for the first, unexpected attacks of German troops, but also for war in general. The Red Army had to master the skills of modern warfare during battles, while suffering enormous losses in manpower and military equipment. The deficiencies in the combat readiness of our troops, revealed at Khalkhin Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish War, were not and could not be eliminated in a short time. The army grew quantitatively, but to the detriment of the quality of training, and especially of officers and non-commissioned officers. The main emphasis in combat training was on the infantry: the training of armored forces and aviation was not given due attention, and therefore our troops could not become a striking force like the Wehrmacht, mainly due to a lack of personnel, professional command staff and headquarters. Our troops were unable to realize the technical and human potential that exceeded the potential of the aggressor at the beginning of the war. The disruption of constant communication between troops and headquarters deprived the command, right up to the General Staff and Headquarters, of the opportunity to receive regular information about the state of affairs at the front. The order of the Headquarters to hold occupied lines at all costs, even in the conditions of a deep flanking bypass of the enemy, often became the reason for exposing entire groups of Soviet troops to enemy attacks, which forced heavy fighting in the encirclement, entailed large losses in men and military equipment, and increased panic in the troops. A significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have the necessary military and combat experience. Headquarters also lacked the necessary experience, hence the most serious miscalculations at the very beginning of the war. The more successful the campaign to the east developed, the more boastful the statements of the German command became. Noting the steadfastness of the Russian soldier, they, however, did not consider him as a decisive factor in the war. They considered their main success, in accordance with the “Blitzkrieg” plan, to be the rapid advance of German troops, the capture of vast territories and trophies, and huge human losses. losses. The resilience of the Russian warrior was demonstrated during the defense of the Brest Fortress. The heroism of the defenders of the fortress will appear even more obvious if we consider that the German troops had superiority in experience, manpower and technology, while our fighters did not have a harsh and long school of war behind them, were cut off from their units and mandates, experienced an acute shortage of water and food, ammunition, and medicine. And yet we continued to fight the enemy.

The Red Army was not prepared for the conditions of modern industrial war - the war of engines. This is the main reason for its defeats in the initial period of hostilities.

9. The situation on the fronts of the Soviet Union in June 1941. – November 1942 Moscow battle. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commanded by General M. Popov), and the Southern Front (commanded by General I. Tyulenev) was formed from the 9th and 18th armies. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

On June 22 at 7:15 a.m., the Main Military Council issued a directive to Soviet troops to begin active military operations. When it was received at the front headquarters, the first echelon divisions were already drawn into defensive battles, but the tank and motorized formations were not ready to deliver a quick powerful strike due to the great distance from the border. By the end of the first day of the war, a difficult situation had arisen at the junction of the North-Western and Western fronts, on the left wing of the Western Front. The corps and division commanders could not act on the situation, since they had no data on the number of forces and military actions enemy. There was no constant relationship between the units, no one knew anything about the true losses, it was assumed that the troops raised on alert would be sufficiently combat-ready. But by the end of the day on June 22, under enemy attacks, our units were driven back from the state border by about 40 km. As a result, in just two days, with heavy losses in manpower and equipment, the troops moved 100 km from the border. A similar situation was observed in other sectors of the front. The operational results of the counterattacks, despite the selfless actions of our soldiers, were insignificant, and the losses incurred were incredibly large. At best, individual formations of the Western Front managed to delay the enemy's offensive only for a short time. After successful breakthroughs of the border defenses in the Western Front, enemy tank groups, with the support of large air forces, managed to complete the encirclement and defeat of the backbone of the Western Front's troops by July 9. As a result, 323 thousand people were in German captivity in the Bialystok-Minsk region, and the casualties of the troops of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla amounted to 418 thousand people. However, the main Wehrmacht group suffered significant damage, and the pace of its advance on Smolensk and Moscow was slowed down. Having suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war, the troops of the Northwestern Front were unable to organize a stable defense either on the right bank of the Western Dvina or at the last major defensive line near Pskov - the Velikaya River. Pskov was captured by the Nazis on July 9, which resulted in a real danger of their breakthrough to Luga and further to Leningrad, but the Wehrmacht failed to destroy the large Kra Ar forces in this direction. A more favorable situation developed on the South-Western Front. Despite enormous difficulties, the command managed to pull up large forces in the direction of the enemy’s main attack and bring them into battle in a fairly organized manner, although not simultaneously. On June 23, in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area, the largest outbreak of the war unfolded in the entire initial period of the war. tank battle. Here the enemy was not only detained for a whole week, but also his plan to encircle the main forces of the front in the Lvov salient was thwarted. Enemy aircraft carried out air strikes simultaneously on the front line and the outback. The bombing was carried out methodically and clearly, which greatly exhausted the Soviet troops. The power of the enemy suppressed the hearts, desertion from the battlefield, self-mutilation, and sometimes suicide took place. By the end of June, it became obvious that the troops of the South-Western, as well as other fronts, were unable to defeat the intervening enemy group. Enemy aircraft firmly maintained air supremacy. Our aviation suffered serious damage; The mechanized corps suffered heavy losses in personnel and tanks. The results of military operations on the Soviet-German front were catastrophic for the Red Army. During the three weeks of the war, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and a significant part of Ukraine and Moldova were abandoned. During this period, the German army advanced inland to the north westward at 450-500 km, in the west - at 450-600, in the south-west -300-350 km. The hastily withdrawn strategic reserves of the High Command were only able to detain the enemy for the shortest possible time in certain sectors of the front, but did not eliminate the threat of his breakthrough to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. Moscow battle. On September 6, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive to attack Moscow. The main focus in it was on tank formations and aviation. Particular attention was paid to the secrecy of the preparation of the operation. Initially, it was planned to defeat Soviet troops in the areas of Vyazma and Bryansk, then, pursuing the formations of the Western Front retreating to Moscow in the zone from the upper Volga to the Oka, to capture the capital. The general offensive on Moscow began on September 30 with a strike from the enemy’s 2nd Tank Army on the left wing Bryansk Front in the Shostka region, and on October 2, the main forces of the Germans attacked the positions of the Western Front troops. The fight immediately became fierce. As a result of the breakthrough of the defenses in the sector of the 43rd Army and in the center of the Western Front, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Soviet troops. An attempt to withdraw the army from the attack failed due to the rapid advance of the enemy's motorized corps, which cut off the escape route. On October 7, the Germans in the Vyazma area completed the encirclement of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies. Heavy fighting broke out in the Bryansk Front. On October 3, the Germans broke into Orel and, moving along the Orel-Tula highway, occupied Karachev and Bryansk on October 6. The armies of the Bryansk Front were cut into pieces, and their escape routes were intercepted. Units of the 3rd, 13th, and 50th armies fell into the cauldron near Bryansk. Tens of thousands, including volunteers of the people's militia divisions, died on the battlefield. Among the main reasons for the disaster of this period are the enemy's superiority in technology, maneuverability of troops, air supremacy, possession of the initiative, blunders of the headquarters and front command in organizing defense Lack of a continuous line defense in the western direction and the necessary reserves to close the gap created a real threat of the appearance of enemy tanks near Moscow. The current situation required tough measures to control troops at all command levels. During this time, the Soviet command managed to take urgent measures to organize defense on the Mozhaisk line, which the GKO in the current situation chose as the main bridgehead of resistance. To concentrate troops covering the approaches to Moscow and for clearer control, the Headquarters transferred the armies of the Reserve Front to the Western Front. The command was entrusted to G. Zhukov. Combat-ready formations transferred to Moscow from the Far East and Central Asia, as well as reserve formations from the European part of the country, were hastily moving towards the front, but were still at a considerable distance. Zhukov, having only insignificant reserves at his disposal, built his defenses in such a way that the most vulnerable areas along highways and railways were covered, hoping that as he moved towards Moscow his forces would become denser, since the capital is a major transport hub. By October 13, the troops of the Western Front deployed on the following approaches to Moscow: Volokolamsk fortified area - 16th Army (commander K. Rokossovsky), Mozhaisky - 5th Army (commander L. Govorov), Maloyaroslavetsky - 43rd Army (commander K. Golubev ), Kaluga -49 army (commander I. Zakharkin). To strengthen the immediate approaches to the capital, another line was created, which also included the city defense line. Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the Moscow direction on October 13-18. The Nazis were rushing towards Moscow with all their might. On October 18, they took Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Tarusa, and there was a threat of their reaching Moscow. On the morning of October 17, volunteer formations began to take up defensive positions on the immediate approaches to the capital. The fighter battalions created in July, which had previously patrolled the city, also moved here. Moscow enterprises switched to working in three shifts; The labor of women and teenagers began to be used increasingly. On October 15, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree “On the evacuation of the capital of the USSR, Moscow,” according to which part of the party and government institutions and the entire diplomatic corps accredited to the Soviet government were transferred to Kuibyshev. Alarming rumors about the surrender of the capital began to spread, and thousands of residents began to leave the city. The situation was aggravated by the lack of reliable information about events at the front. On October 19, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree introducing a state of siege in Moscow and its surrounding areas. The defense of the capital on lines located 100-120 km west of Moscow is entrusted to G. Zhukov. On November 15-16, the enemy resumed the attack on Moscow. The balance of power was still unequal. German troops tried to bypass Moscow from the north - through Klin and Solnechnogorsk, from the south through Tula and Kashira. Got started bloody battles. On the night of November 28, the Germans crossed the Moscow-Volga canal in the Yakhroma area, but their further advance on this section of the front was thwarted. According to von Bock, the command of Army Group Center saw the further offensive on Moscow as “having neither purpose nor meaning, since the moment when the group’s forces would be completely exhausted was approaching very close.” The end of November - beginning of December 1941 became the culmination of the battle: it was by this time that the Germans' miscalculations exceeded a critical level; for the first time in the entire war the enemy was faced with the fact of his powerlessness before the enemy; the huge losses of the ground forces had an overwhelming effect on him. At the beginning of December, about 47 divisions of Army Group Center, while continuing to rush towards Moscow, could not withstand the counterattacks of the Soviet troops and went on the defensive. Only on December 8, having received reports from the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 2nd Panzer Armies about the intensification of the Red Army's attacks, Hitler gave the order for strategic defense on the entire Eastern Front. By the beginning of December, the enemy on the immediate approaches to the capital was completely stopped. In the Moscow direction, the reserve armies of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts advanced to the areas of upcoming operations, thanks to which it was possible to create a new strategic grouping, larger in composition than the previous one, which began defensive operations near Moscow. Simultaneously with the counteroffensive, our troops conducted active military operations southeast of Lenin and in the Crimea, which deprived the Germans of the opportunity to transfer reinforcements to their troops near Moscow. at dawn on December 5, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (commander I. Konev) delivered a powerful blow to the enemy, and the next morning the strike groups of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern (commander S. Timoshenko) fronts launched a counter-offensive. At the beginning of February 1942, the Western Front reached the Naro-Fominsk - Maloyaroslavets line, then west of Kaluga to Sukhinichi and Belev.

This was the first major offensive operation of strategic importance, as a result of which enemy strike groups were thrown back 100, and in some places - 250 km west of the capital. The immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated and Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire line of the Western direction. The plan of Hitler’s “blitzkrieg” was thwarted, and during the war a turn in favor of the USSR began.

10. Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive at Stalingrad November 19, 1942 Military and international significance.

The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. As part of this strategic operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943), the November encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group (Uran), Kotelnikovskaya and Middle Don ( “Little Saturn”) operations that deprived the enemy of the opportunity to support the group encircled at Stalingrad from the west and weakened its offensive from the south, as well as Operation “Ring” to eliminate the enemy group that was surrounded in Stalingrad itself.

The decision to launch a counteroffensive was made by the Headquarters in mid-September 1942 after an exchange of views between I. Stalin, G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The military’s plan was to defeat the enemy in a 400-kilometer zone in the Stalingrad area, wrest the initiative from him and create conditions for conducting offensive operations on the southern wing,

The operation was entrusted to the troops of the newly formed Southwestern Front (commander N. Vatutin), Don and Stalingrad (commanders K. Rokossovsky and A. Eremenko). In addition, long-range aviation units, the 6th Army and the 2nd Air Army of the neighboring Voronezh Front (front commander F. Golikov), and the Volga Military Flotilla were involved here. The success of the operation largely depended on the surprise and thoroughness of the preparation of the strike; all events were carried out in the strictest secrecy. Headquarters entrusted the leadership of the counteroffensive to G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The Soviet command managed to create powerful groups superior to the enemy in the direction of the main attacks.

The offensive of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began at 7:30 a.m. on November 19, 1942. Heavy fog and snowfall that day prevented the departure of Soviet attack aircraft, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. And yet, on the very first day, the enemy’s defense was broken through. On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. His tank and mechanized corps, without getting involved in battles for populated areas and skillfully maneuvering, moved forward. Panic began in the enemy camp. On November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in the area of the cities of Kalach and Sovetsky. Units of the enemy's 6th field and 4th tank armies with a total number of 330 thousand people. were surrounded. The same fate befell the Romanian group of troops. In parallel with the internal one, the external encirclement of the enemy was also envisaged. It was clear that the enemy would try to break out of the “cauldron.” Therefore, the Headquarters ordered the Don and Stalingrad fronts, in cooperation with aviation, to eliminate the enemy group, and the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts to push the encirclement line to the west by about 150-200 km. Initially, the idea of Operation Saturn boiled down to the delivery of attacks by the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts in converging directions: one to the south in the direction of Rostov, the other from east to west in the direction of Likhaya. To unblock the ring, the German command created the Gotha strike group from a tank corps, a number of infantry and remnants of cavalry divisions. On December 12, it went on the offensive from the Kotelnikovsky area along the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway and on December 19, overcoming the fierce resistance of the few Soviet troops in this direction, it reached the line of the Myshkova River. On December 16, 1942, Operation Little Saturn began. As a result of 3 days of fierce fighting, troops of the Southwestern and left wing of the Voronezh front broke through the heavily fortified enemy defenses in several directions and crossed the Don and Bogucharka with battles. In order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold, it was decided not to slow down the pace of the offensive, strengthening the troops of the Southwestern Front at the expense of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, especially tank and mechanized formations. The offensive was carried out in harsh winter conditions, it was difficult, however, the 24th Tank Corps under the command of V. Badanov advanced 240 km in depth in five days, smashing the rear of the 8th Italian Army, and on December 24, with a surprise attack, took Tatsinskai station, destroying the airfield and capturing over 300 enemy aircraft as trophies. The most important communication line between Likhai and Stalingrad, along which the German command was concentrating the troops of the Hollidt group and supplying them with everything necessary for combat operations, was interrupted. The advance of the Goth group was put to an end. The Germans began to strengthen their positions in particularly threatened areas of the front. But by the end of December, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of about 200 km and firmly established themselves on new frontiers. As a result, the main forces of the Hollidt task force, the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies were defeated. The position of the German troops at Stalingrad became hopeless. The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was Operation Ring. According to Rokossovsky, her plan provided for the defeat of the enemy in the western and southern parts of the encirclement, followed by the dissection of the enemy group into two parts and their liquidation separately. The difficulty of completing the task was due to the fact that the necessary reserves were transferred by the Headquarters to other fronts, as required by the actual situation. surrounded by troops - was thwarted. Despite enormous hardships, the German side rejected the Soviet command’s offer of surrender; on January 10, our troops launched a round-the-clock offensive and on the morning of January 15 captured the Pitomnik airfield. On January 31, 1943, the southern enemy group surrendered, and on February 2, the northern group of the enemy. During three operations - "Uranus", "Little Saturn" and "Ring" - 2 German, 2 Romanian and 1 Italian armies were defeated. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep political crisis in Germany. Three days of mourning were declared in the country. Faith in victory was undermined, defeatist sentiments gripped wide sections of the population. The morale of the German soldier fell, he became increasingly afraid of being surrounded, and believed less and less in victory. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep military-political crisis in the fascist coalition. Italy, Romania, and Hungary faced serious difficulties associated with large losses at the front, a drop in the combat effectiveness of troops, and growing discontent among the masses. The victory at Stalingrad seriously influenced the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and the USA. Both sides were well aware that the Red Army could achieve a decisive turning point in the war and defeat the Germans before the Allies transferred troops to Western France. Since the spring of 1943 The American General Staff, taking into account the changing military situation, began to instruct F. Roosevelt that the United States, in the event of the defeat of Germany, should have a large military contingent in Great Britain. The victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on its further move. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end. The people believed in the final victory over fascism, although it came at the cost of heavy losses.

10.Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive at Stalingrad November 19, 1942 Military and international significance. The radical turning point in the war came at Staling. In this large industrial center, named after the leader, German motorized groups of troops met the most fierce resistance, which had never been seen before, even in this brutal war of “total annihilation.” If the city could not withstand the onslaught and fell, then the German troops could cross the Volga, and this, in turn, would allow them to completely surround Mos and Lenin, after which Sov. the union would inevitably have turned into a truncated northern Asian state, pushed beyond the Ural Mountains. But Sta did not fall. Soviet troops defended their positions, proving their ability to fight in small units. Sometimes the territory they controlled was so small that German aircraft and artillery were afraid to bombard the city for fear of causing damage to their own troops. Street fighting prevented the Wehrmacht from using its usual advantages. Tanks and other equipment in narrow streets got stuck and turned into a good target for Soviet soldiers. In addition, the German troops were now fighting in conditions of extreme overstrain of resources, which were supplied to them only by one railway line and by air. The battles for the city exhausted and bled the enemy, creating the conditions for the Red Army to launch a counteroffensive. In the offensive operation "Uranus" near Stalingrad, two stages were envisaged: in the first it was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses and create a strong encirclement ring, in the second - to destroy the encircled fascist troops if they did not accept the ultimatum to surrender. For this, the forces of three fronts were involved: the Southwestern (commander - General N.F. Vatutin), Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Staling (General A.I. Eremenko). The equipment of Kra Ar with new military equipment was accelerated. To its superiority over the enemy in tanks, achieved in the spring of 1942, at the end of the year was added a predominance in guns, mortars, and aircraft. The counterattack began on November 19, 1942, and five days later the advanced units of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in, encircling more than 330 thousand German soldiers and officers. On January 10, Soviet troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky began to eliminate the group blocked in the Steel area. On February 2, its remnants surrendered. More than 90 thousand people were taken prisoner, including 24 generals led by Field General F. Paulus. As a result of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the Nazi 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army, the 3rd and 4th Armies and the 8th Italian Army were defeated. During the Battle of Steel, which lasted 200 days and nights, the fascist bloc lost 25% of the forces operating at that time on the Soviet-German front. The victory at Stalingrad was of great military and political significance. She made a huge contribution to achieving a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire war. As a result of Stalin's battle, the armed forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and retained it until the end of the war. The outstanding significance of the Stalin battle was highly appreciated by the USSR's allies in the war with Germany. Prime Minister Great W. Churchill in November 1943, at a conference of leaders of the Allied powers in Tehran, handed over to the Soviet delegation an honorary sword - a gift from King George VI to the citizens of Stal in commemoration of the victory over the fascist invaders. In May 1944, US President Franklin Roosevelt, on behalf of the American people, sent a letter to Stalin. By this time, Soviet industry had established the production of a sufficient number of tanks and other weapons of various types, and did this with unprecedented success and in huge quantities. Steel was defeated and the victory of the Soviet troops in it contributed to the liberation of most of the North Caucasus, Rzhev, Voronezh, Kursk were liberated , most of Donbass.

11.Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1943. Battle of Kursk . Crossing of the Dnieper. Tehran Conference. The question of opening a second front. In preparation for the summer campaign, Nazi strategists concentrated their attention on the Kursk Bulge. This was the name given to the protrusion of the front line facing west. It was defended by troops of two fronts: Central (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (General N.F. Vatutin). It was here that Hitler intended to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. Two powerful tank wedges were supposed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops at the base of the ledge, encircle them and create a threat to Moscow. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having received timely information from intelligence about the planned offensive, was well prepared for defense and response actions. When the Wehrmacht attacked the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, the Red Army managed to withstand it, and seven days later launched a strategic offensive along a front of 2 thousand km. The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to July 23, 1943, and victory in it, Soviet troops had enormous military and political significance. It became the most important stage on the path to the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany. More than 4 million people took part in the battles on both sides. 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. In this battle, the offensive strategy of the German armed forces finally collapsed. The victory at Kursk and the subsequent advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts of the Second World War, which had a huge impact on its course. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the Resistance movement in the countries occupied by the Nazis became increasingly active. By this time, all the resources of the Soviet state were mobilized as fully as could be done in war conditions. By government decree of February 1942, the entire working population of the country was mobilized for military purposes. People worked 55 hours a week, with only one day off a month, and sometimes no days off at all, sleeping on the floor of the workshop. As a result of the successful mobilization of all resources, by mid-1943, Soviet industry was already far superior to German, which, moreover, was partially destroyed by aerial bombing. In areas where industry was still weak, shortages were made up by constant supplies from Great Britain and the United States under the Lend-Lease agreement. The Soviet Union received a significant amount of tractors, trucks, car tires, explosive materials, field telephones, telephone wires, and food products. This superiority allowed the Red Army to confidently conduct combined military operations in the same spirit as the German troops were able to do at the initial stage of the war. In August 1943, Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkov were liberated, and in September, Smolensk. At the same time, the crossing of the Dnieper began; in November, Soviet units entered the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and by the end of the year they had advanced far to the west. By mid-December 1943, Soviet troops liberated part of the Kalinin, all of Smolensk regions, part of the Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Gomel regions; crossed the Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, Pripyat, and Berezina rivers and reached Polesie. By the end of 1943, Soviet troops liberated about 50% of the territory occupied by the enemy. The partisans caused great damage to the enemy. In 1943, the partisans carried out major operations to destroy communication lines under the code names “Rail War” and “Concert”. In total, during the war, over 1 million partisans operated behind enemy lines. As a result of the victories of the Red Army, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena and its role in resolving the most important issues of world politics increased immeasurably. This was also evident at the Tehran Conference of 1943, where the leaders of the three powers - the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain - agreed on plans and deadlines for joint actions to defeat the enemy, as well as agreements on the opening of a second front in Europe during May 1944. The Tehran Conference took place in the capital of Iran on November 28 – December 1, 1943. One of the main topics of the conference was the question of opening a second front. By this time, a radical change had occurred on the eastern front. The Red Army went on the offensive, and the Allies saw the real prospect of a Soviet soldier appearing in the heart of Europe, which was by no means part of their plans. This especially irritated the leader of Great Britain, who did not believe in the possibility of cooperation with Soviet Russia. At the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to open a second front, although resolving this issue was not easy for them. Churchill tried to convince the Allies of the extreme importance of military operations in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. Stalin, on the contrary, demanded the opening of a second front in Western Europe. In choosing the direction of the main attack of the allied forces, Stalin found support from Roosevelt. The political and military leadership of England and the USA agreed to open a second front in the spring of 1944 in Normandy. Stalin promised to launch a powerful offensive operation on the eastern front by this time. The Big Three also discussed future borders in Europe. The most painful question was Polish. Stalin proposed moving the Polish border west, to the Oder. The Soviet-Polish border was supposed to run along the line established in 1939. At the same time, Stalin announced Moscow's claims to Konigsberg and new borders with Finland. The Allies decided to agree to Moscow's territorial demands. Stalin, in turn, promised to enter the war against Japan after Germany signed the act of surrender. The Big Three were discussing the future of Germany, which was generally agreed to be divided. However, no concrete decision was made, since each side had its own view on the future borders of the German lands. Starting from the Tehran Conference, the issue of borders in Europe became the most important for all subsequent meetings. Implementing the decisions of the Tehran Conference, with some delay, on June 6, 1944, the Allied landing in Normandy began (Operation Overlord) with simultaneous support for the Allied landing in the south of France ( Operation Dragoon). On August 25, 1944, they liberated Paris. At the same time, the offensive of Soviet troops, launched along the entire front, continued in northwestern Russia, Finland, and Belarus. The joint actions of the allies confirmed the effectiveness of the coalition and led to the collapse of the fascist bloc in Europe. Particular attention should be paid to the interaction of the allies during the Ardennes counter-offensive of Germany (December 16, 1944 - January 26, 1945), when Soviet troops launched an offensive from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians earlier than planned (January 12, 1945), at the request of the allies, thereby saving Anglo-American troops from defeat in the Ardennes. It should be noted that in 1944-1945. The Eastern Front continued to be the main one, with 150 German divisions operating against 71 divisions and 3 brigades on the Western Front and 22 divisions in Italy.

12.Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1944-May 1945. Crimean (Yalta) conference. The third period of the Great Patriotic War - the defeat of the fascist bloc, the expulsion of enemy troops from the USSR, liberation from the occupation of European countries - began in January 1944. This year was marked by a series of new grandiose and victorious operations of the Red Army. In January, the offensive of the Leningrad (General L. A. Govorov) and Volkhov (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts began, finally lifting the blockade of heroic Leningrad. In February-March, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian (General N.F. Vatutin) and 2nd Ukrainian (General I.S. Konev) fronts, having defeated Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya and a number of other powerful enemy groups, reached the border with Romania. In the summer, major victories were won in three strategic directions at once. As a result of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation, the forces of the Leningrad (Marshal L. A. Govorov) and Karelian (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts drove the Finnish units out of Karelia. Finland stopped hostilities on the side of Germany, and in September the USSR signed an armistice agreement with it. In June - August, troops of four fronts (1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian, 1st Baltic) under the command of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, and I.Kh. Bagramyan expelled the enemy from the territory of Belarus during Operation Bagration. In August, the 2nd Ukrainian (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and 3rd Ukrainian (General F. I. Tolbukhin) fronts, having carried out a joint Iasi-Kishinev operation, liberated Moldova. In early autumn, German troops retreated from Transcarpathian Ukraine and the Baltic states. Finally, in October, a German group on the extreme northern section of the Soviet-German front was defeated by a strike on Pechenga. The state border of the USSR was restored all the way from the Barents to the Black Sea. In general, the Soviet armed forces in 1944 carried out about 50 offensive operations that had enormous military and political significance. As a result, the main groups of Nazi troops were defeated. In the summer and autumn of 1944 alone, the enemy lost 1.6 million people. Nazi Germany lost almost all of its European allies, the front approached its borders, and in East Prussia crossed them. With the opening of the second front, Germany's military-strategic position worsened. However, Hitler's leadership launched a large-scale offensive in the Ardennes (Western Europe). As a result of the German offensive, the Anglo-American troops found themselves in a difficult situation. In this regard, at the request of Winston Churchill, Soviet troops in January 1945 earlier than planned, they went on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front. The offensive of the Red Army was so powerful that already at the beginning of February its separate formations reached the approaches to Berlin. In January - the first half of April 1945, Soviet troops carried out the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Vienna, East Pomeranian, Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian offensive operations. The student needs to talk about the liberation campaign of the Red Army - the liberation of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. The final strategic offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War was the Berlin operation, carried out by the Red Army on April 16 - May 8, 1945. In the spring of 1945, On the territory of Germany, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France conducted military operations. During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and motorized divisions, most of the aviation, and captured about 480 thousand people. On May 8, 1945, in Karlhorst (a suburb of Berlin), an act of unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was signed. With the surrender of Germany, the war in Europe ended, but the war with Japan in the Far East and the Pacific, waged by the USA, Great Britain and their allies, continued . Having fulfilled its allied obligations adopted at the Crimean Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8. The Manchurian strategic offensive operation lasted from August 9 to September 2, 1945. Its goals were the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army, the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea, and the elimination of the bridgehead of aggression and the military-economic base of Japan on the Asian continent. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on board the American battleship Missouri, Japanese representatives signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, which led to the end of World War II. The southern part of Sakhalin and the islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to the Soviet Union. His sphere of influence extended to North Korea and China. Successful actions in 1944 led to the need to convene a new Allied conference on the eve of Germany's surrender. The Yalta (Crimean) Conference, held on February 4-11, resolved issues primarily related to the post-war structure of Europe. An agreement was reached on the occupation of Germany, its demilitarization, denazification and demonopolization, and on German reparations. It was decided to create four occupation zones on German territory and create a special control body of the commanders-in-chief of the three powers, headquartered in Berlin. In addition to the three great powers, France was also invited to occupy and rule Germany. However, having made this decision, the parties did not stipulate procedural issues and did not define the boundaries of these zones. The Soviet delegation initiated a discussion of the reparation issue, proposing two forms: removal of equipment and annual payments. Roosevelt supported Stalin, who proposed determining the total amount of reparations at 20 billion dollars, of which 50% was to be paid to the Soviet Union. The focus of the conference participants was again on the Polish question. The borders of Poland, according to the decisions of the conference, ran in the east along the “Curzon Line” with compensation for territorial losses by gains in the northwest at the expense of Germany. This secured the accession of Western Belarus and Ukraine to the USSR. The conference participants discussed a number of issues related to other European countries. Stalin agreed to Anglo-American influence in Italy and British influence in Greece. Despite the fact that London and Washington were not satisfied with the position of the Soviet Union on Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, where Moscow acted virtually independently, they were forced to agree to resolve these issues in the future through normal diplomatic channels. De facto, Eastern Europe was coming under Soviet influence. It is this result of the Yalta conference that many American researchers cannot forgive Roosevelt, although the decisions made at Yalta were the result of a compromise.

13.The entry of the USSR into the war with Japan. Strategic operations of the Red Army. End of World War II. In the spring of 1945, the redeployment of troops of the USSR and its allies began to the Far East. The forces of the United States and England were quite sufficient to defeat Japan. But the political leadership of these countries, fearing possible losses, insisted on the USSR entering the war on Dal Vos. S Arm was given the goal of destruction impact force Japanese - Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria and Korea and numbering about a million people. In accordance with its allied duty, on April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of 1941 and on August 8 declared war on Japan. On August 9, a group of Soviet troops consisting of Transbaikal (commander - Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky), 1st (commander - Marshal K.A. Meretskov) and 2nd (coma - General M.A. Purkaev) Far Front, as well as the Quiet Fleet (commander - Admiral I.S. Yumashev) and Amur military flotilla (commander - counter- Admiral N.V. Antonov), numbering 1.8 million people, launched military operations. For strategic leadership of the armed struggle, on July 30, the Main Command of the Soviet troops on Da Vo was created, headed by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. The offensive of the Soviet fronts developed quickly and successfully. During 23 days of stubborn battles on a front stretching over 5 thousand km, Soviet troops and naval forces, successfully advancing during the Manchurian, South Sakhalin and Kuril amphibious operations, liberated Northeast China, North Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands -va. Soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army also took part in the war with Japan along with Soviet troops. Soviet troops captured about 600 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and many weapons and equipment were captured. The enemy's losses were almost twice as high as those suffered by the Soviet army. The USSR's entry into the war finally broke Japanese resistance. On August 14, its government decided to ask for surrender. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on board the American battleship Missouri, representatives of Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. This meant the end of the Second World War. The victory of the USSR and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition over the Nazi Germany and Militia Japan in the Second World War was of world-historical significance and had a huge impact on the entire post-war development of mankind. Fatherland was its most important component. The Soviet Voore Forces defended the freedom and independence of the Motherland, participated in the liberation of the peoples of 11 European countries from fascist oppression, and expelled the Japanese occupiers from Northeast China and Korea. During the four-year armed struggle (1,418 days and nights) on the Soviet-German front, the main forces of the fascist bloc were defeated and captured: 607 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its allies. In battles with the Soviet Armed Forces, Nazi Germany lost over 10 million people (80% of all military losses), over 75% of all military equipment. In the fierce battle with fascism, the question was about life and death of the Slavic peoples. At the cost of a colossal effort, the Russian people, in alliance with all other large and small nations of the USSR, were able to defeat the enemy. However, the cost of the victory of the Soviet people over fascism was enormous. More than 29 million people passed through the war in the ranks of the Sov Vooru Forces. The war claimed over 27 million lives of our fellow citizens, including military losses amounting to 8,668,400 people. The ratio of losses between Kra Ar and the Wehrmacht is determined as 1.3: 1. About 4 million partisans and underground fighters died behind enemy lines and in the occupied territories. About 6 million Soviet citizens found themselves in fascist captivity. The USSR lost 30% of its national wealth. The occupiers destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and towns, over 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 98 thousand collective farms and 2 thousand state farms, 6 thousand hospitals, 82 thousand schools, 334 universities,

14.Culture during the Great Patriotic War . From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, all the achievements of national culture, science and technology were put into the service of victory and defense of the Motherland. The country was turning into a single combat camp. All spheres of culture had to be subordinated to the tasks of fighting the enemy. Cultural figures fought with weapons in their hands on the war fronts, worked in the front-line press and propaganda brigades. Representatives of all cultural trends made their contribution to the victory. Many of them gave their lives for their homeland, for victory. This was an unprecedented social and spiritual upsurge of the entire people. (See additional illustrative material.) The war with Nazi Germany required a restructuring of all spheres of society, including culture. At the first stage of the war, the main efforts were aimed at explaining the nature of the war and the goals of the USSR in it. Preference was given to operational forms of cultural work, such as radio, cinematography, and print. From the first days of the war, the importance of mass information, mainly radio, increased. Information Bureau reports were broadcast 18 times a day in 70 languages. Using the experience of political education during the civil war - "Windows of GROWTH", they began to publish posters "Windows of TASS". A few hours after the declaration of war, a poster of the Kukryniksys appeared (Kukryniksy is a pseudonym (based on the first syllables of their last names) of a creative team of graphic artists and painters: M.V. Kupriyanov, P.F. Krylov and N.A. Sokolov). “We will ruthlessly defeat and destroy the enemy!”, which was reproduced in newspapers in 103 cities. I.M.’s poster carried a great emotional charge. Toidze “The Motherland is Calling!”, stylistically related to the poster by D.S. Moore's Civil War "Have you volunteered?" Posters by V.B. were also extremely popular. Koretsky "Warrior of the Red Army, save!" and Kukryniksov “I Lost a Ring,” depicting Hitler, who “dropped a ring” from 22 divisions defeated at Stalingrad. Posters were an effective means of mobilizing people to fight the enemy. Since the beginning of the war, the evacuation of cultural institutions has been intensive. By November 1941, about 60 theaters in Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine and Belarus were evacuated to the eastern regions of the country. 53 universities and academic institutions, about 300 creative unions and organizations were evacuated to the Uzbek SSR alone. Kustanay houses the collections of the Historical Museum, the Museum of the Revolution, the most valuable part of the collections of the Library named after. IN AND. Lenin, Foreign Language Library and Historical Library. The treasures of the Russian Museum and the Tretyakov Gallery were taken to Perm, and the Hermitage to Sverdlovsk. The Writers' Union and the Literary Fund moved to Kazan, and the USSR Union of Artists and the Art Fund moved to Sverdlovsk. Soviet art devoted itself entirely to the cause of saving the Fatherland. Soviet poetry and song achieved an extraordinary sound during this period. The song “Holy War” by V. Lebedev-Kumach and A. Alexandrov became a true anthem of the people’s war. Songs by composers A. Aleksandrov, V. Solovyov-Sedoy, M. Blanter, A. Novikov, B. Mokrousov, M. Fradkin, T. Khrennikov and others were very popular. The battle lyrical song became one of the leading genres of literature. “Dugout”, “Evening on the roadstead”, “Nightingales”, “Dark Night” - these songs entered the golden treasury of Soviet song classics. During the war years, one of the greatest musical works of the 20th century was created. - D. Shostakovich’s 7th symphony, dedicated to the heroic defenders of Leningrad. At one time, L. Beethoven liked to repeat that music should strike fire from the courageous human heart. It was these thoughts that were embodied by D. Shostakovich in his most significant work.D. Shostakovich began writing the 7th Symphony a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War and continued to work in Leningrad, besieged by the Nazis. On the original score of the symphony, the composer’s notes “VT” are visible, meaning “air raid warning”. When it came, D. Shostakovich interrupted work on the symphony and went to drop incendiary bombs from the roof of the conservatory. The first three movements of the symphony were completed by the end of September 1941, when Leningrad was already surrounded and subjected to brutal artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. The victorious finale of the symphony was completed in December, when the fascist hordes stood on the outskirts of Moscow. “I dedicate this symphony to my hometown Leningrad, our fight against fascism, our upcoming victory” - this was the epigraph to this work. In 1942, the symphony was performed in the USA and other countries of the anti-fascist coalition. The musical art of the whole world does not know of another composition that would have received such a powerful public response. During the war years, Soviet drama created true masterpieces of theatrical art. In the initial period of the war, the plays of L. Leonov “Invasion”, K. Simonov “Russian People”, A. Korneichuk “Front”, which quickly became popular, were published. Works of domestic literature that are well-known and loved by many today also appeared, such as chapters of the novel by M. Sholokhov “They Fought for the Motherland”, “The Science of Hate”, story by V. Vasilevskaya "Rainbow". The Battle of Stalingrad is dedicated to the stories of K. Simonov “Days and Nights” and V. Grossman “The Direction of the Main Strike”. The heroism of home front workers was described in the works of M.S. Shaginyan and F.V. Gladkova. During the war, the first chapters of A. Fadeev’s novel “The Young Guard” were published. Journalism of those years is represented by articles by K. Simonov, I. Ehrenburg. Military lyrics by M. Isakovsky, S. Shchipachev, A. Tvardovsky, A. Akhmatova, A. Surkov, N. Tikhonov were created in the form of an oath, lamentation, curse, and direct appeal. O. Berggolts, B. Pasternak, M. Svetlova, K. Simonov. Thus, the images of the defenders of Leningrad were created by O. Berggolts in the “Leningrad Poem” and V. Inber in the poem “Pulkovo Meridian”. The poem by A.T. was extremely popular. Tvardovsky "Vasily Terkin", poem by M.I. Aliger "Zoya". More than a thousand writers and poets in the ranks of the active army worked as war correspondents. Ten writers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Musa Jalil, P.P. Vershigora, A. Gaidar, A. Surkov, E. Petrov, A. Bek, K. Simonov, M. Sholokhov, A. Fadeev, N. Tikhonov. The coming to power of fascism in a number of countries and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War revived the Russian patriotic theme in cinema ("Alexander Nevsky", "Suvorov", "Kutuzov"). On the basis of the evacuated film studios "Lenfilm" and "Mosfilm" in Almaty, the Central United Film Studio (CUKS) was created. During these years, film directors S. Eisenstein, V. Pudovkin, the Vasilyev brothers, F. Ermler, I. Pyryev, G. Roshal worked at the film studio. About 80% of all domestic feature films during the war years were produced at this film studio. In total, during the war years, 34 full-length films and almost 500 film magazines were created. Among them is “Secretary of the District Committee” I.A. Pyryeva, “Invasion” by A. Room, “Rainbow” by M.S. Donskoy, “Two Fighters” by L.D. Lukova, “She Defends the Motherland” F.M. Ermler, documentary film “The Defeat of German Troops near Moscow” by L. Varlamov and I. Kopalin. There were more than 150 cameramen on the front line and in partisan detachments.

To provide cultural services to the front, front-line brigades of artists, writers, painters and front-line theaters were created (by 1944 there were 25 of them). The first of them was the Iskra Theater, made up of actors from the theater. Lenin Komsomol - volunteers of the people's militia, then front-line branches of the Maly Theater, the Theater named after. E. Vakhtangov and the Komsomol theater of GITIS. During the war years, more than 40 thousand artists visited the fronts as part of such brigades. Among them were the luminaries of the Russian stage I.M. Moskvin, A.K. Tarasova, N.K. Cherkasov, M.I. Tsarev, A.A. Yablochkina and others. During the war years, the concerts of the Leningrad Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra under the direction of E. Mravinsky, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army under the direction of A. Alexandrov, and the Russian Folk Choir named after A. Aleksandrov enjoyed exceptional success during the war years. M. Pyatnitsky, soloists K. Shulzhenko, L. Ruslanova, A. Raikin, L. Utesov, I. Kozlovsky, S. Lemeshev and many others. etc. The 13-meter statue of a Soviet liberator warrior with a girl in his arms and a lowered sword, erected after the war in Berlin in Treptower Park (sculptor - E.V. Vuchetich), became a sculptural symbol of the war years and the memory of fallen wars. War, heroism of the Soviets people are reflected in the paintings of artists A.A. Deineki "Defense of Sevastopol", S.V. Gerasimov "Mother of the Partisan", painting by A.A. Plastov “The Fascist Flew” and others. Assessing the damage to the cultural heritage of the country, the Extraordinary State Commission to investigate the atrocities of the invaders named 430 museums out of 991 located in the occupied territory, 44 thousand palaces of culture and libraries among those plundered and destroyed. The house-museums of L.N. were looted. Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana, I.S. Turgenev in Spassky-Lutovinovo, A.S. Pushkin in Mikhailovsky, P.I. Tchaikovsky in Klin, T.G. Shevchenko in Kanev. The frescoes of the 12th century were irretrievably lost. in the St. Sophia Cathedral of Novgorod, manuscripts by P.I. Tchaikovsky, canvases by I.E. Repina, V.A. Serova, I.K. Aivazovsky, who died in Stalingrad. Ancient architectural monuments of ancient Russian cities were destroyed - Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Rzhev, Vyazma, Kyiv. Suburban architectural ensembles-palaces of St. Petersburg and architectural monastery complexes of the Moscow region were damaged. The human losses were irreparable. All this affected the development of domestic culture after the war. Thus, despite the period of totalitarianism in the history of the country preceding the Great Patriotic War, severe ideological pressure on the entire domestic culture, in the face of tragedy, the danger of foreign conquest, ideological vocabulary is leaving genuine culture and coming to the fore eternal, deep, truly national values are put forward. Hence the amazing unity of the culture of those years, the desire of people to protect their Earth and its traditions.

15.The international significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Sources of victory. Results. Berlin (Potsdam Conference).

The victory over fascist Germany and its allies was achieved through the joint efforts of the states of the anti-fascist coalition, the peoples who fought against the occupiers and their accomplices. But decisive role The Soviet Union played a role in this armed conflict. It was the Soviet country that was the most active and consistent fighter against the fascist invaders who sought to enslave the peoples of the whole world.

The world-historical significance of the Victory lies in the fact that it was the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who blocked the path of German fascism to world domination, bore the brunt of a war unprecedented in human history and made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.

The victory over Nazi Germany was the result of the joint efforts of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But the main burden of the struggle against the shock forces of world reaction fell to the lot of the Soviet Union. It was on the Soviet-German front that the most fierce and decisive battles of the Second World War took place.

The Great Patriotic War ended with a complete military-political, economic and ideological victory of the Soviet Union. This predetermined the outcome of the Second World War as a whole. The victory over fascism is an event of world-historical significance. What are the most important results of the war?

The main result of the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War is that, in the most difficult trials, the Soviet people crushed fascism - the darkest creation of the era, and defended the freedom and independence of their state. Having overthrown fascism, together with the armies of other states of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union saved humanity from the threat of enslavement.

The victory of the Soviet people over German fascism had a huge impact on the entire further course of world history and on the solution of the fundamental social problems of our time.

The war imposed on the Soviet Union had socio-political consequences that were unforeseen for its organizers. The hopes of the reactionary circles of the Western powers to weaken our country were dashed. The USSR emerged from the war even stronger politically and militarily, and its international authority rose immeasurably. Governments and people listened to his voice; without his participation, essentially, not a single important problem affecting the fundamental interests of the world was solved. This was expressed, in particular, in the establishment and restoration of diplomatic relations with many states. Thus, if in 1941 26 countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, then in 1945 - already 52 states.

Victory in the war brought the USSR into the ranks of the leading powers of the post-war world and created a real basis for a new stage in international relations. First of all, this is the creation of the United Nations, joint measures to eradicate Nazism and militarism in Germany, the formation of international mechanisms for discussing post-war problems, etc.

The moral, political and spiritual unity of Soviet society was of great importance for achieving victory. Attacking the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany It also relied on the fact that the Soviet multinational state would not withstand severe military tests, anti-Soviet, nationalist forces would become more active in the country, and a “fifth column” would appear.

The coordinated organizational work of the country's political and military leadership played a huge role in achieving victory. Thanks to targeted and well-coordinated work at the center and locally, the country was quickly turned into a single military camp. The program for defeating the enemy, scientifically grounded and understandable to the majority of the population, was set out already in the first documents and speeches of state leaders: the appeal of the Soviet government to the people on June 22, the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions of June 29, the speech of I. IN. Stalin on the radio July 3, 1941. They clearly defined the nature and goals of the war, and named the most important measures aimed at repelling aggression and defeating the enemy. The most important source of victory in the Great Patriotic War was the powerful potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Victory in the Great Patriotic War showed the superiority of Soviet military science and military art, high level strategic leadership and combat prowess of our military personnel, the military organization as a whole.

Victory in the war was also achieved thanks to the high patriotism of Soviet soldiers, their love for their Fatherland, and loyalty to their constitutional duty. These qualities were embedded in the consciousness of military personnel in the pre-war years during a well-organized system of patriotic and military-patriotic education, which permeated all layers of Soviet society and accompanied the citizen at all stages of his life. life path- at school, in the army, at work. Soviet losses at the fronts, according to various estimates, range from 8.5 to 26.5 million people. The total material damage and military costs are estimated at $485 billion. 1,710 cities and towns and more than 70 thousand villages were destroyed. But the USSR defended its independence and contributed to the full or partial liberation of a number of European and Asian countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria , Yugoslavia, China and Korea. He made a huge contribution to the overall victory of the anti-fascist coalition over Germany, Italy and Japan: on the Soviet-German front, 607 Wehrmacht divisions were defeated and captured, and almost 3/4 of all German military equipment was destroyed. The USSR played an important role in the post-war peace settlement; its territory expanded to include East Prussia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, the Petsamo region, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. It became one of the leading world powers and the center of an entire system of communist states on the Euro-Asian continent.

Potsdam Conference 1945, Berlin Conference, conference of heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, US President G. Truman, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, who was replaced on July 28 by the new Prime Minister K. Attlee . It took place from July 17 to August 2 at the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam, near Berlin. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, military advisers and experts participated in the work of the PK. The decisions of the Political Committee were a development of the decisions of the Crimean Conference of 1945.

Issues related to the demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of Germany, as well as many other important aspects of the German problem, occupied a central place in the work of the PK.

The participants of the PK reached an agreement on the main directions of the general policy towards Germany, which was considered as a single economic and political whole. The Potsdam Agreements provided for the complete disarmament of Germany, the dissolution of its armed forces, the destruction of monopolies and the liquidation in Germany of all industry that could be used for: military production, the destruction of the National Socialist Party, organizations and institutions controlled by it, the prevention of all Nazi and militaristic activities or propaganda in the country. The conference participants signed a special agreement on reparations, confirming the rights of the peoples who suffered from the Germans. aggression, for compensation and determining the sources of reparation payments. An agreement was reached on the establishment of central German administrative departments (finance, transport, communications, etc.).

At the conference, a system of quadripartite occupation of Germany was finally agreed upon, which was supposed to serve its demilitarization and democratization; it was envisaged that during the occupation, supreme power in Germany would be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, each in its own zone of occupation; on matters affecting Germany as a whole, they were to act jointly as members of the Control Council.

The Potsdam Agreement defined a new Polish-German border along the Oder-West Neisse line, the establishment of which was reinforced by the PK decision to evict the German population remaining in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The PK confirmed the transfer of Koenigsberg (since 1946 - Kaliningrad) and the adjacent region to the Soviet Union. She established the Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA), entrusting it with preparing a peace settlement with Germany and its former allies.

At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, the conference discussed the fate of the German fleet and decided to divide the entire German surface, naval and merchant fleet equally between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. At the suggestion of Great Britain, it was decided to sink most of the German submarine fleet, and divide the rest equally.

The Soviet government proposed to extend the competence of the Austrian provisional government to the entire country, that is, also to those areas of Austria that were occupied by the troops of the Western powers. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to study this issue after the entry of US and British troops into Vienna.

The three governments confirmed at the P.C. their intention to bring the main war criminals to trial at the International Military Tribunal. The participants of the PK expressed their opinions on some other issues of international life: the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea Straits, the attitude of the United Nations towards the Franco regime in Spain, etc.

The armed conflict between the Soviet state and Finland is increasingly viewed by contemporaries as one of the components of the Second World War. Let's try to isolate the true causes of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
The origins of this war lie in the very system of international relations that had developed by 1939. At that time, war, the destruction and violence it brought, were considered an extreme, but completely acceptable method of achieving geopolitical goals and protecting the interests of the state. Large countries were building up their armaments, small states were looking for allies and entered into agreements with them for assistance in case of war.

Soviet-Finnish relations from the very beginning could not be called friendly. Finnish nationalists wanted to return Soviet Karelia to the control of their country. And the activities of the Comintern, directly financed by the CPSU (b), were aimed at the speedy establishment of the power of the proletariat throughout the globe. It is most convenient to start the next campaign to overthrow bourgeois governments from neighboring states. This fact should already make the rulers of Finland worry.

Another exacerbation began in 1938. The Soviet Union predicted the imminent outbreak of war with Germany. And to prepare for this event, it was necessary to strengthen the western borders of the state. The city of Leningrad, which was the cradle of the October Revolution, was a large industrial center in those years. The loss of the former capital during the first days of hostilities would have been a serious blow for the USSR. Therefore, the Finnish leadership received a proposal to lease their Hanko Peninsula to create military bases there.

The permanent deployment of the armed forces of the USSR on the territory of a neighboring state was fraught with a violent change of power to “workers and peasants”. The Finns well remembered the events of the twenties, when Bolshevik activists tried to create a Soviet republic and annex Finland to the USSR. The activities of the Communist Party were banned in this country. Therefore, the Finnish government could not agree to such a proposal.

In addition, in the Finnish territories designated for transfer there was the famous Mannerheim defensive line, which was considered insurmountable. If it is voluntarily handed over to a potential enemy, then nothing will be able to restrain the Soviet troops from advancing forward. A similar trick had already been performed in Czechoslovakia by the Germans in 1939, so the Finnish leadership was clearly aware of the consequences of such a step.

On the other hand, Stalin had no compelling reason to believe that Finland's neutrality would remain unshakable during the upcoming big war. The political elites of capitalist countries generally saw the USSR as a threat to the stability of European states.
In short, the parties in 1939 could not and, perhaps, did not want to come to an agreement. The Soviet Union needed guarantees and a buffer zone in front of its territory. Finland needed to maintain its neutrality in order to be able to quickly change its foreign policy and lean towards the favorite in the approaching big war.

Another reason for a military solution to the current situation seems to be a test of strength in a real war. Finnish fortifications were stormed in the harsh winter of 1939-1940, which was a difficult test for both military personnel and equipment.

Part of the community of historians cite the desire for the “Sovietization” of Finland as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war. However, such assumptions are not confirmed by facts. In March 1940, the Finnish defensive fortifications fell, and the imminent defeat in the conflict became obvious. Without waiting for help from the Western allies, the government sent a delegation to Moscow to conclude a peace agreement.

For some reason, the Soviet leadership turned out to be extremely accommodating. Instead of quickly ending the war with the complete defeat of the enemy and the annexation of its territory to the Soviet Union, as was done, for example, with Belarus, a peace treaty was signed. By the way, this agreement also took into account the interests of the Finnish side, for example, the demilitarization of the Åland Islands. Probably in 1940 the USSR focused on preparing for war with Germany.

The formal reason for the start of the war of 1939-1940 was the artillery shelling of the positions of Soviet troops near the Finnish border. Which, naturally, the Finns were accused of. For this reason, Finland was asked to withdraw troops 25 kilometers in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. When the Finns refused, the outbreak of war became inevitable.

This was followed by a short but bloody war, which ended in 1940 with the victory of the Soviet side.

Soviet-Finnish War 1939 - 1940

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 (Finnish) talvisota - Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland with the second largest city of Vyborg. 430 thousand inhabitants lost their homes and moved into the interior of Finland, creating a number of social problems.

According to a number of foreign historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland dates back to the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography this war is considered as a separate bilateral local conflict, not part of the Second World War, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. The declaration of war led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR was declared a military aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations.

A group of Red Army soldiers with a captured Finnish flag

Background
Events of 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the “whites”. After the victory in Finland, the Finnish “White” troops provided support to the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty was concluded between these states. Some Finnish politicians such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded the treaty as “too good a peace,” believing that superpowers would only compromise when absolutely necessary.

Juho Kusti Paasikivi

Mannerheim, former activists and separatist leaders in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a disgrace and a betrayal of their compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Finnish: H. H. (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Nevertheless, relations between Finland and The USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, went to Finland in the North, in the Arctic, were not friendly, but also openly hostile Same. Finland was afraid of Soviet aggression, and the Soviet leadership practically ignored Finland until 1938, focusing on the largest capitalist countries, primarily Great Britain and France.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles in Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their weapons. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliament members have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, due to cost savings, military exercises have not been held at all. The allocated money was barely enough to maintain the army. The issue of spending on weapons provision was not considered in parliament. Tanks and military aircraft were completely absent.

Interesting fact:
The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Coast Guard battleship “Väinämöinen”

Finnish coastal defense battleship Väinemäinen entered service in 1932. It was built at the Creighton-Vulcan shipyard in Turku. It was a relatively large ship: its total displacement was 3900 tons, length 92.96, width 16.92 and draft 4.5 meters. The armament consisted of 2 two-gun 254 mm cannons, 4 two-gun 105 mm cannons and 14 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The ship had strong armor: the thickness of the side armor was 51, the deck - up to 19, the turrets - 102 millimeters. The crew numbered 410 people.

Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in Russia, the situation there was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “The plague coming from the east could be contagious.” In a conversation with Risto Ryti, then the governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, which took place that same year, he outlined his thoughts on the need to quickly resolve the issue of creating a military program and its financing. Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the benefit of providing the military department with such large sums if no war is expected?”

Since 1919, the leader of the Socialist Party was Väinö Tanner.

Väine Alfred Tanner

During the Civil War, his company's warehouses served as a base for the Communists, and then he became the editor of an influential newspaper, a strong opponent of defense spending. Mannerheim refused to meet with him, realizing that by doing so he would only reduce his efforts to strengthen the defense capability of the state. As a result, by decision of parliament, the defense expenditure line of the budget was further cut.
In August 1931, after inspecting the defensive structures of the Enckel Line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.
In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the 1934 budget, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was crossed out.

Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of parliament:
...still believes that a prerequisite for maintaining the country’s independence is such progress in the well-being of the people and general conditions his life, in which every citizen understands that it is worth all the costs of defense.
Mannerheim describes his efforts as “a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow pipe filled with resin.” It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future were met with a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his position.
Negotiations of Yartsev in 1938-1939

The negotiations were started at the initiative of the USSR, initially they were conducted in secret, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain “free hands” in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view from the point of view of domestic politics, since the population of Finland had a generally negative attitude towards the USSR.
On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived at the USSR Embassy in Finland in Helsinki. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side attack through Finland. That is why Finland’s attitude towards the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait on the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide it with military and economic assistance, since Finland itself is not able to repel the German landing. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner. The Finnish side's guarantees that Finland would not allow its territorial integrity to be violated and Soviet Russia to be invaded through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, first of all, in the event of a German attack, to participate in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Åland Islands and to receive military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Finnish: Suursaari). No territorial demands were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.
In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tyutyarsaari, and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they could not be defended or used to protect the Karelian Isthmus. Negotiations ended without result on April 6, 1939.
On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany entered into a Non-Aggression Treaty. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-interference in the event of war. Germany began World War II by attacking Poland a week later on September 1, 1939. USSR troops entered Polish territory on September 17.
From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.
On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the agreement between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union’s demands on Finland—the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.
Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4, and November 9.
For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.
At these negotiations, for the first time, the proximity of the border to Leningrad is discussed. Joseph Stalin noted: “We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it”
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side to the Finnish delegation in Moscow looked like this:

1. Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.
2. Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.
3. The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohya (Finnish) Russian.
4. Finland transfers to the USSR the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytyarsaari, Seiskari.
5. The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
6.Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
7.The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km?).
8.The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands with Finland’s own forces.

Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and in Porayarvi (Finnish) Russian. These were territories that declared independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty The treaty remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised agreeing to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that demands for military bases should be accepted, and there was no point in hoping for German help.
The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoi Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and those closest to Leningrad territories in Terijoki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.
Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.
Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.
Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and starting in mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.
In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

President of Finland Risto Heikki Ryti (center) and Marshal K. Mannerheim

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions, since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issues of ensuring the security of Leningrad, in turn trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to armament of the Aland Islands, the demilitarized status of which governed by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.
The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.
Negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side followed with a statement: “We civilians have made no progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers.”
However, Stalin again made concessions the next day, offering to buy it instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to reaching an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.
On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “We will throw to hell all the games of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down any and all obstacles on the way to the goal.” On the same day, troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to prepare military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin outwardly demonstrated a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases, but the Finns refused to discuss it and on November 13 left for Helsinki.
There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered as confirmation of the correctness of its position.
On November 26, Pravda published an article “A buffoon at the post of Prime Minister,” which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign.

K.. Mannerheim and A. Hitler

On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the settlement of Maynila, staged by the Soviet side, which is confirmed by the corresponding orders of Mannerheim, who was confident in the inevitability of a Soviet provocation and therefore had previously withdrawn troops from the border to a distance that would exclude the occurrence of misunderstandings. The USSR leadership blamed Finland for this incident. IN Soviet authorities information to the terms widely used to name hostile elements: White Guard, White Pole, White emigrant, a new one was added - White Finn.
On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were given the order to go on the offensive.
Causes of the war
According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours) of the war.
It is alleged that the measures we are taking are directed against the independence of Finland or to interfere in its internal and external affairs. This is the same malicious slander. We consider Finland, whatever regime may exist there, to be an independent and sovereign state in all its foreign and domestic policies. We firmly stand for the Finnish people to decide their internal and external affairs themselves, as they themselves see fit.

Molotov assessed Finnish policy more harshly in a report on March 29, where he spoke of “hostility towards our country in the ruling and military circles of Finland” and praised the peaceful policy of the USSR:

Imbued with peacefulness foreign policy The USSR was demonstrated here with complete certainty. The Soviet Union immediately declared that it stood on a position of neutrality and steadily pursued this policy throughout the entire period.

— Report by V. M. Molotov at the VI session of the Supreme USSR on March 29, 1940
Did the Government and Party do the right thing by declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army.
Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, doubtfully increased the security of Leningrad. There was only one constant in the demands: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland, and near its coast, to oblige Finland not to ask for help from third countries other than the USSR.
On the second day of the war, a puppet force was created on the territory of the USSR Terijoki government, led by Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen.

Otto Vilhelmovich Kuusinen

On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti.

We can assume with a high degree of confidence: if things at the front had gone according to the operational plan, then this “government” would have arrived in Helsinki with a specific political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners.” Kuusinen’s address to the soldiers of the Finnish People’s Army directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the building of the Presidential Palace in Helsinki.
However, in reality, this “government” was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov’s statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow Assarsson on March 4, 1940 that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then subsequent Soviet conditions peace will be even tougher, and the USSR will then agree to a final agreement with the “government” of Kuusinen.

- M.I. Semiryaga. "Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1941-1945"

There is an opinion that Stalin planned, as a result of a victorious war, to include Finland into the USSR, which was part of the sphere of interests of the USSR according to the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, and negotiations with conditions that were obviously unacceptable for the then Finnish government were carried out only for the purpose of , so that after their inevitable breakdown there will be a reason to declare war. In particular, the desire to annex Finland explains the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic in December 1939. In addition, the plan for the exchange of territories provided by the Soviet Union assumed the transfer of territories beyond the Mannerheim Line to the USSR, thus opening a direct road for Soviet troops to Helsinki. The conclusion of peace could be caused by the realization of the fact that an attempt to forcefully Sovietize Finland would encounter massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the German side.
Strategic plans of the parties
USSR plan

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” (it should be noted that the Soviet command had practically no information about the very presence of a powerful line of defense. It is no coincidence that Mannerheim himself was surprised to learn of the existence of such a line of defense) in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops by Finland’s Western allies from the Barents Sea. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on flat territory that did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself to the maximum. in full. After breaking through the fortifications, it was planned to launch an attack on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. At the same time, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned.

Red Army party meeting in the trenches

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect - “it was believed that the Finnish army was in war time will have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions.” In addition, the Soviet command did not take into account the presence of a serious line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, by the beginning of the war having only “sketchy intelligence data” about them.
Finland plan
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line”, consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-earth firing points, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers that had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 long-term fire structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. Very powerful and complex fortifications were created in 1930–1939. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the state’s financial capabilities, and the people called them “millionaires” due to their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified with numerous artillery batteries on the shore and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to coordinate the fire of Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work - by the beginning of the war, Estonia provided its territories for military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.

Finnish soldier with a Lahti SalorantaM-26 machine gun

Finnish soldiers

Finnish sniper - “cuckoo” Simo Høihe. On his combat account there are about 700 Red Army soldiers (in the Red Army he was nicknamed -

" White death ".

FINNISH ARMY

1. Soldier in uniform 1927

(the toes of the boots are pointed and turned up).

2-3. Soldiers in uniform 1936

4. A soldier in a 1936 uniform with a helmet.

5. Soldier with equipment,

introduced at the end of the war.

6. An officer in winter uniform.

7. Huntsman in a snow mask and winter camouflage coat.

8. A soldier in a winter guard uniform.

9. Pilot.

10. Aviation Sergeant.
11. German helmet model 1916

12. German helmet model 1935

13. Finnish helmet, approved in

time of war.

14. German helmet model 1935 with the emblem of the 4th light infantry detachment, 1939-1940.

They also wore helmets captured from the Soviets.

soldier. All these hats and different types of uniforms were worn at the same time, sometimes in the same unit.

FINNISH NAVY

Finnish Army insignia

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for guerrilla operations, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to accommodate aircraft from the Western Allies.
The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee rapid stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment on the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then carry out a counter-offensive in Karelia.

Armed forces of opponents
Balance of forces by November 30, 1939:

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the supplies in the warehouses lasted:
-Cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns for - 2.5 months
-Shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - 1 month
-Fuels and lubricants - for 2 months
- Aviation gasoline - for 1 month

The Finnish military industry was represented by one state-owned cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

Soviet bomber DB-3F (IL-4)

The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one communications company, one engineer company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one battery of anti-tank guns, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.
The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

The Soviet division was twice as powerful as the Finnish division in terms of the total firepower of machine guns and mortars, and three times as powerful in artillery firepower. The Red Army did not have machine guns in service, but this was partially compensated by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; They had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.
Regarding the difference in the level of weapons on December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda will write:

You can’t help but admire the valiant soldiers of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles and shiny automatic light machine guns. The armies of two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peace-loving, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists force to rattle their sabers. And the weapon, let’s be honest, is old and worn. There is not enough gunpowder for more.

Red Army soldier with an SVT-40 rifle

However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the “Mannerheim Line”, difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, was stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov’s report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable “Mannerheim Line”, similar to the “Maginot Line” and “Siegfried Line”, which have not yet been crushed by any army, begins to live.
Cause of war and breakdown of relations

Nikita Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin said: “Let's start today... We will just raise our voices a little, and the Finns will only have to obey. If they persist, we will fire only one shot, and the Finns will immediately raise their hands and surrender.”
The official cause of war was the Maynila Incident: On November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which stated that as a result of artillery shelling carried out from Finnish territory, four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Finnish border guards recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day. The fact of the shots and the direction from which they came were recorded, and a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government proposed creating an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish agreement on mutual non-aggression.
The next day, Molotov accused Finland of “desiring to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling” and stated that the USSR “from now on considers itself free from the obligations” undertaken by virtue of the previously concluded non-aggression pact. Many years later, the former head of the Leningrad TASS bureau, Antselovich, said that he received a package with the text of a message about the “Maynila incident” and the inscription “open by special order” two weeks before the incident. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities. War was never officially declared.
Mannerheim, who as commander-in-chief had the most reliable information about the incident near Maynila, reports:
...And now the provocation that I had been expecting since mid-October happened. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border... ...We did not have to wait long for the implementation of Molotov’s words spoken at Moscow negotiations: “Now it will be the soldiers’ turn to talk.” On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation now known as “Shots at Maynila”... During the 1941-1944 war, Russian prisoners described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized...
In Soviet textbooks on the history of the USSR, responsibility for the outbreak of the war was placed on Finland and Western countries: “The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939, they managed to provoke Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR. England and France actively helped the Finns with arms supplies and were preparing to send their troops to help them. German fascism also provided hidden assistance to the Finnish reaction. The defeat of the Finnish troops thwarted the plans of the Anglo-French imperialists. In March 1940, the war between Finland and the USSR ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Moscow.”
In Soviet propaganda, the need for a reason was not advertised, and in the songs of that time the mission of Soviet soldiers was presented as liberating. An example would be the song “Accept us, Suomi beauty.” The task of liberating the workers of Finland from the oppression of the imperialists was an additional explanation for the outbreak of the war, suitable for propaganda within the USSR.
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Aarno Yrj?-Koskinen (Finnish: AarnoYrj?-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note from the Soviet government. It stated that in view of the current situation, for which responsibility falls on the Finnish government, the USSR government came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland.
Early in the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations from the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland at 8 o’clock in the morning on November 30 on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas.”
War

Order of the Leningrad Military District

The patience of the Soviet people and the Red Army has come to an end. It's time to teach a lesson to the presumptuous and insolent political gamblers who have blatantly challenged the Soviet people, and to completely destroy the center of anti-Soviet provocations and threats to Leningrad!

Comrades Red Army soldiers, commanders, commissars and political workers!

Fulfilling the sacred will of the Soviet government and our great people, I order:

The troops of the Leningrad Military District cross the border, defeat the Finnish troops and once and for all ensure the security of the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union and the city of Lenin - the cradle of the proletarian revolution.

We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of landowners and capitalists. We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the government of Kajander-Erkko, which oppresses the Finnish people and provoked a war with the USSR.

We respect the freedom and independence of Finland, received by the Finnish people as a result of the October Revolution and the victory of Soviet power. The Russian Bolsheviks, led by Lenin and Stalin, fought for this independence together with the Finnish people.

For the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR and the glorious city of Lenin!

For our beloved Motherland! For the Great Stalin!

Forward, sons of the Soviet people, soldiers of the Red Army, to the complete destruction of the enemy!

Commander of the Leningrad Military District Comrade K.A.Meretskov

Member of the Military Council Comrade A.A.Zhdanov

Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov

After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began evacuating the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered between November 29 and December 4.

Signal flares over the Soviet-Finnish border, the first month of the war.

The first stage of the war is usually considered to be the period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing in the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

Main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 3/13/1940.

	USSR Finland	Beginning of negotiations on concluding a mutual assistance agreement
	Finland	General mobilization announced
		The formation of the 1st Corps of the Finnish People's Army (originally the 106th Mountain Division), which was staffed by Finns and Karelians, began. By November 26, the corps numbered 13,405 people. The corps did not participate in hostilities
	USSR Finland	Negotiations were interrupted and the Finnish delegation left Moscow
		The Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly carried out from Finnish territory in the area of the border village of Mainila, four Red Army soldiers were killed and eight were wounded
		Announcement of denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland
		Severance of diplomatic relations with Finland
		Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities
		Troops of the Leningrad Military District (Commander 2nd Rank Army Commander K. A. Meretskov, Member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov):
		7A attacked on the Karelian Isthmus (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 13 artillery regiments; commander of the 2nd rank army commander V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - 2nd rank army commander Meretskov)
		8A (4 rifle divisions; division commander I. N. Khabarov, since January - 2nd rank army commander G. M. Stern) - north of Lake Ladoga in the Petrozavodsk direction
		9A (3rd infantry division; commander corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, from mid-December - corps commander V.I. Chuikov) - in central and northern Karelia
		14A (2nd infantry division; division commander V.A. Frolov) advanced into the Arctic
		The port of Petsamo has been taken in the Murmansk direction
		In the town of Terijoki, the so-called “People's Government” was formed from Finnish communists, headed by Otto Kuusinen
		The Soviet government signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the government of the “Finnish Democratic Republic” Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti
		Troops 7A overcame the operational zone of barriers 25-65 km deep and reached the front edge of the main defense line of the Mannerheim Line.
		USSR expelled from the League of Nations
		The advance of the 44th Infantry Division from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi with the aim of providing assistance to the 163rd Division encircled by the Finns. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. On January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. Division commander, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar I.T. Pakhomenko and Chief of Staff A.I. Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning their troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, 79 guns, 280 machine guns, 150 cars, all radio stations, and the entire convoy on the battlefield. Most of the fighters died, 700 people escaped encirclement, 1200 surrendered. For cowardice, Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were shot in front of the division line
		The 7th Army is divided into 7A and 13A (commander corps commander V.D. Grendal, from March 2 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov), which were reinforced with troops
		The government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland
		Stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus
		The Finnish attack on units of the 7th Army was repulsed
		The North-Western Front was formed on the Karelian Isthmus (commander 1st Rank Army Commander S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Zhdanov) consisting of 24 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 21 artillery regiments, 23 air regiments: - 7A (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments) - 13A (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments)
		A new 15A was formed from units of the 8th Army (commander of the 2nd rank army commander M.P. Kovalev)
		After the artillery barrage, the Red Army began to break through the main line of Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus
		The Summa fortified junction was taken
	Finland	Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman is suspended. Major General A.E. was appointed in his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps
		Units 7A reached the second line of defense
		7A and 13A began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay
		A bridgehead on the western shore of the Vyborg Bay was captured
	Finland	The Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of Viipuri (Vyborg)
		The 50th Corps cut the Vyborg-Antrea railway
	USSR Finland	Arrival of the Finnish delegation in Moscow
	USSR Finland	Conclusion of a peace treaty in Moscow. The Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala, Kuolajärvi, islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy Peninsula in the Arctic went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there. The Petsamo region, captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war, has been returned to Finland. (The border established by this treaty is close to the border under the Treaty of Nystad with Sweden in 1721)
	USSR Finland	Storming of Vyborg by units of the Red Army. Cessation of hostilities

The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.

Soviet tank T-28

The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Army of the Isthmus (Kannaksenarmeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.

For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy bunkers. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.

Until the end of December, attempts at a breakthrough continued, but were unsuccessful.

Scheme of military operations in December 1939 - January 1940

Scheme of the offensive of the Red Army in December 1939

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IVarmeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.

Juho Heiskanen

Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.
The advance of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland task force (Pohjois-SuomenRyhm?) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy defenses at 35–45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, attacking the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Front kitchen

Some researchers and memoirists try to explain the Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to? 40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +2 to -7 °C. Then until the New Year the temperature did not drop below 23 °C. Frosts of up to 40 °C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Destroyed Soviet T-26 tank

T-26

An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

Molotov cocktail of the times " Winter War»

During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Radar "RUS-1"

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line (Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920-1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.

Name

The name “Mannerheim Line” appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish War in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before this, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the start of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the structures.
History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, and construction itself continued intermittently until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939.
The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
Work on the defense plan was continued by the German colonel Baron von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish combat engineer training battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oskar Enckel. The main design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, in 1920 - 1924, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built, of which 114 were machine gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They reached their greatest scale in 1932, when six double-embrasure bunkers were built under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabritius.

Fortifications
The main defensive line consisted of an elongated system of defense nodes, each of which included several wood-earth field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed extremely unevenly on the main defensive line: the gaps between individual resistance nodes sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If counting is carried out from the shore of the Gulf of Finland, then the node designations will follow in this order: Bunker scheme

“N” – Khumaljoki [now Ermilovo] “K” – Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] “N” – Nyayukki [no existence]
“Ko” — Kolmikeeyalya [no noun] “Well” — Hyulkeyalya [no noun] “Ka” — Karkhula [now Dyatlovo]
“Sk” - Summakylä [non-creature] "La" - Lyahde [non-creature] "A" - Eyuräpää (Leipäsuo)
“Mi” – Muolaankylä [now Gribnoye] “Ma” – Sikniemi [no existential] “Ma” – Mälkelä [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [no noun] "No" - Noisniemi [now Mys] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Portovoye] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)

Dot SK16

Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive line. The fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense units:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct] "Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoye] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoye] "Le" - Leviainen [no existence]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Yulya-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
“Not” - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyyukylä [now Ozernoye]

Dot Ink5

The resistance center was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front the node occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and in depth 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine gun and artillery, which made up the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication trench with forward machine gun nests and rifle cells for one to three riflemen.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and embrasures for firing. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The basis for the fortifications was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and streams. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests there are rocky ridges and numerous large boulders everywhere. The Belgian general Badu wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia.”
Reinforced concrete structures of the “Mannerheim Line” are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).

A group of Red Army soldiers inspects an armored cap on a Finnish pillbox

The first generation bunkers were small, one-story, with one to three machine guns, and did not have shelters for the garrison or internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coating - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.

The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million-dollar” or million-dollar pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, and obtained additional allocations from the country’s parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified bunkers were the Sj4 "Poppius", which had embrasures for flanking fire in the western casemate, and the Sj5 "Millionaire", with embrasures for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers swept through the entire ravine with flanking fire, covering each other's front with machine guns. Flanking fire bunkers were called casemate “Le Bourget”, named after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some bunkers in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into flanking fire casemates, while the front embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of the flanking fire were well camouflaged with stones and snow, which made them difficult to detect; in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate the casemate with artillery from the front. “Million-dollar” pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm guns of the 1900 model on Durlyakher casemate mountings and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.

The weaknesses of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in first-term buildings, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, and lack of rigid reinforcement in first-term buildings.
The strengths of the pillboxes lay in the large number of fire embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, and in the rich filling of gaps.

Destroyed bunker

Engineering barriers
The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were somewhat different from the Soviet slingshots or the Bruno spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank ones. The gouges were usually placed in four rows, two meters apart, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with wire fences, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel obstacles at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at height 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdubolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the hole, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three or four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front edge of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and pillboxes was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of a populated area and were made of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. If necessary, the Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of wire barriers along the main defense line. In practice, when in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive line and began to attempt to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of tests of anti-tank barriers for survivability using those then in service The Finnish army of several dozen outdated Renault light tanks turned out to be incompetent in the face of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the gouges moved from their place under the pressure of medium T-28 tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the gouges with explosive charges, thereby creating passages for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback, undoubtedly, was a good overview of the anti-tank lines from distant enemy artillery positions, especially in open and flat areas, such as, for example, in the area of the defense center "Sj" (Summa-yarvi), where it was on 11.02. 1940 The main defensive line was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the hollows were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.

Between the granite anti-tank gouges there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Rubble of stones, barbed wire and in the distance an SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the contract neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”
In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, was no longer governing the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENT OF VINTER

Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government,” which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government.” The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen.

The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (made of khaki cloth and was similar to the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a captured uniform of the Polish army , are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to begin the political and organizational work of communists (note: the word “communists” is crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create Popular Front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, the roads were mined. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns citizens of the USSR

Foreign volunteers

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. The most significant number of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers there were also citizens of many other countries, including England and the USA, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the “Russian People's Detachments”, formed by the Finns from among captured Red Army soldiers. But since the work on forming such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in the hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Units of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov.

Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich

The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 mm.

203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931

Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland. [source not specified 198 days] Fought on the side of the Finns about 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries.

Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns

Finnish assault rifle M-31 “Suomi”

TTD “Suomi” M-31 Lahti


Cartridge used	9x19 Parabellum

Sighting line length
Barrel length
Weight without cartridges
Empty/loaded weight of 20-round box magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 36-round box magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 50-round box magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 40-round disc magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 71-round disc magazine
Rate of fire	700-800 rpm
Initial bullet speed
Sighting range	500 meters
Magazine capacity	20, 36, 50 rounds (box) 40, 71 (disc)

At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used guerrilla warfare tactics: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were established. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army, became widely known. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi to help the 163rd Division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had significant technical advantage before the Finns, but division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment on the battlefield of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train. More than a thousand personnel from among those who escaped the encirclement were wounded or frostbitten; some of the wounded were captured because they were not taken out during their escape. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division line.

On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

crew of the submarine "S-2"

Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelok of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae of the Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and fire from closed positions and mainly across areas, since target reconnaissance and adjustments were poorly established. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.
On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.
On February 9, the commander of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa region were not successful, the main attack was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the “Mannerheim Line”, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.

On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

England and France: plans for intervention

England provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, “we would have to fight one way or another.” The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, approached Halifax on December 1, 1939, asking for permission to ship war materials to Finland, on the condition that they would not be re-exported to Germany (with which England was at war). The head of the Northern Department, Laurence Collier, believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while opposing, however, the use proposed by Finland Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Snow continued to support the idea of an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he had expressed before the war. Amid government disagreements, the British Army began supplying weapons, including artillery and tanks, in December 1939 (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).
When Finland requested the supply of bombers for attacks on Moscow and Leningrad, as well as for the destruction of the railway to Murmansk, last idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Department of the North: helping the Finns destroy the road would allow Britain to “avoid carrying out the same operation later, independently and in less time.” favorable conditions" Maclean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with Maclean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Gerrard, plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, which were formed in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasement of the aggressors was wrong; Now the enemy, unlike his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not on ideological, but on humanitarian grounds.
Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in “circles close to the government” there was a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that at a conscious level the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to exchange one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely linked.
From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense because of the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany through a blockade. Soviet supplies of raw materials led to the fact that the German economy continued to grow and the realization that after some time this growth would make winning the war against Germany impossible. In this situation, although moving the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, the alternative was even worse inaction. The Chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, ordered the planning of an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.
Great Britain did not support many French plans, including an attack on the oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was technically at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also moving closer to opening a second front against the USSR. On 5 February 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill was unusually present but not speaking) it was decided to seek Norwegian and Swedish consent to a British-led operation in which an expeditionary force would land in Norway and move east . As Finland's situation worsened, French plans became increasingly one-sided. So, in early March, Daladier, to the surprise of Great Britain, announced his readiness to send 50,000 soldiers and 100 bombers against the USSR if the Finns asked for it. The plans were canceled following the end of the war, to the relief of many involved in the planning.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

For starting the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations.
Also, a “moral embargo” was imposed on the USSR - a ban on the supply of aviation technologies from the United States, which negatively affected the development of the Soviet aviation industry, which traditionally used American engines.
Another negative result for the USSR was the confirmation of the weakness of the Red Army. According to the Soviet history textbook of the USSR, before the Finnish War, the military superiority of the USSR even over such a small country as Finland was not obvious; And European countries could count on Finland's victory over the USSR.
Although the victory of the Soviet troops (the pushed back border) showed that the USSR was no weaker than Finland, information about the losses of the USSR, significantly exceeding the Finnish ones, strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany.
The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter time, in a wooded and swampy area, experience in breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics.
All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, “The war ended in 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom set for Finland turned out to be correct.”
The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).
In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build a railway on its territory connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.
The peace treaty also provided for the creation of a Soviet consulate in Mariehamn (Aland Islands), and the status of these islands as a demilitarized territory was confirmed.

Finnish citizens leave for Finland after the transfer of part of the territory to the USSR

Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which it made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to test out possible changes. Relations were initially cool, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently arranged for a meeting with Hermann Goering, the number two in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström at the end of the 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest.” Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; they also influenced Hitler's decision to attack the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis powers was called the “Continuation War” in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
3.Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland.
5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
6.Rent of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years.

Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War. In 1944, these territories again ceded to the USSR.
Finnish losses
Military
According to an official statement published in the Finnish press on May 23, 1940, the total irretrievable losses of the Finnish army during the war amounted to 19,576 killed and 3,263 missing. Total - 22,839 people.
According to modern calculations:
Killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people)
Wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people)
Prisoners - 1000 people.
Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. out of approximately 250 thousand participants, that is, about 25%. Brief information about each of the victims on the Finnish side was published in a number of Finnish publications.
Civil
According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombings of Finnish cities, 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

USSR losses

The official figures for Soviet casualties in the war were announced at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.

Monument to those who fell in the Soviet-Finnish war (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy).

war memorial