Operation Typhoon World War II briefly. Operation Typhoon or the Moscow defeat of Hitler

Of the three directions according to the Barbarossa plan, the most important was the Minsk-Smolensk - Moscow direction. The breakthrough to Moscow and its capture was to be carried out by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock.

G. Blumentritt reports that Army Group Center was the strongest of the three army groups, noting that “Hitler sought to achieve economic goals: he wanted to capture Ukraine, the Donetsk basin and, finally, the Caucasus,” and in He was least interested in Moscow (15). The question arises, why then was the most powerful of the German groupings Army Group Center and not Army Group South?

Already on September 16, the command of Army Group Center sent directive N1300/41 to the troops on the immediate preparation of the operation to capture Moscow (16). According to the plan, the offensive was to begin no later than the beginning of October and the attack of three armies and three tank groups, with the support of the second air fleet under the command of Field Marshal

A. Kesselring.

During the second half of September, the High Command of the German Ground Forces, or Oberkommando des Heeres, and the High Command of the German Armed Forces, or OKW, transmitted additional instructions to the headquarters of Army Group Center for preparations for the offensive, which included ensuring secrecy. wax regroupings, the timing of the arrival of mobile formations and OKH reserve troops, the timing of the transition to the offensive and clarification of the tasks of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Group (17).

Operation Typhoon had to “certainly succeed, in the shortest possible time, before the onset of the autumn thaw and winter, and end in victory” (18). For this purpose, armies and divisions were transferred from army groups “North” and “South” to the Moscow direction, and troops were re-equipped.

Thus, by the end of September - beginning of October, Army Group Center had 74.5 divisions, including 14 tank, 8 motorized and 1 cavalry, or 64% of all German formations operating on the Soviet-German front (19). By October 1, Army Group Center had 1,800 thousand people (20), over 14 thousand.

guns and mortars, 75% of tanks of the total number located on the Soviet-German front. About 1,390 aircraft were allocated to support the attack on Moscow (21).

On September 26, the command of Army Group Center issued order N1620/41 to attack. The action plan of the armies for it was as follows: the 4th Army (commander - G. von Kluge) and the 4th Panzer Group (commander E. Gepner) advance from Roslavl to Vyazma; 9th Aryan (commander A. Strauss) and 3rd Panzer Group (commander G. Got) - from the Dukhovshchina area towards the Vyazma - Rzhev railway; The 2nd Army (commander M. von Weichs) should cover the 4th Army from the south and is heading to the Sukhinichi area; The 2nd Panzer Group (commander G. Guderian) should launch an offensive two days earlier before the armies go on the offensive and strike in the direction of Orel and Bryansk (22). In addition to the main attacking three armies and three tank groups, Army Group Center's reserve included

one tank division, one infantry regiment and one motorized brigade (23) were allocated.

Anticipating options for possible enemy actions, the Soviet command did not remain idle. On September 10, the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov, on behalf of the SVGK, ordered the transition of the troops of the Western Front to defense. On September 20, the headquarters of the Western Front presented a plan for the defensive operation of the troops, which determined the tasks of the front and armies, as well as the probable directions of the enemy’s actions and, in connection with this,

various options for the actions of the front armies (24). From September 27, by order of B.M. Shaposhnikov, reconnaissance of all types was organized in the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts (25).

On September 30, 1941, 15 divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group under the command of G. Guderian went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The defensive stage of the battle for Moscow began.

What could the Soviet command oppose to the attackers at this time? The Western Front, commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev from September 12, defended a 340-kilometer strip with the forces of six armies (16th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 29th and 30th) from Ostashkov to Yelnya. The reserve front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny, its main forces consisting of four armies (31st, 32nd, 33rd and

49th) occupied defense in the rear of the Western Front west of Rzhev, Vyazma and Spas-Demensk. The rest of his armies, the 24th and 43rd, continuing the southern wing of the Western Front, covered the junction of the Bryansk and Western fronts. The Bryansk Front, under the command of Colonel General A.I. Eremenko, consisting of three armies (3rd, 13th and 50th) and the operational group of Major General A.I. Ermakov, occupied defense at the line west of Bryansk and east

Glukhov, i.e. defended the eastern bank of the Desna from Frolovka to Putivl. All three fronts included about 1,250 thousand people (i.e., about 30% of the active army), 7,600 guns and mortars, 990 tanks (of which only 140 were medium and heavy), 677 aircraft (about 80% of them obsolete types). Thus, the German troops outnumbered them in manpower by 1.4 times, in artillery by 1.8 times, in tanks by 1.7 times, and in aircraft by 2 times (26).

The measures taken by the Soviet command to strengthen the defense and organize reconnaissance were belated and by the beginning of the German offensive, the construction of defensive lines and the regrouping of troops had not been completed and, therefore, the Soviet army was not ready to meet the enemy’s attack.

So, on September 30, simultaneously with the 2nd Tank Group in the Bryansk Front, the 2nd Field Army also went on the offensive. In the evening, the commander of the Bryansk Front, A.I. Eremenko, reported to the Chief of the General Staff about the enemy going on the offensive and using about 250 tanks in battle (27).

On October 2, the remaining troops of Army Group Center went on the offensive against the Reserve and Western Fronts. By directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of October 1 and 2, additional units of aviation and rifle corps were sent to the area of ​​​​Glukhov and Sevsk to help the Bryansk Front in order to defeat the enemy (28). Thus, the Soviet High Command considered it more appropriate to strengthen the defense of the Oryol-Bryansk direction, while only a diversionary blow was struck there, the main German offensive unfolded in the Vyazma area. It was in this direction that the main events of the battle for Moscow unfolded.

Already in the first days of the offensive, German troops managed to achieve significant results. On October 2, enemy troops attacked units of the 19th and 30th armies in the Dukhovshchina area and penetrated 15-30 km into the defenses of Soviet troops. Despite the counterattacks undertaken by the Soviet command, by October 7, units of the 19th and 20th armies of the Western Front were surrounded west of Vyazma. At a rapid pace, the enemy continued to make his way to Moscow in other directions: by October 5, the areas of Spas-Demensk, Yukhnov, Yelnya, Zhizdra, Orel, Karachev, and Bryansk were captured.

During the first days of October, a difficult situation developed in the western direction, creating the danger of a breakthrough of Wehrmacht troops to Moscow. Units of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts found themselves surrounded, since there was no continuous line of defense, as well as reserves capable of assisting them. The main task was to create a new line of defense in order to stop the enemy on the approaches to the capital. The Mozhaisk line, which ran from north to south from Volokolamsk to Kaluga, became such a line of defense.

Having lost faith in the ability of the commanders of the Western and Reserve Fronts, I.S. Konev and S.M. Budyonny, to save the situation in the western direction, J.V. Stalin urgently summons G.K. Zhukov from Leningrad.

Defensive stage of the Moscow Battle.

Fascist Germany. The operation to capture Moscow received a code name "Typhoon". The concept of the operation included: powerful strikes by large groups concentrated in areas Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka encircle the main forces of the Red Army troops covering the capital and destroy them in the areas Bryansk and Vyazma, and then quickly go around Moscow from the North and South with the aim of capturing her.

USSR

The idea of ​​the Soviet Supreme High Command in this operation was to inflict the greatest possible losses on the Nazi troops through stubborn defense and gain time for the formation and concentration of new reserves for the purpose of a subsequent counter-offensive.

Dates (start and end of operation)

The Moscow strategic defensive operation was Stage 1 the battle of Moscow and took place with September 30 to December 5, 1941.

Balance of forces before surgery

USSR

The Moscow direction was covered by troops of three fronts - Western, Reserve and Bryansk. I.V. Stalin so overestimated the strength and capabilities of these troops that already during the German offensive he gave the order to withdraw two divisions from Vyazma to the reserve of Headquarters. The real forces of the three fronts were limited. The fronts consisted of 1250 thousand. man, up 1000 tanks, 7600 guns and mortars. Thus, the enemy outnumbered Soviet ground forces by 1.3-1.4 times

The air forces of the three Soviet fronts consisted of 568 aircraft (210 bombers, 265 fighters, 36 attack aircraft, 37 reconnaissance aircraft). In addition, already in the first days of the battle, 368 long-range bombers and 423 fighters and 9 reconnaissance fighter aircraft of the Moscow air defense were brought into battle. Thus, the forces of the Red Army Air Force in the Moscow direction were practically not inferior to the enemy and numbered 1368 aircraft.

Fascist Germany

On September 6, 1941, Adolf Hitler signed OKW Directive No. 35, which set decisive goals for the destruction of Soviet troops east of Smolensk. The following troops were involved in the operation: Army Group troops "Center"(commander - Field Marshal General F. von Bock) - 74,5 divisions ( 1800 thousand people, 1700 tanks and assault guns, 14 thousand. guns, 1400 aircraft), including directly for participation in the operation - 53 divisions, of which 14 tank and 8 motorized.

Personalities (commanders of fronts, armies and other units)

At the command post of the 16th Army. Battle for Moscow

In the Moscow direction, a strip of about 800 km was defended by troops of the Western, Bryansk, and Reserve Fronts.

• Western Front (Colonel General I. S. Konev, member of the Military Council N. A. Bulganin, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General V. D. Sokolovsky), consisting of:

22nd Army (Major General V. A. Yushkevich)

29th Army (Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov)

30th Army (Major General V. A. Khomenko)

19th Army (Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin)

16th Army (Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky)

20th Army (Lieutenant General F. A. Ershakov)

• Reserve Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, member of the Military Council N. S. Kruglov A. F. Anisov) consisting of:

in the second echelon of the Western Front)

31st Army (Major General V. N. Dalmatov)

49th Army (Lieutenant General I. G. Zakharkin)

32nd Army (Major General S.V. Vishnevsky)

33rd Army (brigade commander D. N. Onuprienko) (in the first echelon)

24th Army (Major General K. I. Rakutin)

43rd Army (Major General P. P. Sobennikov)

• Bryansk Front (commander Colonel General A.I. Eremenko, member of the Military Council, divisional commissar P. I. Mazepov, Chief of Staff Major General G. F. Zakharov) consisting of:

50th Army (Major General M.P. Petrov)

3rd Army (Major General Ya. G. Kreizer)

13th Army (Major General A. M. Gorodnyansky)

Operational group (Major General A. N. Ermakov)

• To clarify the front-line situation and assist the headquarters of the Western and Reserve Fronts in creating a new group of forces to repel the enemy, representatives of the State Defense Committee and Headquarters arrived in the event areas in early October 1941 V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov and A. M. Vasilevsky.
• On October 10, the State Defense Committee united the control of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts in one hand. Their troops were included in the Western Front, headed by K. Zhukov, who had previously commanded the Leningrad Front.

• To cover the capital from the north-west, on October 17, on the basis of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front (22nd, 29th, 30th and 31st armies), the Kalinin Front was created (commander Colonel General I. S. Konev, member of the Military Council, corps commissar D. S. Leonov, Chief of Staff Major General I. I. Ivanov).

• The air forces of the three Soviet fronts in the Battle of Moscow consisted of 568 aircraft (210 bombers, 265 fighters, 36 attack aircraft, 37 reconnaissance aircraft). The commander of the Air Force is Alexander Aleksandrovich Novikov.

Progress of the operation

First operation "Typhoon" the enemy's southern attack group began. September 30th she attacked the troops Bryansk Front from the area Shostka, Glukhov in the direction of Orel and bypass Bryansk from the southeast. On October 2, the remaining two groups from the regions went on the offensive Dukhovshchina and Roslavl.

Their attacks were directed in converging directions towards Vyazma with the aim of covering the main forces of the Western and Reserve Fronts. In the first days, the enemy offensive developed successfully. He managed to reach the rear of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front, and west of Vyazma - encircle the 19th and 20th armies of the Western and 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve Fronts. Deep breakthroughs of enemy tank groups, encirclement by them significant forces on three fronts, the incomplete construction of lines and the lack of troops on Mozhaisk line of defense- all this created a threat of the enemy reaching Moscow. On the night of October 5 The State Defense Committee decided to defend Moscow. The main line of resistance was identified as the Mozhaisk line of defense, where all forces and means were urgently sent. October 10 State Defense Committee united the control of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts in one hand. Their troops were included in the Western Front, headed by G. K. Zhukov, who previously commanded the Leningrad Front. It was decided to build another line of defense on the immediate approaches to the capital - Moscow zone Active military operations by Soviet troops surrounded had a serious impact on the development of events. They pinned down 28 fascist German divisions in the Vyazma area, which were stuck here and could not continue the attack on Moscow.Advanced tank divisions Guderian, rushing from Orla to Tula, came across in the area Mtsensk to the resistance of the 1st Special Rifle Corps of the General D. D. Lelyushenko. The enemy's delay at Mtsensk made it easier to organize the defense of Tula. TO October 10 a fierce struggle unfolded on the front from the upper reaches of the Volga to

Lgova. The enemy captured Sychevka, Gzhatsk, reached the approaches to Kaluga, fought in the Bryansk region, near Mtsensk, on the approaches to Ponyryam and Lgov. The Western Front was replenished from the reserves of the Headquarters and other fronts with 11 rifle divisions, 16 tank brigades, and more than 40 artillery regiments. The front command used them to cover the most important directions leading to Moscow - Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. By the end of October at the front from Selizharova to Tula There were already ten armies operating on two fronts. 15th of November Hitler's command again led its troops in the “last” attack on Moscow. Fascist troops managed to break through to the canal from the north Volga – Moscow and cross it in the Yakhroma area. In the south they bypassed the unconquered Tula and broke through to the shores Oka in the Kashira area. It was during these critical days that our reserves arrived from the rear. Straining their last strength, the fascist troops captured Aprelevka– it’s 35 kilometers from Moscow. In the north they broke into Kryukovo(30 kilometers from the capital). One more effort and here they are Krasnaya Polyana(this is already 25 kilometers from the city limits). And now at the front near Moscow to December 4 – 5 there was a lull. The fascist German troops were exhausted, their offensive was faltering.

Results of the operation

During fierce battles on the distant and near approaches to Moscow, Soviet troops stopped the advance of the main German group, Army Group Center, and inflicted a heavy defeat on it. The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army, G. Guderian, wrote down his summary as follows: “The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat, which, due to the stubbornness of the high command, led to fatal consequences in the coming weeks. A crisis arose in the German offensive; the strength and morale of the German army were broken.” The conditions were prepared for launching a counteroffensive and defeating the enemy near Moscow.

Heroes of the battle

There are a lot of heroes of the battle for Moscow. Victory in the battle surrounded its heroes with an aura of unfading glory. For the exemplary performance of combat missions and the courage and heroism shown in the battle of Moscow, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and later - Hero of the Russian Federation. Let's remember them by name.

• The Battle of Moscow is one of the largest battles of the war in terms of the number of troops involved and the losses incurred. On the fields of the Moscow region, 3.4 million more soldiers and officers fought than in the Battle of Stalingrad, 3 million more than in the Kursk Bulge and 3.5 million more than in the Berlin operation.

• Shortly before the battle, political instructor of the Panfilov division Vasily Klochkov told his soldiers: “Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind us!” It should be noted that, according to the generally accepted version, all participants in the battle that followed these words died, so where this phrase came to be known is completely unclear.

• The Soviet 32nd Red Banner Rifle Division under Colonel V.I. Polosukhin, reinforced by tank brigades, defended on the Borodino field. For four days she repelled enemy attacks, after which she was forced to retreat. The chief of staff of the 4th German Army, G. Blumentritt, recalled: “The four battalions of French volunteers operating as part of the 4th Army turned out to be less resistant. At Borodin, Field Marshal von Kluge addressed them with a speech, recalling how, during the time of Napoleon, the French and Germans fought here side by side against a common enemy. The next day, the French boldly went into battle, but, unfortunately, they could not withstand either the powerful attack of the enemy or the severe frost and blizzard. They had never had to endure such trials before. The French legion was defeated, suffering heavy losses from enemy fire and frost. A few days later he was withdrawn to the rear and sent to the West...” / History of the Second World War, 1939-1945, T. 4.- M.: Military Publishing House. 1975/

Value (estimates) of the operation

Monument to the heroes of the Moscow Battle on Peremilovskaya Heights, in the Yakhroma area

• The historical significance of the victory near Moscow lies in the fact that it changed the international situation: it contributed to the strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition, instilled confidence in the masses of the enslaved countries in the victory over fascism, weakened the coalition of aggressive countries, and undermined the economic, military and moral forces of German fascism. The defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow was the beginning of the death of Hitler's Wehrmacht, the beginning of the collapse of Nazi Germany.
• G.K. Zhukov recalled: “When people ask me what I remember most from the last war, I always answer: the battle for Moscow... It was the most crucial moment of the war. I took command of the front in the days when the front was essentially in the suburbs of Moscow. "It took us an hour to get from the Kremlin to the front headquarters in Perkhushkovo by car. Now it's even hard to imagine how close it is. The battles took place in places where young Muscovites now go to ski in winter and pick mushrooms in the fall."
• American General D. MacArthur noted: “The scope and brilliance of its (Red Army) recent crushing offensive, which forced the Germans to retreat from Moscow, was the greatest achievement of all history.”
• The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army, G. Guderian, wrote down his summary as follows: “The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat, which, due to the stubbornness of the high command, led in the coming weeks to fatal consequences "A crisis arose during the German offensive; the strength and morale of the German army were broken."
• The operational-tactical assessment of the Battle of Moscow is that the Red Army won this first general battle of the war not by superiority of forces and means and by no means by superiority of tactics. The soldiers and officers of the Red Army surpassed the enemy with fortitude: perseverance and endurance, dedication and the will to win - qualities that originate in the depths of the national Russian character.

The battle for Moscow is coming. Operation Typhoon was the name of the operation to capture Moscow in Hitler's documents. Moscow was supposed to be captured before the onset of frost. They wanted to turn Moscow into ruins, and they planned to take the Soviet government prisoner. Operation Typhoon of 1941 was supposed to be the end of the war, but Hitler’s plans, fortunately, did not come true. November 7 was set as the day for the capture of Moscow. This date was not chosen by chance - November 7 in the USSR was a public holiday, a day

Operation Typhoon was structured as follows. First, powerful strikes had to be carried out using military equipment, which would lead to gaps in the defense of our troops. After this, Nazi tanks and infantry were to move forward and encircle the main forces of our troops in the area of ​​​​Vyazma and Bryansk. After these forces were destroyed, the infantry also had to encircle Moscow. The 2nd tank group was supposed to surround Moscow from the south, the 3rd and 4th groups from the north. The infantry was to enter from the west.

On September 30, the 2nd Tank Group under the command went on the offensive in the field of the Bryansk Front. Operation Typhoon has begun. The German troops greatly outnumbered the Soviets both in numbers and in weapons. On October 2, two other tank groups went on the offensive. Soviet troops began to retreat to Moscow. Operation Typhoon was successful for some time - on October 7, not far from Vyazma, part of the Soviet troops was encircled. On October 13, Rzhev was captured. On October 14, tank groups occupied Kalinin. The Soviet units surrounded near Vyazma pinned down a considerable number of German troops around them. On October 18, Mozhaisk fell. November 18 Operation Typhoon enters its second phase.

The defense of the capital was commanded by G.K. Zhukov. Under his leadership, the three fronts were united into one front - the Western Front. On November 7, a day that was a holiday for the Soviet people, a parade of troops took place on Red Square, from which soldiers and officers went straight to the front. Forces flocked to help from Transbaikalia, Central Asia, and the Far East. Divisions were formed and immediately sent to the front. Also, fighter battalions were formed from volunteers, which were engaged in catching enemy spies in the city. A huge number of Moscow women and teenagers were engaged in construction. The Germans managed to advance so much that Moscow was 30 kilometers away. Stalin in these fateful days decided to remain in Moscow.

On December 4-5, the German advance was stopped. Operation Typhoon failed. On December 5, General Konev’s troops launched a counteroffensive, and on December 6, Zhukov’s troops launched a counteroffensive. German troops began to retreat. Skiers and paratroopers were sent to the areas of retreat to the fascist troops. The fascist army suffered heavy losses. The German army alone lost about half a million people. The losses of Soviet troops were also enormous.
WWII's Operation Typhoon was a fiasco, and it was of great consequence. The plan for a lightning victory failed.

For the first time, Hitler's army failed to achieve its desired goal. It turned out that the German one is not at all invincible. Having captured vast territories, it was now retreating before the onslaught of the Soviet people. As a result, the war dragged on, it was not possible to win before the onset of frost, and now Hitler will have to fight in Russia in the winter. The Soviet people showed their courage, the readiness of every soldier to fight until their last breath for their Motherland. His courage became known throughout the world.

9. Battle of Kursk

Leningrad blockade.

Breaking the blockade of Leningrad

New order" of Germany and the partisan movement.

Hitler's concept of a complete reorganization of German social life in accordance with the Nazi worldview. Speaking to the leadership of the Nazi Party in June 1933, Hitler declared that “the dynamism of the national revolution still exists in Germany and that it must continue until its complete end. All aspects of life in the Third Reich must be subordinated to the policy of Gleichschaltung.” In practice, this meant the formation of a police regime and the establishment of a brutal dictatorship in the country.
The Reichstag, as a legislative body, was rapidly losing its power, and the Weimar Constitution ceased immediately after the Nazis came to power.
Nazi propaganda tirelessly tried to convince the German public that the “new order” would bring true freedom and prosperity to Germany.

The partisan movement (partisan war 1941 - 1945) is one of the sides of the USSR's resistance to the fascist troops of Germany and the Allies during the Great Patriotic War.

The partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War was very large-scale and, most importantly, well organized. It differed from other popular uprisings in that it had a clear command system, was legalized and subordinated to Soviet power. The partisans were controlled by special bodies, their activities were prescribed in several legislative acts and had goals described personally by Stalin. The number of partisans during the Great Patriotic War numbered about a million people; more than six thousand different underground detachments were formed, which included all categories of citizens.

The purpose of the guerrilla war of 1941-1945. - destruction of the infrastructure of the German army, disruption of food and weapons supplies, destabilization of the entire fascist machine.

Events of the Khrushchev Thaw

The period of the Khrushchev Thaw is characterized by the following events:

• The process of rehabilitation of victims of repression began, the innocently convicted population was granted amnesty, and relatives of “enemies of the people” became innocent.
• The republics of the USSR received more political and legal rights.
• The year 1957 was marked by the return of Chechens and Balkars to their lands, from which they were evicted during Stalin's time due to accusations of treason. But such a decision did not apply to the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars.
• Also, 1957 is famous for the International Festival of Youth and Students, which in turn speaks of the “opening of the Iron Curtain” and the easing of censorship.
• The result of these processes is the emergence of new public organizations. Trade union bodies are undergoing reorganization: the staff of the top level of the trade union system has been reduced, and the rights of primary organizations have been expanded.
• Passports were issued to people living in villages and collective farms.
• Rapid development of light industry and agriculture.
• Active construction of cities.
• Improving the standard of living of the population.

One of the main achievements of the policy of 1953–1964. there was the implementation of social reforms, which included solving the issue of pensions, increasing incomes of the population, solving the housing problem, and introducing a five-day week. The period of the Khrushchev Thaw was a difficult time in the history of the Soviet state. Behind so In a short time (10 years), many transformations and innovations were carried out. The most important achievement was the exposure of the crimes of the Stalinist system, the population discovered the consequences of totalitarianism.

Results

So, the policy of the Khrushchev Thaw was superficial and did not affect the foundations of the totalitarian system. The dominant one-party system was preserved using the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev did not intend to carry out complete de-Stalinization, because it meant admitting his own crimes. And since it was not possible to completely renounce Stalin’s time, Khrushchev’s transformations did not take root for long. In 1964, a conspiracy against Khrushchev matured, and from this period a new era in the history of the Soviet Union began.

Perestroika of the USSR.

By the mid-80s. The USSR's lag behind the West became increasingly obvious. The country needed reforms. In April 1985, the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev announced the beginning of “perestroika and acceleration.” But he did not have a reform plan. Business was legalized under the guise of cooperatives, but immediately imposed excessive taxes, and money from criminal structures was often “laundered” there. The independence of enterprises expanded, but the weakening of centralization in the system, which did not work without it, and in such conditions, the delay in creating a normal market system led in 1990-1991. to the collapse of the economy. Glasnost appeared, i.e. freedom of speech, but mainly only in large cities. The rehabilitation of victims of the Stalinist (and not only) regime has resumed. The awakening of hopes and openness gave rise to a new rise in culture, and previously prohibited works began to be published. The exposure of Stalinism was resumed, which turned into an exposure of the communist system as a whole. In 1989, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR convened, elected on an alternative basis (previously only one candidate was nominated). During the elections, the anti-communist movement “Democratic Russia” arose, uniting supporters of the reorganization of the country along Western lines. They were supported primarily by the intelligentsia. At the congress they organized the Interregional Deputy Group faction. Its leaders have headed the capital cities since 1990: G. Kh. Popov - Moscow, A. A Sobchak - Leningrad (St. Petersburg). In 1990, under pressure from the opposition, the phrase about the leading role of the CPSU was removed from the Constitution. A variety of parties emerged. Gradually, power began to transfer from party structures to councils elected by the people, but even they often could not improve the situation. Often the heads of local party organizations themselves became leaders of councils. In 1990, the positions of president of the USSR (Gorbachev became) and the RSFSR (member of “Democratic Russia” B.N. Yeltsin) were introduced. Supporters of preserving the previous system (Vice President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense of the USSR D.T. Yazov, etc.) tried to stage a coup, sent troops into Moscow on August 19, 1991 and declared a state of emergency, but already on August 21 failed and were arrested.

Stages.

1st stage(March 1985 - January 1987). The beginning of the period of Perestroika was characterized by the recognition of the departmental shortcomings of the existing political-economic system of the USSR and attempts to correct them through several large administrative campaigns - an anti-alcohol campaign, “b-ba with unearned income”, the introduction of state acceptance , a demonstration of corruption. Radical steps had not yet been taken during this period; outwardly everything remained as before. At the same time, in 1985-86, the main body of old/brezhn/conscription personnel was replaced with a new management team. Thus, the beginning stage of perestroika can be regarded as a kind of “calm before the storm.”
2nd stage(January 1987 - June 1989). "Golden Age" of Perestroika. Characterized by the beginning of large-scale reforms in all spheres of life in Soviet society. Half of publicity is being proclaimed in public life - the easing of censorship in the media and the lifting of bans on topics that were previously considered taboo. In the economy, private entrepreneurship in the form of cooperatives has been legalized, and joint ventures with foreign companies are beginning to be actively created. In international politics, the main doctrine is “New Thinking” - a course towards abandoning the class approach in diplomacy and improving relations with the West. Part of the population is gripped by euphoria from the long-awaited changes and freedom unprecedented by Soviet standards. At the same time, during this period, general instability begins to gradually increase in the country: the economic situation worsens, separatist sentiments appear on the outskirts of the nation, and the first interethnic clashes break out.
3rd stage(June 1989 - 1991). The final stage of Perestroika, which dates back to the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. During this period, there was a sharp destabilization of the political situation in the country: after the Congress, a confrontation between the communist regime and the new political forces that emerged as a result of the democratization of society began. Difficulties in the ek-ke are developing into a full-scale crisis. Chronic goods reach their apogee. shortage: empty store shelves become a symbol of the turn of the 80s and 90s. Perestroika euphoria in society is replaced by disappointment, uncertainty about the future and mass anti-Soviet sentiment. “New thinking” in the international arena boils down to endless unilateral concessions to the West, as a result of which the USSR loses its plural position and superpower status. In Russia and other republics of the Union, separatist-minded forces come to power - the “parade of sovereignties” begins. The logical result of this development of events was the liquidation of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
(However, it is controversial whether the events that took place in the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR in 1991 are attributed to Perestroika, since at least it is not known for certain when the last time the term “perestroika” was used in the ideological policy of the Soviet Union. leadership. At the same time, historically it is reliable that as a result of the events of 1991, which are, if not a stage of Perestroika, then at least its direct logical continuation, its fundamental object - the USSR - collapsed. Perestroika, which was initially a kind of reform of its object - the USSR, ultimately became the voluntary or involuntary cause of the destruction of this holy object.)
Fak-ki Perestroika in its original form, i.e. as a course to improve socialism, ended in the first half of 1990. Subsequent events were essentially the beginning of a complete change in the system: the dismantling of the socialist system and the construction of capitalism on the Western model instead.

Defeat of the Kwantung Army

At the beginning of August 1945, the Soviet Union, fulfilling its obligations to its allies, began military operations in the Far East. A large strategic enemy group was concentrated on the territory of Manchuria and North Korea. Its basis was the Japanese Kwantung Army (commander - General O. Yamada).

General Yamada was also subordinate to the troops formed in the occupied territories - the army of the “state” of Manchukuo, the army of Inner Mongolia under the command of Prince Dewan and the Suiyuan Army Group.

The enemy troops numbered over 1 million people, 6,260 guns and mortars, 1,155 tanks, 1,900 aircraft, and 25 ships. A third of the group's troops were located in the border zone, the main forces were in the central regions of Manchuria.

There were 17 fortified areas along the borders with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR).

In preparation for the operation, the Soviet command, during May and early August, transferred part of the troops and equipment released in the west to the Far East. From the newly arrived, as well as the troops already available in the Far East, 3 fronts were formed: Transbaikal (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky), 1st Far Eastern (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov), 2- th Far Eastern (commander - army general

M.A. Purkaev). The front troops numbered over 1.5 million people, over 27 thousand guns and mortars, more than 700 rocket artillery installations, 5,250 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft. The forces of the Pacific Fleet involved in the operation (commander - Admiral I.S. Yumashev) numbered about 165 thousand personnel, 416 ships, 1382 combat aircraft, 2550 guns and mortars.

In addition, the Amur Military Flotilla (12.5 thousand people, 126 ships, 68 combat aircraft, 199 guns and mortars; commander - Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov), as well as the Border Troops of the adjacent districts, took part in the battles. The overall command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was exercised by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. The Mongolian troops were commanded by Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic Kh. Choibalsan. The actions of the Navy and Air Force forces were led by Fleet Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov and Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.

To defeat the forces of the Kwantung Army and its allies, the Soviet command planned to launch two main strikes from the territory of Mongolia and Soviet Primorye, as well as several auxiliary strikes in the general direction of the central regions of Manchuria. After completing a deep envelopment of the main forces of the Kwantung Army, they were supposed to be cut up and defeated in parts. Combat operations had to be conducted in a complex theater of military operations, replete with various difficult terrain types (desert, mountain, taiga) and large rivers.

The offensive began on August 9 with simultaneous actions by three Soviet fronts. Military installations in Harbin, Changchun and Jilin, as well as troop concentration areas, enemy communication centers and communications in the border areas were subjected to massive air strikes. Ships of the Pacific Fleet attacked Japanese naval bases in North Korea and cut communications connecting Korea and Manchuria with Japan.

The troops of the Transbaikal Front advanced from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic and Soviet Dauria. The advanced detachments crossed the border on the night of August 9 and launched a rapid offensive. The main forces moved forward at dawn. Having overcome the waterless steppes, the Gobi Desert and the Greater Khingan mountain system, the armies of the Transbaikal Front defeated the Kalgan, Solun and Hailar enemy groups, reached the approaches to the large industrial and administrative centers of Manchuria, cut off the Kwantung Army from Japanese troops in Northern China and, having occupied Changchun and Shenyang, advanced to Dalian and Lushun.

Troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front advanced from Primorye towards the Transbaikal Front. They broke through the enemy's border fortifications, after which, repelling strong counterattacks of Japanese troops in the Mudanjiang region, together with the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front they occupied Girin and Harbin.

In cooperation with the landing forces of the Pacific Fleet, they captured the North Korean ports of Ungi, Najin, Chongjin, and Wonsan. Japanese troops found themselves cut off from the mother country. At the same time, front troops launched an offensive on Harbin and Girin, fighting to eliminate individual enemy groups that continued to resist. For the speedy liberation of Harbin, Girin, Pyongyang and other cities, airborne assault forces were landed in them from August 18 to 24.

Troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, in cooperation with the Amur Military Flotilla, crossed the Amur and Ussuri and within three days cleared the entire right bank of the Amur of the enemy. After this, they broke through the enemy's long-term defenses in the Heihe and Fujin regions and then launched an offensive deep into Manchuria.

Having overcome the Lesser Khingan mountain range by August 20, the forward detachments of the front developed an attack on Qiqihar. On August 20, formations of the 15th Army entered Harbin, already occupied by Soviet airborne troops and sailors of the Amur Flotilla.

By August 20, Soviet troops, having advanced deep into Northeast China from 200-300 km from the east and north to 400-800 km from the west, reached the Manchurian Plain, surrounded and dismembered the Japanese group into several isolated parts. On August 19, Japanese troops began to surrender en masse.

After the defeat of the Kwantung Army and the loss of the military-economic base in Northeast China and North Korea, Japan lost its last strength and ability to continue the war. On September 2, 1945, Japanese representatives signed the instrument of surrender aboard the American battleship Missouri, ending World War II.

Periodization of the Second World War.

Main periods of the Great Patriotic War

• First period (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942) Within a year after Germany attacked the USSR, the German army was able to conquer significant territories, which included Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. After this, the troops moved inland with the goal of capturing Moscow and Leningrad, however, despite the failures of Russian soldiers at the beginning of the war, the Germans failed to take the capital.

Leningrad was besieged, but the Germans were not allowed into the city. The battles for Moscow, Leningrad and Novgorod continued until 1942;

• The period of radical change (1942 - 1943) The middle period of the war is so called due to the fact that it was at this time that Soviet troops were able to take the advantage in the war into their own hands and launch a counter-offensive. The German and Allied armies gradually began to retreat back to the western border, and many foreign legions were defeated and destroyed.

Thanks to the fact that the entire industry of the USSR at that time worked for military needs, the Soviet army managed to significantly increase its weapons and provide worthy resistance. The USSR army turned from a defender into an attacker;

• The final period of the war (1943 - 1945). During this period, the USSR began to recapture the lands occupied by the Germans and move towards Germany. Leningrad was liberated, Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia, Poland, and then into German territory.

On May 8, Berlin was captured and German troops announced unconditional surrender. Hitler, upon learning that the war was lost, committed suicide. War is over.

Battle of Smolensk (1945)

Progress of the Smolensk battle

On July 10, 1941, the offensive of German troops began on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front. A group consisting of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions was able to break through the Soviet defenses in the shortest possible time and move towards Mogilev. Soon the city was surrounded, Orsha was captured, and parts of Smolensk, Yelnya and Krichev were also captured. Part of the Soviet army found itself surrounded by Germans near Smolensk.

On July 21, Soviet troops received long-awaited reinforcements and a counteroffensive was launched in the direction of Smolensk. A number of Soviet troops attacked the German headquarters, and a fierce battle began. Despite the fact that it was not possible to defeat the Germans, the centralized offensive of the fascist troops was still broken, and the troops were forced to switch to defensive tactics instead of offensive ones. Several Soviet armies were combined during this period to create a more effective offensive campaign.

On August 8, the Germans again went on the offensive in the area of ​​the Central and Bryansk fronts. The offensive was intended to secure its own army from the Soviet threat and again open the possibility of an offensive. The Soviet army retreated, but this was only a strategic move designed to strengthen the army and bring in new forces. After the reorganization, on August 17, Soviet troops again attacked the Germans, as a result of which the German army was again pushed back and suffered significant losses.

The battles, with varying success for one side or another, continued for some time, the German army was losing soldiers and its advantage, even despite small victories. As a result, on September 8, Soviet troops managed to completely eliminate the German offensive and secure Smolensk and nearby areas, opening the way to Moscow.

Results of the Smolensk battle

Despite the numerical superiority of the German army and the lack of strength among Soviet soldiers, the USSR still managed, albeit at the cost of significant losses, to recapture Smolensk and thwart the further plans of the German command. The Smolensk operation was extremely important for the further course of the war, since the Germans lost the opportunity to directly attack Moscow, and were forced to turn from attackers into defenders. The rapid plan to capture the USSR was thwarted once again.

Thanks to the victory at Smolensk, the Soviet command was able to buy a little more time in order to more thoroughly prepare Moscow for defense, which was only a matter of time.

Battle for Moscow. Operation Typhoon

The Battle of Moscow included combat operations by Soviet and German troops in the Moscow direction and was divided into two periods: defensive (September 30 - December 4, 1941) and offensive (December 5-6, 1941 - April 20, 1942). In German and Western military history, the battle is known as Operation Typhoon. The Moscow operation unfolded over a vast area, the boundaries of which in the north ran along the Volga River, from Kalyazin to Rzhev, in the west along the railway line Rzhev, Vyazma, Bryansk (to Dyatkovo), in the south along the conditional line Ryazhsk, Gorbachevo station, Dyatkovo. So, the German offensive on Moscow began on September 30, after the Wehrmacht forces were able to break the resistance of the Red Army units near Smolensk.

The task of the Center group was to implement the Typhoon plan - to capture the capital of the USSR before the onset of cold weather. More than half of the fascist forces located on the Soviet-German border were involved in this offensive. As a result, the Germans were able to penetrate deep into the rear of the Soviet troops and encircle four armies near Vyazma and two near Bryansk. Then more than 660 thousand Soviet soldiers were captured by fascists.

The Red Army had no reserves behind the front line. Only the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops made it possible to pin down the forces of 28 German divisions. A very small part of the soldiers managed to escape from the encirclement. But this gave time to organize the defense of Moscow. As a result, German troops were unable to get closer to the capital than 20-30 km. Based on the results of these battles, to maintain the spirit of the Soviet people, on November 28, the Red Star published an editorial, “The Testament of 28 Fallen Heroes.”

9. Battle of Kursk , according to historians, was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. This has never happened in world history, and probably never will happen again.

The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Vasilevsky. The size of the Soviet army was more than 1 million people. The soldiers were supported by more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, and 2 thousand aircraft provided air support to the Soviet infantrymen. The Germans opposed the USSR on the Kursk Bulge with 900 thousand soldiers, 10 thousand guns and more than two thousand aircraft.

The German plan was as follows. They were going to capture the Kursk ledge with a lightning strike and launch a full-scale offensive. Soviet intelligence did not eat its bread in vain, and reported the German plans to the Soviet command. Having learned exactly the time of the offensive and the target of the main attack, our leaders ordered to strengthen the defenses in these places.

The Germans launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Heavy fire from Soviet artillery fell on the Germans gathered in front of the front line, causing them great damage. The enemy's advance stalled and was delayed by a couple of hours. During the day of fighting, the enemy advanced only 5 kilometers, and during the 6 days of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, 12 km. This state of affairs was unlikely to suit the German command.

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest tank battle in history took place near the village of Prokhorovka. 800 tanks from each side fought in the battle. It was an impressive and terrible sight. Tank models of the Second World War were better on the battlefield. The Soviet T-34 clashed with the German Tiger. Also in that battle, “St. John’s wort” was tested. A 57 mm cannon that penetrated the Tiger's armor.

Another innovation was the use of anti-tank bombs, the weight of which was low, and the damage caused would take the tank out of the battle. The German offensive fizzled out, and the tired enemy began to retreat to their previous positions.

Soon our counter-offensive began. Soviet soldiers took the fortifications and, with the support of aviation, broke through the German defense. The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted approximately 50 days. During this time, the Russian army destroyed 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, 1.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns, 15 thousand tanks. Wehrmacht casualties on the Kursk Bulge amounted to 500 thousand people.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk showed Germany the strength of the Red Army. The specter of defeat in the war hung over the Wehrmacht. More than 100 thousand participants in the battles of Kursk were awarded orders and medals. The chronology of the Battle of Kursk is measured in the following time frame: July 5 – August 23, 1943.

Leningrad blockade.

The siege of Leningrad lasted exactly 871 days. This is the longest and most terrible siege of the city in the entire history of mankind. Almost 900 days of pain and suffering, courage and dedication. Many years after the breaking of the siege of Leningrad, many historians, and even ordinary people, wondered: could this nightmare have been avoided? Avoid - apparently not. For Hitler, Leningrad was a “tidbit” - after all, here is the Baltic Fleet and the road to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, from where help came from the allies during the war, and if the city had surrendered, it would have been destroyed and wiped off the face of the earth.

Breaking the blockade of Leningrad

In 1943, a turning point occurred in the war, and at the end of the year, Soviet troops were preparing to liberate the city. On January 14, 1944, during the general offensive of the Soviet troops, the final operation to lift the siege of Leningrad began.

The task was to deliver a crushing blow to the enemy south of Lake Ladoga and restore the land routes connecting the city with the country. By January 27, 1944, the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, with the help of Kronstadt artillery, broke through the blockade of Leningrad. The Nazis began to retreat. Soon the cities of Pushkin, Gatchina and Chudovo were liberated. The blockade was completely lifted.

The Siege of Leningrad is a tragic and great page in Russian history, which claimed more than 2 million human lives. As long as the memory of these terrible days lives in the hearts of people, finds a response in talented works of art, and is passed from hand to hand to descendants, this will not happen again! The blockade of Leningrad was briefly but succinctly described by Vera Inberg, her lines are a hymn to the great city and at the same time a requiem for the departed.

Battles near Bryansk. Army Group Center launched Operation Typhoon on schedule. On a clear and sunny autumn day on September 30, troops of the 2nd Tank Group broke through the positions of the Bryansk Front, defeated units of General Ermakov’s operational group that did not have time to take up defense, and repelled counterattacks of the 13th Army and Ermakov’s group, undertaken on Stalin’s orders, aimed simultaneously from the south and north cut off the units of the German 24th Tank Corps that had broken through, and occupied the city of Orel on October 3.

Due to mistakes made by the local command, the city was not prepared for defense. As a result of the actions of German aviation, the system of command and control of troops was disrupted. Eremenko had no connection at all with the armies subordinate to him and could not properly use the reserves located near Bryansk. This was explained by the fact that the 2nd Tank Army launched an attack on Bryansk with its left flank and thereby pinned down the Russian forces located there. However, the German tank formations, 51 covering the large industrial city from the east, were not helped by another group, which should have consisted of troops of the 2nd Army.

This army, which began its offensive on the move after almost two months of continuous fighting, encountered unexpectedly strong resistance from the 3rd and 50th armies of the Russians. Only the breakthrough of the formations of the 4th Tank Group in the defense zone of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front allowed the formations of the 2nd Army to wedge into the Russian defense at the junction between the 43rd and 50th Soviet armies and thereby reach the rear of the Bryansk Front with their right flank. On October 5, the advanced German units occupied Zhizdra, on October 6, Eremenko’s troops had their withdrawal and supply routes cut off, all three of his armies were surrounded, and the remnants of Ermakov’s group were pushed to the south. On the same day Bryansk fell. On October 6, the Russian Headquarters approved Eremenko’s proposal to turn the front and break through to the east. On October 7, a corresponding order was issued to the armies.

The German command, trying to speed up the operation, was already thinking not only about encirclement, but also about a quick breakthrough to the east in order to completely cut off the Russian escape route. These goals were served by Boka's order to Guderian to capture Mtsensk, and if possible, Volkhov, and conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Tula. But the Soviet command realized the danger of a breakthrough near Orel through Tula to Moscow. Headquarters promptly took countermeasures in this direction, but at first the German offensive “on the Bryansk Front was somehow not yet taken seriously, although it was dangerous.”

The Soviet command tried to quickly transfer fresh forces to Mtsensk with the help of aviation. Despite the enemy's air superiority, the Russians managed to transfer 5,500 people with the necessary weapons and equipment from the Yaroslavl area within three days. The 1st Guards Rifle Corps™ was formed from fresh forces, whose task was to stop the German advance. Guderian's formations were opposed primarily by the 4th Tank Brigade of Colonel M.E. Katukov, which was armed with T34 tanks, which were significantly superior to German tanks. The German 4th Panzer Division had to go through difficult trials. With the help of quickly taken countermeasures, the Russians managed to stop the advance of the main forces of the 24th Panzer Corps and inflict such heavy losses on it that Guderian wrote about this: “Heavy fighting gradually took its toll on ours and soldiers ...

And it was not a physical, but a mental shock that could not be ignored. And the fact that our best officers were so greatly suppressed as a result of the last battles was amazing.” Instead of rapid advancement, it was necessary to conduct heavy battles, which allowed the Soviet command to wait for the saving mud and delay the German offensive so much that the advanced attacking units approached Tula only at the end of October™.

Thus, the maneuverable actions of the southern wing of Army Group Center were decisively paralyzed, which subsequently had a very significant impact on the actions of the entire German army. Further difficulties were brought by the battles directly in the Bryansk pocket, which delayed the main forces of the 2nd combined arms and 2nd tank armies until the end of October. According to German data, the fighting in this pocket officially ended on October 19.

In fact, they continued until October 23, that is, until the 3rd and 50th Soviet armies broke out from encirclement in 1821. The order of the command of Army Group Center dated October 4, which ordered the 2nd Army not to take part in the battles for Bryansk, but to move forward, could not be carried out, since the following days showed that the 2nd Tank Army did not have sufficient forces to independently complete the battles against the encircled group.

Therefore, a new order was given to the 2nd Combined Arms Army: moving east with its left flank, take part in the encirclement of the enemy near Bryansk. In connection with the attempts of the troops of the Bryansk Front to make a breakthrough from the encirclement, it was impossible to even think about using the troops of the 2nd Tank Army to strengthen the formations advancing on Mtsensk.

The extended offensive front of Guderian's army, which initially cost Bock so much trouble, no longer caused concern to the German command, since the Russians 53 failed to organize cooperation between the Southwestern and Bryansk fronts. The 13th Army Corps of the 2nd Army was able to quickly advance east. In addition, on October 9, it was possible to reach the junction of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Army advancing from the northeast.

The encircled Bryansk enemy group was divided into two parts - the northern, in the Bryansk, Zhizdra region, and the southern, in the Trubchevsk region. On the same day, the army group command issued an order according to which the 2nd Army was tasked with destroying the northern part of the encircled group, and the 2nd Tank Army with the southern part. On October 12, northeast of Bryansk, the encirclement ring around the northern part of the enemy group was finally closed.

However, significant forces of Soviet troops managed to break through on October 8 and, despite heavy losses (front commander Eremenko was also wounded), broke out of the encirclement on October 12, 13 and 14. At the same time, the Russian 3rd Army first tried to break through the German positions in the Navlya sector, the 13th Army near Khomutovka, and the 50th Army at Resseta. Since the 50th Army's attempts to break through were unsuccessful, it, having suffered heavy losses, turned northeast in the direction of Belev to break through there. Bock was concerned about the heavy fighting in the encirclement area and hurried the advance of both German armies.

On 12 October he wrote in his diary: “Guderian is not moving forward; he, like Weichs, was stuck in the Bryansk cauldron.” However, Bok soon learned that, despite the beginning of the regrouping of the 2nd Field and 2nd Tank Armies, movement forward to the northeast as a result of stubborn enemy resistance became possible only after the end of the fighting in the Bryansk pocket area. The Soviet troops, who broke through the German positions on October 22 and 23 and, in accordance with Eremenko’s order, reached the Belev-Fatezh line, with their resistance to a decisive extent paralyzed the offensive of the southern wing of Army Group Center and did not allow a quick pursuit to be organized.

The fighting in the Bryansk cauldron did not bring the Germans the desired success. Battles near Vyazma. On October 2, all the remaining troops of the Center group entered “the last big and decisive battle of this year,” from which Hitler demanded that they “with the last powerful blow ... defeat the enemy before the onset of winter.” Good weather favored the massive use of aviation, which provided especially active support to the 4th and 9th armies operating in the direction of the main attack.

1,387 aircraft took part in the fighting. The breakthrough of the 3rd Tank Group in the defense zone of the 24th and 43rd Russian armies was successful. The erroneous idea of ​​the Soviet command about the inexpediency of carrying out defensive measures in this area, which was located between the Western and Bryansk fronts and was under the jurisdiction of the Reserve Front, led to catastrophic consequences for the Soviet troops. When both armies began to retreat as a result of the attack by German troops, the southern flank of the Western Front and the northern flank of the Bryansk Front were exposed. On October 5, Budyonny reported on this matter: “The situation on the left flank of the Reserve Front has become extremely serious. There is nothing to close the resulting gap along the Moscow Highway.”1131 In addition, the Red Army command initially thought that there was an offensive with limited goals and that everything was not so tragic.

The first echelon divisions, which fought defensive battles with the advancing enemy, did not know what to do, since the Russian command was paralyzed for some time. Already on the second day of the offensive, the southern wing of the German troops reached Kirov and crossed the river. Oka and on October 5 advanced units reached Yukhnov. The German mobile units bypassed the left flank of the Western Front and reached its rear. On October 5, the tank wedge of the 4th Panzer Group turned north and reached Vyazma two days later.

As a result of a communication breakdown, both formation commanders and the Soviet high command until that day had no clear idea of ​​the situation at the front. K.F. Telegin, who was then a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, paints a figurative picture of the situation that developed in connection with the offensive of the German troops: “Until October 5, all the attention of the Party Central Committee, the High Command and the Military Council of the District is focused on the sharply complicated situation near Tula. On October 4, employees of the Political Department brought a translation of Hitler's speech on the radio. The Fuhrer said that the last decisive offensive had begun on the Eastern Front and that “the Red Army is defeated and will not be able to restore its strength.” It was unclear what kind of “decisive offensive” and “defeat” of the Red Army they were talking about. The General Staff did not receive such data from the Western and Reserve Fronts... But still, the night of October 5 passed in anxious worries. Telephone contact with the Western Front was interrupted, and our liaison officer did not report anything...

But at 12 o’clock in the afternoon, the pilots of the 120th Fighter Regiment, flying out on patrol, reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry up to 25 km long was moving along the highway from SpasDemensk to Yukhnov, and they did not find our troops in front of it.”1841. Telegin ordered this report to be double-checked by aerial reconnaissance. This time the Russian fighters were even fired upon, but Telegin again did not believe it. The High Command simply could not imagine that the Germans could break through to a depth of 100-120 km. The best pilots were sent on reconnaissance missions for the third time. They reported that the Germans had already occupied Yukhnov by this time. Only after this did the Russian High Command recognize the situation as serious and Stalin ordered the Moscow defensive region to be put on full combat readiness. The Military Council received an order to occupy positions near Mozhaisk with all the troops at its disposal and “at all costs, detain the enemy who has broken through in front of the Mozhaisk line for five to seven days until General Headquarters reserves arrive.”

On the northern flank of the German forces, the 3rd Panzer Group launched an offensive on October 2 and broke through the Russian front at the junction between the 19th and 30th armies, advancing towards Kholm and partly towards Bely. A day later, Kholm was in the hands of the Germans, in addition, to the east of the city, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, they managed to create two bridgeheads, from which the offensive in the direction of Bely was to begin the next day. This offensive, however, failed due to poor supplies of the 3rd Panzer Group. Due to difficult road conditions on October 4, the 3rd Panzer Group 56 found itself almost without fuel, and the advance of the tank divisions was bogged down. The proposal of the command of the 2nd Air Fleet to deliver fuel to the 3rd Tank Group was rejected, since the tankers believed that they could organize the supply on their own. However, when the transport columns finally got stuck on impassable roads, on the evening of October 4, the command of the tank group was still forced to turn to aviation for help. Thus, more than a day was lost, and the formations of the 3rd Panzer Group were able to fight only in the afternoon of October 5. The Russians immediately took advantage of this. Konev, who on October 4 reported to Stalin about the threat of encirclement in 1861, on October 5 received an order from Headquarters to withdraw to the previously prepared defense line of Vyazma and Rzhev. At the same time, the 31st and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front were transferred to him in order to ensure unified command and control of troops in the Vyazma region. At first, Russian troops stubbornly defended themselves, but then began to retreat to the east, trying to avoid encirclement. On October 3, the combat log of Army Group Center wrote: “The general impression of these battles, based on aerial reconnaissance data, was that the enemy was determined to defend himself and there were no other orders from the Russian high command.” Only on October 7, the 10th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group linked up with the 7th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Group.

The encirclement ring east of Vyazma was closed. However, as German aerial reconnaissance reported, “significant enemy forces have escaped encirclement and large columns of Russian troops are moving in the direction of Moscow.” The Russians again, despite heavy losses, managed to promptly withdraw large forces from the threat of encirclement. At the same time, leaving the encirclement, the Russians inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans. As the commander of the 7th Panzer Division reported, on October 11 and 12, the division lost 1000 people, one battalion was literally destroyed. Between two tank wedges, which had the task of creating an outer ring of encirclement, the 2nd and 4th armies advanced towards each other in the direction of Sukhinichi and Yukhnov, and to the north the 4th and 9th armies advanced with their left flank with the task of closing the encirclement ring from the west and north-west. The main goal was to free the tanks as soon as possible so that they could participate in the further offensive against Moscow.

In the offensive zone of the 9th Army, the enemy offered such stubborn resistance that the left flank formations were only able to move forward at the cost of heavy losses. These difficulties were aggravated by the daily stoppage of the 3rd Panzer Group, as a result of which the pressure on those surrounded from the north was not as strong as expected. The beginning of the persecution and the first Russian countermeasures. On October 7, when the encirclement was finally completed, the High Command of the Ground Forces and the Army Group Command came to the conclusion that the enemy no longer had significant forces at his disposal with which he could resist the further advance of Army Group Center towards Moscow, and therefore it was possible to immediately start pursuing the enemy in the direction of Moscow. The German command was optimistic and thought “that it was possible to take a few risks” and that this time everything would look different than at Minsk and Smolensk, when the enemy managed to build new defensive lines in a timely manner and slow down the advance of German troops.

Bock wanted to immediately free up as many forces as possible and immediately involve them in carrying out a new operation. And although the fighting in the encirclement ring was in full swing and it was still unclear which enemy forces were surrounded, Bock believed that he now had enough forces to solve both problems - to finish off the encircled enemy and at the same time begin pursuit with the forces of his existing formations. Since it seemed that the enemy did not have any serious reserves, the opinions of various levels of the German command agreed that these chances should be taken advantage of now and quickly break through to Moscow. On October 7, 1941, at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center, in which Brauchitsch and the head of the 58th operational department of the ground forces headquarters, General Staff Colonel Adolf Heusinger, took part, it was noted that the orders given to the armies indicated how favorably the existing situation was assessed. Based on the successes achieved and the fact that a large number of trophies and prisoners were captured, and being under the general impression of Hitler’s plans in this operation, the command assessed the situation one-sidedly, taking into account only positive factors. According to Brauchitsch and Bock, the 2nd Tank Army should have moved as quickly as possible in the direction of Tula and captured the crossings across the Oka, in order to then advance to Kashira and Serpukhov. At the same time, Brauchitsch drew the attention of those present to the wishes of Hitler, who proposed that Guderian capture Kursk and then strike in the south with the forces of the 2nd Panzer Group. The final decision on setting this task was expected only in the following days. The 2nd Army was ordered to defeat the enemy in the northern part of the encirclement near Bryansk. The task of the 4th Army was to advance with the forces of infantry formations and as many mobile units as possible to the Kaluga-Borovsk line and, in cooperation with the 9th Army, close the encirclement ring near Vyazma. The 9th Army received the task, together with units of the 3rd Tank Group, to reach the Gzhatsk-Sychevka line in order, firstly, to ensure the encirclement of the group near Vyazma from the north and, secondly, to concentrate for an offensive in the direction of Kalinin or Rzhev.

These considerations were set out in the “Order to continue the operation in the direction of Moscow” dated October 7, 1941. The basis of this idea - to turn the tank forces to the north - expressed by the new commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General of the Panzer Forces Hans Georg Reinhardt, was the plan to defeat the enemy by the forces of the northern wing of the 9th Army together with the southern wing of the 16th Army of Army Group North in the Bely, Ostashkov area and disruption of communications between Moscow and Leningrad. And although Bock opposed this operation plan, a day later the 3rd Panzer Group received the Fuhrer's order to advance north. These forces were not enough for the battle at the decisive moment near Moscow, when the new Russian defensive lines were not yet fortified, and the Russian reserves were mostly still on the way. Based on the available assessment of the enemy, the OKW and OKH still considered it possible to carry out this broadly conceived plan.

The assessment of the enemy by the headquarters of Army Group Center, as can be seen from the notes of October 8, was very optimistic: “Today the impression is that the enemy does not have large forces at his disposal that he could oppose to the further advance of the army group towards Moscow... For immediate defense of Moscow, according to the testimony of prisoners of war, the Russians have divisions of the people’s militia, which, however, have already been partially brought into battle, and are also among the encircled troops.” But the orders to release all forces for the rapid pursuit of the enemy in the direction of the Russian capital did not take into account two factors that were soon to slow down the further offensive, namely, the beginning of a period of mud and the increasing resistance of the Russians. Starting from October 6 in the southern sector of the group of forces, and from October 7 and 8 in its remaining sections, autumn rains began, as a result of which the roads, especially country roads, became impassable, which significantly slowed down the offensive. The combat log of Army Group Center noted on October 10: “The movement of tank units is currently impossible due to the poor condition of the roads and bad weather.

For the same reasons, there are difficulties in providing tanks with fuel.” On October 8, the actions of supporting aviation were also significantly limited, since the danger of icing, poor visibility and snowstorms, on the one hand, and the poor condition of the runways, on the other, did not allow maintaining aviation support for the operation at the same level. Units of the 2nd Air Fleet conducted 1,030 sorties on October 6, 559 on October 8, and 269 on October 9. In connection with this, the pace of pursuit dropped sharply, although the German divisions still moved forward and captured new areas. The most severe consequences of the thaw period appeared later, in the second half of October. However, the enemy’s desire, using local and climatic conditions, to increasingly slow down the German offensive, inflict increasingly significant losses on the Germans, gain time in order to build new defensive lines in the rear, tighten up reserves and prepare their troops for new battles, was more pronounced than the mud.

The German command, confident of their victory, ordered a rapid pursuit of the enemy, believing that the 57th Tank Corps and two infantry corps would be sufficient for this. The 41st Tank Corps, already prepared for the “jump” to Moscow, was aimed at Kalinin. The Soviet command had taken decisive countermeasures the day before. On October 5, the Headquarters realized that in connection with the German offensive, the order to the Western Front to occupy the Rzhev-Vyazma line was almost too late and that it was necessary to create a new line of defense further in the east, which was supposed to run along the already partially equipped Mozhaisk line. It was supposed to throw all available reserves there and send all the troops that had escaped encirclement. As a first measure, four rifle divisions of the Western Front were ordered to take positions on the Mozhaisk defense line and create the necessary barrier there. In addition, Stalin urgently summoned G.K. Zhukov from Leningrad to Moscow to send him as a representative of Headquarters on the Western Front.

Such a decision seemed necessary to Stalin, since he received almost no information about the situation at the front, although he needed accurate data to take appropriate measures. Since Stalin was dissatisfied with the command of the Western Front, he sent a commission of the State Defense Committee to Konev, which, along with others, included Molotov, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Vasilevsky. The commission had to look into the essence of the issue and save what else could be saved. She found the state of affairs at the front extremely unsatisfactory. 61 Thus, the headquarters of the Reserve Front, for example, had no idea where the front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union SM, was located. Budyonny. There was no connection with the Western and Bryansk fronts. In Medyn, one of the important cities that covered the approaches to Moscow, of all the defenders of the city, Zhukov found only three policemen1^. Having received information from Zhukov about the state of affairs and worried about the dire situation on the Western Front, Stalin acted very quickly. He removed Konev and appointed Zhukov in his place. Despite his dissatisfaction with the previous command of the Western Front, Stalin, at the insistence of Zhukov, left Konev as deputy commander of the front, and Sokolovsky as chief of staff of the front1*1. At the same time, he immediately sent all available reserves to the Mozhaisk area. By October 10, there were four rifle divisions, cadets from various military schools, three reserve rifle regiments and five machine gun battalions on the Mozhaisk defense line.

On the same day, five newly created machine-gun battalions, ten anti-tank regiments and five tank brigades were additionally delivered. It is noteworthy that, in order to raise the morale of the troops at the front, Stalin called the ten anti-tank battalions that were at the disposal of the Supreme Command ten “anti-tank regiments”1®1. But these forces were not enough to remove the threat of a German breakthrough. At a time when the head of the press bureau of the German Reich, Otto Dietrich, proclaimed, on Hitler’s orders, that the Soviet Union was “militarily finished”, and the Volkische Beobachter claimed that “Stalin’s army was wiped off the face of the earth,” the Russians, looking forward to the period with hope muddy roads, organized resistance to the advancing enemy. The troops operating in the Mozhaisk area were united into the 5th Army, and the troops defending in the Orel area were united into the 26th Army. The Western and Reserve Fronts were united into one - the Western Front. This time included the transfer of troops from the Far East and Central Asia, whose arrival was expected in mid-October. The 316th Infantry Division, formed in July in Alma-Ata, was transferred to the west. In October she 62 arrived in Volokolamsk. On the same day, German intelligence established the arrival of the 312th Infantry Division from Kazakhstan, the 313th from Turkestan and the 178th from Siberia.

In the following days, other formations from the Far East arrived at the front. The headquarters of the 16th, 31st, 33rd and 49th armies were redeployed to the east with the task of forming new armies from the reserve. Until October 13, it was possible to form the 16th Army under the command of Rokossovsky in the Volokolamsk area, the 1.5th Army in the Mozhaisk area, the new 43rd Army under the command of Golubev in the Maloyaroslavets area, the new 49th Army under the command of Zakharkin in the Kaluga area and the new 33rd Army under the command of Efremov in the area NaroFominsk. All these formations were united into a new Western Front under the command of Zhukov, who had the task of stopping the advance of German troops with all the forces at his disposal. To increase the maneuverability of his troops, Zhukov collected all the means of transport available in Moscow to send them to the front. The Soviet Supreme High Command was able to transfer eight tank and two mechanized brigades, as well as several rifle formations, from the reserves of the Headquarters to the Western Front, and two tank brigades and one reinforced tank battalion to the Bryansk Front. Thus, by mid-October, 12 rifle divisions, 16 tank brigades and 40 artillery regiments and other units*8*1 arrived to strengthen the defense of Moscow.

Aviation was also replenished with new formations and two divisions of long-range bomber aviation. All this allowed, by the time the advanced units of the Germans reached the Mozhaisk defense line and started fighting, to create a dense defensive barrier on the main highways leading to Moscow, about which German intelligence knew nothing. The intelligence department of the headquarters of Army Group Center stated on October 14: “The enemy is currently unable to counter those attacking Moscow with forces capable of providing long-term resistance to the west and southwest of Moscow. Everything that remained of the enemy after the battle was pushed north or south.” 63 And although the command of the Western Front failed to establish contact with the units encircled near Vyazma, and attempts to break out of the encirclement due to poorly organized interaction cost large losses, the Russians still managed to pin down the German tank forces for a long time and thereby exclude the possibility of their participation in the immediate pursuit in the direction of Moscow15*. Starting from October 11, German tanks were forced, moving forward, to break through ever new defensive lines and overcome very stubborn enemy resistance.

Increasing difficulty in pursuit. Despite the fact that Medyn was taken on October 11, and Kaluga on October 12, although the first gaps were created in the Mozhaisk defense line, the ongoing stubborn battles in the encirclement indicated that the release of the forces that ensured the encirclement would require a longer time than assumed. The enemy's attempts to break out of the encirclement in the Vyazma area on October 10-12 pinned down the 40th and 46th tank corps intended for pursuit and delayed their shift. Only on October 14 was it possible to regroup the main forces of the formations of the 4th and 9th armies operating near Vyazma for the pursuit, which began on October 15. The advanced detachments turned out to be too weak to break the growing enemy resistance in the first onslaught. They could advance only by suffering very heavy losses. On October 15, the commander of the 4th Army, General Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, assessing the situation, stated that “psychologically, a critical situation had developed on the Eastern Front, because, on the one hand, the troops found themselves in frosty weather without winter uniforms and warm apartments, and on the other hand, there was impassable terrain and The tenacity with which the enemy defends, covering his communications and cantonment areas, makes it extremely difficult for our still weak advanced detachments to advance.”

A report from the headquarters of the 57th Tank Corps, which led the offensive in the area of ​​Medyn and Mozhaisk, reported that the last battles for the capture of Russian positions were the most intense during the entire period of the campaign in Russia, since the enemy offered fierce resistance, entrenched in concrete permanent structures, built in peacetime. Tank losses increased greatly from the beginning of the operation to mid-October. Thus, the 6th Panzer Division, which had over 200 tanks on October 10, had at its disposal only 60 tanks ready for use in battle on October 16. The 20th Panzer Division, one of the first to begin pursuing the enemy in the direction of Moscow, of the 283 tanks it had on September 28, irretrievably lost 43 tanks by October 16.

The 4th Panzer Division, battered in battles in the Mtsensk area, had by this time only 38 tanks. In total, by October 16, the 2nd Tank Army consisted of 271 tanks, the 3rd Tank Group - 259 tanks, and the 4th Tank Group - 710 tanks. We are, of course, talking about available tanks, but there were much fewer ready for use in battle. While Army Group Center still had over 1,240 tanks at its disposal, Army Group South on the 1st Panzer Army front lost 144 tanks during the period from September 26 to October 15, 1941. On October 15, the 1st Tank Army had only 165 tanks. But it was not only tank formations that suffered heavy losses. Infantry units were also forced to pay dearly for their offensive successes. The losses of Army Group Center for the period from October 1 to October 17 amounted to 50 thousand people. These figures indicate how fierce the fighting was. The difficulties caused by heavy losses in men and equipment and a lack of reinforcements were further complicated by mud roads and disruption of supplies. The muddy road did not immediately make itself felt during the fighting. Only from mid-October did its disastrous consequences begin to be felt along the entire front of Army Group Center, precisely at the moment when fighting began on the defensive line near Mozhaisk and when the advancing divisions required a large amount of ammunition and fuel. The German command knew about the difficulties that could arise during the period of thaw.

But it believed that this should not be accepted in the 65th calculation, since the battle for Moscow was planned to be won before the onset of the thaw, that is, before mid-October. The German leadership did not consider it necessary to consult specialists on this issue. The opinion of the meteorologists at the disposal of the OKH was not requested. Thus, everything went as in the Russian proverb: “In autumn, a spoonful of water makes a bucket of dirt.” Without taking appropriate measures and not properly preparing for the thaw, the OKH in the fall of 1941 claimed that the Germans had suffered an incredible natural disaster and that “the thaw turned out to be unprecedentedly strong and dragged on for an unusually long time.” Thus, the German command was ready to shift its blame onto some higher power independent of it. Hitler later stated: “With the onset of the rains, we were once again convinced that it was fortunate that the German armies did not advance far into Russia in October.” But the facts show that the amount of precipitation in October and November 1941 was below normal. The entire period of thaw was, therefore, drier than usual. Even if the average air temperature in October and November 1941 was lower than in previous years, this also did not affect either the duration of the thaw period or its intensity, rather, on the contrary.

The frosts that arrived relatively early in 1941 made it possible to use highways and country roads, as well as areas away from them, already in early November81. Thus, comparing data on temperature and amount of precipitation, we can state that the thaw in the fall of 1941 was weaker and shorter lasting than in other years. The Russians, of course, took advantage of the rainy weather and included the role of climatic conditions in their defense plans. Zhukov, for example, hoped that the German offensive could only develop along the main highways. Therefore, he concentrated the small forces that he had on October 15 on the roads leading to Moscow in the area 66 of Volokolamsk, Istra, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Podolsk and Kaluga,1^ while the Bryansk Front concentrated the troops remaining at its disposal in the direction the main attack of the Germans, along the Orel-Tula highway. On October 17, the headquarters of the 2nd Tank Army reported that “on both sides of Mtsensk the enemy has retained the same number of forces... Occupying his equipped field positions and bunkers with armored caps, he is putting up fierce resistance.

The main forces of the 2nd Army suspended the offensive, awaiting the arrival of service units." The reports of the division of the 2nd Army indicated that since October 7, regular supply of formations had completely ceased, that the divisions were stretched over 240 km or more and were forced to switch to supply from local resources, as a result of which their main forces were not capable of either marching or combat use . The same situation was observed in the 4th Army, which, moreover, due to enemy counterattacks supported by tanks and aircraft (despite the bad weather, it intensified its actions), was forced to go on the defensive in some areas of its right flank. On the front of the 9th Army and the 3rd Tank Group, supply difficulties were so great that the advance of their formations was significantly delayed. The main line of communications for the delivery of supplies on the northern wing of the army group was the Vyazma-Moscow highway, which at times was unusable due to various types of damage from shelling, bombing, and delayed-action mine explosions. In addition, the highway was overloaded, and it was impossible to move outside the highway.

Transportation difficulties have grown into a real crisis. The combat log of the 9th Army headquarters noted in this regard: “The main reason for the emergence and deepening of the crisis is that repairing the highway requires much more effort and time than expected. The inconsistency of the initial assumptions was primarily demonstrated by the destruction caused by Russian delayed-action mines. Such mines, when exploding, form a crater 10 m deep and 30 m in diameter. The fuses are installed with such precision that several explosions occur every day, and therefore detour roads have to be built anew every day. With these broadly conceived acts of sabotage, for which there is no end in sight, the enemy, although he will not be able to disrupt our offensive near Vyazma, will complicate and delay the development of our achieved success, and winter is approaching.” In the Kalinin area, the Russians, having brought up reserves, continuously attacked the German vanguard.

In order to coordinate military operations in this sector of the front, the Russian Headquarters created the Kalinin Front under the command of Konev11051 on October 19. In order to solve to some extent the problem of supplying the 9th Army, OKH attempted to build a railway from Vyazma to Sychevka, but this took time and did not eliminate difficulties at a time when everything was decided by speed of action. Due to the lack of rolling stock on the front of Army Group Center, the construction of the railway also did not help. On October 19, the entire 5th Infantry Division was allocated to repair the highway. On this day, along the entire sector of the army group's front, the supply situation deteriorated so much that the offensive actually had to be suspended; only local battles took place. In the combat log of the headquarters of Army Group Center on October 19 it was written: “On the night of October 18-19, it rained along the entire front of Army Group.

The condition of the roads deteriorated so much that a severe crisis arose in the supply of troops with food, ammunition and especially fuel. The condition of the roads, weather and terrain conditions significantly delayed the progress of military operations. The main concern of all formations is the supply of logistics and food.” Bok in his diary was forced to admit that the persecution did not have the success that he had hoped for. 68 “In total, all this (the individual successes achieved) can only be assessed as nothing. The dismemberment of the army group's battle formations and the terrible weather have led to the fact that we are sitting still. And the Russians are gaining time to replenish their defeated divisions and strengthen their defenses, especially since they have a lot of railways and highways in their hands near Moscow. This is very bad! Although the Russians gained time, their divisions also suffered from muddy roads and poor roads. General A.V. Khrulev, who was at that time the head of the rear of the Red Army, considers the catastrophic situation with roads during the muddy season to be one of the main reasons “why the entire Kalinin Front suffered a “fatal failure” and why the supply of supplies was disrupted. From all the armies, telegrams were then sent to the chief of the rear with complaints about the disruption of the entire supply system.

Due to the shortage of aircraft, it was impossible to supply troops by air and therefore it was proposed to resort to the only remaining means - delivering cargo by horse-drawn transport. To this proposal from the chief of logistics, Stalin sarcastically remarked that Khrulev apparently forgot that he lived in an age of technology. Nevertheless, in a short time, the entire Russian supply system was rebuilt based on the use of horse-drawn transport, which made it possible to quickly eliminate the crisis situation with the supply of troops. The goals of the German command in relation to Moscow. After the encirclement of Soviet troops near Vyazma and the start of the pursuit, the German command considered the battle for Moscow to be basically won. It believed that the point now was only to defeat the remaining forces of the Red Army and break the resistance of the few Zhukov troops still continuing to defend themselves west of Moscow. The OKH intended to remove the corps headquarters, four infantry and one cavalry divisions from the Soviet-German front and transfer them to the west with the aim of reorganizing them for use in operations according to the plan for the period after Barbarossa.

We were talking about the 8th Army Corps, which included the 8th, 28th, 5th and 15th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry 69th Division. Based on these divisions, it was planned to form the 5th, 8th and 28th light divisions and the 24th tank division. On October 11, the OKH informed the Army Group command how it envisaged the continued use of the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group after the capture of Kalinin. These formations were to advance in the direction of Torzhok and further to Vyshny Volochek and Ostashkov with the task of depriving the enemy of the opportunity to retreat further to the east, and prevent him from escaping the attacks of the flank formations of Army Group “Center” and “North”. In this regard, the entire northern wing of Army Group Center was not supposed to participate in a direct attack on Moscow. The encirclement of Moscow itself was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 2nd Tank Army, 4th Army and 4th Tank Group. On October 12, Hitler ordered that “Moscow’s surrender should not be accepted, the Soviet capital should be surrounded and subjected to debilitating artillery fire and air raids.” He had to admit that the original plan “to flood Moscow and its environs, so that where Moscow had previously stood... a huge lake would form, which would forever hide the metropolis of the Russian people from the eyes of the civilized world,” turned out to be impracticable. Plans for further operations were based on Hitler's order to turn the left wing of Army Group Center to the north, and with the forces of the 2nd Army to advance south through Kursk to Voronezh in order to prevent the threat of an enemy strike at the junction of Army Groups Center and South. While the 2nd Panzer Army was to bypass Moscow from the south and close the encirclement east of the city, the 4th Panzer Group was to carry out the same maneuver from the north, while providing for flank attacks on Rybinsk and Yaroslavl.

The 4th Army was to advance along the line of the Moscow Circular Railway, where three Russian defensive sectors passed. Bock tried, simultaneously with the maneuver of the 9th Army, to strike with the forces of the 3rd Tank Group and the 2nd Army, since he feared, as was the case after Smolensk, that the forces of the army group would be dispersed and thus there would be a risk of their weakening in the main direction. But all his attempts were unsuccessful. 70 By the time the difficulties in supplying the front first reached their highest point"*111 and the shadow of their dire consequences was already hanging over the troops, Halder announced new big plans that were supposed to lead to a further dispersal of the forces of Army Group Center. After In order to defeat the enemy forces opposing Army Group North, it was supposed to take positions that would cover troops from the northeast and north. Thus, any pressure on them from the enemy from the depths of the country during the winter months would be excluded and fewer forces would be required to solve this tasks. The goal was, subject to the occupation of Rybinsk, to reach the line of Vologda, Ozerny Krai, to the border of the tundra, and cut the only railway leading from the White Sea to the central regions of Russia. It turned out that the 4th Army had to leave on its own to the rear of Moscow, east of the Volga.

To Major General Hans von Greifenberg's objection about the "catastrophic state of the roads in the army group's area of ​​operations," Halder responded by remarking that he asked that "everything be done regarding supplies and due preparations be made for the long journey planned." The OKH at this time was completely impressed by the victorious reports of battles with the encircled enemy and hoped that things would continue in this spirit. This was manifested in Halder’s boundless and enthusiastic recognition of the one-of-a-kind battle near Vyazma, and therefore he did not want to hear about the difficulties facing the troops. The position of the 9th Army, which was intended to be used for an offensive in a northern direction, at that time was far from the best. The army troops, bypassing Kalinin on both sides with their infantry corps, tried to connect with the advanced units of the 3rd Panzer Group, but were continuously subjected to surprise attacks by Russian divisions. Beginning on October 17, Soviet troops, supported by tanks and aircraft, attacked the Germans daily in the Kalinin area. Therefore, on October 23, Bock ordered to suspend the offensive through Kalinin and first defeat 71 enemy forces in the Volga Reservoir-Kalinin-Volga triangle.

The basis for this decision was that the Russians had concentrated large forces southeast of Kalinin, which posed a threat to the flanks of the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group. Hitler believed that instead of the temporarily suspended offensive of the 9th Army, a strike should be launched in the direction of Rybinsk and Yaroslavl with the forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, and the 9th Army should take up defensive positions west of Kalinin. Bock immediately opposed this maneuver of his tank forces and justified the impossibility of its implementation primarily by difficulties in supply and the poor condition of the roads. Nevertheless, on October 28, Hitler ordered the implementation of this plan, with the ultimate goal of access to the Volga in order to block the enemy between the Volga and Lake Ladoga, cut the railways coming from the east through Yaroslavl and Rybinsk to Bologoye, as well as through Vologda to Tikhvin, depriving the Russians the ability to supply troops, and thereby inflict a decisive defeat on them. Despite the objections of the command of Army Group Center, who believed that the implementation of such a plan would cause enormous difficulties and would affect the further development of the attack on Moscow, Hitler kept his directive in force. Thus, in addition to the troops of the northern wing of the army group, the bulk of the forces of the 4th Panzer Group could not participate in the attack on the Russian capital.

Objecting to the new plans to use the troops of the northern wing of the Army Group, Bock also opposed the decision to use the tank formations of the 2nd Tank Army to attack Voronezh, and not Tula. Hitler considered the 4th Army strong enough to carry out the tasks previously envisaged for the 2nd Panzer Army with the help of right-flank formations. The discrepancy between Hitler’s assessment of the situation and the actual state of affairs at the front was most clearly manifested in the fact that Kluge was forced to bring up his last reserves and give the order to the 13th, 12th, 20th and 57th Army Corps to go on the defensive on the southern sector of the front. According to Bock, the only chance to continue the offensive with the forces of the right-wing 72nd formations of the 4th Army was that Guderian’s army would launch an offensive through Tula to the northeast. This blow was supposed to force the enemy opposing the 4th Army to withdraw its forces from this section of the front and throw them against the 2nd Tank Army. In this way, Bock hoped to facilitate the further offensive of the 4th Army. The turn of the 2nd Tank Army to the south not only made it impossible to carry out these plans, but also created an additional “wide gap on ... the entire front of the army group”, which there was nothing to close. Bock fought against this order by all means.

He even explained to Halder that he was delaying giving Hitler’s order to the troops to suspend the advance of the 2nd Panzer Army in the direction of Tula until the issue of assigning its further mission was finally resolved. In this case, he was ultimately successful and on October 28, Hitler announced that he “agreed, in order not to waste time, to continue the offensive of the 2nd Panzer Army in the same direction.” The consequence of this was that only the 2nd Army was aimed at Voronezh, while Guderian's troops were ordered to advance towards Moscow "between Ryazan and Kashira across the Oka". The great goals that were proclaimed even in those days at the Fuhrer's headquarters, in practice, despite all the orders and directives, were impossible to achieve, since the supply situation and the condition of the German troops made a further offensive impossible. Bock gave an order that said that if it is impossible to advance further, then we must at least do everything possible to prepare the offensive and overcome difficulties with supplying troops as quickly as possible, so that with the onset of good weather (frost) we can immediately resume the advance. Thus, Bock admitted that the last attempt in a fleeting battle to defeat the remaining units of the Red Army and capture Moscow before the onset of winter had failed.

Moreover, the troops of his army group had exposed flanks, were not prepared to operate in winter conditions, and were opposed by an enemy who had received reinforcements. It was clear to Bok that in order to defeat the enemy, it was necessary to launch a new offensive, but he did not have the opportunity to make up for the huge losses suffered by his troops. On October 31, Bock wrote in his diary: “Our losses are becoming very noticeable. In army group formations, more than twenty battalions are commanded by chief lieutenants.” Army Group Center officer losses averaged 45 people daily (about 40% of all officer losses on the Eastern Front), and they were especially high in the infantry, where those who were out of action had to be replaced by officers from other branches of the military. Russian defensive measures. The Soviet command was aware that in mid-October a serious danger loomed over Moscow. These days, all the cash reserves of the Headquarters were thrown into battle or pulled up to the front. The formation of new formations and the transfer of divisions from the East were not yet completed. When advanced detachments of German tank formations appeared in front of the Mozhaisk defense line and the Russians did not have equivalent forces against them, Zhukov recommended that Stalin evacuate Moscow. Already on October 13, the Secretary of the Central Committee and the Moscow City Committee of the Party A.S. Shcherbakov officially declared that Moscow was in danger and that it was necessary to mobilize new forces to defend the city. Along with the continuing frantic construction of defensive structures around and inside the city, another 12 thousand people were recruited to take these positions.

They were part of the destruction battalions that were used on October 17 to cover the roads leading to Moscow. Since Stalin was not completely convinced of the effectiveness of these measures, on October 16, the evacuation of most government, military and party institutions, as well as the diplomatic corps, began from Moscow to Kuibyshev. These events had a demoralizing effect on the city's population, and panic arose. Even the fact that Stalin and his closest associates remained in Moscow did not have a calming effect on Muscovites, and thus, on October 19, a state of siege was declared in the city and its environs, and martial law was proclaimed. The resolution stated: “Persons who violate public order must be immediately prosecuted and brought before a military tribunal for sentencing. Provocateurs, spies and other agents of the enemy who call for disruption of order must be shot on the spot.”

These circumstances, as well as the first battles on the Mozhaisk defense line, as a result of which the Russian units were forced to retreat, convinced the German command that the Russian army, experiencing a lack of forces on a large front, had concentrated strong groups only at a few points in order to cover from the defeat of the main forces and create the basis for further warfare, that it will not have large combat-ready reserves until the onset of winter. Therefore, the German command believed that it was possible to continue the offensive with the available forces, break through the shallow Russian defensive lines and quickly encircle Moscow.

In such an assessment of the situation, which really determined only the difficult situation of the Red Army, three important factors were not taken into account. Firstly, the Mozhaisk line of defense, which had deeply echeloned (100 km) equipped positions with numerous natural and anti-tank obstacles, allowed the Russians to carry out a slow, organized retreat to the east with fighting, inflicting more and more losses on the Germans. The rivers Lama, Moscow, Kolocha, Luzha, Pakhra, Oka, Protva, Una, Plava and Sukhodrev flowed along the path of the German advance. The positions of the Mozhaisk defense line were approached by good railways and highways, which made it possible to transport troops to where they were especially needed and to quickly transport reinforcements. By the way, these roads, starting from mid-October, were almost not subject to German air raids. The actions of the 2nd Air Fleet were directed primarily against the enemy, located directly in front of the German battle formations, in order to support the advance of their troops. The railway distribution network near Moscow, the destruction of which would have been especially important for disrupting the supply system of Russian troops, was not subject to any significant impact from aviation. Throughout October, German aircraft carried out only 17 night harassing raids and 6 daytime raids on Moscow, the largest of which (59 aircraft) was the raid on October 28. But at the same time, German aviation failed to inflict much damage on the city1^41. The second factor was the new method of warfare applied by Zhukov. It was necessary both for the combat use of small units, often created for this purpose, and due to the fact that the battles took place near the Russian capital. Retreating from the Mozhaisk defense line and abandoning a large territory was no longer possible if Stalin wanted to retain Moscow11^1. The Red Army was practically fighting on the last line.

Therefore, Zhukov did everything to use his small forces as efficiently as possible, creating for this purpose in the armies in the most dangerous areas deeply echeloned anti-tank and artillery defense centers, which forced the advancing enemy to break through more and more new positions. In addition, tanks were now used not only to support infantry, but also concentrated to fight German tanks. To strengthen the defense, Stalin immediately sent all the anti-tank units at his disposal to the front for use in the main directions. In the implementation of this new method of warfare, which provided wide possibilities for maneuver and combined firepower with rapid counterattacks on the flanks of the advancing enemy, Russian aviation provided increasing support. Soviet pilots, operating from stationary airfields near Moscow, increasingly entered into battle and inflicted significant losses on the German troops. In the period from October 10 to October 31, Soviet aviation carried out about 10 thousand sorties against the troops of Army Group Center1, operating even when German aviation could not fly due to weather conditions.

The third, decisive factor was the nature of the fighting. As the front approached Moscow, the morale of the Red Army soldiers increased. In his order to the troops of the Western Front, Zhukov indicated: “At this moment, everyone, from the ordinary Red Army soldier to senior commanders, must bravely and adamantly fight for the Motherland, for Moscow! Showing cowardice and panic under these conditions is tantamount to betrayal. In this regard, I order: 1. Cowards and panickers who leave the battlefield, leave occupied positions without orders and throw away weapons and equipment, be shot on the spot. 2. Responsibility for the implementation of this order should be placed on the military courts and the prosecutor's office... Not a step back! Forward for the Motherland!” Although this order and similar orders did not lose their force in the second half of October, one should generally note an increased will to fight and an increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers. The formations that arrived from the Far East served as an example for other troops. Soviet propaganda especially highlighted the military exploits of the 316th Infantry Division under the command of General I.V. Panfilov and the 78th Infantry Division under the command of General A.P. Beloborodov, who were part of Rokossovsky’s 16th Army. Both divisions, for their courage, were renamed, respectively, into the 8th and 9th Guards Rifle Divisions."181 Not only strict orders and political slogans put forward by political workers led to an increase in the moral qualities of the soldiers, but also the fear of German captivity."

The fate of Russian prisoners of war very soon became known to Soviet soldiers. Bok, during a trip to the front, having become convinced of the difficult conditions in which Russian prisoners of war were, wrote in his diary that torture, hunger, executions of soldiers - all this was in reality. “The impression from tens of thousands of Russian prisoners of war, who were moving towards Smolensk almost unguarded, was terrible. Pale and emaciated, these unfortunate people could barely stand on their feet. Many died along the way. I talked about this with the army command, but it’s unlikely to help.” 77 The “order on commissars” also played a role. Soviet political workers understood that if captured they would inevitably be killed, and encouraged their soldiers to resist with all their might, so that when faced with the alternative of surrendering to the Germans or continuing the fight, they leaned toward the latter. And although some German commanders demanded that this order be canceled because of its negative consequences for the actions of the German army, Hitler did not comply with these wishes, since it contradicted him. Not only commanders at the front, but also propaganda organizations tried to eliminate obvious shortcomings, since they understood that Russian soldiers hardly believed German broadcasts and leaflets. In one of the reports from the Wehrmacht propaganda department at the command of the rear area of ​​Army Group Center, a significant statement was made on this matter: “Creating a favorable mood among the population makes it difficult... our treatment of prisoners of war.

Again and again, cases occur when prisoners are simply shot, who, due to exhaustion, cannot continue to move... News of these cases, when prisoners are shot in populated areas, instantly spreads throughout the entire region.” But the German command did not show much desire to improve the situation of Soviet prisoners of war and to hold anyone accountable for the mass executions of these people who voluntarily surrendered to the Germans. On the contrary, Jodl, in his resolution on the above report, indicated: “It was necessary to carry out counter-propaganda, namely, it was necessary to point out that in this case we are talking about prisoners of war who refuse to go further not because they can no longer, but because they cannot want. In all such reports, I am surprised that it is only stated as a result of which of our wrong actions the enemy counter-propaganda receives arguments that are beneficial to itself. It would be more correct to report on what counter-propaganda measures should be taken.” The German security service, pursuing a policy of terror against the civilian population and mass executions, 78 only increased the hatred of the Russians towards the German occupiers.

The situation of the Russian population was also worsened by the directive on the suppression of the partisan movement of October 25, which recommended that the Wehrmacht instill respect for the Germans among the population and thereby gain their trust. But the consequence of this directive was not trust, but an even deeper hatred of the Germans and fear of them. The difficult food situation of the civilian population in the occupied areas convinced the Red Army soldiers that German soldiers had come not as “liberators,” but as enslavers, and that they should be fought against with all available means. At the same time, not only ordinary soldiers, but especially the Soviet intelligentsia deeply hated the German invaders. In 1941, A. Surkov wrote a story about how a Red Army soldier takes an oath.

The soldier swears: “I am Russian, a soldier of the Red Army. My country gave me a rifle. She sent me to fight against Hitler’s black hordes that invaded my land... Behind me are one hundred and ninety-three million Soviet people, and Hitler’s enslavement is worse than death... I saw thousands of murdered women and children lying on highways and railways. They were killed by German bloodsuckers... The tears of women and children burn my heart. The murderer Hitler and his hordes will pay with their wolf's blood for these tears; The avenger’s hatred knows no pity.” The hatred and fortitude that the commanders demanded from the Red Army soldiers was reinforced by the demands of the party, which carefully ensured that all formations held their sectors at the front.

If any unit retreated without an order, it was immediately subject to censure and a requirement was put forward to it to show higher fighting qualities in the future. But not only the moral qualities of Russian soldiers had a decisive influence on the nature of the actions of the Red Army, but also, above all, the timely transfer of reserve formations and troops from the eastern regions of the country. While the German General Staff believed that the Soviet reserves had basically already been used up and Stalin had no more forces to occupy a new line of defense, the Russian command already at the end of September began transferring divisions and personnel formations from the eastern regions of the USSR to the west to make up for the losses suffered in the battles for Kyiv. These troops arrived just in time, in mid-October, to enter the battle for Moscow.

The reports of the Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge, in which from the beginning of July he reported to the leaders of the USSR about the position of the Japanese government, which decided not to oppose the Soviet Union in the Far East, as well as the urgent need to throw all forces against the Germans in order to defend Moscow, were the basis for the further transfer of troops . The news received from Sorge was a valuable confirmation for the Russian command of the correctness of the measures it was taking, but were not the decisive arguments for this major transfer of troops. Politicians from the Kremlin, based on the changed situation in the world, when confrontation between Japan and the United States was becoming more and more likely, transferred some troops from the Far East to Europe, not at all under the influence of Sorge’s reports. And yet it should be considered established that the news that the Far East was not in immediate danger from Japan gave the Russians the opportunity to transfer more forces to the west than originally planned.

The railway network of the Soviet Union made it possible to transfer eight fully equipped divisions, including one tank, to the European part of the USSR in a period of twelve to fifteen days. The Germans did not initially expect such a pace. To transport one rifle division, from 20 to 40 trains were needed, which would travel along both tracks at high speed. Entire “packs” of 15-20 trains, traveling close to each other only at night, completely fell out of sight of German air reconnaissance. To ensure the speedy transfer of troops, the Russians stopped all other trains for several days, including trains with military cargo, and thus the divisions were delivered in trains directly to the front line.

This made it possible to transfer at least 13 rifle divisions and 5 tank brigades to the area west of Moscow from the Far East, Central Asia and Siberia by the end of October and significantly stabilize the front. In addition to this direct replenishment for the front, divisions intended for the newly formed armies in the rear were simultaneously delivered.

These troops, engaged in combat training, had the task of creating deeply echeloned defensive lines in the formation areas and immediately occupying them. If the Germans broke through near Moscow and reached the Volga, they could continue to fight. This confirms that even if Moscow had fallen, Stalin would not have considered the war lost, as the German command hoped, but would have been ready to fight further in the interior of the country. Since the Russian command was convinced from previous experience that introducing reserves into battle in small portions was irrational and only led to large losses, the Headquarters began to create a strike force from the reserves, intending to introduce these forces into battle concentratedly, in the main directions. The fact that the Russians were covering the gaps that had opened up on the front west of Moscow with workers' detachments rather than with regular troops only reinforced the German perception that the Russians were running out of steam and that the war in the East could be over in the near future. In a conversation with Ciano on October 25, 1941, Hitler argued “that, as the events of the last four months indicate, the fate of the war is, strictly speaking, decided and that the enemy has no way to prevent it ... Under these circumstances, the war will soon again be transferred to the West ..." In reality, the situation at the front was far from being so favorable for the Wehrmacht. At the end of October, the Russian front was so strengthened111^ that the command of the Western Front believed that it could stop a new German offensive. Zhukov's October 30 order to go on the defensive was symptomatic in that it showed how Zhukov, using new methods, assumed military action and gained time in the process.

First of all, all highways and other roads leading to the defense areas were mined and heavily damaged over a distance of 100 km. All tank-dangerous directions between the roads were mined in order to prevent the possibility of a roundabout maneuver. By constructing barricades, ditches and other obstacles, it was supposed to slow down the advance of German infantry units; if necessary, the defenders were even supposed to flood areas of the terrain lying in front of their front line. It was ordered to create a number of “anti-tank areas” (Kalugine, Drakino, Lopasnya, Stremilovo, Kamenka, Kresty, Istra, NaroFominsk, Petrovskoye, Akulovo, Kubinka, Dorokhove, Serpukhov, Zvenigorod, Mikhailovskoye, Lokotnya, Anufrievo, NovoPetrovskoye, Teryaeva Sloboda), in which all available anti-tank weapons were concentrated in the main directions - anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, tanks and infantry support guns. In addition to these areas, additional forces of armies and divisions created “anti-tank areas” at the junctions of formations.

Local commanders paid special attention to ensuring that the combat formations of the troops at their disposal were echeloned in depth and that sufficient reserves were allocated at all levels, from the regiment and above, that could be brought into battle at the decisive moment. To ensure reliable command and control of troops, communication lines, as well as command posts, were well hidden underground. At the junctions of units and formations, commanders used well-trained communications. Zhukov again and again pointed out the need to organize interaction between infantry and artillery, tanks and aviation and placed responsibility for this on the commanders of units and formations. Since the command of the Western Front did not expect a major German offensive in the foreseeable future, it believed that it would be possible to complete the necessary defensive measures in a relatively calm environment and prepare to repel the German offensive.

K. Reinhardt. Turning near Moscow.