Ukraine is preparing for war. This is obvious, and many signs suggest that the reorganization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is being carried out according to some far-reaching plan. The generals themselves and the leadership of the regime are talking about a period of 3-5 years, after which their Armed Forces will acquire a new look and be able to perform new tasks.
Let's try to figure them out.
At the annual meeting with the highest command staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, timed to coincide with their professional holiday, "Defender of the Fatherland Day", President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko said:
We have increased the real, and not paper, strength of the armed forces of Ukraine, created groupings of troops that provide cover for all potentially dangerous directions, including from the Crimea and unrecognized Transnistria.
Poroshenko Petr Alekseevich
This statement is interesting from many perspectives, but it is precisely this that made me take a closer look at the new military doctrine of Ukraine and, as a consequence, the construction of its new armed forces.
Lessons of war in Donbass
To understand the internal transformations of the Ukrainian army, we should go back a little. When, in March 2014, the “interim” President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov announced a “march to the east” (Drang nach Osten), the Ukrainian armed forces were not ready for this. Not ready technically and… geographically. The fact is that the country inherited the system of military camps from the USSR and most of the regular troops were on the right bank of the Dnieper or in its immediate vicinity. There was no regular army in the Donbass. The nearest brigade was the 92nd mechanized brigade based south of Kharkov. And therefore, for all the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the campaign against Donbass became a rather serious test, which they could not stand. This led the Ukrainian "patriots" to accuse President Yanukovych of the deliberate collapse of the army. They are right, the army was deliberately disorganized. But it was not Yanukovych's fault. According to the adopted concept of building the Armed Forces of Ukraine (in 2009), after 2012 the armed forces of the Ukrainian army were to consist of three corps:
8 AK: 1 tank, 1 mechanized, 1 airmobile, 1 artillery brigades. 6 AK: 2 mechanized, 1 light, 1 airmobile, 1 artillery brigades. 13 AK: 2 mechanized, 1 light, 1 airmobile, 1 artillery brigades. The light "brigade" is an analogue of the American "light infantry".
It was under this staff structure that the 17th tank brigade was disbanded under President Viktor Yanukovych, whose tanks were to be sold (starting with the Congo). And as we understand, it was all conceived during the time of Viktor Yushchenko, and therefore all the claims of Ukrainian "patriots" to the fourth president of Ukraine are pure emotions and are not substantiated by anything. The “collapse” of the Ukrainian army was planned long ago, by the third Ukrainian president. Just then the country had a completely different military doctrine. Washington did not plan to use the armed forces of Ukraine against Russia due to the latter's refusal to support Mikhail Saakashvili's military adventure in 2008. And since the Americans just don’t pay for anything, it was decided to finally destroy the unnecessary and very burdensome “ballast” for the decaying economy of Ukraine. But events began to develop in a different scenario. That immediately changed both the Ukrainian army and the military doctrine of the state. Events in 2014 developed rapidly. Initially, it was decided to deploy all available military force along the Russian-Ukrainian border and prevent the "invasion", which never happened. And apparently it was not planned (at least from the Russian side, but which they really wanted overseas). Then, the Ukrainian army, in violation of all the norms of the Constitution, began to be drawn into a military confrontation with the residents of Donbass who had “gang against Kyiv”. And the first phase of the civil war in Ukraine began: the invasion (what kind of nonsense) of its armed forces into its own territory, which refused to obey the illegally seized power. The Armed Forces of Ukraine could not rely on any of the existing military camps or supply base for concentration and deployment. All this was aggravated by the catastrophic state of technology and the lack of equipment. As a result, each brigade mobilized very slowly and sent hastily shot down units to the front (usually battalion-by-battalion or as part of battalion-tactical groups formed according to the American model). This often led to the fact that parts of the same brigade fought far from each other, which led to confusion in management and largely predetermined the outcome of the campaign. By the way, the US Army is now implementing the concept of deploying a field army from modular units. The US Armed Forces have more than a hundred brigades (heavy, light, striker, artillery, rear). And there are separate headquarters: divisions, corps, armies. During the outbreak of the conflict, the US army should be deployed in fact on the same principle as the Ukrainian army in the Donetsk campaign of 2014 (only the “puzzles” are larger). In fact, the "modules" of future corps will not have a sense of elbow and coherence of actions. The principle of rationalism in the US Army defeated the military spirit and traditions (for details about the US Army, about the reasons that prompted the US military to do so and the consequences, a whole series of articles is already being written, where everything will be described in detail). The Ukrainian army, having suffered a defeat, decided to return to the tactics of using entire brigades in full strength and as part of "sectors" (corps). That is, separate sectors of the front are held by units assigned to one operational command (an idea that has not yet been fully implemented), with which quite a lot of horizontal ties have been organized during the service (the principle of producing officers for vacancies within their brigade). The real restructuring of the army began after the summer defeat in 2014. Since the end of the year, the Ukrainian army, both at the front and in the rear, has entered a period of transformation that has not yet ended. Perestroika touched not only the military doctrine, but also the technical equipment and the concept of the use of troops. The American tactics of individual tactical groups were finally abandoned and returned to the principle of conducting combat operations as part of permanently operating units: brigades, corps.
Troop deployment
I omit without comment the already well-known fact that the most likely enemy in the new military doctrine of Ukraine is the Russian army. Obviously, one should not expect anything else from the current Kiev authorities. Let us turn our attention to how this doctrine is being implemented in practice and to what changes it has led within the armed forces of the state. If you look the facts in the eye, you can see that the new military doctrine of Ukraine, proclaimed at the end of 2015, began to be implemented much earlier. All transformations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine made since the end of 2014 fully comply with the document prepared in early September 2015 and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the end of the year. If you look closely, the places of permanent deployment of the new brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were not chosen by chance and ... have nothing to do with the war in Donbass. Here is a list of the main brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the end of 2015. For convenience and better understanding, I will immediately scatter them among the “operational commands” (parts of the new formation deployed after the summer campaign of 2014 are in bold):
Operational Command "North": 1st separate tank brigade, town. Goncharovskoye Chernihiv region; 14th separate mechanized brigade, (on the basis of the disbanded 51st separate mechanized brigade) Vladimir-Volynsky, Volyn region; 30th separate mechanized brigade, Novograd-Volynsky, Zhytomyr region; 72nd separate mechanized brigade, Belaya Tserkov, Kyiv region; 26th artillery brigade - Berdichev; 43rd Separate Artillery Brigade (Devichki village, Kiev region) May be used with units of the Vostok OK. 95th separate airmobile brigade - Zhitomir; Operational Command "East": 17th separate tank brigade, Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk region; 53rd separate mechanized brigade, Severodonetsk, Luhansk region 54th separate mechanized brigade, Artemovsk, Donetsk region 56th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, p. Mirne, Zaporozhye region. 58th separate motorized infantry brigade, Konotop, Sumy region. 92nd separate mechanized brigade, p. Klugino-Bashkirovka Kharkiv region; 93rd separate mechanized brigade, town. Cherkasy, Dnepropetrovsk region; 27th rocket artillery brigade - Sumy. 55th artillery brigade - Zaporozhye; 107th rocket artillery regiment - Kremenchug, 25th separate airmobile brigade - town. Guards, Dnepropetrovsk region; 81st air assault brigade - Konstantinovka, Donetsk region; Operational Command "South": 28th separate mechanized brigade, town. Chernomorskoye Odessa region; 57th separate motorized infantry brigade, Kirovograd. 59th separate motorized infantry brigade, Gaisin, Vinnitsa region (headquarters), Kotovsk, Odessa region (2 battalions); 40th separate artillery brigade (Pervomaisk, Nikolaev region) 79th separate airmobile brigade - Nikolaev (management, headquarters), Bolgrad; Operational Command "West": 10th mountain assault brigade, Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk region (management, headquarters), p. Tsenzhev Ivano-Frankivsk region; 24th separate mechanized brigade, Yavorov, Lviv region; 128th separate mechanized brigade, Mukachevo, Transcarpathian region; 44th Artillery Brigade - Lviv region 15th regiment of rocket artillery - Drohobych; 80th separate airmobile brigade - Lvov (management, headquarters), Chernivtsi; So, we see that the former three corps have been transformed into four commands. Each of them against his personal opponent: OK "North" - Belarus; OK "West" - Poland, Hungary, Romania OK "South" - Transnistria OK "Vostok" - Russia.
At the same time, the Crimean Isthmus also falls within the responsibility area of OK Vostok, which is completely logical in this concept. Each command is actually the same corps (except OK Vostok), which now includes three mechanized brigades, an artillery brigade and a rocket artillery regiment, and a reconnaissance battalion. Plus anti-aircraft units and support units, but for now we will leave them out of the scope of consideration due to their low significance in a possible future conflict. One tank brigade is deployed in the most dangerous directions from Kyiv's point of view. The 17th tank brigade is deployed in the Vostok OK and can be used both against the south of Russia, the Crimea, and against Transnistria, the 1st can very quickly strengthen the defense of the corps operating against the center of Russia and Belarus. In addition, in the area of responsibility of each corps, we see one “rapid response” brigade, which has long been neither airmobile, but somewhat resembles (in concept) the American Stryker brigades (mobile strike units, to cover the flanks, raids on the rear, cover deployment of the main forces). What do we see in the end. Most of the new brigades were formed against Russia and Transnistria. Taking into account Belarus, against the armed forces in one form or another, listed as allies of Russia, 4/5 of the armed forces of Ukraine are deployed. New units were deployed precisely on the basis of the military doctrine that had not yet been adopted. There is no chance here, everything is thought out and pursues far-reaching goals. Not for the war in the Donbass. Or rather, not only for the war in the Donbass. Therefore, further we will consider the formation of the armed forces of Ukraine based on some "future", post-war considerations. OK "Vostok", as we see, will include two whole corps. One should cover the Sumy and Kharkov regions (58th, 92nd and 93rd brigades and the 25th airmobile). The 43rd Artillery Brigade is formally located on the territory of OK Sever, but its location is ideal for deployment as part of the Corps of OK Vostok. The 27th Jet Brigade (Sumskaya) will apparently be divided into two regiments very soon. One will remain in Sumy, and the second will be deployed to support parts of OK Sever. The location of the brigade is very inconvenient, but for financial reasons no one will change anything yet. The second corps should cover the Donbass and the Crimean direction (53rd, 54th, 56th brigades and 81 air assault). These are all new parts. The artillery grouping of the corps will consist of the 55th artillery brigade and the 107th jet regiment. Worst of all today is the situation with the direction "South". Initially, only the 28th mechanized and 79th airmobile brigades were based on this territory. And therefore, in order to bring the command forces to the “state”, one motorized infantry brigade was formed in Kirovograd (57th), and in the area south of Vinnitsa (59th) and the north of Odessa region the second (so far) motorized infantry brigades. The 40th artillery brigade will be based in the city of Pervomaisk, Nikolaev region, and apparently there is nothing to form a jet regiment yet, but it certainly is in the plans. If necessary, the corps can be reinforced by the 17th Tank Krivoy Rog Brigade. In general, it is very likely that the tank brigades, as well as the 19th missile brigades, are a kind of reserve of the main command, which can be transferred partially or in full strength to strengthen one direction or another. therefore, the newly formed 14th mechanized brigade was transferred to OK "Sever", leaving the 24th and 128th brigades as the backbone and including the new 10th mountain brigade in the "western" corps. The artillery of the corps will be the 44th artillery brigade and the 15th rocket artillery regiment. OK "North" covers the capital and controls the border with Belarus. In fact, there are only two dangerous directions. From the side of Brest, where the 14th mechanized brigade is stationed and along the border of the Chernihiv region, which should be covered by "parts of the Kiev garrison": the 72nd and 30th mechanized brigades, the 26th artillery brigade. Reactive "strengthening", most likely the corps will receive from Sumy, especially since the main theater of possible military operations of the "northern" corps will be in the Chernihiv and Sumy regions. Actually, the garrison of the capital should consist of units of central subordination: the 1st presidential regiment and the 101st security brigade of the General Staff of the Moscow Region.
Special Operations Forces. They are created on the basis of the 3rd and 8th special purpose regiments of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. In general, we see that the Kyiv regime is building a new army. The size of the field army will be almost doubled (howitzer artillery more than doubled). Given the announced timeline for the implementation of reforms in the army (three to five years) and current events, it is unlikely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are ready for real combat operations right now. On the contrary, any war today is a delayed implementation of plans for the future. Is that why Washington so “loved” the Minsk agreements and is trying to bargain a respite from Moscow for Kyiv? Apparently, according to the main plan, this army should be ready to deliver one, but powerful blow to crush the Armed Forces of Novorossia (AFN) or to draw it into the war of the regular forces of the RF Armed Forces, which it will never be able to resist, but the introduction of which into the territory of Donbass or Ukraine will mean a geopolitical victory for the United States, against the background of the complete defeat and destruction of “Ukraine is not Russia”. How and with what forces they are trying to achieve this will be described in the second part of the article, devoted to the tactical formation (according to the new doctrine) and the technical capabilities of the "future" armed forces of Ukraine.
December 24, 1942 - the date of the victory of the USSR in the battle on the Volga. ================================================= ======== On December 24, 1942, realizing the impossibility of breaking through the encirclement of the Stalingrad group, the commander of the Don Army Group, Field Marshal Manstein, stopped Operation Winter Storm. So, in fact, the Red Army won the most important victory for it in the Great Patriotic War. The Stalingrad group of Nazi troops turned into the largest camp of armed prisoners of war in anticipation of defeat and surrender. In the course of intense fighting from November 19 to December 24, 1942, the Red Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Stalingrad region, surrounded 20 German and 2 Romanian divisions and repelled the fierce attempts of the Germans to release their troops on the Volga. The culmination of these great days in the history of our country were 12 frosty December days of fighting in the area of the Kotelnikovo railway station. The soldiers and commanders of the cavalry-mechanized group (KMG) of the 4th cavalry and 4th mechanized corps, as well as the 2nd Guards Army, were able to stop and then push back the German tank wedge. It seemed that military happiness again smiled at the Germans: General Goth, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, sent radiograms in plain text to his tankers in the Stalingrad cauldron so that they would hold on and he would definitely save them. Some 15 kilometers remained to the positions of the encircled, but then the striking force of the German armored ram dried up on this. And it started well for the Germans near Kotelnikovo: the Hollidt army group attacks the troops of the Southwestern Front from the direction closest to the encircled ones and ties up its reserves, General Vatutin cannot help his KMG in the Kotelnikovo area, where the 6th Panzer Division of General Raus is unloading, urgently arrived from France. Manstein played the game in his own style: diverting the attention and forces of his opponent in a secondary direction in order to suddenly deliver the main blow on another sector of the front. It turned out great in Belgium in May 1940, when Army Group B in Holland diverted the most combat-ready part of the troops of the Anglo-French coalition to itself at a time when the tank wedge of Army Group A, having overcome "impassable for tanks" according to the French command The Ardennes cut the Allied troops and pressed part of them to the sea near the city of Dunkirk. 50 French, British and Belgian divisions, as well as many units and subunits, were surrounded. Thus was created the most numerous "cauldron" in the history of wars. If then it was possible to deal with the troops of the Western coalition, then why should they break with the Russian "untermenschs"? The military genius of the Third Reich began to repeat itself, and in military affairs it is necessary to constantly engage in creativity. No wonder the great Russian commander Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov said that in order to win, you need to surprise the enemy with an unexpected action for him, to do what he does not expect from you. But the Soviet command had already well studied the habits of each German commander, and it was only up to intelligence that established the area and the number of troops destined to break through the Stalingrad ring. If the KMG did not have enough strength to stop the tank wedge of Routh, then the 2nd Guards Army was urgently transferred from the Don Front to the South-Western Front in a forced march advanced to the line of the Myshkovka River. The courage and steadfastness of Russian soldiers by November 1942 were significantly supplemented by the ability of commanders and staffs to plan military operations, the ability of the Soviet economy to provide the army with weapons and ammunition in the required quantities and of proper quality, food and other types of supplies. Now the Red Army has become truly invincible and legendary. The qualitative advantage of the Soviet Armed Forces over the Wehrmacht was achieved. The peak of the military power of the Third Reich was passed, while the military strength of the Soviet Union grew more and more. On December 24, 1942, refusing to try to free his Stalingrad grouping from the "boiler", Manstein stated this unpleasant fact for the Nazis: the 6th field army would have to be doomed to death in order to save the rest of the troops on the southern flank of the Soviet-German from defeat. Such a Christmas gift was received from their superiors by tens of thousands of "true Aryans" in Stalingrad. On December 24, 1942, the greatest battle in the history of mankind was won by Soviet soldiers and commanders. Surrounded fascists could only be finished off.
In order to increase the number of active bayonets, the Kiev leadership decided to increase the number of mechanized units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Number of five pieces, two mechanized and three motorized infantry.
Freshly mobilized 2014-15 fall under the recycling program in new brigades.
History is being made along the way and new brigades are being formed.
The brigades begin with the number 53, perhaps in memory of the defeated 51 mechanized brigades and the dispersed 52 brigades.
The 53rd, 57th, 59th brigades are real and something is glimmering there, and the 54th and 58th brigades are apparently at the zero cycle stage.
The 57th motorized infantry brigade consists of the famous and battle-hardened territorial battalions, and the 59th motorized infantry brigade is the same of these same territorial battalions, but less famous and battle-hardened.
The main problem of the brigades is the lack of equipment and heavy weapons, therefore they are armed only with what God sent.
53rd separate mechanized brigade(village of Novaya Lubomirka, Rivne region / in the plans of Severodonetsk, Luhansk region)
According to the states, it should not differ from other mechanized brigades. Question in the current configuration.
As if now this is a powerful connection, but most likely in the future
"The brigade consists of three mechanized battalions, one tank, division 2S3M, 2S1, BM-21 and an anti-tank artillery battery (Braga does not have - linear divisions) plus two full-time BTGs, an air defense division, a reconnaissance company.
The BTG includes a mekhbat (three companies), a 2S1 battery, a reconnaissance platoon, a MANPADS platoon, a ZU-23-2 platoon and a mortar battery. For the 53rd brigade, which is now being formed at the N.Lyubomirka training ground in the Rivne region, then the PPD of this brigade will be the city of Severodonetsk (if you remember when the President announced the deployment of two new brigades in the east in Severodonetsk and Kramatorsk)"
They also promised to transfer two battalions (4 and 5) of the 24th mechanized brigades to the 53rd brigades.
Some comrades from the 53rd brigade. 
54th separate mechanized brigade(location / planned Artemovsk, Donetsk region)
Almost zero cycle.
57th separate motorized infantry brigade, Kirovograd.
Formed at the end of 2014.
Composition
17th Army Motorized Battalion
34th Army Motorized Battalion
42nd Armed Forces Motorized Battalion
The armament of the brigade is the armament of motorized infantry battalions.
The 57th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (possibly also the 1st Special Territorial Defense Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) was created approximately in October/November 2014 as a development of the initiative of the Territorial Defense Battalions of Ukraine.
The brigade was created by combining 3 battalions of the territorial defense of the Kirovograd region - 17, 34 and 42.
Motorized infantry brigades were created in the Ground Forces for the first time.
They differ from "standard" mechanized brigades in a smaller number of armored vehicles (subdivisions on cars), in the absence of artillery and, accordingly, in the staff structure. In the future, they should be transformed into mechanized ones, or maybe not, and they will remain in their original state.
Veterans of Debaltseve. They left the boiler light, They suffered losses, including prisoners. Some kind of combat unit.
As artillery they had mortars - 3 mortars 2S12 and 3 Vasilka.
By Debaltseve The presence and loss of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Sector "C" as of February 3, 2015:
58th separate motorized brigade(Konotop, Sumy region)
Zero cycle.
Perhaps, together with the famous brigades of finishers in Konotop, there will be a new brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
59th separate motorized infantry brigade
Formed at the end of 2014, Gaisin, Vinnytsia region (office, headquarters), Kotovsk, Odessa region.
9th Army Motorized Battalion (formerly in the 30th Ombre)
16th Army Motorized Battalion
45th Armed Forces Motorized Battalion
The military unit was formed in 2014 in accordance with the general directive of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of December 08, 2014. Formation deadline is December 20, 2014. Separate motorized infantry battalions became the basis for the formation of the brigade: the 9th separate motorized infantry battalion (before the reorganization of the 9th armored personnel carrier of the Vinnitsa region), the 16th motorized infantry brigade (formerly the 16th armored personnel carrier of the Poltava region), the 45th and ompb (formerly the 5th battalion Air Force security). Place of deployment of the administration and units of the brigade, Gaisin, Vinnitsa region, military camp No. 100 (funds of the 31st training aviation center, disbanded in 2013, military unit A3769). Place of deployment of two battalions m. Kotovsk, Odessa region on the funds of the former 90th training center of automobile troops.
The directive of the General Staff states that the restoration of infrastructure, the creation of conditions for the deployment of soldiers and officers must be done before the beginning of March 2015.
While the boiler houses are being repaired, the regional authorities will connect a military facility to the city's heating network in order to start internal repairs of the premises as soon as possible.
According to Anatoly Oleinik, chairman of the Vinnytsia Regional State Administration, the work will be financed by the Ministry of Defense. However, local officials turned to entrepreneurs and philanthropists to help with funds, materials, labor, so that the military unit could start functioning as soon as possible.
In Gaisin, 250 families of officers are already waiting.
According to available information, a motorized infantry unit should be based on the site of the disbanded flying unit. Now, since the spring of this year, at the still surviving base of the military unit, they have been training fighters for military operations in the ATO. The most trained have recently departed as part of the rotation to the east of the country.
our squad of pioneers 
Servicemen of the 16th battalion of the 58th brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine appealed to the country's top political leadership and, first of all, to President Petro Poroshenko with a call to stop trade and any financial relations with representatives of the separatists in the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass.
This was reported in a video message from the military posted on the Facebook page of serviceman Nikolai Voroshnov.
“We, the 16th battalion of the 58th brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, appeal to the country's top political leadership, first of all, to President Petro Alekseevich Poroshenko, with a call to stop trade and any financial relations with representatives of the separatists in the temporarily occupied territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions. We do not support any political force, but we condemn pressure, especially physical pressure, on the veterans of the ATO, who today, through a trade blockade in the Luhansk region, are fighting the financing of the occupiers.
In addition, we demand to completely stop the movement of smuggling along the entire border of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Each hryvnia directed to CADLO is direct financing of terrorism. Terrorism, which has been haunting our country for the third year in a row. Our relatives and friends understand the problem and are ready to accept temporary difficulties that may arise due to the lack of energy from Donbass. But the memory and honor of those soldiers who sacrificed their health and lives in this bloody war are much more precious than this. We understand that many citizens live in the occupied territories who love and support Ukraine. Therefore, we ask them to treat this economic embargo with understanding, because there is not a single example in history when a country in a state of war fed its enemy. The army of Ukraine is with the people of Ukraine. Glory to Ukraine!"
Recall that on January 25, activists blocked the Luhansk-Lysichansk-Popasnaya railway at the Gornoye-Zolotoye section, as well as the Svetlanovo station with calls to stop trade with illegal armed groups, reminds Ukrayinska Pravda.
The head of the Lugansk regional military-civilian administration, Yuri Garbuz, wrote on Facebook that this action threatens the energy security of the entire country.
Deputy Minister for the Occupied Territories Georgy Tuka called this action illegal and inappropriate.
On January 26, the prosecutor's office opened criminal proceedings on the fact of blocking the railway in the Luhansk region on the line of demarcation.
The head of the SBU of Ukraine, Vasily Hrytsak, negatively assessed the actions of people's deputies who blocked part of the road in the Lugansk region, and urged them to act by legal methods.
On January 31, Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman said that there is currently no alternative to obtaining coal from uncontrolled territories in Donbas.
On February 1, the National Liberation Movement "Right Sector" made, in which, among other things, it called for the complete severing of any economic relations with representatives of the so-called "DPR" and "LPR".
The increased tension and active combat phase on the front line between Ukraine and the Donbass republics made us think about the topic of what the Armed Forces of Ukraine are today and how effectively they can solve the “Donbass problem” by force.
These are figures, figures and again figures that can show an exclusively quantitative character, nothing more. But since they fight not by numbers, but by skill, then, simply starting from the numbers, it is difficult to make a full-fledged conclusion about the combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For quality must also be fastened to quantity.
But I'll try.
As in any normal country (many will disagree with this statement and quite rightly, but the key word here is “how”), the Armed Forces of Ukraine consist of a land, air force and naval unit. Let's go down the list from the end, I think it's clear why.
Naval Forces.
We will not look at what is not there for a long time, so let's start with the Ukrainian Navy. Everything that was more or less usable sailed along with the Crimea to Russia. So today the Ukrainian Navy is piles of scrap metal produced in the 60s and 70s of the last century.
All that can be of value as a relatively new watercraft is 2 Gyurza boats of 2016 and 13 American inflatable boats of 2015. The rest is rubbish and junk.
There are very real parts of the Marine Corps.
36th Separate Marine Brigade named after Konstantin Olshansky (Nikolaev).
Collected "from the world by thread" in the same memorable 2014, the formation united the 1st separate battalion of the marines, the 501st separate battalion of the marines and the 36th separate coastal defense brigade.
701st Separate Marine Battalion (Mariupol). The name behind which the nationalistic slag collected from the Crimean fugitives is hidden.
137th separate battalion of marines (Odessa region). New build from 2015.
Marine battalions are armed with BMP-1, BTR-60 and artillery in the form of D-30, which are enough in storage warehouses in Ukraine. The lack of amphibious assault ships in the Ukrainian Navy puts the marines into the category of ordinary ones. Let's not talk about "Yuri Olefirenko", the former "Kirovograd", his days are actually numbered. He can't even swim anymore. I just keep quiet about going to the performance of the BZ.
Air Force.
It's almost like a fleet, which is sad, but there's still something left.
The structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has 6 tactical aviation brigades (7, 40, 114, 204, 299, 831), the 39th separate squadron, the 203rd tactical aviation training brigade and the 383rd UAV regiment.
In addition, there are three transport aviation brigades (15, 25, 456).
There are still a certain number of SU-27s and MiG-29s at the storage bases, which, in the absence of production facilities and engines, are used as donors.
Everything that can still take to the air has been reduced to tactical aviation brigades, of which the 7th (8 Su-24M units, 5 Su-24MR units, 2 L-39S units), 40th (11 MiG units) can be called full-fledged -29, 4 units of MiG-29MU1, 3 units of MiG-29UB, 8 units of L-39S) and 299th (10 units of Su-25M1, 9 units of Su-25, 3 units of Su-25UB, 2 units of Su-25UBM, 3 units L-39M1, 4 units L-39S) BrTA.
The rest are nothing more than figures on paper, especially the 204th BrTA, which technically remained in Belbek.
Although the given number of actually combat-ready aircraft is rather sad evidence that one should not expect feats from the Ukrainian Air Force. In theory, of course, it is possible to fight, in practice ... it is doubtful.
If we talk about actions in the Donbass, then these are 7 BrTA on the Su-24 and 299 BrTA on the Su-25. Plus, the brigades were “reinforced” with combat training L-39s.
We do not consider fighter aircraft, because the basis of the Ukrainian IA is the MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, which have already demonstrated low efficiency in a land war when working on ground targets.
Whether Ukraine will use aviation in the ATO is another question, especially given the presence of well-organized air defense in the armies of the republics.
The only air unit that carries out real actions is the 383rd separate UAV regiment. And this is a serious structure, because they do not use homemade products and toy quadrocopters, but quite decent devices, and according to information from the defenders of the LDNR, they perform their tasks of reconnaissance and adjusting artillery fire quite professionally.
Army aviation, that is, helicopters.
The Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has 4 brigades of army aviation (11, 12, 16, 18). There is a storage base near Lviv, which plays the role of a source of spare parts, there is the production of our own engines and rocket helicopter weapons.
However, the significant losses suffered by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the ATO, in fact, reduced to a minimum the number of combat-ready vehicles that could take part in the operation. Now in army aviation, only the 11th and 16th brigades represent something more or less real. The 12th and 18th brigades can be called conditionally, since 8-10 helicopters per brigade are not pulled in any way.
Their main goal will be the removal of the wounded to the rear and the transfer of troops, for other tasks, what is left of army aviation in Ukraine is not capable, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine understand this very well.
Replenishing the helicopter fleet does not seem to be a problem, there are a lot of hulls left. There is "Motor-Sich", which produces a lot of useful things. The main problem is the lack of electronics, guidance and protection systems. That is, even produced helicopters will become a desirable target for the air defense of the republics.
We will not consider the air defense forces, because the defenders of Donbass do not have their own aviation, and it is not worth comparing the Ukrainian air defense in the light of a possible conflict with the Russian Armed Forces.
Ground troops.
Here everything is more optimistic and confident.
To date, Ukraine has 11 mechanized brigades (14, 24, 28, 30, 33, 53, 54, 60, 72, 92 and 93), in addition, 3 more brigades (15, 61 and 63), 3 mountain infantry brigades (10.62 and 128), 4 motorized infantry brigades (56, 57, 58, 59).
In reality, we can say that, compared to 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have more or less decent ground forces. But there are nuances.
Everything seems to be decent in the numbers, because the numbers indicate that there are 21 brigades in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It's pretty decent. However, we start to go downhill.
4 brigades (10 OGSBr, 15 OMBR, 60 OMBR and 62 OGBR are guarding the borders. So we will simply count them as a reserve in case of emergency.
8 brigades (14 OMBR, 24 OMBR, 28 OMBR, 30 OMBR, 53 OMBR, 72 OMBR, 92 OMBR and 93 OMBR) can indeed be considered quite full-fledged combat units. They are fully staffed in terms of staff and equipment, they were tested in battles in 2014-15. And that is why the prospect of 100% participation in the ATO is unlikely. Rather, they will keep it as a reserve, but an operational reserve.
9 brigades (33 motorized brigade, 54 motorized brigade, 61 motorized brigade, 63 motorized brigade, 128 OMPbr, 56 OMPbr, 57 OMPbr, 58 OMPbr and 59 OMPbr) - this is exactly the same "cannon fodder", which, most likely, will be used in the Donbass first of all. On the principle of "who is not sorry."
These newly formed brigades differ from full-fledged and incomplete personnel (example - the 33rd brigade, in fact, a hodgepodge of terbatov with all the outgoing), and equipment (example - the 128th brigade, actually gouged near Debaltseve and re-formed). Often brigades of two battalions.
Tank forces.
Ukraine has 3 tank brigades (1, 5 and 17) and 2 brigades (3 and 14) are under formation. There are 4 more separate tank battalions (1, 2, 4, 5).
There are no problems with equipment in terms of quantity, because the storage bases from the 3rd Soviet tank divisions have not gone away, and there is still a lot of things there. But it's a question of quality. And the ability to revive this technique and put it into action. This moment is getting sadder.
The 5th Tank Brigade guards the Crimea, the rest, in principle, can take part in hostilities. The 1st and 17th Tank Brigade, from which one full-fledged battalion was "squeezed" in favor of the brigades being created, as well as the 3rd and 14th Tank Brigade, of course, represent a certain force.
To date, the 1st Specialized Brigade and the 17th Specialized Brigade are fully staffed both in terms of personnel and equipment. Moreover, only these brigades have new modifications of the T-64, the rest have to use what they have.
Separate tank battalions may well play a role in the creation of the BTG, but there are the same problems with completeness.
But nevertheless, the tank forces of Ukraine are still a moment to be reckoned with. For starters, quantitatively.
Rocket troops and artillery.
19 Ukrainian artillery brigades and 2 rocket artillery regiments look very significant on paper. Given that in 2014 there were only 2 artillery brigades: the 26th and 55th. Plus the only 19 missile brigade.
The fact that the 19th RBR is alone should not bother anyone. "Tochka-U", which is in service, is able to reach any place on the map of the republics. On the paper. In fact, that rocket, that artillery brigades - this is one more song.
40 OABR is located on the border with Crimea, so we are silent about it.
The rest of the brigades are units of towed cannon artillery. The exceptions are the 27th rocket artillery brigade ("Hurricanes"), the 26th and 43rd self-propelled and 2 separate regiments of the RA (15th and 107th with the Smerch MLRS).
Plus a fair amount of Grads in separate artillery divisions as part of tank and mechanized brigades.
There are enough bases for storing artillery weapons in Ukraine. Numerically, there will be enough equipment to fight, if not to the bitter end, then to the end of Ukraine for sure.
But in matters of quality - complete sadness.
The main part of the equipment, and, most importantly, ammunition, belongs to the 50-70s of the last century. And this is a big problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine today. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that more and more obsolete models of the D-20 type are being put into operation.
With self-propelled artillery, it's no better. 26th Specialized Aviation Brigade, in which the remains of the self-propelled guns "MSTA-S" and self-propelled guns "Hyacinth" and 43rd Specialized Armed Forces with self-propelled guns "Pion" were collected. And it's all. Plus, again, a certain number of "Carnations", which are in the divisions of mechanized and tank brigades, but most of these divisions are incomplete.
The 40th OABr, 44th OABr, 45th OABr and 55th OABr are armed exclusively with towed guns. This is good when you just need to shell cities in the event of a positional war, but during dynamic hostilities, such artillery begins to increase the enemy’s combat score and replenish his artillery. That successfully proved Ilovaysk and Debaltseve.
Anti-tank artillery in most brigades also consists of MT-12 towed guns.
The situation turned out to be very unpleasant, since the best that was in warehouses and in parts was heavily spent in 2014-15. And it was either destroyed or became the trophies of the militia. And, if in the case of tanks, which can somehow be restored in Kharkov, this does not work with artillery.
highly mobile troops.
Calling them airmobile does not turn out due to the state of aviation in Ukraine.
They include:
- 1 airborne brigade (25th);
- 5 air assault (45, 46, 79, 80 and 95);
- 2 airmobile brigades (81 and 82).
The 82nd OAemBr is preparing to block the border with Crimea. Cross out.
The best airborne brigade in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the 25th Airborne Brigade, where they brought all the combat-ready landing equipment (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns "Nona").
Of the 7 remaining brigades, all represent a fairly high-quality mobile reserve capable of reinforcing any sector of the front. The equipment of the paratroopers is also in order, especially in comparison with conventional units. In some brigades, even helicopters for operational deployment have been preserved.
Special Operations Forces.
The composition of the MTR from the combat units includes 2 regiments of the Special Forces (3 and 8), the 73rd MTsSO and the 140th TsSpN. This also includes the 10th Separate Detachment of the Special Forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 36 OBMP, 137 OBMP and 6 separate reconnaissance companies (54, 74, 129, 130, 131, 136).
In principle, not everything is perfect with special forces either. Forces of the MTR of Ukraine, unlike conventional units, having suffered losses in the active phase of hostilities, continue to bear them at the present time.
Yes, losses are replenished, but a well-trained special forces soldier cannot be quickly made. And the groups perished, are perishing and will continue to perish, because on the other side, in the Donbass, they also learn military science in a real way.
But in any case, the Ukrainian special forces today are very seriously trained and (especially) well-equipped fighters.
What is the conclusion?
Yes, in Ukraine, starting from the moment of the struggle for independence, that is, from the first Maidan, something similar to the land army appeared.
The quantity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has increased significantly. Many units went through not just training at training grounds and exercises, but a real run-in at the forefront.
However, the technical level is increasingly rolling back to the boundaries of the 60-80s of the last century.
But if we look at the resumption of the active phase in the Donbass, then there is one unpleasant thing.
It is the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have at their disposal well-equipped and trained units (for Ukraine) and about the same amount of "cannon fodder" is a problem.
It is precisely in the field of human resources that Ukraine can afford to simply pour the blood of its own people and cover the approaches to the Republics with corpses. And already more valuable units will pass over the corpses of the former new brigades and complete what they started.
Unfortunately, Donbass does not have such resources. It is a fact.
The same is true for technology. If Ukraine puts 10 decommissioned artillery barrels on one modern artillery barrel at the LDNR, the outcome is obvious. Same with tanks.
More people and equipment is the main trump card of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And this trump card is very, very significant.
What will be able to oppose this in the LDNR? Only training of personnel and better equipment. But people are more important. The armies of the republics will not be able to afford such losses, which will be quite normal for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The experience of veterans of the first days of the war, the competent leadership of the officer corps of the republics, the ability to conduct a mobile, maneuverable battle, good tactical training - all this can completely offset the quantitative superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Work during the calm period was carried out by the former militia, and considerable. It is quite possible that we will soon have to find out how well it was done.
