https://www.site/2017-02-06/kak_snimayut_i_naznachayut_gubernatorov_v_2017_godu
“They call you and say: there is a good career option, come over”
How governors are removed and appointed in 2017
The governor of the Perm region has resigned, and more replacement governors are expected. the site spoke with experts and sources to find out how decisions to dismiss some regional heads and appoint others are made and handled today. This is a complex procedure full of formal and informal approvals.
How governors leave
The decision to resign a particular governor is maturing gradually - unless, of course, we are talking about extreme cases with the arrest of the head of the region, political scientists, former employees of the presidential administration and interlocutors close to the Kremlin tell the site.
“Given that we have a single voting day in September, best time for the planned resignation of the governor - February-March. In this case, the interim has enough time to delve into the regional layouts and prepare for the elections. The second “window” of resignations is October-November, immediately after the elections. This period is used if a situation arises in the region in which the new governor needs more time to get used to it. But, of course, there are also extreme situations, when the governor comes to a meeting at the presidential administration, and they tell him: “Write a statement,” says an interlocutor close to the presidential administration.
The governor is usually informed of the resignation by the head of the administration or the first deputy head of the administration, who oversees the internal political bloc (currently Anton Vaino and Sergei Kiriyenko). In the rarest cases, as, for example, was the case with the ex-head of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev, the retiree is personally seen off by the president (head of state Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with him).
The decision usually takes quite a long time to prepare; in some complex regions it can take up to four months. Sometimes the outgoing governor agrees to extend this period a little, and then an informal transition period begins in the region, says a former employee of the presidential administration.
“The president is the final authority. Before he decides to resign, analytical notes and monitoring are prepared for him, and the opinion of elite groups is taken into account. Next, the search for successors begins, and when approvals are completed, someone from the administration leadership meets with the outgoing governor and agrees to write a resignation letter at will and the date of publication of this information. At such a last meeting, you can ask for something and resolve the issue with future employment. Usually they meet the outgoing governor halfway,” says the publication’s interlocutor. If a governor leaves for health reasons, he may be allowed to leave a successor.
There can be many options for the governor to resign, and each time the technical side of the issue will be different, says another source close to the administration.
"When the governors last years they began to elect rather than appoint, and the electability factor began to be taken into account when making decisions,” the source explained. “However, it is not decisive, since if a person has serious support, he will still be sent to the polls and elected. But let’s imagine: let’s say the governor’s term of office is expiring. The presidential administration sums it up: they look at socio-economic indicators, acute and chronic elite conflicts, high-profile scandals and accidents, election results in the region, all this is taken into account. In parallel, those interested in the resignation or retention of the governor are leading individual work with a variety of people - from the president to clerks in the administration. The one who is stronger and more dexterous wins. Formal papers don’t play a special role here.”
According to the narrator, the main event of the process is the meeting of the president with the head of the administration or the relevant first deputy, at which a decision is made.
“It happens that a decision on a replacement is made in advance and taken personally by the president, for example, this is how the issue of replacing the governor of the Tula region Vladimir Gruzdev with Alexey Dyumin was decided,” says the interlocutor. “Then the administration simply acts as the executor of the will of the first person. If the governor goes for a promotion, like, for example, Alexander Khloponin from Krasnoyarsk Territory, he may also be allowed to appoint a successor, in in this case- Lev Kuznetsov. If the governor is removed against his will, succession is not allowed,” says the source.
“The president receives information from a variety of groups of people,” says political scientist Dmitry Gusev. — There is a political block of the presidential administration, which is supervised by Kiriyenko. They take stock of the governors' performance in their positions and propose solutions. The second group is the administration block responsible for interaction with the security forces. They prepare information for the president about governors in their area. The third block is the government, which has its own parameters for assessing the work of governors. There are also other influence groups, including corporate ones, which in one way or another convey their opinions to the president. When the decision to resign is made, the process of technical execution begins,” says Gusev.
“Governors leave in different ways,” says Vyacheslav Smirnov, head of the Center for Political Sociology. — In exceptional cases, they learn about the resignation from the press. Someone knows that he will leave, but does not know the date of departure. When appointing someone else, it is agreed upon that it is for one term. A smart governor begins to ask for resignation himself and in advance, because it is better to honestly tell those around him that, they say, “on new term I'm not going, I found something new a good place work” than to later look like they were kicked out of work. There is, however, a sign. If the deadline for reappointment approaches, and you are called not to the president, but to the head of the administration, it will probably be about resignation.” The elites believe that a personal meeting with the president shortly before the end of his term of office, on the contrary, indicates the good position of the governor.
Political scientist Leonid Davydov believes that the frequency of meetings with the first person does not affect the survival period of the governor.
“They say this has been happening in recent years. You are a governor about whom a decision has been made to resign,” he says. — First, a mid-high-level official, for example, the head of a department, will invite you to a conversation domestic policy or even his deputy, they will test the waters in the conversation. Then the curator of the internal political bloc will call you - he will tell you that there is an opinion that you should leave, that an even higher boss will talk to you, and keep in mind that, probably, such a position will be voiced. The higher boss is the head of the administration or, in cases of the resignation of an exceptional heavyweight, this will be the first person of the country. You will probably answer that you will agree.”
“The decision is made based on a set of factors,” continues Davydov. — For example, there are regular analytical notes that a person can get into. There is an assessment based on parameters - for example, the electability parameter, which takes into account the current leadership of the administration, which is primarily busy preparing the March campaign,” Davydov said.
How governors come
When the president decides that a particular governor is leaving office, the process of selecting a successor begins. It can take from a couple of weeks to a couple of months, except in cases where the president makes the decision alone.
“The presidential administration forms a shortlist of proposals for personalities, usually two or three candidates remain on it. The president can choose or reject all proposals. He may suggest someone himself, or he may simply suggest that he think about it some more. The first person has many communication channels, and after the administration presents him with its proposals, he can request characteristics of candidates from the shortlist from other people who will support one of the candidates or offer their own. Interviews and meetings with candidates are underway. This difficult process, and yet, for a person to receive a call and be notified that he will now be appointed governor, this does not happen,” says a source close to the presidential administration.
Another source of the publication, also close to the Kremlin, says that the scenario for selecting a new governor almost always looks different.
“If a successor is pre-selected or if the governor is allowed to choose a successor, then the process is already technical,” he says. — In other cases, they launch the process of selecting candidates. It is attended by the embassy, the presidential administration department for domestic policy, different groups and structures, including state corporations and businesses. They all give suggestions. Then they are first filtered at the level of the Administration of the Internal Affairs, then at the level of the leadership of the Administration, and then brought to the attention of the president. In this case, the candidate may be replayed at the last moment. In this situation, if suddenly pressure groups manage to remove a priority candidate from the list, they choose from the remaining people on the shortlist. For example, this happened with the appointment of governor Volgograd region Anatoly Brovko. The priority candidate was Valery Yazev, but at the last moment the appointment was canceled under the influence of Lukoil and Dmitry Medvedev,” says the publication’s source.
A former employee of the presidential administration says that there are also difficult cases when the priority candidate refuses, and the second most important candidate has problems or is too young. This, for example, happened in the Kaliningrad region, where Nikolai Tsukanov was initially replaced by a native of the FSB, Evgeny Zinichev, but two months later he refused his public post. Then, instead of him, 30-year-old Anton Alikhanov became the head of the Kaliningrad region.
"Sometimes in difficult cases It is clear that a candidate for the region must be selected from outside, and all regional applicants are removed from the short list. Most often, outside candidates are proposed by business groups or political clans that oversee the region. Also, in this case, the candidate can be proposed by the head of the administration, members of the Security Council, or the speaker of the State Duma during a personal meeting with the president. Speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko is inactive in this regard. There are also some interesting cases. For example, Nikita Belykh was recommended to the president for the post of governor by Anatoly Chubais,” says the publication’s interlocutor.
He notes that one should not exaggerate the importance of analytical notes that political scientists write for the administration, especially regional political scientists. The publication's interlocutor says that he does not know a single case when someone recommended by political scientists from the region became governor. The opinion of federal political scientists working with the region is taken into account at the level of internal policy management, he adds.
“It happens that it’s like on Election Day: a person didn’t know yesterday that he would become governor today,” says Leonid Davydov. — A more normal situation is when a person receives a call from his patron from structures that can lobby their candidate. The following call comes in: they say, there is one career option for you, come over. In rare emergency situations, it may be different: a call comes from the presidential administration, asking where you are, supposedly, a car will come for you now. You will most likely go to the head of the police department and then directly to the curator of the political bloc. At the same time, the process of special verification of you by security forces will be launched. And then - a meeting with the first person in front of television cameras, but it is of a ritual nature. Or there may be no meeting at all. Sometimes, if in the process of compiling a shortlist of possible successors, a couple of candidates remain, then it is taken into account which influence group, including corporate, the region is assigned to. There are many examples when you cannot become the governor of a certain region without joining a certain sub-clan.
And even at the last stage of appointing a new governor, the first person can consult with someone from his entourage and cancel the decision on the appointment and choose another candidate,” says Davydov.
“There is no single algorithm,” agrees Vyacheslav Smirnov. — It happens that the name of the new governor is determined by the first person to whom someone could recommend a person, or personal acquaintance with the president can play a role. In this case, the people executing the decision may not know who or what influenced it. On the other hand, for example, during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, there was a system when in the administration, at a meeting with its head and deputies, the names of those who would be recommended to the president on the short list were discussed on record, with arguments why this or that should be included in the list person. I don’t know how such meetings are held now,” he said.
Dmitry Gusev notes that one should not underestimate the opinion of the security forces, which is conveyed to the president at the stage of the special inspection.
“First, shortlisted candidates are interviewed by the administration, and then the security forces evaluate the candidates. We also must not forget that there are actually not one, but two keys to the governor’s office: one is with the president, the second is with the residents of the region,” adds Gusev.
Of course, the decision is still ultimately made by the president, sums up the head of the Center for Political Analysis, Pavel Danilin. “The presidential administration plays a key role in preparing the procedure for appointing a new head of the region. She is the one responsible for preparing the shortlist of candidates. Ever since the president himself proposed candidates for the post of governors, the administration has been involved in the preparation, and this tradition is now somewhat modified, but on the whole it has been preserved,” says Danilin.
Last week, Vladimir Putin replaced the governors of the Samara and Nizhny Novgorod regions and appointed acting Dmitry Azarov and Gleb Nikitin, respectively. Or vice versa.
And even earlier, the governor of Buryatia was appointed.
Find ten differences.
And all this is in addition to the recent governors of the Kaliningrad region, Perm region and Sevastopol.
And of course, the loudest change is in Dagestan, with the appointment of Vladimir Vasiliev there.
But besides the laughter that the portrait resemblance of the new regional heads inevitably caused, I think there is something else behind the appointments of cloned governors.
All these new governors, let’s say, obviously went through the same school (for some it was called the Academy of Civil Service under the President of the Russian Federation), where they were trained to look with a dead gaze and look the same and inconspicuously, to the point of confusion with environment. Vasiliev, of course, does not fit into this list in appearance, but his school is the former deputy head of the Russian Security Council, but it is outstanding, and in general “Vasiliev” in Dagestan even sounds great without the typical appearance of a junior FSB officer.
What unites all these people? They are all not members of local clans and elites. And changing governors to people outside these regional systems is, of course, good way to exact tribute from the regional elites in a new way, and to exact tribute from everyone, and not just from those who are not in power. In conditions of greatly diminished resources, a fight for the remaining pieces of the pie is always logical.
This is especially clearly seen in the example of Dagestan. The Dagestani elites are not only constantly at war with the Chechen elites, but also fight among themselves, torn apart by clan squabbles. Dagestan is, for example, billionaire Ziyavudin Magomedov, “the businessman of the Medvedev era.” Under the now former governor Abdulatipov, Magomedov was doing well, but now he will be forced to negotiate with Vasiliev. Also, Dagestan is the former president of the republic, Magomedsalam Magomedov, who, apparently, was given a ride with the position of the new head of the republic. And he will also have to negotiate with Vasiliev.
Simply put, everyone will now pay in the second round to the central cash register.
But there is, it seems to me, something else with these cloned governors. All of them are people of the system, primarily the KGB system. Why does Putin put such people at the head of the regions? It is clear that any governor, no matter what clan he is, will always carry out any order of President Putin unquestioningly.
Whether a governor from the local elite will carry out the orders of another president is a big question.
And a person of the system will carry out the orders of another president, if this president is part of the same system.
Simply put, with KGB majors as heads of regions, you can’t expect a riot on the ship.
And this is not the only sign that the question of a successor has not been resolved. Otherwise, why would Sechin attack Medvedev through the arrest of Minister Ulyukaev - and here I completely agree with Vladimir Pastukhov, who wrote brilliantly about this? After all, the only thing that Dmitry Anatolyevich is valuable for is his constitutionally guaranteed function as a successor.
Attacks on Medvedev, by the way, began even earlier, with investigations of Navalny and rallies officially declared against corruption, but in fact dedicated to the unfortunate prime minister’s sneakers.
Or Ramzan Kadyrov, who suddenly became nervous and said strange things about his special opinion and called on his followers to go to a rally in the center of Moscow at the Myanmar embassy, which they did, demonstrating strength to the federal center. Putin as president is a guarantee of peace for Ramzan Kadyrov, as indeed, and vice versa now. If Putin is going to sit in the Kremlin for another two hundred years, why should Kadyrov be nervous? And if Ramzan Kadyrov is nervous, it means he has a reason, and this reason can only be one - the question of Putin’s successor has not been resolved.
If Russia had not solemnly screwed up its bet on Trump, who, although he sympathizes with Putin with all his heart, cannot do anything for him, which the Russian President even publicly complained about (blaming political system USA), and if there was even a hint of lifting sanctions, then nothing would stop Vladimir Putin from ruling for another decade. But in conditions of economic suffocation (and no matter how hard Kremlin undercover agents try to convince themselves and others that sanctions do not work, and they work very well, especially the new Trump ones), remaining in office means turning Russia into Iran, or worse, into North Korea. The West has made it clear that under Putin, nothing but bad relations with Russia are possible. At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation knows how to starve out the enemy, so the tired West, nevertheless, seems to be ready for any change of the head of Russia, even the most formal one.
Is the Kremlin ready to do this? This is the question of questions.
Within a week, the heads of five regions resigned. Why they didn’t want to work and “who would hire the new guy” - political scientist Nikolai Petrov answers these questions for Fontanka.
Dmitry Korotaev/Kommersant
On Wednesday, February 15, the name of the next governor, who will not complete his term in office, became known. The head of Karelia, Alexander Khudilainen, asked to resign. The President immediately signed the petition and very quickly appointed a successor - the ex-head Federal service bailiffs Artur Parfenchikov. A day earlier, the head of the Ryazan region, Oleg Kovalev, voluntarily submitted his resignation. On Monday, the head of the Novgorod region Sergei Mitin did the same.
The previous working week was marked by the resignations of the Governor of the Perm Territory, Viktor Basargin, who will be the head of Rostransnadzor, and the head of Buryatia, Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn. What happened to the governor’s corps – explains the professor of the Department of Comparative Political Science High school economics, head of the Center for Political and Geographical Research Nikolai Petrov.
- Nikolai Vladimirovich, which governor is next to go?
– Ten heads of regions are expiring their terms of office, of which the Kremlin was going to change five or six, and reassign the rest. Among those who were called candidates for relegation, there was still Kuyvashev in the Sverdlovsk region.
- By what criteria are they selected for resignation?
– In the survival rating, which is last time published in December, all these governors received the lowest marks. For example, open and public conflicts occurred in their regions, and the governor was unable to consolidate the regional elite and control the situation. Like, for example, Basargin in Perm region. On the eve presidential elections this lack of control is dangerous. In addition, the Kremlin is changing generations. Governors born in the late 1940s and early 1950s are leaving and are being replaced by new governors born in the 1970s. And those who have already been replaced are among the ten governors whose powers expire this year. On the one hand, this is an element of rotation, on the other hand, it is a demonstration of a fundamentally new approach.
- The approach is not very new; rejuvenation began last year.
– Today these are young technocrats, emphatically civil, with experience in the federal government. And last time it was mainly the Federal Security Service and the military. Parfenchikov, appointed in Karelia, also cannot be called a man in uniform. He is first and foremost a lawyer. As we know, he is a classmate of Dmitry Medvedev.
Among the ten governors with expiring terms of office there is, for example, the head of Mordovia Volkov. In addition, he is 60 years old, these are two factors. But in the last elections in Mordovia there was a turnout of 83 percent, and 84 percent for “ United Russia" Or Belgorod: Governor Savchenko is 66 years old, but the turnout is 62 percent and the party in power has almost 55 percent. Are such merits taken into account?
- Yes, sure. Belgorod region is just good example that there are no clear criteria. If the governor has good control over the situation in the region, then the Kremlin prefers not to stir up anything and not take on the risk of destabilization on the eve of serious federal elections. In this sense, in Mordovia Volkov, who inherited almost cemetery calm and silence, has a good chance of being reassigned.
The governor of the Saratov region, Radaev, is only 55 years old, and he has excellent results in the Duma elections. But his region was among the record holders for officially registered complaints about election irregularities. What will outweigh?
– In this sense, Radaev has a certain weakness. But something else is important here. For example, the former Perm governor Basargin was considered Sobyanin’s man. He was replaced by a person from Sobyanin’s team, that is, the balance of power in the region was preserved. Radaev in Saratov is a member of Volodin’s team. And his fate is a question of how strong Volodin’s position is. Changes should not just mean some changes in the region, but also reflect and even provoke changes in the federal center. Therefore, experts are much less likely to call Radaev a candidate for relegation.
- This, therefore, is another factor: “whose will the governor be?”
– The conditional “federal roof” is the most important factor. And we have recently seen how three governors not only left, but sat down. They were united by the fact that they all did not have a serious federal roof.
- Are there still such unfortunate people left without a “roof”?
– The issue is not simply its absence. For example, the ex-governor of Karelia Khudilainen was associated with Naryshkin. While Naryshkin was the head of the administration and speaker of the State Duma, his influence on such things was significantly higher than it is today.
- Which governors have a fairly reliable “roof” today?
– This situation is also not static. Probably Sobyanin’s “roof” is not bad. We saw this in the example of Basargin: not only was he replaced by another person from Sobyanin’s team, but also Basargin is so far the only one of those fired who received a federal post in return.
- Who, besides Sobyanin, is considered a reliable “roof”?
- There are quite a lot of them. Volodin is not just an influential federal politician, he is a politician who appointed governors. There are about twenty such regions where he was directly involved in this. Sobyanin’s governors are, naturally, the Tyumen region, where, when he left, he left his man, the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets districts. Then there is the problem of corporate “roofs”: Chemezov with Rostec, Sechin with Rosneft. Here, the question of the governor’s belonging to one or another clan is a question of the region’s entry into the zone of interests of the corporation.
- Who, and most importantly – why, needs the current changes in the governor’s corps?
– Rotation occurs constantly, and partly it is based on objective reasons: the governor is aging, ceases to be, from the point of view of the federal center, effective, and he is being replaced. This may be the result of competition between corporations. Finally, there is an underlying idea: if a person sits for too long at some corporation, and the Kremlin in this sense is also a corporation, he becomes too involved in some kind of internal corporate interests. Too rigid connections are built there, and it becomes more difficult to control the situation. In the last two or three years, we have seen intensive changes in leadership at the level of federal corporations, just as at the regional level. That is general idea– purely managerial: from time to time it is necessary to mix personnel. Including, so that people more actively demonstrate their effectiveness, so that they do not have the feeling that they have forever boarded their region or their own, say, railway.
- Is all this really for the benefit of voters?
– Well, in this case, the elites proceed from their own interests. But in some ways their interests may coincide with the interests of ordinary citizens. What happens when the head of the customs service sits in office for a long time? A strong chain of connections has been formed and consolidated, including corruption, and a significant part of the funds that the state would like to count on in a crisis situation goes somewhere within the corporation, to relatives, friends, acquaintances, and so on. It is important for the state to eliminate such corruption leaks.
- Why can’t this be done as planned? Just in required deadline re-elect governors?
– It’s no secret that the governor whom Putin appointed today will tomorrow...
- ... will be elected by the people.
- He will be elected by the people.
- Moreover, why these urgent changes?
– It’s easier for the Kremlin. It is easier than in conditions of competition, even relative ones, to bring a convenient person to power or to establish relations with the person who won the elections. But even with the current system, everything can be done more... More balanced. Looking for someone who has experience working in the region. Like, say, Reshetnikov in Perm. This was the first appointment in a series, and it gave hope that the Kremlin would be looking for loyal, but also good, effective people related to the region.
- Inspired – are you speaking in the past tense? No longer inspiring?
– We already see that this is not at all necessary. The next three appointments are people who are active and effective, but they do not have any connections with the regions where they were appointed. They never lived in these regions. And I don’t think they are going to live there in the future.
- Do you want to say that these are temporary workers?
- They are temporary workers. Their task is to extract the maximum from the region, from their post, in the 4–5 years that they are allotted. Therefore, they think for a very short term. In the longer term, this is dangerous, and primarily for the federal center.
- Does the center understand this?
“I think he understands that there are smart people sitting there.”
- So they do it deliberately?
– It’s just that they themselves have a very short planning horizon and, accordingly, decision-making. When appointing a governor, they are forced to choose between loyalty and efficiency every time. This is rarely combined in one person. When an outsider is appointed to a region, it is clear that he is loyal to those who appointed him.
- Is it possible to find someone in the region, appoint him, he will be grateful - but also tied to the place?
– When you look for someone in the region, he has his own internal connections, obligations, loyalties, and so on. Such a leader will not necessarily be loyal. He will contradict the federal center, sometimes even publicly. An example is Shaimiev in Tatarstan, who was an effective head.
Instead of Khudilainen, the ex-head of the Bailiff Service, Parfyonchikov, was appointed to Karelia, and he is a native of Karelia. This is already the second case of communication with the region.
– He was born and worked in the region – and that’s great. Of course, his connections in Karelia are not what they were ten years ago. And ten years ago he was a representative not of the regional elite, but of the federal structure. Nevertheless, he will, of course, have a different feeling from the region than a “Varangian” would have.
Over the course of a year or two, the governor of St. Petersburg found himself at the center of several scandals, the latest connected with the transfer of St. Isaac's Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church. How will this affect the fate of Georgy Poltavchenko?
– It’s difficult to predict. St. Petersburg is a special region; here the president does not need to read newspapers to understand what is happening. And Poltavchenko in this sense is a special person. The Kremlin probably doesn’t see Poltavchenko’s replacement as good enough to quell the conflicts in St. Petersburg. Another thing that works for Poltavchenko is that he is semi-officially involved in relations with the church. And when Putin goes somewhere to the outback for work, he goes with Poltavchenko. That is, there are some connections here, in addition to those on the surface. But I think that this is up to a certain limit. When the Kremlin sees that a governor is not so much helping as demanding help himself, a decision is made to replace him.
In the Oryol region, Potomsky became a laughing stock because of the story about the journey of Ivan the Terrible to St. Petersburg. People in Vladimir really don’t like Governor Orlova. Do these kinds of stories influence the fate of the head of the region?
– It is important for the Kremlin that the scandal does not spill over into the public sphere and does not take drastic forms. When they start making fun of the governor, when he becomes “parsley,” the Kremlin does not need this. And when they simply don’t like it, then let them not like it. Thus he will be more loyal to the center. The Kremlin doesn't need the governor to be too loved, but it doesn't need to be hated too much either.
- How do you know what is “too much”?
– This is where opinion polls come to the rescue. But if the federal government, in spite of everything, gets the desired results, the governor remains. Take the example of Merkushkin in the Samara region: someone makes fun of him, someone really dislikes him, but in the elections Samara shows results like in Mordovia. And all the rumors that Merkushkin is about to be replaced turn out to be exaggerated. The Kremlin has something to do even without regions. By the way, this is why it is precisely those governors whose terms of office are ending who find themselves in a suspended and more problematic state.
- Is attention focused on them at this moment?
– The Kremlin has 85 regions. It’s impossible to deal with everyone’s problems. But when the time comes to replace the governor, when you still have to decide whether to leave him or replace him, the “Last Judgment” happens. But the Kremlin has more important problems. And more important regions than the Oryol or Belgorod regions.
- How do they divide regions into “important” and “not important”?
– There are regions that play some kind of symbolic role. Moscow and St. Petersburg are capitals. Crimea is a focus of attention both within the country and abroad. Perm and Sverdlovsk are important because these are huge regions where there are many voters, and any political scandal takes on special significance. And there are regions, like Transbaikalia or the Amur region, that are so far from the focus of public interest that what happens there is simply not important. There is another factor - the availability of people who can replace the governor. If a region is important from a business point of view, if serious clans are fighting for it, this is one situation.
- Is there always a replacement at the ready?
- Yes. And there are regions like the Kursk region. The Kremlin may be unhappy with the governor. But the Kremlin also does not want to specifically look for a replacement for him and create a problem for itself when there are no two or three serious business groups proposing candidates.
- And without “sponsoring” business groups, the Kremlin itself cannot find candidates?
– Such business groups make it easier to manage the people put in charge of the regions. This is easier than solving the problem of each region individually.
“I thought that’s what plenipotentiaries were invented for.”
– Look at who is appointed as plenipotentiary representative, and you will understand what kind of tasks they must solve. There was a time when governors came to the posts of plenipotentiary representatives. From this one could conclude that the Kremlin wanted to see people capable of understanding and deciding complex tasks in the regions, promote economic development, resolve conflicts, and so on. Once upon a time these were generals. It followed from this that they had to transmit orders from Moscow and control execution. Today we see retired and retired officials in the posts of plenipotentiary representatives. What they are needed for today is unknown.
If informal “roofs” are still needed, why not make them official? Why not return the institution of plenipotentiary mission to its former meaning?
- Plenipotentiary representatives are overseers. But they do not have financial resources. It is important. If you divided the country into seven pieces and gave a budget to each plenipotentiary, he would become a small viceroy of the king. You look - and you yourself would like to become a king. As it is, they don’t have financial resources, their task is to monitor, control, whisper, give their own conclusions, but nothing more.
What is the secret of the unsinkability of the Pskov governor Turchak? It would seem that the scale of the scandal was, even with a criminal odor...
– This is partly being discussed in the press; the very rumor that the center is removing this or that official can almost serve as protection for him. In the sense that the Kremlin does not want to make decisions that will look forced.
- Well, time has already passed; no one will suspect the Kremlin of succumbing to pressure with Turchak.
- I would see it here possible reason Another thing is that the Pskov region is of little interest to anyone from the point of view of business attractiveness. And the fact that Turchak Sr. and this whole system of informal connections and institutions is quite strong. In this sense, Andrei Turchak was safe. We see scandals involving several children of the Kremlin elite. But so far I have not seen any serious organizational measures. There is a rational explanation for this. In particular, there is a certain hostage mechanism in this: if your son works in a high position, you will think about whether to make strong statements and whether to take radical steps.
What is the secret of Aman Tuleyev’s survival in Kemerovo? He has been in office for 19 years, with another 4 years left until the end of his term of office, which will already be longer than Putin’s presidency.
– Tuleyev has built a powerful political machine; he completely controls the situation in the region at all levels. The region itself is located quite far from Moscow, but it can be considered explosive. Several years ago there was a major accident there, and Tuleyev, as a representative of an almost extinct generation of public politicians, came out to the people and managed to take control of the situation. Any, even the most effective, official in his place could not behave like that. It’s like in economics: you always have to weigh costs and benefits.
So you say all this - and it seems that if in the region no one makes noise, does not make a fuss, does not die in accidents, and so on, it is as if no one lives there. Are residents of the regions even of interest to anyone in the Kremlin?
– Feedback there is no connection between the regions and the Kremlin. It exists either in the form of scandals that attract increased attention to the region, or through serious lobbyists who are able to convey to the Kremlin people’s aspirations that coincide with their interests, the lobbyists. If neither one nor the other happens, if the region is not attractive enough for business groups and if it does not create problems for the Kremlin, this is a whirlpool. Such a region is the safest for the governor, who will sit without sticking his head out.
Interviewed by Irina Tumakova, Fontanka.ru
The end of the year is a time to take stock not only in private life, but also in the political arena. The Rating Center decided to determine how effectively the governors managed their areas under their jurisdiction, and how cloudless (or foggy) the future was for them.
To compile " National Governors Ranking» many specialists in a variety of fields were involved and interviewed orally or in writing. The anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. The number of experts included such prominent figures of political Olympus as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Sergei Belokonev, Sergei Markov, Alexey Kondratiev and others.
The permanent ruler of Chechnya since 2007 continues to rule the territory entrusted to him, although his position has weakened somewhat - compared to the 2016 rating, he dropped from seventh to tenth place.
Kadyrov himself in November made a speech in the style of “I’m tired, I want to leave” and said that Chechnya now needs not soldiers, but administrators. However, he said the same thing in February 2016.
This year, Anatoly made it into the governor’s top ten for the first time, although he has been governing the Kaluga region since 2000.
The creator of the “Kaluga economic miracle,” under whose leadership Kaluga moved from the usual semi-poor post-Soviet region to the category of relatively prosperous ones, believes that governors should not be moved from place to place. In his opinion, the governor should be rooted in his territory, and when the time will come to leave, to educate successors in advance.
For the mere preservation of the title of president and the unique status of the republic, grateful Tatars are able to give Minnikhanov the highest rating. In addition, Rustam manages to successfully maneuver in political trends, extract money from Moscow and use it for the benefit of the republic.
True, the governor’s reputation was somewhat tarnished by the language question - how exactly and in what proportions Russian and Russian should be studied Tatar languages in schools.
In addition, while intensively preparing the region for the World Cup, Minnikhanov somewhat forgot about the needs ordinary people. In Kazan, construction is underway on the second metro line, which runs through a non-residential area under the tram line. But it could be installed under a residential area, thereby allowing many Kazan residents to get to work and back faster. After all, championships pass, but people remain.
In 2017, Alexander’s position shifted lower - if in 2017 he was in fourth place, then this year he is only in seventh. His management of the region attracted the favorable attention of Putin himself, United Russia took the most seats in the elections in State Duma, and the personnel reform in the region’s administrative apparatus turned out to be successful. There are even rumors that Drozdenko may take the place of the head of St. Petersburg. And although many experts are suspicious of this possibility, these rumors reflect the strong position of the head of the Leningrad region.
The governor is also proud that his region has the lowest infant mortality rates in the country.
Serious miscalculations in Drozdenko’s work include failure to meet the deadlines for the construction of a perinatal center in Gatchina and the collapse of a school building being built 5 kilometers from St. Petersburg. Luckily it hasn't been put into operation yet.
There were also traditional corruption scandals, but in general they were quite small and insignificant by national standards
The past year turned out to be successful for Alexey - from ninth place in the 2016 ranking he moved to sixth. Before his appointment as governor of the Voronezh region, Gordeev was a minister Agriculture; perhaps this factor was the key to effective development agricultural region in the territory under its jurisdiction.
In addition, the region’s budget is positive, roads are being repaired, major renovation is being carried out, and German entrepreneurs have begun construction of a pharmaceutical plant in the region. What more could you want?
This rosy picture is somewhat spoiled by the high-profile story of a violation of the production technology of engines for the Proton-M launch vehicle, which occurred at one of the Voronezh enterprises. Of course, Alexey Vasilyevich himself has nothing to do with technological process, however, history has negatively affected the image of the region he heads.
Putin's former aide-de-camp and permanent goalkeeper in Night League hockey matches had a generally favorable year. It is interesting that for the first time in 15 years he was not appointed to Tula “from above”, but received his place after the elections and immediately set to work developing the region.
The implementation of a federal project for the construction of the Moscow-Tula highway has begun, a special economic zone has been created, which, in theory, should help with employment of the population, and a children's technology park has been opened in Tula.
According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dyumin is Putin’s possible successor in the 2018 elections. We’ll see if this is true in a few months.
Many governors can only dream of fourth place in the ranking, but for Sobyanin it became a sign that not all is well in the Muscovite kingdom. A wave of indignation among Muscovites was caused by regular accidents (in the summer Moscow is flooded, in the winter it freezes due to problems on the heating main) and Sobyanin’s remakes. Perhaps they were implemented with the best intentions (and not to cut the budget), but it turned out, as always, rudely and with shortcomings.
However, the Moscow mayor still remains a very influential figure in the political arena. The expensive programs initiated by him periodically receive support from Vladimir Putin, and the elections of deputies of the capital's municipal districts were quite successful for Sobyanin.
Information from Yamalo-Nenets District are contradictory. On the one hand, this is a rather favorable region with high salaries. Federal projects are being successfully implemented (new oil and gas pipelines are being built, and an effective transport network is being established).
On the other hand, the problem of fires may negatively affect Dmitry's rating in the future. In the summer, his forests are burning (and even the introduction of an emergency message could not help extinguish them with least losses), then his eyes light up wooden houses Yakutsk (in some cases we can confidently talk about arson). Well, as usual, they steal, sir.
Despite these troubles, Kobylkin has big plans for 2018. He intends to draw up a blacklist of employers who irregularly pay salaries to rotation workers. Pleasant changes await the wives of reindeer herders; they will receive wages for household chores.
Although outwardly the year went well for Evgeniy, experts are sure that this will not last long. Although Putin himself positively assessed his speech at a meeting of federal politicians in Moscow (it is worth noting that Savchenko was one of the few allowed to the microphone), however, the growing contradictions among local authorities may threaten Savchenko with the loss of his chair. However, Evgeny himself directly says that this is his last term, and is looking for a successor. And since this region is important to many federal players, the search for a suitable successor is unlikely to go smoothly or calmly.
He has been in the chair of the head of the Belgorod region since 1993, this is a very long period of time, and experts believe that the peak political career Savchenko has already passed.
The leader in the “National Rating of Governors” was the head of the Tyumen region, Vladimir Yakushev. The first place was not a surprise for him - he was in the top three almost the entire year.
The secret of his success is effective management region; From a raw material appendage, it is gradually turning into a comfortable place to live. The governor pays more attention to the construction of transport infrastructure and the development of the manufacturing industry. There are few dissatisfied people in the region - except perhaps the residents of Tobolsk, who already have their hot water pipes bursting once a year.
Full list (Table)
| Rating | Governor | The subject of the Russian Federation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | YAKUSHEV Vladimir Vladimirovich | Tyumen region |
| 2 | SAVCHENKO Evgeniy Stepanovich | Belgorod region |
| 3 | KOBYLKIN Dmitry Nikolaevich | Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
| 4 | Sergei Semyonovich SOBYANIN | Federal city Moscow |
| 5 | DYUMIN Alexey Gennadievich | Tula region |
| 6 | GORDEEV Alexey Vasilievich | Voronezh region |
| 7 | DROZDENKO Alexander Yurievich | Leningrad region |
| 8 | MINNIKHANOV Rustam Nurgalievich | Republic of Tatarstan |
| 9 | ARTAMONOV Anatoly Dmitrievich | Kaluga region |
| 10 | KADYROV Ramzan Akhmatovich | Chechen Republic |
| 11 | POLTAVCHENKO Georgy Sergeevich | Federal city of St. Petersburg |
| 12 | KHAMITOV Rustem Zakievich | Republic of Bashkortostan |
| 13 | KONDRATIEV Veniamin Ivanovich | Krasnodar region |
| 14 | ILYUKHIN Vladimir Ivanovich | Kamchatka Krai |
| 15 | AKSYONOV Sergey Valerievich | Republic of Crimea |
| 16 | VOLKOV Vladimir Dmitrievich | The Republic of Mordovia |
| 17 | MOROZOV Sergey Ivanovich | Ulyanovsk region |
| 18 | RESHETNIKOV Maxim Gennadievich since 02/06/2017. Replaced V.F. Basargin | Perm region |
| 19 | KOMAROVA Natalya Vladimirovna | Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug-Yugra |
| 20 | NIKITIN Alexander Valerievich | Tambov Region |
| 21 | GOLUBEV Vasily Yurievich | Rostov region |
| 22 | SHPORT Vyacheslav Ivanovich | Khabarovsk region |
| 23 | KARLIN Alexander Bogdanovich | Altai region |
| 24 | PECHENYY Vladimir Petrovich | Magadan Region |
| 25 | KUYVASHEV Evgeniy Vladimirovich | Sverdlovsk region |
| 26 | TSYBULSKY Alexander Vitalievich since 09/28/2017. Replaced I.V.Koshin | Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
| 27 | NIKITIN Andrey Sergeevich since 02/13/2017. Replaced S.G. Mitin | Novgorod region |
| 28 | MIRONOV Dmitry Yurievich | Yaroslavl region |
| 29 | VLADIMIROV Vladimir Vladimirovich | Stavropol region |
| 30 | KUVSHINNIKOV Oleg Alexandrovich | Vologda Region |
| 31 | KOPIN Roman Valentinovich | Chukotka Autonomous Okrug |
| 32 | EVKUROV Yunus-bek Bamatgireevich | The Republic of Ingushetia |
| 33 | KOROLEV Oleg Petrovich | Lipetsk region |
| 34 | VASILIEV Vladimir Abdualievich since 10/03/2017. Replaced by R.G. Abdulatipov | The Republic of Dagestan |
| 35 | KOZHEMYAKO Oleg Nikolaevich | Sakhalin region |
| 36 | VOROBYOV Andrey Yurievich | Moscow region |
| 37 | RUDENYA Igor Mikhailovich | Tver region |
| 38 | ZHVACHKIN Sergey Anatolievich | Tomsk region |
| 39 | SITNIKOV Sergey Konstantinovich | Kostroma region |
| 40 | IGNATIEV Mikhail Vasilievich | Chuvash Republic |
| 41 | BELOZERTSEV Ivan Alexandrovich | Penza region |
| 42 | GAPLIKOV Sergey Anatolievich | Komi Republic |
| 43 | ALIKHANOV Anton Andreevich | Kaliningrad region |
| 44 | VOSKRESENSKY Stanislav Sergeevich from 10.10.2017. Replaced P.A. Konkov | Ivanovo region |
| 45 | BERG Yuri Alexandrovich | Orenburg region |
| 46 | USS Alexander Viktorovich from 09/29/2017. Replaced V.A. Tolokonsky | Krasnoyarsk region |
| 47 | TRAVNIKOV Andrey Alexandrovich from 10/06/2017. Replaced V.F.Gorodetsky | Novosibirsk region |
| 48 | EVSTIFEEEV Alexander Alexandrovich from 04/06/2017. Replaced L.I.Markelov | Mari El Republic |
| 49 | OSTROVSKY Alexey Vladimirovich | Smolensk region |
| 50 | BOGOMAZ Alexander Vasilievich | Bryansk region |
| 51 | BRECHALOV Alexander Vladimirovich since 04/04/2017. Replaced A.V. Solovyov | Udmurt republic |
| 52 | TEMREZOV Rashid Borispievich | Karachay-Cherkess Republic |
| 53 | NIKITIN Gleb Sergeevich from 09/26/2017. Replaced V.P. Shantsev | Nizhny Novgorod Region |
| 54 | ORLOVA Svetlana Yurievna | Vladimir region |
| 55 | KOKOV Yuri Alexandrovich | Kabardino-Balkarian Republic |
| 56 | AZAROV Dmitry Igorevich since 09/25/2017. Replaced N.I. Merkushkin | Samara Region |
| 57 | VASILIEV Igor Vladimirovich | Kirov region |
| 58 | DUBROVSKY Boris Alexandrovich | Chelyabinsk region |
| 59 | RADAEV Valery Vasilievich | Saratov region |
| 60 | LYUBIMOV Nikolay Viktorovich since 02/14/2017. Replaced O.I. Kovalev | Ryazan Oblast |
| 61 | OVSYANNIKOV Dmitry Vladimirovich | Federal city of Sevastopol |
| 62 | KLYCHKOV Andrey Evgenievich from 10/05/2017. Replaced V.V.Potomsky | Oryol Region |
| 63 | ZHIKIN Alexander Alexandrovich | Astrakhan region |
| 64 | BURKOV Alexander Leonidovich from 09.10. 2017. Replaced V.I.Nazarov | Omsk region |
| 65 | TSYDENOV Alexey Sambuevich since 02/07/2017. Replaced V.V. Nagovitsyn | The Republic of Buryatia |
| 66 | TARASENKO Andrey Vladimirovich since 10/04/2017. Replaced V.V. Miklushevsky | Primorsky Krai |
| 67 | MIKHAILOV Alexander Nikolaevich | Kursk region |
| 68 | KUMPILOV Murat Karalbievich since 01/12/2017. Replaced A.K. Tkhakushinov | Republic of Adygea |
| 69 | ORLOV Igor Anatolievich | Arhangelsk region |
| 70 | KOKORIN Alexey Gennadievich | Kurgan region |
| 71 | TULEEV Aman Gumirovich | Kemerovo region |
| 72 | BOCHAROV Andrey Ivanovich | Volgograd region |
| 73 | VEDERNIKOV Mikhail Yurievich since 10/12/2017. Replaced A.A. Turchak | Pskov region |
| 74 | KOZLOV Alexander Alexandrovich | Amur region |
| 75 | KARA-OOL Sholban Valerievich | Tyva Republic |
| 76 | LEVCHENKO Sergei Georgievich | Irkutsk region |
| 77 | PARFENCHIKOV Artur Olegovich since 02/15/2017. Replaced A.P. Khudilainen | Republic of Karelia |
| 78 | ZHDANOVA Natalya Nikolaevna | Transbaikal region |
| 79 | ORLOV Alexey Maratovich | Republic of Kalmykia |
| 80 | LEVINTAL Alexander Borisovich | Jewish Autonomous Region |
| 81 | BORISOV Egor Afanasyevich | The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) |
| 82 | BITAROV Vyacheslav Zelimkhanovich | Republic of North Ossetia-Alania |
| 83 | KOVTUN Marina Vasilievna | Murmansk region |
| 84 | BERDNIKOV Alexander Vasilievich | Altai Republic |
| 85 | ZIMIN Viktor Mikhailovich | The Republic of Khakassia |
The year 2017 brought the most serious changes in the gubernatorial corps in the entire history of V.V. Putin’s reign. And, as experts note, most of the new governors come from federal structures. Previously, the trend was the opposite, governors changed their position to the post of minister or went for promotion to the federal center. The only unshakable governor remains Aman Tuleyev. Will it be beneficial? Russian regions, especially in conditions of economic and social crisis, the appointment of “young technocrats,” as the new governors were dubbed, will be shown in 2018.
Illustration copyright AlEXEY DRUZHININ/TASS Image caption Sociologists note that Russians want change
A total of 10 governors may be fired in Russia in the near future. So the Kremlin is looking for a way to satisfy the public’s demand for renewal of power on the eve of uncontested presidential elections, experts say.
On Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed the governor of the Samara region, Nikolai Merkushkin. His place was taken by the former mayor of Samara, senator Dmitry Azarov.
This dismissal is just the beginning of a more massive shift in power. In the near future, the Kremlin may dismiss up to nine more governors, a federal official and several interlocutors close to the Kremlin (all of whom are not authorized to comment for the media) told the BBC Russian Service.
Several Russian federal publications previously wrote about the possible dismissal of several more governors, citing their sources.
Merkushkin, who had already been transferred to another job, spoke about such plans on Monday: “Probably, decisions will follow regarding other governors, I believe, according to a certain list,” the ex-governor said at a press conference (quoted from RIA Novosti).
Officially, the Kremlin neither confirmed nor denied information about the upcoming replacement of other regional heads.
Why are new governors needed?
In less than six months, presidential elections will be held in Russia. The campaign has not yet formally begun, but Vladimir Putin is expected to run again in this election.
Given the predictability of the campaign and the lack of competition in the upcoming elections, the Kremlin is trying to satisfy society’s demand for this competition and for change through a symbolic change of regional leaders, says political scientist Alexander Kynev.
More than two-thirds of the population has a demand for change, Levada Center sociologist Denis Volkov wrote on the Carnegie Center website.
Renewal of power is one of the obvious directions of the presidential administration's course during the campaign, and renewal of regional power is one of its obvious components, says political scientist Vitaly Ivanov.
“It’s like in the movie “Jaws” - you can’t immediately show the viewer the whole shark. First you need to show the fin and jaws. It’s the same here: the resignations of governors are a prologue. What will be more interesting next is the renewal of federal power,” says the political scientist.
Do reshuffles affect election results?
Governors are not only symbolic power, but also people who will be directly responsible for holding presidential elections in their regions.
“You don’t think that only regional election commissions are involved in organizing elections in the regions? Even if informally, the tasks of each governor include organizing elections so that they take place in his region in compliance with all procedures required by law,” says the BBC. he is a former Kremlin employee who is not authorized to discuss the organization of the presidential elections.
The new governors will have a difficult task. The regional elections held in September have so far shown that Russians' interest in elections is falling; the previous Duma elections were also remembered for their low turnout. And Putin must get 70% of the votes in the elections with 70% turnout, RBC argued, citing the speech of the first deputy head of the presidential administration, Sergei Kiriyenko.
The list of regions where governors may be replaced has not been officially announced. Kommersant wrote that changes could occur in the Nizhny Novgorod, Ivanovo, Murmansk, Novosibirsk and Omsk regions, as well as in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Altai Territory and Krasnoyarsk Territory.
These are not protest regions, but in almost all of them the result of United Russia in the 2016 Duma elections and Putin’s result in the 2012 presidential election were below the national average (see table). The exception was the Nizhny Novgorod region, where the level of support for the authorities is usually high.
| Region (year of appointment of the current governor) | The result of United Russia in the State Duma elections2016 year - 54.2%countrywide | Putin's result in the presidential elections2012 -63,6% countrywide |
| Nizhny Novgorod Region (2005) | 58,15 | 63,90 |
| Krasnoyarsk region (2014) | 40,45 | 60,16 |
| Omsk region (2012) | 36,32 | 55,55 |
| Nenets Autonomous Okrug (2014) | 41,11 | 57,05 |
| Samara region (2012) | 50,77 | 58,56 |
| Ivanovo region (2014) | 42,38 | 61,85 |
| Novosibirsk region (2014) | 38,26 | 56,34 |
| Altai Territory (2005) | 35,16 | 57,35 |
| Murmansk region (2012) | 41,98 | 60,05 |
However, replacing a governor does not automatically improve election results. For example, in 2016, a few months before the State Duma elections, the Kremlin had already changed governors of several regions.
Then in the Komi Republic, in the Trans-Baikal Territory and in the Tula Region, where elections were held by new governors, the result of United Russia was even lower than in the previous Duma elections of 2011 (although the party improved its result in the country as a whole). Only in the Tver region, where there was also a new governor, the result of United Russia this time was higher than in the previous elections.
There are practically no risks and threats when appointing acting governors on the eve of presidential elections if new manager does not initially irritate residents and elites, says political consultant Konstantin Kalachev.
“In any case, next to any new governor there will be experienced political strategists. And local heads of municipalities will be ready to jump out of their pants to prove their competence,” adds Kalachev.
In addition, personnel changes can relieve local tension and discontent in the regions, Kynev notes.
For example, in Samara, after Merkushkin’s resignation, people may experience inspiration and even emotional uplift, “because the degree of inadequacy of the policy has gone off scale,” the political scientist continues.
Merkushkin has only been in charge of the Samara region since 2012, but he is most remembered for a number of statements that caused a scandal: for example, in 2016, he promised employees of an automobile plant that they would never receive wage payments because they did not speak in an appropriate tone.
The head of the Central Election Commission, Ella Pamfilova, named the Samara region among the most problematic in compliance with election legislation.
