Acute contradictions between the North and South were caused by the issue of the development of Western lands. The essentially extensive plantation economy of the South could develop through the constant expansion of the scope of use of slave labor. The colonization of Western lands opened up this opportunity. However, the northern colonization flow also moved westward. Northern farmers needed western lands to be available for sale in relatively small parcels at an affordable price; Southern planters and slave owners sought to sell land at auction in large plots to establish plantations on them. The first clashes between northern colonists and southerners led to a compromise Missouri Treaty of 1820 which established a border along the 36th parallel between two streams moving west. The agreement also provided for the inclusion of two new states into the United States, free and slave states at the same time, so as not to upset the balance of power in the federation. The parties adhered to the agreement of 1820 for thirty years, but under a new law in 1850, slavery was allowed in the new states if a majority of the population voted in favor of it. The departure from the compromise of 1820 marked the beginning of a deterioration in relations between the North and South. Election to 1860 US President Abraham Lincoln, known for his criticism of slave-owning orders, was perceived in the South as a signal of danger and served as a reason for the separation of the southern states from the northern. At the beginning of 1861, 11 southern states formed the Confederacy of American States and in April opened military operations against the northerners. The forces of the participants in the Civil War were unequal. The North had an advantage in population (22 million people versus 12 million people) and economic resources. A turning point in the course Civil War came after the publication by the government Lincoln's Homestead Act of May 20, 1862 and the abolition of slavery of blacks from 1 January 1863. With these laws, the federal government expanded its social base in both the North and South. 186 thousand blacks took part in hostilities on the side of the northerners. The long resistance of the South was broken, and it capitulated on April 9, 1865. The Homestead Act was the final act of American agricultural legislation, which began in 1787. It gave the right to every US citizen who had reached the age of 21 years to receive a free loan homestead- a tract of 160 acres (65 hectares) or less of public land, subject to ownership if the purchaser lives on it for 5 years and pays a registration fee of $5 to $10. Homestead property was protected from forced sale for debt. The Lincoln government also took measures to limit the fragmentation of homesteads and preserve average farming. Homestead could be sold, but only with the consent of all family members, and after the death of the owner it could be divided among the heirs only after some time. The 2 million people who took advantage of the homestead law swelled the number of farmers, strengthened the position of farming in the country and expanded the middle-income group that US industry now targets.
Introduction
"Revolutions are the locomotives of history." This is how K. Marx assessed the role and place of revolutions in the history of mankind, and this assessment was more than once confirmed not only by the rapid socio-economic and socio-political development of countries that experienced revolutionary upheavals, but also by the enormous impact that these revolutions had on international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy.
The Civil War of 1861-1865 in the United States is rightfully assessed by progressive historians as a bourgeois-democratic revolution. V.I. Lenin pointed out the “greatest world-historical progressive and revolutionary significance” of this war.
* (Lenin V.I. Complete. collection op. - T. 37. - P. 58.)
The revolutionary war destroyed slavery in the United States - the most important obstacle to the country's capitalist development - and created everything the necessary conditions for the rapid development of the US economy. If in 1860 the United States ranked fourth in the world in terms of economic development, then after the Civil War it made a powerful leap forward and in 1894 came out on top in the world in terms of industrial production.
The war had another important consequence: American capitalism, while simultaneously strengthening its economic potential and its military potential, gradually began to reach its starting lines, from which it later began the struggle for the redivision of the world. At the end of 1864, F. Engels wrote to I. Weydemeyer: “As soon as slavery is blown up, these greatest chains fettering the political and social development United States - the country will experience such an upswing that the shortest possible time will provide it with a completely different place in world history, and the army and navy that the war created for them will then quickly find use for themselves." * The American Civil War convincingly confirmed the well-known Marxist position that "every revolution only then worth it if she knows how to defend herself." ** The American Revolution of 1861-1865 was defended for four long years, and not only in bloody battles with rebellious slave owners.
* (Marx K., Engels F. Soch. - T. 31. - P. 359.)
** (Lenin V.I. Complete. collection op. - T. 37. - P. 122.)
Exclusively important there was also a foreign policy front in the struggle for the successful solution of the tasks facing the revolution. Every great revolution, and the American Civil War was certainly one, generates powerful resistance from international counter-revolutionary forces. This phenomenon is natural and natural: a great revolution not only radically transforms all life in its own country, but also has a great revolutionary influence on other countries. In an effort to prevent this, the forces of international reaction always come to the aid of the counter-revolution. The American Revolution of 1861-1865 developed according to this scenario.
The anti-slavery forces of the North were opposed by the new “holy alliance” of European reaction, which included the governments of Great Britain and Imperial France, the pro-slavery circles of Spain and others European countries. Abraham Lincoln and other members of his government immediately faced difficult foreign policy problems. The President, his Secretary of State William Seward, and other members of the administration had no foreign policy experience.
The North “swayed” slowly and difficultly, reminiscent of a giant who was provoked into a fight that was completely unnecessary for him. With all his appearance, he showed that he would not mind going to peace, to end the military conflict that had begun. Confusion reigned in the camp of the northerners, political amorphousness; the enormous military-economic potential of the North took a very long time to mobilize.
The rebel slaveholders were the attacking party, followed by the vast majority of the most experienced officers and generals of the US military. Southerners, living in constant fear of slave rebellion, were traditionally accustomed to owning weapons. From the very beginning of hostilities, the slave-owning Confederation, created as a result of secession, the separation of the slave-owning states from the union, enjoyed active support from the reactionary ruling circles of England, France and other European powers.
All this created difficult conditions for solving the complex foreign policy problems that the Lincoln government faced during the Civil War. Ways to solve these problems were not found quickly, and this process was far from painless.
The peculiarity of any revolutionary era is that it is capable of promoting a new type of leaders, leaders who understand the interests of the masses and lead them to fight for the solution of revolutionary tasks, including in the field of foreign policy.
Abraham Lincoln was one of these leaders. A continuator of the democratic line of the American political tradition, who called democracy “a government of the people and for the people,” * he himself was a man of the people and served the people. This was the strength of Abraham Lincoln, a great American citizen, whose personality was extremely highly rated by Karl Marx and other outstanding thinkers, as well as statesmen, political and public figures.
* (The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln./Ed. by R. P. Basler. -Vols. I-VIII. - New Brunswick, 1953. - Vol. VI, p. 230. (hereinafter: Collected Works).)
These assessments relate not only to the domestic political activities, but also to the foreign policy activities of Lincoln the president, Lincoln the diplomat, the initiator and leader of the most important foreign policy actions of the American Revolution.
Lincoln was an exceptionally modest man; he was not inclined to overestimate the significance of his activities. Speaking about President Lincoln's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, published on September 22, 1862, K. Marx noted that the author of the Proclamation had “no posing, no historical draperies... Hesitantly, against his will, reluctantly, he performs the bravura aria of his role , as if asking for an apology for the fact that circumstances force him to “be a hero”" *.
* (Marx K., Engels F. Soch. - T. 15. - P. 570.)
Lincoln could objectively evaluate his activities. After signing the Emancipation Proclamation, he declared: “If my name ever goes down in history, it will be for this act, and in it is my whole soul.” The main act of his life, the decision that propelled him into the ranks of global figures, was, indeed, the liberation of slaves in the United States.
* (Quote by Holden W. Abraham Lincoln. - Harrogate, 1944. - P. 20.)
However, the problem of freeing slaves - the main task of the revolution - was solved not only in the direct struggle with the counter-revolution, with the rebellious slave owners. The struggle to abolish slavery was also waged on the other side of the Atlantic, in difficult battles on foreign policy fronts. And the difficulties here were no less than in the fight against internal counter-revolution, since the diplomacy of the federalist North was opposed by the combined forces of the diplomatic services of Great Britain, France and other countries, which followed the foreign policy path of these powers.
Lincoln's diplomacy is less known than his activities as a state and political leader who fought for the abolition of slavery, restoration of the unity of the country, and the creation of a broad anti-slavery coalition that included a spectrum of the most diverse classes and groups of the US population.
The diplomats who were in the service of the revolution (the vast majority of them were never professional employees of foreign policy departments) wrote many bright, interesting, memorable pages in the history of diplomacy.
Corresponding examples are provided by the first American Revolution, the War of Independence of 1775-1783.
The ambassador of revolutionary America in Paris, Benjamin Franklin, introduced a lot of new things into the traditional diplomacy of the 18th century. Everything about Franklin was unusual, from his appearance to his methods of diplomatic work.
He did not look like the dressed-up diplomats and representatives of high society in Paris: he wore a modest Quaker suit, did not wear a wig or use powder, which was customary at that time, and even appeared at official meetings in a modest fur headdress.
Franklin recruited military personnel in Europe, so necessary for the American republic, achieved economic and financial assistance European countries. Contrary to the traditions of official diplomacy, he maintained extensive contacts with prominent scientists, political and public figures. Among them were Voltaire, the liberal politician Abbé Sieyès, the materialist philosophers Cabanis, D'Alembert, the orientalist Volney, the future heroes of the French Revolution Jean Paul Marat and Maximilien Robespierre, the playwright Beaumarchais, the famous chemist Lavoisier and others. The American ambassador took every opportunity to maintain ties with the environment in which democratic ideas spread and matured.It was precisely such methods that helped him solve the seemingly impossible task of getting monarchical France to recognize the United States and sign the Franco-American Alliance.
The American Revolution of 1861 - 1865 also had an impact on diplomatic practice.
Bourgeois historians specializing in the study of foreign policy problems believe that since Lincoln was not a professional diplomat, there is nothing instructive or interesting in his foreign policy activities. This opinion is often reflected even in the headlines of historical studies. For example, D. Monaghan called his book dedicated to the foreign policy activities of President Lincoln “The Diplomat in Slippers” *.
* (Monaghan J. Diplomat in Carpet Slippers. Abraham Lincoln. - Indianapolis. - N.Y., 1945.)
Many authors who have studied the life and work of Lincoln are inclined to believe that foreign policy was outside the sphere of interests of the president, that all foreign policy problems were left to him by Secretary of State William Seward. This is a widespread misconception that seriously distorts the actual state of affairs, the real balance of power within the Lincoln administration. Indicative in this regard is the opinion of William Seward himself about the prerogatives of the US President: “We elect a king for four years and give him absolute powers within certain limits, which he can interpret as he pleases.” *
* (Quote by Mishin A. A. US State Law. - M. 1976.- P. 162.)
The President of the United States truly has enormous powers: he is the head of state, the head of government, and the commander-in-chief of all the country's armed forces. The powers of the president increase especially during times of war.
Lincoln, however, was in no way characterized by the dictatorial habits of which his political opponents accused him and which reactionary bourgeois historians attribute to him today. But due to the difficult situation in which the country found itself during the years of his presidency, Lincoln could not and did not allow the uncontrolled leadership of the country's foreign policy by W. Seward, especially since he did not have complete unity of views with the Secretary of State on a number of the most important foreign policy issues. problems of the United States.
The main problems of foreign policy were resolved on the initiative or with the sanction of the president. The foreign policy activities of the United States during the Civil War are marked by the individuality of Abraham Lincoln, his worldview, the characteristics of his character, and the president’s understanding of the country’s national interests.
Consideration of the specifics of Abraham Lincoln's diplomacy has, in our opinion, a certain practical significance. The Civil War of 1861-1865 is an important period in the history of US foreign policy, a milestone followed by an increase in its aggressive orientation.
This point of view is shared by bourgeois historians of the United States. In January 1976, the author of this book was present at the University of New Orleans (Louisiana) at a lecture by the famous American historian of bourgeois-liberal orientation Henry Steele Commager, who stated: “The United States of America was born in the flames of the revolutionary war of independence of 1775-1783. But since then We have evolved so sharply to the right that in the 30 years since the end of World War II, the United States has opposed all the revolutions that have occurred in the world."
Studying the history of US foreign policy and diplomacy during Lincoln's presidency is important from another point of view. Today in the United States there are many government, political, and public figures who, in principle, reject the possibility of improving Soviet-American relations. They often appeal to history, seek historical arguments to substantiate this point of view, and argue that they cannot peacefully coexist and maintain mutually beneficial relations between countries belonging to opposing socio-economic systems. Such a formulation of the question indicates either ignorance of the history of relations between our countries, or its deliberate falsification.
During the American Civil War, the bourgeois-democratic government of Abraham Lincoln maintained friendly, mutually beneficial relations with Imperial Russia. Moreover, Russia was the only great power that, during the years when the fate of the United States was being decided, exerted a decisive political support to the federal government.
In September 1861, during the most difficult period of the Civil War, Lincoln said that he saw in Russia's policy "a new guarantee of friendship between our states, dating back to the very first days of the existence of the United States" *. From the practice of Russian-American relations, President Lincoln concluded that cooperation with Russia is “not only possible, but also extremely necessary for the well-being” of the United States **.
* (United States Senate Documents, 1861-1862. - Vol. I. - P. 309 (hereinafter: Senate Documents).)
** (Quote by Woldman A. Lincoln and the Russians. Cleveland - N.Y., 1952. - P. VII-VIII.)
And during the time of Lincoln, there were many skeptics in the United States who sincerely believed that autocratic-monarchical Russia and the bourgeois-democratic United States could not maintain friendly relations. The New York Daily Tribune held a different point of view, calling for maintaining a “strong and mutually beneficial friendship” with Russia. An article on Russian-American relations noted: “It is difficult to overestimate the importance of friendly relations with this great and rising power.” It emphasized that Americans should not be embarrassed by the fact that “Russia is absolute monarchy". On the contrary, "there is every reason to believe that the empire will eventually become a great republic or a confederation of republics" *.
The period of the American Civil War is extremely interesting, as is history. international relations of that time, so rich in events, ideas and insights. But the author does not set himself the task of considering all this abundance of facts and thoughts, the entire complex complex of political and diplomatic relations. For one monograph this is an impossible task.
The purpose of this work is more limited and specific - to show the role and place of President Abraham Lincoln in American diplomacy in solving the most important foreign policy problems during the Civil War.
In addition to the constant change of commanders of the northern armies, and personal participation in the development military strategy During the four years of his presidency, Lincoln was occupied with several important political issues.
The first was the issue of slavery - and here the “liberator president” was not at all as radical as is commonly believed. Signed on January 1, 1863, the Emancipation Proclamation for the 10 states of the Confederacy was not so much a document embodying high moral principles as a political ploy in the confrontation with separatists.
The black inhabitants of the South practically did not react in any way to this document; no major uprisings of “freed” slaves occurred in the South. Much more important was the reaction of Europe - after the Proclamation, all talk about recognizing the Confederacy as an independent state was stopped.
It is known that Lincoln did not consider himself to have the right to resolve the issue of slavery throughout the United States, suggesting that Congress should deal with this issue. And even a couple of months before his death, in February 1865, Lincoln was sure that slaves in the United States could only be freed by paying a decent ransom to their owners.
It may seem paradoxical, but the adoption of the Proclamation on January 1, 1863 sharply reduced political support for Lincoln in the northern states. Few northerners were willing to fight for black freedom, especially since universal conscription for men between the ages of 20 and 45 was introduced in March 1863.
The authorities’ decision to offer the opportunity to pay off military service was not particularly popular either - it turned out that the “people’s” President Lincoln gave special advantages to the wealthy classes. Ordinary Americans now had to go to war, instead of taking advantage of the prospects opened by the Homestead Act signed in May 1862, which realized the century-old dream of practically free land in the West for everyone.
It is not surprising that the presidential election campaign of 1864 was extremely difficult for Lincoln, and he won by a very small margin.
As always happens during wars, the presidential branch of government was significantly strengthened in the United States in 1861-1865, which caused discontent among congressmen and senators, who constantly suspected Lincoln of violating the Constitution. Indeed, there were reasons for this: presidential decrees in the United States limited the Bill of Rights, mass arrests of those suspected of Confederate sympathies were made, newspapers were closed, although elections were held, they could hardly be considered fair and free (especially in the border states) .
However, it is believed that it was the refusal of Lincoln’s southern colleague, Jefferson Davis, to suspend the action during the war constitutional freedoms in the Confederacy, and his strict adherence to the principle of “states' rights”, became significant factors that prevented the South from gaining the upper hand in the confrontation with the North.
Lincoln's toughness in matters of war was offset by his constant desire to ensure the fastest possible national reconciliation after its end. The “Amnesty and Reconstruction” plan he proposed back in December 1863 provided for pardons for all Confederates who agreed to take an oath of loyalty to the United States.
The struggle between the slave-owning South and the rapidly developing industrial North in the United States continued for many years. The clash between the slave and capitalist production systems was inevitable. Under these conditions, the struggle for federal power acquired special significance. Therefore, the election of Abraham Lincoln, an opponent of slavery, to the presidency in November 1860 entailed the withdrawal of South Carolina from the Union on December 20 of the same year. Before February 1, 1861, other states followed suit: Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and then Georgia and Texas.
On February 8, 1861, delegates from the seven listed states met in Montgomery, Alabama, and proclaimed the creation of the Confederacy of Slave States. Jefferson Davis was elected President of the Confederacy, and Vice President.
The President of the United States at that time was still formally James Buchanan, a supporter of the South, surrounded by politicians from the southern states. He allowed the Confederates to occupy forts in the South and other properties owned by the US government. However, under the influence of pressure put on him, he opposed the further seizure of federal installations, in particular Fort Sumter.
On March 4, 1861, Lincoln became president. He tried to find a way out of the political crisis in which the country found itself. Lincoln took a conciliatory position towards the southern states. In his message upon taking office, he assured the Southern states: “It is not my object, either directly or indirectly, to interfere with the question of slavery in the States where it exists.” But he firmly stated that “no state can have its own at will leave the Union." 23 states with a population of 22 million declared loyalty to the federal government, while the Confederacy included 11 states with a population of 9 million, including 3 million slaves.
Lincoln's Secretary of State was William H. Seward, an ambitious and capable New York politician who was Lincoln's rival for the Republican presidential nomination.
W. Seward offered the president several options for solving the most important problems facing the government. On April 1, 1861, he submitted a memorandum entitled “Some Thoughts for the Consideration of the President.” “A month has already passed since the beginning of our reign,” Seward wrote, “and we have still not mastered either domestic or foreign policy,” Seward intended to overcome the internal crisis with the help of an external conflict. He proposed to divert public attention from internal affairs, to unite the country by declaring war on Spain, France, England or Russia. “In this way,” Seward believed, “we will avoid civil war.” Lincoln tactfully and unequivocally rejected these plans, believing that, given the situation in which the country was, the number of opponents should not be multiplied.
On April 12, 1861, at 4:30 a.m., Confederate troops attacked Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Two days later, the fort's garrison capitulated. Lincoln convened a special session of Congress and called 75 thousand members of the people's militia under arms for a period of three months. Thus began the civil war, sometimes called secession and lasting for four years.
On May 13, 1861, Queen Victoria declared Great Britain's neutrality, which meant recognition of both belligerents involved in the conflict. Thus, the Confederacy was interpreted as having an independent government and capable of waging war. Lincoln and Seward assessed England's actions as unfriendly towards the United States or at least premature. At the same time, other European powers followed in London's footsteps. Russia was the only major power to take a favorable position toward the Lincoln government from the very beginning of the American Civil War.
Bourgeois American historiography focuses on the internal aspects of the Civil War, especially military operations. Meanwhile, the diplomatic side of this war had a great influence on its development. The northern states, as is known, saw their main task as preventing the intervention of foreign states. The diplomacy of the southern states sought the intervention of European powers, primarily England and France, on the side of the Confederacy.
US diplomacy of this period is well developed. But relatively little is known about the foreign policy of the southern states during the Civil War. This article is devoted to this issue.
Sometimes in the literature you can find an opinion that the Confederacy of the Southern States not only did not pursue foreign policy, but also did not develop the concept of foreign policy. In particular, James L. Orr, Chairman of the Commission on foreign affairs House of Representatives of the Confederacy, once stated that the Confederacy never engaged in foreign policy and never even attempted to conduct diplomacy on top level and internationally. In our opinion, this is not true.
The Confederation had a widely ramified external service apparatus. President Jefferson Davis appointed many diplomatic, consular representatives, and secret envoys who were supposed to represent the interests of the Confederacy in other countries. But among the diplomatic representatives of the southerners there were no such famous names as among the northerners.
Back in February 1861, the Confederates proposed to the United States government to begin negotiations on the peaceful withdrawal of the southern states from the Union. The leaders of the South counted on the fact that neither the war nor the means of pressure would meet with the support of the population of the North, for whom it would be important to preserve the inviolable trade relations with the South. This explains the proposals to establish diplomatic relations between the South and the North. Leading figures of the Confederacy spoke out for a peaceful secession from the Union and even for concluding an alliance with the North. They hoped for the support of the western states, which were guaranteed freedom of navigation along the Mississippi. Some more optimistic leaders even believed that the number of states in the Confederacy would increase in the future.
Southerners took several unsuccessful attempts ensure peaceful separation from the Union. Having made this decision, South Carolina sent three representatives to Washington to negotiate terms of secession, but President Buchanan did not receive the envoys. They then submitted a memo to the Secretary of State, but received no response. In February 1861, South Carolina sent its attorney general to Washington to seek diplomatic recognition. However, his mission was a fiasco. After the formation of the Confederate Provisional Government, three representatives were delegated to Washington to negotiate a peace agreement. Seward, however, refused to accept the delegates. When Confederate troops attacked Fort Sumter, starting the war, the federal government did not take the loss of the fort, which it did not attach too much strategic importance, to heart. Seward believed that military action should not be launched because the South would not dare to wage war on a large scale. Of course, this was an erroneous judgment. In April, the southern states entered into an alliance with each other.
J. Davis appointed a commission that went to Washington on an unofficial visit to discuss issues of war and peace. Lincoln and Seward met with representatives from the South, but no agreement was reached.
The Confederates hoped for help, or at least sympathy, from the Canadians, relying on traditional American-Canadian differences and mutual distrust. On April 22, 1864, President Davis sent two envoys, J. Thompson and C. C. Clay, to Canada to carry out verbal instructions to make Canada a base for attacks on the United States. To achieve this goal, both Confederates had an amount of $900 thousand.
The activities of the Confederates in Canada caused lively debate in Congress in Washington. There was even talk about the possibility of an Anglo-American war. Secretary of State Seward sharply protested against England's permission for Confederate agents to operate in Canada. The English Times expressed the opinion that the Confederates were deliberately seeking to provoke an Anglo-American war; On February 13, 1865, Lord Russell sent a note to Mason, Slidell and Manu in which he regretted that, contrary to the intentions of Great Britain, the Confederates were still taking actions aimed at a military clash between London and Washington.
Representatives of the Confederacy also established contact with Mexico. On May 17, 1861, Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs sent J. Pickett to explore the possibility of concluding an alliance with Mexico. The Confederacy agreed to provide Mexico with guarantees in case of foreign invasion. When Pickett learned that the Mexicans had agreed to allow federal troops to pass through the northern part of their territory to attack Arizona, he threatened Mexico with a declaration of war. At the same time, he promised Mexico the return of California and New Mexico if Mexico established relations with the Confederacy. Pickett soon came to the conclusion that his mission had no chance of success and left Mexico. In September 1803, Throne was appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Mexico, but, having learned that he would not be received by Emperor Maximilian, he refused the trip to Mexico City.
At that time, internal wars were going on in Mexico. The Confederates established contact with the governor of the northern provinces. In particular, the governor of the province of Nuero, León y Guajilla, Santiago Wiedern, cordially greeted the envoy of the South, Quintero, and invited him to conclude a secret agreement on a political union with the Confederation. But the Confederate authorities chose not to associate themselves so closely with the territory, which was in a state of unrest.
The Confederates also sent a representative to the West Indies, which was an important center of communication with Europe. On July 22, 1861, R. Toombs delegated C. Helm to Havana to establish friendly relations with Cuba. Spain declared its neutrality, although the Confederates enjoyed great sympathy in Cuba. Confederate leaders tried to gain diplomatic recognition from Spain, but to no avail.
Representatives of the Confederacy also operated in Nassau and Bermuda.
But the main object of interest for Southern diplomacy was, of course, Europe. Help from European states and diplomatic recognition on their part were regarded as a condition for the success of the Confederates. In particular, they really hoped for help from England. Secretary of State J.P. Benjamin, in a letter to the English consul in New York, noted that conditions might arise under which the southern states would be inclined to return to the English crown. The Confederates were convinced that England would not allow the United States Navy to interfere with British trade with Southern ports. The Confederates were ready to make far-reaching tariff concessions to England in order to gain diplomatic recognition.
At first, Confederate leaders led by Davis decided to withhold cotton supplies to England and France, hoping that these countries, in dire need of raw materials from the southern states, would forcefully overcome the blockade and recognize the Confederacy. When it turned out that events were developing in a different direction, the Confederates offered extremely favorable terms of trade in exchange for political assistance, as well as the delivery of military equipment. The Confederates approved of the political plans and aspirations of France and Spain in America in order to win the support of these states. In a last-ditch effort, the Confederates were willing to give up slavery and guarantee cotton supplies in order to gain aid from European powers. But all these efforts did not bring the expected results.
Some Confederates were convinced that northerners, interested in cotton supplies from the southern states, would quickly agree to a peaceful resolution of the dispute with the Confederacy. But, as it turned out, these were imaginary hopes. Manipulation of cotton as an important raw material could neither paralyze the industry of the North nor force England and France into diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy.
Confederate leaders overestimated the importance of cotton. It was indeed an important instrument of pressure, but not to such an extent that serious political concessions could be achieved with its help. The Confederates also hoped that they would receive significant aid in the form of military supplies from Europe, which they would pay for in cotton. The exchange of warships for cotton was never carried out. The blockade thwarted the plans of Southern politicians, although at first, that is, until the winter of 1862, it was not as effective as later. But in the first period, planters made money by exporting cotton, and the Confederate authorities did not have the funds to purchase military ships. Cotton proved unsuitable as a political and diplomatic weapon.
The Confederates were disappointed by this circumstance. According to a report presented to Congress in Richmond in December 1864, England had significant cotton reserves at the beginning of the American Civil War. In addition, in 1862, supplies of cotton arrived fairly regularly from both northern and southern states. Merchants from the northern states continuously supplied Britain with cotton through Mexico and the West Indies. Some of the cotton that belonged to Southern planters fell into the hands of the federal authorities. The Examiner, a daily newspaper published in Richmond, Virginia, even suggested that it might be better to simply burn the cotton rather than allow it to fall into the hands of Northern authorities. It was also not uncommon for Southern planters to sell cotton to Northern traders.
During the third and fourth years of the civil war, when textile industry Europe really began to need raw materials; the Confederation authorities were unable to provide supplies to the countries of this continent. English ships could not reach Charleston or Wilmington. “One of the main reasons that forced the Confederacy to end the war,” writes the American historian, “was the lack of opportunities to supply cotton that would have been bought in Europe if it could be delivered there.”
F. L. Owsley, a renowned scholar of Confederate diplomatic history, wrote that “if slavery was the cornerstone of the Confederacy, cotton was its base.” The Southern economy was based on cotton plantations, and the area's foreign trade also concentrated on cotton. American cotton was of better quality and cheaper than, for example, Indian cotton. Consequently, the British preferred to export cotton from the United States. For example, in 1858, England imported cotton worth 913,847,156 pounds, of which 732,403,840 pounds came from the United States. Three countries were heavily dependent on cotton supplies from the southern states: England, France, and the United States. Thus, the Confederates had every right to call cotton their king (King Cotton). “The King Cotton theory became the cardinal principle of the men who took the South out of the Union and who led the South through the Civil War.”
At first, in 1861 -1862, in the South it was decided to break the blockade by imposing an embargo on cotton exports. This decision was justified by the following reasoning. The embargo would cause more damage to England and France than to the Confederacy. London and Paris will see how important conservation is to them. good relations with the Confederacy. If the blockade proves effective, so much the better for the South, the sooner the European powers will break through it in the name of their own interests. The Charleston Courier stated that "no cotton should be exported until the blockade is lifted." Other Southern newspapers took a similar position. The Charleston Courier wrote that by the end of 1861, England would take up arms against the blockade.
On May 10, 1861, the Confederate Congress prohibited maintaining trade relations with the United States. IN in this case This was not only a matter of naturally prohibiting trade with the enemy, but also of ensuring that Southern cotton would not reach European ports (before the outbreak of the Civil War, most American cotton exports went through northern ports).
American historians believe that at first, that is, in 1861 - 1862, the embargo was actually observed. But this did not help achieve political and diplomatic successes, which seriously disappointed the leaders of the Confederations. In the spring of 1862, the embargo was relaxed and then lifted. The Confederacy now began to implement a policy of reducing cotton supplies. But the blockade became more stringent and effective, and this complicated the policy of “rationing” cotton supplies. The southern states were in dire need of funds to purchase weapons and military equipment. After 1863, the Confederates completely lost faith in the omnipotence of King Cotton.
Diplomatic representatives of the Confederacy complained about the lack of funds for political and propaganda activities. They could not pay or bribe journalists on a large scale to write pro-Confederate articles. The organ of the South in London was the Index newspaper. Slidell and the envoys to France and England received $12,000 annually, a high salary for the conditions of that time, and $3,000 each for other expenses. In addition, the Confederate Secretary of State sent them both money from a special secret operations fund. Mason not only sought to achieve diplomatic recognition from London, but also tried to influence public opinion in England in a direction beneficial to the Confederates. Mason arrived in England in February 1862, and in November of the same year was so disillusioned by the lack of diplomatic success that he devoted the end of his mission only to saving the dignity of the Confederate government. In one of his letters, he noted that his presence in England was of great importance for protecting the interests of the southern states. Until July 1862, Lord Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, not only did not recognize the Confederation, but did not accept Mason at all.
The Confederates also sought to establish relations with Russia. On November 19, 1862, Confederate Secretary of State J. P. Benjamin recommended that L. C. C. Lemaire go to St. Petersburg on a mission and assure the Russian Tsar that the southern states were striving to maintain friendly trade relations with Russia. However, the tsarist government refused to accept the Confederate envoy. The refusal to accept the envoy of the rebel slaveholders was one of the indications of the benevolent attitude of the Russian government towards the US federal government.
The lack of concrete results from the diplomatic mission in Europe prompted some Confederate politicians to propose recalling the envoys. In this sense, A. Stephens, in particular, spoke out on September 1, 1862. Congressman G. Foote from Tennessee held a similar opinion. The Examiner newspaper wrote that it was better to recall the envoys than for them to “wait like servants in the hall.” According to the newspaper, if the European powers wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the Confederacy, they would find ways and means to send their envoys to Richmond. However, the proposal of Sven, a congressman from Tennessee, to recall England's envoy Mazop was rejected by the House of Representatives. True, as a result of the voting, 39 votes were cast for and 30 against, but a majority of 2/3 of the votes was required to approve the proposal.
At the beginning of 1863, Benjamin, not hoping for help from England and France, recommended that Slidell establish contact with Spain, offering it, in exchange for an alliance, the Confederacy's renunciation of any claims regarding Cuba. But Spain was not interested in such an ally. Consequently, Confederate authorities resorted to various tactics to achieve recognition. On October 26, 1864, Benjamin published a document stating that by continuing the war against the Confederacy, the United States would be unable to pay its debts to foreign countries. The conclusion was that if foreign creditors wanted to avoid bankruptcy, they should not provide loans to the Union government. The Confederate Secretary of State tried to convince England, France, and Spain that their Western Hemisphere possessions would be at risk if the United States won the war. But these actions did not help the Confederacy.
Maintaining friendly relations with England was important to the Confederates for another reason. The southern states had a relatively weak navy compared to the North. Great Britain could become the main supplier of warships, and Confederate diplomats managed to place orders at English shipyards. Washington argued in turn that the construction of warships for the Confederates in English shipyards was a violation of the customs and laws of neutrality. The British believed that the construction of military ships without their equipment and weapons in English ports did not lead to a violation of neutrality.
Taking advantage of this position of the British authorities, Captain J. D. Balach, a representative of the Confederacy, entered into a contract for the construction of warships not equipped with weapons for the Confederacy. First of all, he entered into a contract for the construction of a supposedly trading steam ship "Oreto", intended for a company in Palermo. The ship left Liverpool in March 1862, and a few months later, equipped artillery pieces in Nassau, went to sea as the cruiser Florida. On July 29, also by order of Balach, another ship, the Enrica, left Liverpool, which in the Azores was equipped with English weapons, crewed by Englishmen and named Alabama.
Confederate ships such as the Florida, Alabama, and Shenandoah caused great damage to the United States merchant marine. In all, they destroyed over 250 United States merchant ships. They were a threat to North American merchant ships. Many merchants were forced to re-register ships in order to find protection under a different flag. Particular protests in the northern states were caused by the activities of the cruiser Alabama, the most powerful of these ships.
Charles Adams, the US envoy in London, tried to prevent the construction of warships in English shipyards. But the English authorities believed that Adams had not provided convincing evidence that these ships were built for the Confederacy. However, in the Alabama case, Adams had very strong evidence. But while England was “considering” the question of building the Alabama, the finished ship left the shipyard in Liverpool. In some cases, Adams was able to delay the transfer of completed ships to Confederate authorities.
American historians studying the history of the American Civil War are still looking for an answer to the question why England and France did not intervene in the war? In answering this question, they list various factors.
There is no doubt that the main goal of the Confederate diplomatic missions in Europe was the desire to achieve recognition of the independence of the Confederacy, as well as to achieve diplomatic or military intervention on the side of the southern states. As already noted, the reliance on cotton to achieve these plans did not materialize. Therefore, Confederate diplomacy decided to use other ways, means and techniques. Thus, England's fears about the future expansionism of the United States were fueled. The plans of Napoleon III in Mexico were supported, and American-French contradictions intensified. Southern diplomats convinced the European powers that the policy of weakening the United States, that is, what the Confederation was doing, was of interest to Europe, and therefore European states were obliged to actively cooperate with the southern states.
Reality showed that all these arguments did not work as the Confederates expected. Why? If we talk about France, the answer seems easier. Napoleon was ready to cooperate, but not alone, but only by agreement with England and coordinating its actions. In conversations with Slidell and Mason, he frankly admitted that France was too weak to cope with the United States on its own, and would not take such a risk even in an alliance with other small states. France had powerful battleships, but all this did not guarantee victory. Napoleon was convinced that England, Russia, Prussia and Austria would happily welcome the fact that France entered the war with the United States and would take advantage of this to realize their goals in Europe or to divide French colonies on other continents. Napoleon was especially cautious because French society was unenthusiastic about the idea of war with the United States.
Napoleon assured the Confederates that he was always ready to intervene on their side, but only together with England. However, Britain refrained from openly supporting the Southern States in London, although it did not rule out such a possibility. The reason was that cotton did not prove to be a matter of life or death for the economy of this country. In addition, many Englishmen sympathized with the North, which fought to abolish slavery. It was also impossible not to take into account that American wheat was no less important than cotton, and the North supplied the wheat. In 1860-1862. There were crop failures in England. Under these conditions, grain imports acquired a certain importance. Members of Parliament, for example W. E. Foster, D. Bridget, waged widespread agitation against England's intervention in the American Civil War, arguing that this would deprive England of supplies of American wheat. However, there is no evidence that cabinet members took this argument into account.
The United States was quick to seize this moment. Secretary of State Seward, in instructions given to C. F. Adams and W. D. Dayton, recalled the need to warn England and France that if these countries supported the Confederacy, they would soon experience a shortage of not only cotton, but also wheat. Naturally, the diplomatic representatives of the Union conveyed these warnings at an opportune moment. However, English newspapers such as The Times and The Economist belittled the importance of American wheat, arguing that although half of imports in 1861 -1863. was from the United States, this was due more to the convenience of transportation than to the shortage of grain in other countries. It was emphasized that Russia or Prussia are always ready to sell large quantities of wheat to England. England imported grain from the United States in exchange for arms and military equipment for the United States. Some newspapers noted that for the United States, military supplies to England are much more important than grain supplies to England.
The British government's position on the civil war was influenced by many factors. Reality confirmed that England benefited from neutrality. Because of this, English industry, including textiles, had great advantages. Many businesses were working to fulfill deliveries for the United States. The Civil War allowed the owners of textile enterprises in England to increase prices for finished products and raw materials. Small business owners suffered the most. As soon as rumors spread about the possible end of the civil war or the intervention of European states, cotton prices immediately fell, much to the displeasure of wealthy textile mill owners.
The Civil War led to the end of the American monopoly on cotton supplies. India benefited from this and developed its production. If before the start of the Civil War, 85% of cotton supplies to England were from the United States, then after the war, 85% of supplies came from India. The decline in cotton supplies quickly benefited the flax and wool industries, which expanded significantly. Naturally, the owners of flax and wool enterprises insisted on maintaining neutrality.
The military industry benefited most from neutrality. The British supplied weapons and equipment to both warring parties. It is believed that the North and South together purchased weapons and equipment worth about $100 million from Great Britain. This does not include other additional supplies for the army (uniforms, shoes, military vessels and ships). The war caused a boom in English shipyards. The shipbuilding industry produced about 400 ships and vessels of various sizes. Shipyards in Liverpool and Glasgow built six battleships and two cruisers on Confederate orders.
Speaking of income, we should not forget that England also profited from the fact that the American merchant fleet suffered heavy losses during the war. Confederate warships mercilessly destroyed federal ships. This weakened the competitive ability of the United States compared to England.
Britain, therefore, had no cause for alarm during the Civil War in the United States of America. Its trade turnover during this period increased by more than 1/3 - from 374.5 million pounds in 1860 to 509 million pounds in 1864.
So, England not only had no economic reasons in favor of intervention, but vice versa. Capitalist logic dictated to her the need to maintain neutrality and use it. Confederate diplomacy, which placed so much emphasis on economic pressure on Britain, failed.
Of course, Britain was interested in the territorial split of the United States and the weakening of its rival. But the political leaders of England believed that the South would either win, or at least the war would drag on and wear out both sides so much that partition would eventually occur. They preferred to be witnesses to the process of division of the United States rather than to be its direct enemy, the culprit of the collapse.
Historians differ in their assessment of the reasons that persuaded Great Britain to remain neutral until the end of the war. Some authors, in addition to the listed motives, also talk about England’s doubts as to whether it could withstand a military threat from the United States. Others note the opposition of English workers who opposed cooperation with the Confederation.
K. Clauson also holds the view that economic interests forced England to remain neutral. For Great Britain, the United States was the main link in trade, and a war with them could threaten the British economy. As Clauson writes, “the economic risk of a war with the Union was the dominant element in the decisions of the Foreign Office.” D. P. Baxter III, in turn, put forward the thesis that England did not want to lift the blockade of southern ports, so as not to create a precedent that would in the future could turn against her. As a naval power, Britain was aware of the possibility that it might also impose a blockade and would demand respect for such a decision.
Marx emphasized that the position of the English workers was the decisive factor that prevented the ruling circles of England from openly intervening in the American Civil War on the side of the rebellious slave owners. “It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes,” wrote Marx, “but the heroic resistance of the working class of England to their criminal madness that saved Western Europe from the shameful adventure crusade for the purpose of perpetuating and extending slavery beyond the Atlantic Ocean.”
Progressive public opinion in Europe, after the release of the Proclamation for the Abolition of Slavery, prepared by Lincoln, came out in support of the North. Abolitionists organized huge rallies in England and other countries. K. Marx wrote in December 1861 that Palmerston wants war with the United States, but the English people are opposed to it. English workers convened mass political rallies to protest against possible intervention on the side of slave owners. Even though many workers were out of work, they resisted Confederate support. The First International in 1864 sent Lincoln congratulations on his re-election to the presidency.
A letter from the International Working Men's Association to Abraham Lincoln said: "...The working class of Europe realized at once, even before the fanatical intercession of the upper classes in the cause of the Confederate gentry served as an ominous warning to them, that the rebellion of the slaveholders would sound the sound of a general crusade of property." against labor and that the destinies of the working people, their hopes for the future and even their past conquests are at stake in this great war across the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, the working class everywhere patiently endured the hardships into which the cotton crisis plunged it, ardently opposed the intervention in favor of slavery, which those in power persistently sought, and in most countries of Europe contributed their blood tribute to the just cause...
"Charleston Courier", 12.VIII, 21, 24, 26, 30.IX, 2, 4, 7.X 1861.
"Examiner", 15.1 1862.
For more details, see: Maynard P. I. Plotting the Escape of the “Alabama.” - “Journal of Southern History”, 1954, Vol. XX.
additional information on Confederate diplomacy are contained in: The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents, Narrative, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Vis 12, ed. by F. Moore. New York, 1862-1871; Osterweis R. Judah P. Benjamin, Statesman of the Lost Cause. New York, 1929; The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens and Howell E. Cobb. ed. by U. B. Phillips. Washington, 1913; Bigelow J. France and Confederate Navy. 1862-1868. New York, 1888; Scherer J. Cotton as a World Power. New York, 1916; Thompson S. B. Confederate Purchasing Operations Abroad. Chapel Hill, 1935; Watkins J. L. King Cotton: A Historical and Statistical Review 1790-1908. Now York, 1908.
Claussen M. P. Peace Factors in Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1865. - "Mississippi Valley Historical Review", 1940, Vol. XXVI, p. 516-522.
"American Historical Review", 1928, Vol. XXXIV, p. 9-29.
Marx K., Engels F. Soch., vol. 16, p. eleven.
See: Marx K., Engels F. Soch., vol. 15, p. 424-428.
Marx K., Engels F. Soch., vol. 16, p. 17-18.
Pastusyak L. Foreign policy of the Confederacy of the southern states during the Civil War
The article by Polish historian Longin Pastusiak is devoted to a topic rare for Soviet scientific publications - the foreign policy of the Confederate States of America
LINCOLN, Abraham
(1809-65) - one of the greatest statesmen of the USA.
L. was born in Kentucky, the son of a farmer. In his youth he was a lumberjack and woodcutter, a ferryman on the river. Ohio and Mississippi raftsman. Stubbornly educating himself, L., at the age of 27, passed the bar exam. In 1834-41, L. was a member of the Illinois State Legislature, in 1847-48 - a member of Congress, and from March 1861 to April 1865 - President of the United States.
L.'s activities as president took place in the context of the civil war of 1861-65. His entire domestic and foreign policy was subordinated to the struggle for the victory of the bourgeois democracy of the North in the war against the slave-owning South. But the southerners were better prepared for active action and hoped, with the help of foreign intervention, to crush the federation with a quick blow even before the northerners had time to mobilize and train an army. During the first 2 years, military operations developed in favor of the southerners. During this dangerous period of the war for the North, L. showed himself to be a major statesman and diplomat.
In the first two years of the war, the North faced great danger from England and France. English ruling circles They sympathized with the slave-owning South and hoped that the collapse of the Union would restore the dependence of the North American continent on England. In turn, France from 1862 until the end of the civil war kept an expeditionary army in Mexico, which posed a serious threat to the United States (see. London Convention 1861).
Napoleon III was running around with the idea of destroying the federation and partially restoring the former French influence in America.
The blockade of the confederation ports announced by the government of Latvia served as the most important tool for achieving a turning point in the war. But the blockade caused great discontent in England: the English cotton industry depended on the raw materials of the southern states. In April 1861, L. declared a blockade of all ports located from Virginia to the Mexican coast. The British ambassador in Washington, protesting against the blockade, threatened intervention in favor of the southerners. In May 1861, England, in response to the blockade, issued a declaration of neutrality. In June of the same year, France, Spain and Holland followed the example of England. Declarations of neutrality were seen as recognition of the confederation as a belligerent. But L., having correctly assessed the decisive military significance of the blockade, took a firm position on this issue. Southerners ordered warships from England and France to break the blockade. In 1862, despite the protests of the US government, they received two cruisers from England: Alabama and Florida. The difficult situation of the northern armies forced L. to come to terms with this fact. L. also showed compliance during the Trent incident, when an American warship stopped the English steamer Trent near Cuba and detained members of the southern mission heading to London and Paris. Considering the difficult military and international situation of the northerners, L. released the members of the mission. Thus, L. managed to deprive the British of a reason to break with the North and to recognize the independence of the southern confederation.
L. spoke differently with England when the northerners achieved a turning point in the war, and Washington’s international position strengthened.
5. IX 1863 one of the two warships ordered for the confederation was to be sent from Liverpool. US Ambassador to London Adams told British Foreign Secretary Rossel: “It would be superfluous for me to remind you, Lord, that this means war.” After 3 days, Rossel informed Adams that both ships built for the Confederacy would be detained in Liverpool.
Russia's friendly position played a significant role in improving the international position of the United States. Foreign Minister Gorchakov, in negotiations with the US envoy in St. Petersburg, Taylor, confirmed the existence of plans for the intervention of European powers in America and promised that Russia would reject the invitation to participate in the implementation of these plans that do not correspond to its interests. In 1863, the Pacific and Atlantic squadrons of the Russian fleet visited San Francisco and New York. The arrival of the Russian fleet in America was seen as great moral support for Latvia and the federation. Representatives of the Russian fleet were given a cordial reception by US Secretary of State Seward. Russian sailors were warmly welcomed by various public organizations.
The issue of black emancipation occupied a large place in Latvia's foreign policy. The liberation of blacks (1. I 1863) attracted advanced social groups in England and France to the side of the northerners. However, in 1861-62 L. adhered to different tactics. In May 1862, when the commander of the southeastern front gave the order to free blacks in Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, L. immediately canceled this order and, in a message to Congress, proposed to free blacks only with appropriate compensation to slave owners. In the first period of the war, L. considered it more important to maintain the resulting temporary, fluctuating buffer of border slaveholding states in a state of neutrality than to strengthen the position of supporters of the North in England and France.
In 1864 L. was elected president for the second time. The First International, represented by Marx, welcomed L. and the struggle he waged against the southern slave owners. Lenin believed that this struggle had “the greatest, world-historical, progressive and revolutionary significance.”
14.IV 1865, two weeks after the fall of Richmond (the capital of the southern states), L. was mortally wounded by an agent of the slave owners Bus.
Diplomatic Dictionary. - M.: State Publishing House of Political Literature. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, S. A. Lozovsky. 1948 .
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