The Russo-Finnish War began in November 1939 and lasted 105 days until March 1940. The war did not end with the final defeat of any of the armies and was concluded on terms favorable to Russia (then the Soviet Union). Since the war took place during the cold season, many Russian soldiers suffered from severe frosts, but did not retreat.
All this is known to any schoolchild; all this is studied in history lessons. But how the war began and what it was like for the Finns is less often discussed. This is not surprising - who needs to know the enemy’s point of view? And our guys did well, they beat their opponents.
It is precisely because of this worldview that the percentage of Russians who know the truth about this war and accept it is so insignificant.
The Russian-Finnish War of 1939 did not break out suddenly, like a bolt from the blue. The conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland had been brewing for almost two decades. Finland did not trust the great leader of that time - Stalin, who, in turn, was dissatisfied with Finland's alliance with England, Germany and France.
Russia, to ensure its own security, tried to conclude an agreement with Finland on terms beneficial to the Soviet Union. And after another refusal, Finland decided to try to force it, and on November 30, Russian troops opened fire on Finland.
Initially, the Russian-Finnish war was not successful for Russia - the winter was cold, soldiers received frostbite, some froze to death, and the Finns firmly held the defense on the Mannerheim Line. But the troops of the Soviet Union won, gathering together all the remaining forces and launching a general offensive. As a result, peace was concluded between the countries on terms favorable to Russia: a significant part of the Finnish territories (including the Karelian Isthmus, part of the northern and western coasts of Lake Ladoga) became Russian possessions, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to Russia for 30 years.
In history, the Russian-Finnish war was called “Unnecessary”, since it gave almost nothing to either Russia or Finland. Both sides were to blame for its beginning, and both sides suffered huge losses. Thus, during the war, 48,745 people were lost, 158,863 soldiers were wounded or frostbitten. The Finns also lost a huge number of people.
If not everyone, then at least many are familiar with the course of the war described above. But there is also such information about the Russian- Finnish war, about which it is not customary to speak out loud or they are simply unknown. Moreover, there is such unpleasant, in some ways even indecent information about both participants in the battle: both about Russia and about Finland.
Thus, it is not customary to say that the war with Finland was launched basely and unlawfully: the Soviet Union attacked it without warning, violating the peace treaty concluded in 1920 and the non-aggression treaty of 1934. Moreover, by starting this war, the Soviet Union violated its own convention, which stipulated that an attack on a participating state (which was Finland), as well as its blockade or threats against it, could not be justified by any considerations. By the way, according to the same convention, Finland had the right to attack, but did not use it.
If we talk about the Finnish army, then there were some unsightly moments. The government, taken by surprise by the unexpected attack of the Russians, herded not only all able-bodied men, but also boys, schoolchildren, and 8th-9th grade students into military schools, and then into the troops.
Children somehow trained in shooting were sent to a real, adult war. Moreover, in many detachments there were no tents, not all soldiers had weapons - they were issued one rifle for four. They were not issued with draggers for machine guns, and the guys hardly knew how to handle the machine guns themselves. But what can we say about weapons - the Finnish government could not even provide its soldiers with warm clothes and shoes, and young boys, lying in the snow in the forty-degree frost, in light clothes and low shoes, froze their hands and feet and froze to death.
According to official data, during severe frosts the Finnish army lost more than 70% of its soldiers, while the company sergeant major warmed their feet in good felt boots. Thus, by sending hundreds of young people to certain death, Finland itself ensured its defeat in the Russian-Finnish war.
Combat forces of the parties:
1. Finnish army:
A. Human reserves
By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.
The land army cooperated and was supported by the Finnish Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, to the army's payroll of 337 thousand people as military force connected:
Paramilitary formations of Shutskor and Lotta Svyard - 110 thousand people.
Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.
The total number of manpower involved in the war on the part of Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.
A 150,000-strong Anglo-French expeditionary force was also being prepared and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - beginning of March 1940 to help Finland, whose arrival only disrupted the conclusion of peace.
B. Armament
The Finnish army was well armed and had everything it needed. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 naval warships.
During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent it weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, and Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million cartridges.
90% of financial assistance came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavian countries.
B. Fortifications
The basis of Finland's military power was its unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its front, main and rear lines and defense nodes.
The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bed) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, canals) of Finland in combination with highly technical engineering structures to create a defense line capable of multi-layered fire at the advancing enemy (at different levels and from different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.
The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, rubble, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and ceilings of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. Forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.
On all three stripes of the “Mannerheim Line” there were over 1000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.
The space between the fortification lines, as well as the forefield in front of the entire “Mannerheim Line”, was literally covered with continuous military engineering structures.
The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete obstacles. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, and all roads were prepared for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were built - craters 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest debris reached 250 m in depth.
D. Finnish war plan:
Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the arrival of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega Sea lake
D. Directions of combat operations and command of the Finnish army:
1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: on the “Mannerheim Line” itself and in its forefield stood the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).
2. To the north, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Käkisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.
3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later replaced by E. Heglund).
4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.
5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.
Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed commander-in-chief of the active army of Finland.
The Chief of Staff of Headquarters is Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.
The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is Swedish Army General Ernst Linder.
II.Soviet army:
In combat operations along the entire 1,500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, during the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.
Established number of ground forces: 916 thousand people. They consist of: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal troops and engineers.
The ground forces were supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.
The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.
Thus, up to 1 million personnel of the Red Army and Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary reinforcements during the war to replace the killed and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:
11266 guns and mortars,
2998 tanks,
3253 combat aircraft.
A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:
1. Arctic:
14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.
2. Karelia:
a) Northern and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).
Army commander - corps commander M.P. Dukhanov.
b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).
Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.
3. Karelian Isthmus:
7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).
The commander of the 7th Army is Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.
The 7th Army was supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.
The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.
Nevertheless, the fortifications and deep-echeloned defense of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not only insufficient to break through them, but even to destroy during combat operations a deep and extremely complex fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield.
As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they were unable to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally expected, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.
Others making it difficult fighting Soviet troops were influenced by the extremely harsh winter of 1939/40 with its frosts of up to 30-40 degrees.
The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's actions.
Progress of hostilities
Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:
First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.
Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.
In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.
1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.
2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.
3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.
4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:
5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.
During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.
At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.
Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.
The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.
6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.
7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.
Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.
Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).
Front Commander: Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko.
Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov.
Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.
Commander of the 7th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov (from December 26, 1939).
Commander of the 8th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern.
Commander of the 9th Army: Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov.
Commander of the 13th Army: Corporal Commander V.D. Grendal (from March 2, 1940 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov).
Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.
Commander of the 15th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank M.P. Kovalev (from February 12, 1940).
8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and strengthened:
a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).
b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).
9. The main task during this period was the active preparation by the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as the preparation by the command of the troops better conditions for the offensive.
To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.
In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.
Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.
10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.
In the near rear the troops were practicing new technology assault, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.
As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.
11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.
It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.
12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification center. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.
Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.
13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.
On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.
14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.
15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,
Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.
The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.
By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.
16. At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.
Losses of the parties*:
A. Losses of Soviet troops:
From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.
It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running,
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...
Among the great cruel war,
Why - I can’t imagine -
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Broken, small, killed,
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.
Alexander Tvardovsky
Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.
Of these, 65,384 people were killed.
Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.
Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.
Prisoners - 5567 people.
Total: the total loss of troops during the period of hostilities was 391.8 thousand people. or, in round numbers, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!
B. Losses of Finnish troops:
Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).
(The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)
Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.
Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war was 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called up or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.e. 20%, while Soviet losses amount to 40% of those involved in operations or, in other words, in percentage terms 2 times higher.
Note:
* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and decrease in Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryagi, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacists in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while data from Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.
Baryshnikov V.N. From a cool world to a winter war: Finland’s eastern policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state univ. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.
Winter War 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ross. acad. Sciences, Institute of General Sciences. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Rep. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehviläinen. - 381s.
["Winter War" 1939-1940]: Selection of materials //Motherland. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons forgotten war/ V. Prokhorov// New time. - 2005. - N 10.- P. 29-31
Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999
Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999
Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: according to doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541 p. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Name. decree: p. 517 - 528.
Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [transl. from English V. D. Kaydalova]. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.
Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla: , 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: pp. 109 - 184
Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.
Materials used from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999
Materials used from the book: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999
The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, known in Finland as the Winter War, was an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940. According to some historians of the Western school, the USSR’s offensive operation against Finland during the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography this war is considered as a separate bilateral local conflict, which is not part of the world war, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol.
The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, which recorded the separation from Finland of a significant part of its territory, captured by it during the Civil War in Russia.
Goals of war
Officially, the Soviet Union pursued the goal of achieving by military means what could not be done peacefully: to obtain the Karelian Isthmus, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, bases on the islands and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland.
At the very beginning of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by R. Ryti.
There is an opinion that Stalin planned to include Finland into the USSR as a result of a victorious war.
The war plan with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and possible landings of the Western allies of Finland from the side Barents Sea. The plan was based on what turned out to be an incorrect idea about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. It was assumed that the war would be carried out on the model of the campaign in Poland in September 1939. The main hostilities were to be completed within two weeks.
Cause of War
The official reason for the war was the “Maynila Incident”: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling allegedly carried out from the territory of Finland, four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Finnish border guards actually recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day - as is necessary in this case, the fact of the shots and the direction from which they were heard were recorded, a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government proposed creating an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish agreement on mutual non-aggression. On November 29, the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities. War was never officially declared.
On February 11, 1940, after ten days of artillery preparation, a new offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat. Trying to stop the advance on Vyborg, they opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of the city, but this also did not help. On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.
The end of the war and the conclusion of peace
By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.
Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13.
The terms of the peace treaty were as follows:
The Karelian Isthmus, Vyborg, Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR.
The Petsamo (Pechenga) region was returned to Finland.
The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.
The border that was established under this agreement basically repeated the border of 1791 (before Finland joined the Russian Empire).
It should be noted that during this period, USSR intelligence worked extremely poorly: the Soviet command had no information about the combat reserves (in particular, the amount of ammunition) of the Finnish side. They were practically at zero, but without this information, the Soviet government concluded a peace treaty.
Results of the war
Karelian Isthmus. Borders between the USSR and Finland before and after the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. "Mannerheim Line"
USSR acquisitions
The border from Leningrad has been moved from 32 to 150 km.
Karelian Isthmus, islands of the Gulf of Finland, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, lease of the Hanko (Gangut) Peninsula.
Full control of Lake Ladoga.
Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula), was safe.
The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter. If we take the officially declared goals of the war, the USSR completed all its tasks.
The USSR occupied these territories before the start of the Great Patriotic War. In the first two months of the Great Patriotic War, Finland reoccupied these territories; they were released in 1944.
The negative result for the USSR was the increased confidence in Germany that militarily the USSR was much weaker than it previously seemed. This strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one (although far from the only) of the factors that determined the subsequent rapprochement between Finland and Germany. For the Finns, it became a means of containing the growing pressure from the USSR. The Finns themselves call participation in the Great Patriotic War on the side of the Axis countries the “Continuation War,” meaning that they continued to fight the war of 1939-1940.
Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 |
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Eastern Finland, Karelia, Murmansk region |
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Victory of the USSR, Moscow Peace Treaty (1940) |
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Opponents |
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Finland |
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Swedish Volunteer Corps |
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Volunteers from Denmark, Norway, Hungary, etc. |
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Estonia (Intelligence transfer) |
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Commanders |
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K. G. E. Mannerheim |
K. E. Voroshilov |
Hjalmar Siilasvuo |
S. K. Timoshenko |
Strengths of the parties |
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According to Finnish data as of November 30, 1939: |
On November 30, 1939: 425,640 soldiers, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, 2,446 aircraft. |
According to Finnish data as of November 30, 1939: 250 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks, 130 aircraft. |
According to Finnish data: 25,904 killed, 43,557 wounded, 1,000 prisoners. |
Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 (Finnish campaign, Finnish Talvisota - Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland with the second largest city of Vyborg. 430 thousand Finnish residents lost their homes and moved deeper into Finland, which led to a number of social problems.
According to a number of historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland dates back to the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict, not part of the Second World War, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. The declaration of war led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR, as a military aggressor, was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the mass protests of the international community over the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aircraft, including the use of incendiary bombs. US President Roosevelt also joined the protests.
Background
Events of 1917-1937
On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the “whites”. After the victory in Finland, the Finnish “White” troops provided support to the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty was concluded. Some Finnish politicians, such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded the treaty as "too good a peace", believing that great powers would only compromise when absolutely necessary. K. Mannerheim, former activists and leaders of separatists in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a disgrace and a betrayal of compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Sieven (Fin. H.H.(Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Mannerheim, in his “oath of the sword,” publicly spoke out for the conquest of Eastern Karelia, which was not previously part of the Principality of Finland.
Nevertheless, relations between Finland and the USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, were transferred to Finland in the Arctic, were not friendly, however openly hostile too.
In the late 1920s - early 1930s, the idea of general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their weapons. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliament members have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, to save money, no military exercises have been held at all. The allocated money was barely enough to maintain the army. The parliament did not consider the cost of providing weapons. There were no tanks or military aircraft.
Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in the USSR, the situation there was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “The plague coming from the east could be contagious.” In a conversation that same year with Risto Ryti, then the governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, Mannerheim outlined his thoughts on the need to quickly create a military program and finance it. However, Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the benefit of providing the military department with such large sums if no war is expected?”
In August 1931, after inspecting the defensive structures of the Enckel Line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.
In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.
In the Finnish budget of 1934, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was crossed out.
V. Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of the parliament “...still believes that a prerequisite for maintaining the country’s independence is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that this is worth all the costs of defense.”
Mannerheim described his efforts as “a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow pipe filled with resin.” It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future were met with a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his position.
Negotiations 1938-1939
Yartsev's negotiations in 1938-1939.
The negotiations were started at the initiative of the USSR; initially they were conducted in secret, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain “free hands” in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view from the point of view of domestic politics, since the population of Finland had a generally negative attitude towards the USSR.
On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived in Helsinki, at the USSR Embassy in Finland. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side attack through Finland. That is why Finland’s attitude towards the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait on the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide it with military and economic assistance, since Finland itself is not able to repel the German landing. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner. The Finnish side's guarantees that Finland would not allow its territorial integrity to be violated and Soviet Russia to be invaded through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, obligatory in the event of a German attack, its participation in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on Åland Islands and the placement of Soviet military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Fin. Suursaari). No territorial demands were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.
In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tyutyarsaari and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they were still practically impossible to defend or use to protect the Karelian Isthmus. Negotiations ended without result on April 6, 1939.
On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany entered into a Non-Aggression Treaty. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-interference in the event of war. Germany began World War II by attacking Poland a week later, on September 1, 1939. USSR troops entered Polish territory on September 17.
From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.
On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.
Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland
On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9.
For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.
At these negotiations, the proximity of the border to Leningrad was discussed for the first time. Joseph Stalin remarked: " We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it».
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked like this:
- Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.
- Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.
- The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja
- Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytjarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.
- The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
- Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
- The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km²).
- The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.
The USSR proposed a territorial exchange in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi. These were territories that declared independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty they remained with Soviet Russia.
The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted and that Germany should not hope for help.
The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland, and those closest to Leningrad territories in Terijoki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. The Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.
Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.
Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.
Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and from mid-September the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.
In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.
Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - while at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and Soviet consent to armament of the Åland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.
The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /IN. Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken Finnish side, allegedly caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.
Negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side followed with a statement: “ We civilians have made no progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers».
However, Stalin made concessions the next day, offering to buy it instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to reaching an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.
On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “ We will throw to hell all the games of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down any and all obstacles on the way to the goal" On the same day, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet received directives to prepare for military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin, at least outwardly, showed a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases. But the Finns refused to discuss it, and on November 13 they left for Helsinki.
There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered to confirm the correctness of its position.
On November 26, Pravda published an article “A buffoon at the post of Prime Minister,” which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign. On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the village of Maynila, staged by the Soviet side - which is also confirmed by the relevant orders of Mannerheim, who was confident in the inevitability of a Soviet provocation and therefore had previously withdrawn troops from the border to a distance that would exclude the occurrence of misunderstandings. The USSR leadership blamed Finland for this incident. In Soviet information agencies, a new one was added to the terms “White Guard”, “White Pole”, “White emigrant” widely used to name hostile elements - “White Finn”.
On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were given the order to go on the offensive.
Causes of the war
According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably be captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Leningrad City Council was also the border between the USSR and Finland.
Did the Government and Party do the right thing by declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army. Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country. Speech by I.V. Stalin at a meeting of commanding staff 04/17/1940 |
True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. The only constant in the demands was the following: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.
Already during the war, two concepts emerged that are still being debated: one, that the USSR pursued its stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second, that the true goal of the USSR was the Sovietization of Finland.
However, today there is a different division of concepts, namely on the principle of classifying a military conflict as a separate war or part of the Second World War. Which in turn present the USSR as a peace-loving country or as an aggressor and ally of Germany. At the same time, the Sovietization of Finland was only a cover for the USSR’s preparation for a lightning invasion and the liberation of Europe from German occupation with the subsequent Sovietization of all of Europe and the part of African countries occupied by Germany.
M.I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war both countries had claims against each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 30s, the closure of Finnish schools, etc. The USSR, in turn, knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to “return” the Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland’s unilateral rapprochement with Western countries and, above all, with Germany, which Finland agreed to, in turn, because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhuvud said in Berlin in 1937 that “Russia’s enemy must always be Finland’s friend.” In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) it began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a military solutions.
According to A. Shubin, before the signing of the Soviet-German Pact, the USSR undoubtedly sought only to ensure the security of Leningrad. Helsinki’s assurances of its neutrality did not satisfy Stalin, since, firstly, he considered the Finnish government to be hostile and ready to join any external aggression against the USSR, and secondly (and this was confirmed by subsequent events), the neutrality of small countries itself did not guarantee that they could not be used as a springboard for attack (as a result of occupation). After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the demands of the USSR became stricter, and here the question arises of what Stalin was really striving for at this stage. Theoretically, presenting his demands in the fall of 1939, Stalin could plan to carry out in the coming year in Finland: a) Sovietization and inclusion in the USSR (as happened with other Baltic countries in 1940), or b) a radical social reorganization with the preservation of formal signs of independence and political pluralism (as was done after the war in the Eastern European so-called “countries of people’s democracies”, or in) Stalin could only plan for now to strengthen his positions on the northern flank of a potential theater of military operations, without risking interfering in internal affairs for now Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. M. Semiryaga believes that in order to determine the nature of the war against Finland, “it is not necessary to analyze the negotiations of the autumn of 1939. To do this, you just need to know the general concept of the world communist movement of the Comintern and the Stalinist concept - great power claims to those regions that were previously part of the Russian Empire... And the goals were to annex the whole of Finland. And there is no point in talking about 35 kilometers to Leningrad, 25 kilometers to Leningrad...” Finnish historian O. Manninen believes that Stalin sought to deal with Finland according to the same scenario, which was ultimately implemented with the Baltic countries. “Stalin’s desire to “resolve issues peacefully” was the desire to peacefully create a socialist regime in Finland. And at the end of November, starting the war, he wanted to achieve the same thing through occupation. “The workers themselves had to decide whether to join the USSR or found their own socialist state.” However, O. Manninen notes, since these plans of Stalin were not formally recorded, this view will always remain in the status of an assumption and not a provable fact. There is also a version that, putting forward claims to border lands and a military base, Stalin, like Hitler in Czechoslovakia, sought to first disarm his neighbor, taking away his fortified territory, and then capture him.
An important argument in favor of the theory of Sovietization of Finland as the goal of the war is the fact that on the second day of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and, according to Ryti, refused any contact with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti.
We can assume with a great deal of confidence: if things at the front had gone according to the operational plan, then this “government” would have arrived in Helsinki with a specific political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners.” Kuusinen’s address to the soldiers of the Finnish People’s Army directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the building of the Presidential Palace in Helsinki. However, in reality, this “government” was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov’s statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow, Assarsson, on March 4, 1940, that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then the subsequent Soviet peace terms will be even tougher and the USSR will then agree to a final agreement with the “government” of Kuusinen M. I. Semiryaga. "Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1941-1945" |
A number of other measures were also taken, in particular, among the Soviet documents on the eve of the war there are detailed instructions on the organization of the “Popular Front” in the occupied territories. M. Meltyukhov, on this basis, sees in Soviet actions the desire to Sovietize Finland through an intermediate stage of a left-wing "people's government". S. Belyaev believes that the decision to Sovietize Finland is not evidence of the original plan to seize Finland, but was made only on the eve of the war due to the failure of attempts to agree on changing the border.
According to A. Shubin, Stalin’s position in the fall of 1939 was situational, and he maneuvered between the minimum program - ensuring the security of Leningrad, and the maximum program - establishing control over Finland. Stalin did not strive directly for the Sovietization of Finland, as well as the Baltic countries, at that moment, since he did not know how the war in the West would end (indeed, in the Baltics, decisive steps towards Sovietization were taken only in June 1940, that is, immediately after the defeat of France took place). Finland's resistance to Soviet demands forced him to adopt a tough military option at an unfavorable moment for him (in winter). Ultimately, he ensured that he at least completed the minimum program.
Strategic plans of the parties
USSR plan
The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in three directions. The first of them was on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the Finnish defense line (which during the war was called the “Mannerheim Line”) in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga.
The second direction was central Karelia, adjacent to that part of Finland where its latitudinal extent was the smallest. It was planned here, in the Suomussalmi-Raate region, to cut the country's territory in two and enter the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia into the city of Oulu. The selected and well-equipped 44th Division was intended for the parade in the city.
Finally, in order to prevent counterattacks and possible landings of Finland's Western allies from the Barents Sea, it was planned to conduct military operations in Lapland.
The main direction was considered to be the direction to Vyborg - between Vuoksa and the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here, after successfully breaking through the defense line (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on a territory convenient for tanks to operate, which did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself in the most complete way. After breaking through the fortifications, it was planned to launch an attack on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. At the same time, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned. This would make it possible to ensure a quick capture of Norway in the future and stop the supply of iron ore to Germany.
The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect: “ it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions" In addition, the Soviet command did not have information about the line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, and by the beginning of the war they had only “sketchy intelligence information” about them. Thus, even at the height of the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, Meretskov doubted that the Finns had long-term structures, although he was reported about the existence of the Poppius (Sj4) and Millionaire (Sj5) pillboxes.
Finland plan
In the direction of the main attack correctly determined by Mannerheim, it was supposed to detain the enemy for as long as possible.
The Finnish defense plan north of Lake Ladoga was to stop the enemy on the line Kitelya (Pitkäranta area) - Lemetti (near Lake Siskijärvi). If necessary, the Russians were to be stopped further north at Lake Suoyarvi in echelon positions. Before the war, a railway line from the Leningrad-Murmansk railway was built here and large reserves of ammunition and fuel were created. Therefore, the Finns were surprised when seven divisions were brought into battle on the northern shore of Ladoga, the number of which was increased to 10.
The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee rapid stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment on the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. By strategic plan it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then carry out a counter-offensive in Karelia.
Armed forces of opponents
The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below indicates how many days of the war the supplies available in warehouses lasted:
- cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns - for 2.5 months;
- shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - for 1 month;
- fuels and lubricants - for 2 months;
- aviation gasoline - for 1 month.
The Finnish military industry was represented by one state-owned cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.
The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one communications company, one engineer company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one battery of anti-tank guns, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.
The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:
Statistics |
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Finnish division |
Soviet division |
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Rifles |
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Submachine guns |
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Automatic and semi-automatic rifles |
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7.62 mm machine guns |
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12.7 mm machine guns |
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Anti-aircraft machine guns (four-barreled) |
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Dyakonov rifle grenade launchers |
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Mortars 81−82 mm |
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Mortars 120 mm |
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Field artillery (37-45 mm caliber guns) |
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Field artillery (75-90 mm caliber guns) |
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Field artillery (105-152 mm caliber guns) |
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Armored vehicles |
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The Soviet division was twice as powerful as the Finnish division in terms of the total firepower of machine guns and mortars, and three times as powerful in artillery firepower. The Red Army did not have machine guns in service, but this was partially compensated by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; they had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as unlimited amount ammunition.
On the Karelian Isthmus, Finland’s line of defense was the “Mannerheim Line,” consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-earth firing points, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers that had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 long-term fire structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. In 1939, the most modern fortifications were created. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the state’s financial capabilities, and the people called them “millionaires” due to their high cost.
The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified with numerous artillery batteries on the shore and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to coordinate the fire of Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work: by the beginning of the war, Estonia had provided its territories for military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.
On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for partisan operations, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain, where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads and ice-covered lakes, where enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to accommodate aircraft from the Western Allies.
Finland has started construction navy from the laying of coastal defense battleships (sometimes incorrectly called “battleships”), adapted for maneuvering and fighting in skerries. Their main dimensions: displacement - 4000 tons, speed - 15.5 knots, armament - 4x254 mm, 8x105 mm. The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.
Cause of war and breakdown of relations
The official reason for the war was the Maynila Incident: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note stating that “On November 26, at 15:45, our troops located on the Karelian Isthmus near the border of Finland, near the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon from Finnish territory by artillery fire. A total of seven gun shots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two command personnel were wounded. Soviet troops, having strict orders not to succumb to provocation, refrained from returning fire.". The note was drawn up in moderate terms and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops 20-25 km from the border in order to avoid a repetition of incidents. Meanwhile, Finnish border guards hastily conducted an investigation into the incident, especially since border posts witnessed the shelling. In a response note, the Finns stated that the shelling was recorded by Finnish posts, the shots were fired from the Soviet side, according to the observations and estimates of the Finns, from a distance of about 1.5-2 km to the southeast of the place where the shells fell, that on the border the Finns only have border guards troops and no guns, especially long-range ones, but that Helsinki is ready to begin negotiations on the mutual withdrawal of troops and begin a joint investigation of the incident. The USSR's response note read: “The denial on the part of the Finnish government of the fact of the outrageous artillery shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops, which resulted in casualties, cannot be explained otherwise than by a desire to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling.<…>The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw troops who carried out a villainous attack on Soviet troops, and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, formally based on the principle of equality of arms, exposes the hostile desire of the Finnish government to keep Leningrad under threat.”. The USSR announced its withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland, citing the fact that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad created a threat to the city and was a violation of the pact.
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen (Finnish) Aarno Yrjo-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note. It stated that, in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which rests with the Finnish government, the USSR government recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a break in diplomatic relations. On the same day, the Finns noted an attack on their border guards at Petsamo.
On the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations on the part of the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District at 8 o’clock in the morning on November 30 crossed the border of Finland on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas”. On the same day Soviet aviation bombed and machine-gunned Helsinki; At the same time, as a result of the pilots' error, mainly residential working areas were damaged. In response to protests from European diplomats, Molotov stated that Soviet planes were dropping bread on Helsinki for the starving population (after which Soviet bombs began to be called “Molotov bread baskets” in Finland). However, there was no official declaration of war.
In Soviet propaganda and then historiography, responsibility for the outbreak of the war was placed on Finland and Western countries: “ The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939 they managed to provoke Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR».
Mannerheim, who as commander-in-chief had the most reliable information about the incident near Maynila, reports:
Nikita Khrushchev says that in late autumn (meaning November 26) he dined at Stalin’s apartment with Molotov and Kuusinen. There was a conversation between the latter about the implementation of the decision that had already been made - presenting Finland with an ultimatum; At the same time, Stalin announced that Kuusinen would lead the new Karelo-Finnish SSR with the annexation of the “liberated” Finnish regions. Stalin believed “that after Finland is presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature and if it rejects them, military action will have to begin”, noting: “this thing starts today”. Khrushchev himself believed (in agreement with Stalin's sentiments, as he claims) that "It's enough to tell them loudly<финнам>, if they don’t hear, then fire the cannon once, and the Finns will raise their hands up and agree with the demands.”. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.I. Kulik (artilleryman) was sent to Leningrad in advance to organize a provocation. Khrushchev, Molotov and Kuusinen sat with Stalin for a long time, waiting for the Finns to answer; everyone was sure that Finland would be scared and agree to Soviet conditions.
It should be noted that internal Soviet propaganda did not advertise the Maynila incident, which served as a frankly formal reason: it emphasized that the Soviet Union was making a liberation campaign in Finland to help Finnish workers and peasants overthrow the oppression of the capitalists. A striking example is the song “Accept us, Suomi-beauty”:
We come to help you deal with it,
Pay with interest for the shame.
Welcome us, Suomi - beauty,
In a necklace of clear lakes!
At the same time, the mention in the text of “a low sun autumn"gives rise to the assumption that the text was written ahead of time in anticipation of an earlier start of the war.
War
After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began evacuating the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered between November 29 and December 4.
The beginning of the battles
The first stage of the war is usually considered to be the period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing in the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.
The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.
The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman. For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi. Until the end of December, attempts at a breakthrough continued, but were unsuccessful.
The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen. Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.
The advance of the 9th and 14th Armies was opposed by the Northern Finland Task Force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy’s defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The forces of the 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.
Some researchers and memoirists try to explain the Soviet failures also by the weather: severe frosts (up to −40 °C) and deep snow - up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +1 to −23.4 °C. Then, until the New Year, the temperature did not drop below −23 °C. Frosts down to −40 °C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.
Significant problems for the Soviet troops were caused by Finland's use of mine-explosive devices, including homemade ones, which were installed not only on the front line, but also in the rear of the Red Army, along troop routes. On January 10, 1940, in the report of the authorized People's Commissariat of Defense, Army Commander II Rank Kovalev, to the People's Commissariat of Defense, it was noted that, along with enemy snipers, the main losses to the infantry were caused by mines. Later, at a meeting of the commanding staff of the Red Army to collect experience in combat operations against Finland on April 14, 1940, the chief of engineers of the North-Western Front, brigade commander A.F. Khrenov, noted that in the front action zone (130 km) the total length of the minefields was 386 km, with In this case, mines were used in combination with non-explosive engineering obstacles.
An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.
During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the village of Terijoki (now the city of Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the agreement, neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”
In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, was no longer governing the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.
RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENT OF VINTER Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government”, which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government”. The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland. |
The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform(it was made of khaki cloth and was similar to the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that this was a captured uniform of the Polish army are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. The Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks prepared a draft instruction “Where to start political and organizational work communists (note: the word " communists“crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create a popular front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.
Foreign military assistance to Finland
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. In total, over 11 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, including 8 thousand from Sweden (Swedish Volunteer Corps), 1 thousand from Norway, 600 from Denmark, 400 from Hungary, 300 from the USA, as well as British citizens , Estonia and a number of other countries. A Finnish source puts the figure at 12 thousand foreigners who arrived in Finland to take part in the war.
Also among them were a small number of White Russian emigrants from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), who were used as officers of the “Russian People's Detachments”, formed by the Finns from among the captured Red Army soldiers. Since the work on the formation of such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities only one of them (35-40 people in number) managed to take part in the hostilities.
Great Britain supplied Finland with 75 aircraft (24 Blenheim bombers, 30 Gladiator fighters, 11 Hurricane fighters and 11 Lysander reconnaissance aircraft), 114 field guns, 200 anti-tank guns, 124 automatic small arms, 185 thousand artillery pieces shells, 17,700 air bombs, 10 thousand anti-tank mines.
France decided to supply Finland with 179 aircraft (donate 49 fighters and sell another 130 aircraft various types), however, in fact, during the war, 30 Moran fighters were donated free of charge and six more Caudron C.714 arrived after the end of hostilities and did not participate in the war; Finland also received 160 field guns, 500 machine guns, 795 thousand artillery shells, 200 thousand hand grenades and several thousand sets of ammunition. Also, France became the first country to officially allow the registration of volunteers to participate in the Finnish war.
Sweden supplied Finland with 29 aircraft, 112 field guns, 85 anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns, 500 automatic small arms, 80 thousand rifles, as well as other military equipment and raw materials.
The Danish government sent a medical convoy and skilled workers to Finland, and also authorized a fundraising campaign for Finland.
Italy sent 35 Fiat G.50 fighters to Finland, but five aircraft were destroyed during their transportation and development by personnel.
The Union of South Africa donated 22 Gloster Gauntlet II fighters to Finland.
A representative of the US government made a statement that the entry of American citizens into the Finnish army does not contradict the US neutrality law, a group of American pilots was sent to Helsinki, and in January 1940 the US Congress approved the sale of 10 thousand rifles to Finland. Also, the United States sold Finland 44 Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters, but they arrived too late and did not have time to take part in hostilities.
Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano in his diary mentions assistance to Finland from the Third Reich: in December 1939, the Finnish envoy to Italy reported that Germany had “unofficially” sent to Finland a batch of captured weapons captured during the Polish campaign.
In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles and other weapons, as well as 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland.
Fighting in December - January
The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and supply of the Red Army troops, poor preparedness of the command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Units of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 mm.
During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used guerrilla warfare tactics: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were established. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers, who allegedly fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.
The Battle of Suomussalmi became widely known in Finland and abroad. The village of Suomussalmi was occupied on December 7 by the forces of the Soviet 163rd Infantry Division of the 9th Army, which was given the responsible task of striking Oulu, reaching the Gulf of Bothnia and, as a result, cutting Finland in half. However, the division was subsequently surrounded by (smaller) Finnish forces and cut off from supplies. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help her, which, however, was blocked on the road to Suomussalmi, in a defile between two lakes near the village of Raate by the forces of two companies of the 27th Finnish regiment (350 people).
Without waiting for its approach, the 163rd Division at the end of December, under constant attacks from the Finns, was forced to break out of the encirclement, losing 30% of its personnel and most of its equipment and heavy weapons. After which the Finns transferred the released forces to encircle and liquidate the 44th Division, which by January 8 was completely destroyed in the battle on the Raat Road. Almost the entire division was killed or captured, and only a small part of the military personnel managed to escape from the encirclement, abandoning all equipment and convoys (the Finns received 37 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 350 machine guns, 97 guns (including 17 howitzers), several thousand rifles, 160 vehicles , all radio stations). The Finns won this double victory with forces several times smaller than those of the enemy (11 thousand (according to other sources - 17 thousand) people with 11 guns versus 45-55 thousand with 335 guns, more than 100 tanks and 50 armored vehicles. The command of both divisions The commander and commissar of the 163rd division were removed from command, one regimental commander was shot; before the formation of their division, the command of the 44th division (brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov) was shot.
The victory at Suomussalmi had enormous moral significance for the Finns; Strategically, it buried plans for a breakthrough to the Gulf of Bothnia, which were extremely dangerous for the Finns, and so paralyzed Soviet troops in this area that they did not take active action until the very end of the war.
At the same time, south of Soumusalmi, in the Kuhmo area, the Soviet 54th Infantry Division was surrounded. The winner of Suomsalmi, Colonel Hjalmar Siilsavuo, was promoted to major general, but he was never able to liquidate the division, which remained surrounded until the end of the war. The 168th Rifle Division, which was advancing on Sortavala, was surrounded at Lake Ladoga and was also surrounded until the end of the war. There, in South Lemetti, at the end of December and beginning of January, the 18th Infantry Division of General Kondrashov, along with the 34th Tank Brigade of Brigade Commander Kondratyev, was surrounded. Already at the end of the war, on February 28, they tried to break out of the encirclement, but upon exiting they were defeated in the so-called “valley of death” near the city of Pitkäranta, where one of the two exiting columns was completely destroyed. As a result, out of 15,000 people, 1,237 people left the encirclement, half of them wounded and frostbitten. Brigade commander Kondratyev shot himself, Kondrashov managed to get out, but was soon shot, and the division was disbanded due to the loss of the banner. The number of deaths in the “valley of death” amounted to 10 percent of the total number of deaths in the entire Soviet-Finnish war. These episodes were vivid manifestations of the Finnish tactics, called mottitaktiikka, the tactics of motti - “pincers” (literally motti - a pile of firewood that is placed in the forest in groups, but at a certain distance from each other). Taking advantage of their advantage in mobility, detachments of Finnish skiers blocked roads clogged with sprawling Soviet columns, cut off the advancing groups and then wore them down with unexpected attacks from all sides, trying to destroy them. At the same time, the surrounded groups, unable, unlike the Finns, to fight off roads, usually huddled together and occupied a passive all-round defense, making no attempt to actively resist the attacks of Finnish partisan detachments. Their complete destruction was made difficult for the Finns only by the lack of mortars and heavy weapons in general.
On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses.
On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.
Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in Interposelok, Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goimae, Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma, Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.
February offensive of the Red Army
On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.
On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.
On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops, according to which, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front were to go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa region were not successful, the main attack was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the “Mannerheim Line”, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam, and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.
England and France: plans for military operations against the USSR
Great Britain provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other hand, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, “we would have to fight one way or another.” The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, approached Halifax on December 1, 1939, asking for permission to ship war materials to Finland, on the condition that they would not be re-exported to Nazi Germany (with which Britain was at war). The head of the Northern Department, Laurence Collier, believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while opposing, however, the proposed Finland used the Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Thomas Snow (English) ThomasSnow), the British representative in Helsinki, continued to support the idea of an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he had expressed before the war.
Amid government disagreements, the British Army began supplying weapons, including artillery and tanks, in December 1939 (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).
When Finland requested bombers to attack Moscow and Leningrad and to destroy the railway to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Northern Department: helping the Finns destroy the road would allow Britain to "avoid the same operation" later, independently and in less favorable conditions.” Maclean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with Maclean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.
According to Craig Gerrard, plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, then emerging in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasement of the aggressors was wrong; Now the enemy, unlike his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not on ideological, but on humanitarian grounds.
Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in “circles close to the government” there was a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that at a conscious level the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to exchange one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely linked.
From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense due to the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany through a blockade. Soviet supplies of raw materials meant that the German economy continued to grow, and the French began to realize that after some time, as a result of this growth, winning the war against Germany would become impossible. In such a situation, although moving the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, inaction was an even worse alternative. The Chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, ordered the planning of an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.
Great Britain did not support some French plans: for example, an attack on oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also moving closer to opening a second front against the USSR. On 5 February 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill was unusually present but not speaking), it was decided to seek Norwegian and Swedish consent to a British-led operation in which an expeditionary force would land in Norway and move east .
French plans, as Finland's situation worsened, became more and more one-sided. So, in early March, Daladier, to the surprise of Great Britain, announced his readiness to send 50,000 soldiers and 100 bombers against the USSR if the Finns asked for it. The plans were canceled following the end of the war, to the relief of many involved in the planning.
The end of the war and the conclusion of peace
By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.
Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13.
According to J. Roberts, Stalin's conclusion of peace on relatively moderate terms could have been caused by the awareness of the fact that an attempt to forcefully Sovietize Finland would have encountered massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the German side.
For participation in the Finnish war, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 412 military personnel, over 50 thousand were awarded orders and medals.
Results of the war
All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, " the war ended in
3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom set for Finland turned out to be correct.”
The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).
In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build a railway on its territory connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.
On October 11, 1940, the Agreement between the USSR and Finland on the Åland Islands was signed in Moscow, according to which the USSR had the right to place its consulate on the islands, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone.
US President Roosevelt declared a “moral embargo” on the Soviet Union, which had virtually no effect on the supply of technology from the United States. On March 29, 1940, Molotov stated in the Supreme Council that Soviet imports from the United States had even increased compared to the previous year, despite the obstacles put in place by the American authorities. In particular, the Soviet side complained about obstacles to Soviet engineers gaining access to aircraft factories. In addition, under various trade agreements in the period 1939-1941. The Soviet Union received 6,430 machine tools from Germany worth 85.4 million marks, which compensated for the decrease in equipment supplies from the United States.
Another negative result for the USSR was the formation among the leadership of a number of countries of the idea of the weakness of the Red Army. Information about the course, circumstances and results (a significant excess of Soviet losses over Finnish ones) of the Winter War strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany. At the beginning of January 1940, the German envoy in Helsinki Blucher presented a memorandum to the Foreign Ministry with the following assessments: despite superiority in manpower and equipment, the Red Army suffered one defeat after another, left thousands of people in captivity, lost hundreds of guns, tanks, aircraft and decisively failed to conquer the territory. In this regard, German ideas about Bolshevik Russia should be reconsidered. The Germans proceeded from false premises when they believed that Russia was a first-class military factor. But in reality, the Red Army has so many shortcomings that it cannot cope even with a small country. Russia in reality does not pose a threat to such a great power as Germany, the rear in the East is safe, and therefore it will be possible to speak with the gentlemen in the Kremlin in a completely different language than it was in August - September 1939. For his part, Hitler, based on the results Winter War, called the USSR a colossus with feet of clay. Disdain for the fighting power of the Red Army became widespread. W. Churchill testifies that "failure of Soviet troops" caused in public opinion in England "contempt"; “In British circles many congratulated themselves on the fact that we were not very zealous in trying to win the Soviets to our side<во время переговоров лета 1939 г.>, and were proud of their foresight. People too hastily concluded that the purge destroyed the Russian army and that all this confirmed the organic rottenness and decline of the Russian state and social system.”.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter, in wooded and swampy areas, experience in breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics. In clashes with Finnish troops equipped with a Suomi submachine gun, the importance of submachine guns, previously removed from service, was clarified: the production of PPD was hastily restored and technical specifications for the creation were given new system submachine gun, which resulted in the appearance of the PPSh.
Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which it made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to test out possible changes. Relations were initially cool, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently arranged for a meeting with Hermann Goering, the number two in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström in the late 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “ Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest" Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; in addition, they could in a certain way influence the leadership of the Reich regarding plans for an attack on the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis powers was called the "Continuation War" in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.
Territorial changes
- Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
- Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
- The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland.
- Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
- Rent of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for 30 years.
In total, as a result of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km of Finnish territories. Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War, and in 1944 they again ceded to the USSR.
Finnish losses
Military
According to modern calculations:
- killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people);
- wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people);
- prisoners - 1000 people.
Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. Brief information about each of the victims on the Finnish side was published in a number of Finnish publications.
Modern information about the circumstances of the death of Finnish military personnel:
- 16,725 killed in action, remains evacuated;
- 3,433 killed in action, remains not evacuated;
- 3671 died in hospitals from wounds;
- 715 died from non-combat causes (including disease);
- 28 died in captivity;
- 1,727 missing and declared dead;
- The cause of death for 363 military personnel is unknown.
In total, 26,662 Finnish military personnel were killed.
Civil
According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombings of Finnish cities (including Helsinki), 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.
Losses of foreign volunteers
During the war, the Swedish Volunteer Corps lost 33 people killed and 185 wounded and frostbite (with frostbite making up the vast majority - about 140 people).
In addition, 1 Italian was killed - Sergeant Manzocchi
USSR losses
The first official figures for Soviet casualties in the war were published at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.
According to reports from the troops on March 15, 1940:
- wounded, sick, frostbitten - 248,090;
- killed and died during the sanitary evacuation stages - 65,384;
- died in hospitals - 15,921;
- missing - 14,043;
- total irrecoverable losses - 95,348.
Name lists
According to the lists of names compiled in 1949-1951 by the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Ground Forces, the losses of the Red Army in the war were as follows:
- died and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages - 71,214;
- died in hospitals from wounds and illnesses - 16,292;
- missing - 39,369.
In total, according to these lists, irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 military personnel.
Other loss estimates
In the period from 1990 to 1995, new, often contradictory data about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies appeared in Russian historical literature and in journal publications, and the general trend of these publications was the increasing number of Soviet losses from 1990 to 1995 and a decrease in Finnish ones. So, for example, in the articles of M. I. Semiryagi (1989) the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A. M. Noskov, a year later - 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P. A Aptekar in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, then, according to P. A. Aptekar, their number is more than double the results of the study by Semiryagi and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people. According to data from Soviet military archives and hospitals, sanitary losses amounted to (by name) 264,908 people. It is estimated that about 22 percent of the losses were due to frostbite.
Losses in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. based on the two-volume “History of Russia. XX century" |
||
Finland |
||
1. Killed, died from wounds |
about 150,000 |
|
2. Missing people |
||
3. Prisoners of war |
about 6000 (5465 returned) |
From 825 to 1000 (about 600 returned) |
4. Wounded, shell-shocked, frostbitten, burned |
||
5. Airplanes (in pieces) |
||
6. Tanks (in pieces) |
650 destroyed, about 1800 knocked out, about 1500 out of action due to technical reasons |
|
7. Losses at sea |
submarine "S-2" |
auxiliary patrol ship, tugboat on Ladoga |
"Karelian Question"
After the war, local Finnish authorities and provincial organizations of the Karelian Union, created to protect the rights and interests of the evacuated residents of Karelia, tried to find a solution to the issue of returning lost territories. During the Cold War, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen repeatedly negotiated with the Soviet leadership, but these negotiations were unsuccessful. The Finnish side did not openly demand the return of these territories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of transferring territories to Finland was raised again.
In matters relating to the return of ceded territories, the Karelian Union acts together with and through the foreign policy leadership of Finland. In accordance with the “Karelia” program adopted in 2005 at the congress of the Karelian Union, the Karelian Union seeks to ensure that the political leadership of Finland actively monitors the situation in Russia and begins negotiations with Russia on the issue of the return of the ceded territories of Karelia as soon as a real basis arises and both sides will be ready for this.
Propaganda during the war
At the beginning of the war, the tone of the Soviet press was bravura - the Red Army looked ideal and victorious, while the Finns were portrayed as a frivolous enemy. On December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda will write:
However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the “Mannerheim Line”, difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, was stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov’s report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable “Mannerheim Line”, similar to the “Maginot Line” and the “Siegfried Line”, began to live. which have not yet been crushed by any army. Later Anastas Mikoyan wrote: “ Stalin, an intelligent, capable man, in order to justify the failures during the war with Finland, invented the reason that we “suddenly” discovered a well-equipped Mannerheim line. A special film was released showing these structures to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win a victory.».
If Finnish propaganda portrayed the war as the defense of the homeland from cruel and merciless invaders, combining communist terrorism with traditional Russian great power (for example, in the song “No, Molotov!” the head of the Soviet government is compared with the tsarist governor-general of Finland Nikolai Bobrikov, known for his Russification policy and fight against autonomy), then Soviet Agitprop presented the war as a struggle against the oppressors of the Finnish people for the sake of the latter’s freedom. The term White Finns, used to designate the enemy, was intended to emphasize not the interstate or interethnic, but the class nature of the confrontation. “Your homeland has been taken away more than once - we have come to return it to you”, says the song "Receive us, Suomi beauty", in an attempt to fend off accusations of taking over Finland. The order for LenVO troops dated November 29, signed by Meretskov and Zhdanov, states:
- Cartoon in the Chicago Daily Tribune. January 1940
- Cartoon in the Chicago Daily Tribune. February 1940
- "Receive us, Suomi beauty"
- "Njet, Molotoff"
Mannerheim Line - an alternative point of view
Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify long delay in the offensive, and the second - to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth about “ incredibly heavily fortified» The “Mannerheim Line” is firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the glorification of the line by the Finnish side literally - in song Mannerheimin linjalla(“On the Mannerheim Line”). The Belgian General Badu, a technical adviser on the construction of fortifications, a participant in the construction of the Maginot Line, stated:
Russian historian A. Isaev is ironic about this passage by Badu. According to him, “In reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of long-term Finnish structures were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete structures in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors.
Three bunkers of the “million-dollar” type had two levels, another three bunkers had three levels. Let me emphasize, precisely the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, slightly buried casemates with embrasures in the ground and completely buried galleries connecting them with the barracks. There were negligibly few buildings with what could be called floors.” It was much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov Line, not to mention the Maginot Line, with multi-story caponiers equipped with their own power plants, kitchens, rest rooms and all amenities, with underground galleries connecting bunkers, and even underground narrow-gauge railways. Along with the famous gouges made of granite boulders, the Finns used gouges made of low-quality concrete, designed for outdated Renault tanks and which turned out to be weak against the guns of new Soviet technology. In fact, the Mannerheim Line consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located along the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other, and rarely had cannon armament.
As O. Mannien notes, the Finns had enough resources to build only 101 concrete bunkers (from low-quality concrete), and they used less concrete than the building of the Helsinki opera house; the rest of the fortifications of the Mannerheim line were wood and earthen (for comparison: the Maginot line had 5,800 concrete fortifications, including multi-story bunkers).
Mannerheim himself wrote:
...the Russians even during the war floated the myth of the “Mannerheim Line.” It was argued that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus relied on an unusually strong defensive rampart built with the latest technology, which can be compared with the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The Russian breakthrough was “a feat unparalleled in the history of all wars”... All this is nonsense; in reality, the state of things looks completely different... There was a defensive line, of course, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the “Mannerheim Line”. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Memoirs. - M.: VAGRIUS, 1999. - P. 319-320. - ISBN 5-264-00049-2 |
Fiction about war
Documentaries
- "The Living and the Dead." Documentary film about the “Winter War” directed by V. A. Fonarev
- “Mannerheim Line” (USSR, 1940)
75 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War (Soviet-Finnish War) began. The Winter War was almost unknown to the people of Russia for quite a long time. In the 1980-1990s, when it was possible to blaspheme the history of Russia-USSR with impunity, the dominant point of view was that “bloody Stalin” wanted to seize “innocent” Finland, but the small but proud northern people fought back the northern “evil empire”. Thus, Stalin was blamed not only for the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, but also for the fact that Finland was “forced” to enter into an alliance with Hitler’s Germany in order to resist the “aggression” of the Soviet Union.
Many books and articles denounced Soviet Mordor, which attacked little Finland. They cited absolutely fantastic figures for Soviet losses, reported on heroic Finnish machine gunners and snipers, the stupidity of Soviet generals, and much more. Any reasonable reasons for the Kremlin's actions were completely denied. They say that the irrational anger of the “bloody dictator” is to blame for everything.
In order to understand why Moscow went to this war, it is necessary to remember the history of Finland. Finnish tribes have long been on the periphery of the Russian state and the Swedish kingdom. Some of them became part of Rus' and became “Russians”. The fragmentation and weakening of Rus' led to the fact that the Finnish tribes were conquered and subjugated by Sweden. The Swedes pursued a colonization policy in the traditions of the West. Finland did not have administrative or even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish, spoken by the nobles and the entire educated segment of the population.
Russia , having taken Finland from Sweden in 1809, essentially gave the Finns statehood, allowed them to create basic state institutions, form national economy. Finland received its own authorities, currency and even an army as part of Russia. At the same time, the Finns did not pay general taxes and did not fight for Russia. Finnish language, while maintaining status Swedish, received a state position. The authorities of the Russian Empire practically did not interfere in the affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The policy of Russification was not carried out in Finland for a long time (some elements appeared only in a later period, but it was already too late). The resettlement of Russians to Finland was actually prohibited. Moreover, the Russians living in the Grand Duchy were in an unequal position in relation to the local residents. In addition, in 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included lands that Russia had captured from Sweden in the 18th century. Moreover, Vyborg had great military-strategic importance in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire - St. Petersburg. Thus, the Finns in the Russian “prison of nations” lived better than the Russians themselves, who bore all the hardships of building an empire and its defense from numerous enemies.
The collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland independence. Finland thanked Russia by first entering into an alliance with the Kaiser’s Germany, and then with the Entente powers ( more details in a series of articles - How Russia created Finnish statehood; Part 2; Finland allied with the Kaiser's Germany against Russia; Part 2; Finland is in alliance with the Entente against Russia. First Soviet-Finnish War; Part 2 ). On the eve of World War II, Finland occupied a hostile position towards Russia, leaning towards an alliance with the Third Reich.
Most Russian citizens associate Finland with a “small cozy European country", with peaceful and cultural inhabitants. This was facilitated by a kind of “political correctness” towards Finland, which reigned in late Soviet propaganda. Finland, after defeat in the war of 1941-1944, learned a good lesson and extracted maximum benefits from its proximity to the huge Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR did not remember that the Finns attacked the USSR three times in 1918, 1921 and 1941. They preferred to forget about this for the sake of good relations.
Finland was not a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia.Finland's separation from Russia was not peaceful. The Civil War began between the White and Red Finns. The Whites were supported by Germany. The Soviet government refrained from large-scale support for the Reds. Therefore, with the help of the Germans, the White Finns gained the upper hand. The winners created a network of concentration camps and unleashed the White Terror, during which tens of thousands of people died (during the fighting itself, only a few thousand people died on both sides).In addition to the Reds and their supporters, the Finns “purged” the Russian community of Finland.Moreover, the majority of Russians in Finland, including refugees from Russia who fled from the Bolsheviks, did not support the Reds and Soviet power. Former officers of the tsarist army, their families, representatives of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, numerous students, the entire Russian population indiscriminately, women, old people and children . Significant material assets belonging to the Russians were confiscated.
The Finns were going to place a German king on the throne of Finland. However, Germany's defeat in the war led to Finland becoming a republic. After this, Finland began to focus on the Entente powers. Finland was not satisfied with independence, the Finnish elite wanted more, laying claim to Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and the most radical figures made plans to build a “Greater Finland” with the inclusion of Arkhangelsk, and Russian lands up to the Northern Urals, Ob and Yenisei (the Urals and Western Siberia are considered ancestral home of the Finno-Ugric language family).
The leadership of Finland, like Poland, was not satisfied with the existing borders and was preparing for war. Poland had territorial claims to almost all its neighbors - Lithuania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the Polish lords dreamed of restoring a great power “from sea to sea.” People in Russia more or less know about this. But few people know that the Finnish elite was delirious with a similar idea, the creation of a “Greater Finland.” The ruling elite also set the goal of creating a Greater Finland. The Finns did not want to get involved with the Swedes, but they laid claim to Soviet lands, which were larger than Finland itself. The radicals had unlimited appetites, stretching all the way to the Urals and further to the Ob and Yenisei.
And first they wanted to capture Karelia. Soviet Russia was torn apart by the Civil War, and the Finns wanted to take advantage of this. Thus, in February 1918, General K. Mannerheim stated that “he will not sheathe his sword until Eastern Karelia is liberated from the Bolsheviks.” Mannerheim planned to seize Russian lands along the line White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga, which was supposed to facilitate the defense of new lands. It was also planned to include the Pechenga region (Petsamo) and the Kola Peninsula into Greater Finland. They wanted to separate Petrograd from Soviet Russia and make it a “free city”, like Danzig. On May 15, 1918, Finland declared war on Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, Finnish volunteer detachments began to conquer Eastern Karelia.
Soviet Russia was busy fighting on other fronts, so it did not have the strength to defeat its insolent neighbor. However, the Finnish offensive on Petrozavodsk and Olonets and the campaign against Petrograd across the Karelian Isthmus failed. And after the defeat of Yudenich’s white army, the Finns had to make peace. From July 10 to July 14, 1920, peace negotiations took place in Tartu. The Finns demanded that Karelia be transferred to them, but the Soviet side refused. In the summer, the Red Army drove the last Finnish troops out of Karelian territory. The Finns held only two volosts - Rebola and Porosozero. This made them more accommodating. There was no hope for help from the West; the Entente powers had already realized that the intervention in Soviet Russia had failed. On October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Finland. The Finns were able to obtain the Pechenga volost, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, and most of the Sredniy Peninsula and the islands, west of the limit line in the Barents Sea. Rebola and Porosozero were returned to Russia.
This did not satisfy Helsinki. Plans for the construction of “Greater Finland” were not abandoned, they were only postponed. In 1921, Finland again tried to resolve the Karelian issue by force. Finnish volunteer detachments, without declaring war, invaded Soviet territory, and the Second Soviet-Finnish War began. Soviet forces in February 1922 fully liberated the territory of Karelia from invaders. In March, an agreement was signed to take measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border.
But even after this failure the Finns did not cool down. The situation on the Finnish border was constantly tense. Many, remembering the USSR, imagine a huge powerful power that defeated the Third Reich, took Berlin, sent the first man into space and made the entire Western world tremble. Like, how could little Finland threaten the huge northern “evil empire”. However, the USSR 1920-1930s. was a great power only in terms of territory and potential. Moscow's real policy at that time was extremely cautious. In fact, for quite a long time, Moscow, until it became stronger, pursued an extremely flexible policy, most often giving in and not getting into trouble.
For example, the Japanese plundered our waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula for quite a long time. Under the protection of their warships, Japanese fishermen not only completely caught all the living creatures from our waters worth millions of gold rubles, but also freely landed on our shores to repair, process fish, and obtain fresh water etc. Before Khasan and Khalkin-Gol, when the USSR strengthened thanks to successful industrialization, received a powerful military-industrial complex and strong armed forces, the Red commanders had strict orders to restrain Japanese troops only on their territory, without crossing the borders. A similar situation occurred in the Russian North, where Norwegian fishermen fished in the internal waters of the USSR. And when the Soviet border guards tried to protest, Norway took warships into the White Sea.
Of course, Finland no longer wanted to fight the USSR alone. Finland has become a friend of any power hostile to Russia. As the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhuvud noted: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.” Against this background, Finland even became friends with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. In Finland, as in Poland, they were afraid of any strengthening of the USSR, since their leadership based their calculations on the fact that a war between some great Western power and Russia was inevitable (or a war between Japan and the USSR), and they would be able to profit from Russian lands . Inside Finland, the press was constantly hostile to the USSR, conducting almost open propaganda for an attack on Russia and the seizure of its territories. All kinds of provocations constantly took place on the Soviet-Finnish border on land, at sea and in the air.
After hopes for an imminent conflict between Japan and the USSR did not materialize, the Finnish leadership headed for a close alliance with Germany. The two countries are linked by close military-technical cooperation. With the consent of Finland, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center (“Bureau Cellarius”) was created in the country. His main task was to conduct intelligence work against the USSR. First of all, the Germans were interested in data about the Baltic Fleet, formations of the Leningrad Military District and industry in the northwestern part of the USSR. By the beginning of 1939, Finland, with the help of German specialists, had built a network of military airfields that was capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force. It is also very significant that even before the start of the war of 1939-1940. The Finnish swastika was the identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and armored forces.
Thus, by the beginning of the great war in Europe, we had on the north-western borders a clearly hostile, aggressive state, whose elite dreamed of building a “Greater Finland at the expense of Russian (Soviet) lands and was ready to be friends with any potential enemy of the USSR. Helsinki was ready to fight the USSR both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and with the help of England and France.
The Soviet leadership understood everything perfectly and, seeing the approach of a new world war, sought to secure the northwestern borders. Leningrad was of particular importance - the second capital of the USSR, a powerful industrial, scientific and cultural center, as well as the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Finnish long-range artillery could fire at the city from its border, and ground forces could reach Leningrad in one burst. The fleet of a potential enemy (Germany or England and France) could easily break through to Kronstadt, and then Leningrad. To protect the city, it was necessary to push back the land border on land, as well as restore the distant line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, gaining space for fortifications on the northern and southern shores. The largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had a single base - Kronstadt. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could be hit by long-range guns of the Finnish coastal defense. This situation could not satisfy the Soviet leadership.
The issue with Estonia was resolved peacefully. In September 1939, a mutual assistance agreement was concluded between the USSR and Estonia. A Soviet military contingent was introduced into Estonia. The USSR received the rights to create military bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago, Paldiski and Haapsalu.
It was not possible to come to an amicable agreement with Finland. Although negotiations began back in 1938. Moscow has tried literally everything. She proposed concluding a mutual assistance agreement and jointly defending the Gulf of Finland zone, giving the USSR the opportunity to create a base on the coast of Finland (Hanko Peninsula), sell or lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland. It was also proposed to move the border near Leningrad. As compensation, the Soviet Union offered much larger territories of Eastern Karelia, preferential loans, economic benefits, etc. However, all proposals were met with a categorical refusal from the Finnish side. It is impossible not to note the inciting role of London. The British told the Finns that it was necessary to take a firm position and not give in to pressure from Moscow. This gave Helsinki hope.
In Finland, general mobilization and evacuation began civilian population from border areas. At the same time, arrests of left-wing figures were carried out. Incidents at the border have become more frequent. So, on November 26, 1939, a border incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to Soviet data, Finnish artillery shelled Soviet territory. The Finnish side declared the USSR to be the culprit of the provocation. On November 28, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland. On November 30, the war began. Its results are known. Moscow solved the problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet. We can say that it was only thanks to the Winter War that the enemy was unable to capture the second capital of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.
Currently, Finland is again drifting towards the West, NATO, so it is worth keeping a close eye on it. The “cozy and cultural” country can again recall the plans for “Great Finland” right up to the Northern Urals. Finland and Sweden are thinking about joining NATO, and the Baltic states and Poland are literally turning into NATO’s advanced springboards for aggression against Russia before our very eyes. And Ukraine becomes an instrument for war with Russia in the southwestern direction.
