Submarines dictate the rules in naval war and force everyone to meekly follow the established order.
Those stubborn people who dare to ignore the rules of the game will face a quick and painful death in the cold water, among floating debris and oil stains. Boats, regardless of flag, remain the most dangerous combat vehicles, capable of crushing any enemy.
I bring to your attention a short story about the seven most successful projects submarines of the war years.
T type boats (Triton-class), UK
The number of submarines built is 53.
Surface displacement - 1290 tons; underwater - 1560 tons.
Crew - 59…61 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m (riveted hull), 106 m (welded hull).
Full surface speed - 15.5 knots; in underwater - 9 knots.
A fuel reserve of 131 tons provided a surface cruising range of 8,000 miles.
Weapons:
- 11 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber (on boats of subseries II and III), ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 1 x 102 mm universal gun, 1 x 20 mm anti-aircraft "Oerlikon".
HMS Traveler
A British underwater Terminator capable of knocking the crap out of any enemy's head with a bow-launched 8-torpedo salvo. The T-type boats had no equal in destructive power among all the submarines of the WWII period - this explains their ferocious appearance with a bizarre bow superstructure, where additional torpedo tubes were located.
The notorious British conservatism is a thing of the past - the British were among the first to equip their boats with ASDIC sonars. Alas, despite its powerful weapons and modern means detection, the T-type open sea boats did not become the most effective among the British submarines of World War II. Nevertheless, they went through an exciting battle path and achieved a number of remarkable victories. “Tritons” were actively used in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea, destroyed Japanese communications in the Pacific Ocean, and were spotted several times in the frozen waters of the Arctic.
In August 1941, the submarines "Tygris" and "Trident" arrived in Murmansk. British submariners demonstrated a master class to their Soviet colleagues: in two trips, 4 enemy ships were sunk, incl. "Bahia Laura" and "Donau II" with thousands of soldiers of the 6th Mountain Division. Thus, the sailors prevented the third German attack on Murmansk.
Other famous T-boat trophies include the German light cruiser Karlsruhe and the Japanese heavy cruiser Ashigara. The samurai were “lucky” to get acquainted with a full 8-torpedo salvo of the Trenchant submarine - having received 4 torpedoes on board (+ another one from the stern tube), the cruiser quickly capsized and sank.
After the war, the powerful and sophisticated Tritons remained in service with the Royal Navy for another quarter of a century.
It is noteworthy that three boats of this type were acquired by Israel in the late 1960s - one of them, INS Dakar (formerly HMS Totem) was lost in 1968 in the Mediterranean Sea under unclear circumstances.
Boats of the "Cruising" type XIV series, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 11.
Surface displacement - 1500 tons; underwater - 2100 tons.
Crew - 62…65 people.
Full surface speed - 22.5 knots; in underwater - 10 knots.
Surface cruising range 16,500 miles (9 knots)
Submerged cruising range - 175 miles (3 knots)
Weapons:
- 2 x 100 mm universal guns, 2 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic guns;
- up to 20 minutes of barrage.
...December 3, 1941, German hunters UJ-1708, UJ-1416 and UJ-1403 bombed Soviet boat, which attempted to attack the convoy at Bustad Sund.
Hans, can you hear this creature?
- Nain. After a series of explosions, the Russians lay low - I detected three impacts on the ground...
-Can you determine where they are now?
- Donnerwetter! They are blown away. They probably decided to surface and surrender.
The German sailors were wrong. From the depths of the sea, a MONSTER rose to the surface - the cruising submarine K-3 series XIV, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire on the enemy. With the fifth salvo, Soviet sailors managed to sink U-1708. The second hunter, having received two direct hits, began to smoke and turned to the side - his 20 mm anti-aircraft guns could not compete with the “hundreds” of the secular submarine cruiser. Scattering the Germans like puppies, K-3 quickly disappeared over the horizon at 20 knots.
The Soviet Katyusha was a phenomenal boat for its time. Welded hull, powerful artillery and mine-torpedo weapons, powerful diesel engines (2 x 4200 hp!), high surface speed of 22-23 knots. Huge autonomy in terms of fuel reserves. Remote control of ballast tank valves. A radio station capable of transmitting signals from the Baltic to the Far East. An exceptional level of comfort: shower cabins, refrigerated tanks, two seawater desalinators, an electric galley... Two boats (K-3 and K-22) were equipped with Lend-Lease ASDIC sonars.
But, oddly enough, neither the high characteristics nor the most powerful weapons made the Katyusha effective - in addition to the dark story of the K-21 attack on the Tirpitz, during the war years the XIV series boats accounted for only 5 successful torpedo attacks and 27 thousand brigade . reg. tons of sunk tonnage. Most of the victories were achieved with the help of mines. Moreover, its own losses amounted to five cruising boats.
K-21, Severomorsk, today
The reasons for the failures lie in the tactics of using Katyushas - the powerful submarine cruisers, created for the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, had to “tread water” in the shallow Baltic “puddle”. When operating at depths of 30-40 meters, a huge 97-meter boat could hit the ground with its bow while its stern was still sticking out on the surface. It was not much easier for the North Sea sailors - as practice has shown, the effectiveness of the combat use of Katyushas was complicated by the poor training of personnel and the lack of initiative of the command.
It's a pity. These boats were designed for more.
“Baby”, Soviet Union
Series VI and VI bis - 50 built.
Series XII - 46 built.
Series XV - 57 built (4 took part in combat operations).
Performance characteristics of boats type M series XII:
Surface displacement - 206 tons; underwater - 258 tons.
Autonomy - 10 days.
Working immersion depth - 50 m, maximum - 60 m.
Full surface speed - 14 knots; in underwater - 8 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 3,380 miles (8.6 knots).
Submerged cruising range is 108 miles (3 knots).
Weapons:
- 2 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 2 torpedoes;
- 1 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic.
Baby!
The project of mini-submarines for the rapid strengthening of the Pacific Fleet - the main feature of the M-type boats was the ability to be transported by rail in a fully assembled form.
In the pursuit of compactness, many had to be sacrificed - service on the Malyutka turned into a grueling and dangerous undertaking. Difficult living conditions, strong roughness - the waves mercilessly tossed the 200-ton “float”, risking breaking it into pieces. Shallow diving depth and weak weapons. But the main concern of the sailors was the reliability of the submarine - one shaft, one diesel engine, one electric motor - the tiny “Malyutka” left no chance for the careless crew, the slightest malfunction on board threatened death for the submarine.
The little ones quickly evolved - the performance characteristics of each new series were several times different from the previous project: the contours were improved, the electrical equipment and detection equipment were updated, the dive time was reduced, and the autonomy increased. The “babies” of the XV series no longer resembled their predecessors of the VI and XII series: one-and-a-half-hull design - the ballast tanks were moved outside the durable hull; The power plant received a standard two-shaft layout with two diesel engines and underwater electric motors. The number of torpedo tubes increased to four. Alas, Series XV appeared too late - the “Little Ones” of Series VI and XII bore the brunt of the war.
Despite their modest size and only 2 torpedoes on board, the tiny fish were simply distinguished by their terrifying “gluttony”: in just the years of World War II, Soviet M-type submarines sank 61 enemy ships with a total tonnage of 135.5 thousand gross tons, destroyed 10 warships, and also damaged 8 transports.
The little ones, originally intended only for operations in the coastal zone, have learned to fight effectively in open sea areas. They, along with larger boats, cut enemy communications, patrolled at the exits of enemy bases and fjords, deftly overcame anti-submarine barriers and blew up transports right at the piers inside protected enemy harbors. It’s simply amazing how the Red Navy were able to fight on these flimsy ships! But they fought. And we won!
Boats of the “Medium” type, series IX-bis, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 41.
Surface displacement - 840 tons; underwater - 1070 tons.
Crew - 36…46 people.
Working immersion depth - 80 m, maximum - 100 m.
Full surface speed - 19.5 knots; submerged - 8.8 knots.
Surface cruising range 8,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 148 miles (3 knots).
“Six torpedo tubes and the same number of spare torpedoes on racks convenient for reloading. Two cannons with large ammunition, machine guns, explosive equipment... In a word, there is something to fight with. And 20 knots surface speed! It allows you to overtake almost any convoy and attack it again. The technique is good...”
- opinion of the commander of the S-56, Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Shchedrin
The Eskis were distinguished by their rational layout and balanced design, powerful armament, and excellent performance and seaworthiness. Initially a German project from the Deshimag company, modified to meet Soviet requirements. But don’t rush to clap your hands and remember the Mistral. After the start of serial construction of the IX series in Soviet shipyards, the German project was revised with the goal of a complete transition to Soviet equipment: 1D diesel engines, weapons, radio stations, a noise direction finder, a gyrocompass... - there were none in the boats designated “series IX-bis”. foreign made bolt!
The problems with the combat use of the "Medium" type boats, in general, were similar to the K-type cruising boats - locked in mine-infested shallow water, they were never able to realize their high combat qualities. Things were much better in the Northern Fleet - during the war, the S-56 boat under the command of G.I. Shchedrina made the transition through the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, moving from Vladivostok to Polyarny, subsequently becoming the most productive boat of the USSR Navy.
An equally fantastic story is connected with the S-101 “bomb catcher” - during the war years, the Germans and Allies dropped over 1000 depth charges on the boat, but each time the S-101 returned safely to Polyarny.
Finally, it was on the S-13 that Alexander Marinesko achieved his famous victories.
S-56 torpedo compartment
“Cruel alterations in which the ship found itself, bombings and explosions, depths far exceeding the official limit. The boat protected us from everything..."
- from the memoirs of G.I. Shchedrin
Gato type boats, USA
The number of submarines built is 77.
Surface displacement - 1525 tons; underwater - 2420 tons.
Crew - 60 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m.
Full surface speed - 21 knots; submerged - 9 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 11,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 96 miles (2 knots).
Weapons:
- 10 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 24 torpedoes;
- 1 x 76 mm universal gun, 1 x 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun, 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon;
- one of the boats, USS Barb, was equipped with a multiple launch rocket system for shelling the coast.
Ocean-going submarine cruisers of the Getou class appeared at the height of the war in the Pacific Ocean and became one of the most effective tools of the US Navy. They tightly blocked all strategic straits and approaches to the atolls, cut all supply lines, leaving Japanese garrisons without reinforcements, and Japanese industry without raw materials and oil. In battles with the Gatow, the Imperial Navy lost two heavy aircraft carriers, lost four cruisers and a damn dozen destroyers.
High speed, lethal torpedo weapons, the most modern radio equipment for detecting the enemy - radar, direction finder, sonar. The cruising range allows for combat patrols off the coast of Japan when operating from a base in Hawaii. Increased comfort on board. But the main thing is the excellent training of the crews and the weakness of Japanese anti-submarine weapons. As a result, the "Getow" mercilessly destroyed everything - it was they who brought victory in the Pacific Ocean from the blue depths of the sea.
...One of the main achievements of the Getow boats, which changed the whole world, is considered to be the event of September 2, 1944. On that day, the Finback submarine detected a distress signal from a falling plane and, after many hours of searching, found a frightened and already desperate pilot in the ocean . The one who was saved was one George Herbert Bush.
The cabin of the submarine "Flasher", memorial in Groton.
The list of Flasher trophies sounds like a naval joke: 9 tankers, 10 transports, 2 patrol ships with a total tonnage of 100,231 GRT! And for a snack the boat grabbed Japanese cruiser and a destroyer. Lucky damn thing!
Electric robots type XXI, Germany
By April 1945, the Germans managed to launch 118 submarines of the XXI series. However, only two of them were able to achieve operational readiness and go to sea in the last days of the war.
Surface displacement - 1620 tons; underwater - 1820 tons.
Crew - 57 people.
Working depth of immersion is 135 m, maximum depth is 200+ meters.
Full speed in the surface position is 15.6 knots, in the submerged position - 17 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 15,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 340 miles (5 knots).
Weapons:
- 6 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 2 Flak anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber.
U-2540 "Wilhelm Bauer" permanently moored in Bremerhaven, present day
Our allies were very lucky that all the forces of Germany were sent to the Eastern Front - the Krauts did not have enough resources to release a flock of fantastic “Electric Boats” into the sea. If they appeared a year earlier, that would be it! Another turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Germans were the first to guess: everything that shipbuilders in other countries are proud of - large ammunition, powerful artillery, high surface speed of 20+ knots - is of little importance. The key parameters that determine the combat effectiveness of a submarine are its speed and cruising range when submerged.
Unlike its peers, “Electrobot” was focused on being constantly under water: a maximally streamlined body without heavy artillery, fences and platforms - all for the sake of minimizing underwater resistance. Snorkel, six groups of batteries (3 times more than on conventional boats!), powerful electric. Full speed engines, quiet and economical electric. "sneak" engines.
The stern of U-2511, sunk at a depth of 68 meters
The Germans calculated everything - the entire Elektrobot campaign moved at periscope depth under the RDP, remaining difficult to detect for enemy anti-submarine weapons. At great depths, its advantage became even more shocking: 2-3 times greater range, at twice the speed of any wartime submarine! High stealth and impressive underwater skills, homing torpedoes, a set of the most advanced detection means... “Electrobots” opened a new milestone in the history of the submarine fleet, defining the vector of development of submarines in the post-war years.
The Allies were not prepared to face such a threat - as post-war tests showed, the “Electrobots” were several times superior in mutual hydroacoustic detection range to the American and British destroyers guarding the convoys.
Boats type VII, Germany
The number of submarines built is 703.
Surface displacement - 769 tons; underwater - 871 tons.
Crew - 45 people.
Working immersion depth - 100 m, maximum - 220 meters
Full surface speed - 17.7 knots; submerged - 7.6 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 8,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 80 miles (4 knots).
Weapons:
- 5 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 14 torpedoes;
- 1 x 88 mm universal gun (until 1942), eight options for superstructures with 20 and 37 mm anti-aircraft mounts.
* the given performance characteristics correspond to boats of the VIIC subseries
The most effective warships ever to roam the world's oceans.
A relatively simple, cheap, mass-produced, but at the same time well-armed and deadly weapon for total underwater terror.
703 submarines. 10 MILLION tons of sunk tonnage! Battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes and enemy submarines, oil tankers, transports with aircraft, tanks, cars, rubber, ore, machine tools, ammunition, uniforms and food... The damage from the actions of German submariners exceeded all reasonable limits - if only Without the inexhaustible industrial potential of the United States, capable of compensating for any losses of the allies, German U-bots had every chance to “strangle” Great Britain and change the course of world history.
U-995. Graceful underwater killer
The successes of the Sevens are often associated with the “prosperous times” of 1939-41. - allegedly, when the Allies appeared the convoy system and Asdik sonars, the successes of the German submariners ended. A completely populist statement based on a misinterpretation of “prosperous times.”
The situation was simple: at the beginning of the war, when for every German boat there was one Allied anti-submarine ship, the “sevens” felt like invulnerable masters of the Atlantic. It was then that the legendary aces appeared, sinking 40 enemy ships. The Germans already held victory in their hands when the Allies suddenly deployed 10 anti-submarine ships and 10 aircraft for each active Kriegsmarine boat!
Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Yankees and British began to methodically overwhelm the Kriegsmarine with anti-submarine equipment and soon achieved an excellent loss ratio of 1:1. They fought like that until the end of the war. The Germans ran out of ships faster than their opponents.
The whole history of the German “seven” is a formidable warning from the past: what threat does a submarine pose and how high are the costs of creating an effective system to counter the underwater threat.
A funny American poster of those years. "Hit the weak points! Come serve in the submarine fleet - we account for 77% of the sunk tonnage!" Comments, as they say, are unnecessary
The article uses materials from the book “Soviet Submarine Shipbuilding”, V. I. Dmitriev, Voenizdat, 1990.
In this note, I bring to your attention the firepower that the boats had. I again reviewed the topic briefly, without providing details and nuances, since a detailed coverage of this issue would require writing at least a large review article. To begin with, to make it clear how the Germans highlighted the issue of the need to have a gun on board and its use, I will give an excerpt from the “Manual for Submarine Commanders”, where the following is said about this:
"Section V Artillery weapons of submarines (submarine as a carrier of artillery)
271. The presence of artillery on a submarine is fraught with contradictions from the very beginning. The submarine is unstable, has a low-lying gun and surveillance platform, and is not equipped to conduct artillery fire.
All artillery installations on a submarine are poorly suited for an artillery duel, and in this respect the submarine is inferior to any surface ship.
In an artillery battle, a submarine, as opposed to a surface ship, must immediately bring all its forces into action, because even one hit in the strong hull of a submarine already makes it impossible for it to dive and leads to death. Therefore, the possibility of an artillery battle between a torpedo submarine and military surface ships is excluded.
272. For submarines used for torpedo attacks, artillery is, as it were, a conditional and auxiliary weapon, because the use of artillery over water contradicts the entire essence of a submarine, i.e., a sudden and covert underwater attack.
Based on this, it can be said that on a torpedo submarine, artillery is used only in the fight against merchant ships, for example, to delay steamships or to destroy unarmed or weakly armed ships (§ 305)."(With)
Deck artillery
Caliber, Type, Shooting, Rate of fire, Elevation angle , Effect. range, Calculation
105 mm SK C/32U - U-boot L C/32U Single 15 35° 12,000 m 6 persons
105 mm SK C/32U - Marine Pivot L Single 15 30° 12,000 m 6 persons
88 mm SK C/30U - U-boot L C/30U Single 15-18 30° 11,000 m 6 people
88 mm SK C/35 - U-boot L C/35U Single 15-18 30° 11,000 m 6 people
Of all types of German submarines designed and built from 1930 to 1945, boats of the I, VII, IX and X series were armed with deck artillery with a caliber of over 88 mm. At the same time, only the VII series carried an 88-mm caliber gun; the rest of the indicated series of boats had a 105-mm gun. The cannon was located directly on the upper deck in front of the wheelhouse; the ammunition was stored partly there in the superstructure of the boat, partly inside the durable hull. Deck artillery was in the department of the second watch officer, who performed the duties of a senior gunner on the boat.
On the "sevens" the gun was installed in the area of frame 54 on a pyramid specially reinforced in the superstructure, which was reinforced with longitudinal and transverse beams. In the area of the gun, the upper deck was expanded to 3.8 meters in length, thereby forming a place for artillery crews. The standard ammunition for the boat was 205 shells - 28 of which were in special containers in the superstructure next to the gun, 20 shells in the wheelhouse, and the rest in the "weapons room" inside the durable hull in the second compartment from the bow.
The 105 mm gun was also mounted on a pyramid, which was welded to the pressure hull. Depending on the type of boat, the ammunition for the gun ranged from 200 to 230 shells, of which 30-32 were stored in the superstructure next to the gun, remaining in the “weapons room” located in the central control room and galley.
The deck gun was protected from water by a waterproof plug on the barrel side, and by a special plug sleeve on the breech side. A well-thought-out lubrication system for the gun made it possible to keep the gun in working condition at different temperatures.
I mentioned various cases of using deck guns
And .
By the end of 1942, the command of the submarine forces came to the conclusion that the deck guns on boats that participated in the fighting in the Atlantic theater of operations should be dismantled. Thus, almost all “sevens” of type B and C lost such artillery. The guns were retained on Type IX submarine cruisers and Type VIID and X mines. But by the end of the war it was already difficult to find a German boat of any type that could carry deck artillery.
88 mm U29 and U95 guns. The waterproof plug is clearly visible.
Elevation angle of the 88 mm gun on the U46. It seems that it still exceeds those 30 and 35 degrees indicated in the technical characteristics. The gun had to be raised with its barrel up when loading torpedoes into the bow compartment. The photo below shows how this happened (U74 preparing to take a torpedo) 
105 mm gun on the U26 "one" 
105 mm guns U103 and U106 
General view of the 105 mm gun with its mounts. 
Gunners U53 and U35 prepare for practical shooting 
Artillery crew U123 is preparing to open fire. A tanker is visible straight ahead. The target will be sunk by artillery fire. Completion of Operation Paukenschlag, February 1942. 
But sometimes the tools were used for other purposes :-)
The pictures below show U107 and U156 
Flak
Caliber, Type, Shooting, Rate of fire, Elevation angle , Effect. range, Calculation
37 mm SK C/30U - Ubts. LC 39 Singles 12 85° 2,500 m 3/4 persons
37 mm M42 U - LM 43U Automatic (8 rounds) 40 80° 2,500 m 3/4 persons
37 mm Zwilling M 42U - LM 42 Automatic (8 charges) 80 80° 2,500 m 3/4 persons
30 mm Flak M 44 - LM 44 Automatic (exact characteristics unknown. For type XXI submarines)
20 mm MG C/30 - L 30 Automatic (20 rounds) 120 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm MG C/30 - L 30/37 Automatic (20 rounds) 120 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm Flak C/38 - L 30/37 Automatic (20 rounds) 220 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm Flak Zwilling C/38 II - M 43U Automatic (20 rounds) 440 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
20 mm Flak Vierling C38/43 - M 43U Automatic (20 rounds) 880 90° 1,500 m 2/4 persons
13.2 mm Breda 1931 Automatic (30 rounds) 400 85° 1,000 m 2/4 persons
Quad units are highlighted in red, dual units are highlighted in blue.
Of the fire weapons that the German submarines had, the most interesting were anti-aircraft weapons. If deck guns were obsolete by the end of the war, then the evolution of anti-aircraft fire among the Germans is clearly visible from the above table.
By the beginning of the war, German submarines had only a minimum of anti-aircraft guns, since it was believed that the threat from the air was clearly underestimated by the fleet command. As a result, the designers in the projects included no more than one anti-aircraft gun on the boat. But during the war the situation changed and reached the point that some submarines were literally studded with anti-aircraft guns, such as “anti-aircraft boats” (flakboats).
The main weapons of the boats were initially recognized as 20-mm 20-round anti-aircraft guns, which were installed on all types of boats with the exception of the II series. On the latter they were also provided, but were not included in the standard armament of the boats.
Initially, on the first "sevens" in pre-war times, a 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun of the MG C/30 - L 30 type was supposed to be installed on the upper deck behind the wheelhouse. This is clearly seen in the example of U49. Behind the open hatch you can see the anti-aircraft gun carriage. 
But already in wartime, the 20-mm anti-aircraft gun was moved to a site located behind the bridge. It is clearly visible in the photo. Alternately, anti-aircraft platforms U25, U38 (Karl Doenitz himself is on the bridge of the boat), U46 
Depending on the type and purpose of the boat, "Dvoyki" received anti-aircraft weapons, both pre-war and during the war. The gun was located in front of the wheelhouse. Either a carriage was installed for it, or it was installed there on a waterproof container (in the form of a barrel) in which the machine gun was stored in a disassembled state).
U23 before the war 
Waterproof "barrel", also known as a carriage on U9 (Black Sea) 
Same thing on U145 
And this is already in finished form. U24 (Black Sea) 
Option for installing an anti-aircraft gun on a carriage. U23 (Black Sea) 
The "Twos" operating in the Black Sea underwent some modification. In particular, the deckhouse was modified towards standard ocean-going boats by adding a platform for installing additional firepower. Due to this, the armament of boats of this type at the World Theater Championship increased to 2-3 guns per submarine. The photo shows U19 in full armor. Anti-aircraft gun in front of the wheelhouse, twin guns on the platform behind the bridge. By the way, machine guns installed on the sides of the cabin are visible. 
The growing threat from the air forced the Germans to take measures to increase anti-aircraft weapons. The boat received an additional platform for placing fire weapons, on which two pairs of 20-mm machine guns and one (or two) 37-mm machine guns could be placed. This site was nicknamed " Winter Garden"(Wintergarten). Below are photos of boats that surrendered to the Allies U249, U621 and U234 
As the pinnacle of the evolution of anti-aircraft weapons German boats quad anti-aircraft gun Flak Vierling C38/43 - M 43U, which was received by the so-called “anti-aircraft boats”. As an example U441.
In the Mediterranean, the "Seven" received additional weapons by installing Italian "Breda" machine guns in the form of twin-armed units. As an example U81 
A special word worth mentioning is such a “miracle” weapon as the 37 mm SK C/30U - Ubts anti-aircraft gun. LC 39, which fired single shots. This gun was installed on later types of submarine cruisers of type IX (B and C) and submarine tankers of type XIV. The "cash cows" carried two guns of this type on either side of the wheelhouse. "Nines" had one installed behind the wheelhouse. Below are examples of such a weapon on the U103. 
Since I did not set myself the task of conducting a complete and detailed description of anti-aircraft weapons, I omit such nuances as ammunition and other characteristics of this type of weapon. I once mentioned the training of anti-aircraft gunners on submarines. Examples of confrontation between submarines and aircraft can be found if you look at the topics in my tag.
Firearms and signal weapons
Caliber, Type, Shooting, Rate of fire, Elevation angle , Effect. range, Calculation
7.92 mm MG15 Automatic (50/75 rounds) 800-900 90° 750 m 1-2
7.92 mm MG34 Automatic (50/75 rounds) 600-700 90° 750 m 1-2
7.92 mm MG81Z Automatic (Tape) 2.200 90° 750 m 1-2
In addition, the submarine’s crew had at their disposal 5-10 Mauser 7.65 mm pistols, 5-10 rifles, MP-40 assault rifles, hand grenades and two flare guns.
MG81Z on U33 
In general, I would like to note that German submarines had fire weapons that were quite modern at that time, which worked well during combat operations. In particular, the British noted after testing the artillery they captured U570 that, compared with the 3-inch gun of the 1917 model mounted on S-type boats, the 88-mm German gun was superior to the British one. The 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun was recognized by them as an excellent and effective weapon, which, to their surprise, did not vibrate when fired and had a good magazine.
Photo resource used to illustrate the note http://www.subsim.com
As usual, Vladimir Nagirnyak pored over the analysis.
During the First World War, submarines began to be produced with a diesel engine for movement on the surface and an electric engine for movement under water. Even then they were extremely formidable weapons. The German submarine SM UB-110, which cost 3,714,000 marks, however, did not have time to show its power, having lived for only a couple of months.
SM UB-110 of the Type UB III class of coastal torpedo boats was built in the Hamburg docks of Blohm & Voss for the needs of the Kaiserlichmarine and launched on March 23, 1918. Four months later, on July 19, 1918, she was sunk by the British ships HMS Garry, HMS ML 49 and HMS ML 263. 23 crew members were killed. The submarine was later taken ashore to be repaired at the Swan Hunter & Wigham Richardson docks in Wallsend, but the project was not completed and she was sold as scrap.
Perhaps the most unique acquisition of the 20th century in terms of naval weapons were submarines. Before they even appeared, they gave rise to a lot of fulfilled and unfulfilled hopes. It was believed that new combat weapons would revolutionize the war at sea, leveling the “old values” in the form of armadas of battleships and armored (battle) cruisers; will nullify general battles as the main means of resolving military confrontation at sea. Now, more than 100 years later, it is interesting to evaluate to what extent such bold predictions were confirmed.
In fact, DPs were most effective in the fight against trafficking, where they achieved truly impressive results. From the standpoint of high strategy, this does not contradict the ideas about achieving the main goals in war. “Trade disruption” hits particularly hard on island, highly developed countries that are traditionally and heavily dependent on exports and imports; in addition, the very concept of “supremacy at sea,” which was considered the prerogative of great sea powers and great fleets, is discredited. First of all, we are talking about the confrontation between Germany and England and its allies in the world wars and about the United States against Japan. These largest and most instructive examples formed the basis for an extensive and in-depth analysis, search for patterns, up to the development of motivated views on the use of submarines in the future.
As for the capabilities of submarines against military fleets, their main forces, this section is covered in less detail and leaves many questions.
It is noteworthy that even today this is not some routine scholastic question of naval history or applied sections of the development of the combat use of torpedo weapons (BITO). It is relevant in determining the prospects for the construction and development of the fleet. Increased interest in it is aroused by the objectively existing national aspect of the problem. It is no secret that the Navy, especially in the post-war period, had a clearly visible underwater focus. And this despite the fact that both world wars ended with the official defeat of the idea of submarine warfare. After the First World War - with the introduction of the convoy system and Asdikom, in the Second - the introduction of radar and aircraft. In general, following this logic, betting on submarines in the future seemed pointless. Nevertheless, we did it, just as the Germans did before us in World War II. Disputes about the legality of such a step and the actual appearance of the Navy in the years are still raging. cold war: How justified was such a step under the current conditions? The question is not simple, still awaiting its competent researcher.
The most “subtle” point in objective analysis, and therefore in the formation of a specific answer, is the lack of support from combat experience. Fortunately for humanity and inconvenient for specialists, there has been no opportunity to rely on one for 67 years. We are talking about an axiom: only practice is the criterion of truth, in military affairs, in any case. That is why the experience of the 1982 Falklands crisis between Great Britain and Argentina is considered so valuable and unique. But it only strengthens the confidence that, no matter how far submarines go in their development - right up to equipping them with nuclear power plants, space communications and navigation, advanced electronics and nuclear weapons, - they were not able to completely free themselves from the inherent burden of features and limitations of this type of force. The Falklands “underwater experience” turned out to be doubly interesting. This is the experience of combat operations against enemy surface ships (NS). However, we will stick to the chronology and start with the participation of submarines in world wars.
Submarines as a branch of the navy are just over 100 years old. The beginning of widespread combat use and their intensive development dates back to the period of the First World War. Overall this debut can be considered successful. About 600 submarines (372 of them were German submarines, but the Germans also lost the most - 178 submarines), then in service with the warring parties, sent to the bottom more than 55 large warships and hundreds of destroyers with a total displacement of more than 1 million tons and 19 million b.r.t. (gross register ton is a unit of volume equal to 2.83 cubic meters, not currently used) merchant tonnage. The Germans turned out to be the most numerous and productive, chalking up more than 5,860 sunk ships with a total displacement of 13.2 million b.p.t. trade tonnage. The blow mainly fell on English trade and was extremely effective.
The record of sunk tonnage will be repeated, but not surpassed, during the Second World War and, characteristically, by a much larger number of submarines. But the personal record belonging to the German commander Arnaud de la Perriere is more than 440 thousand b.r.t. – not achieved by anyone. The best submariner of the Second World War, also German, Otto Kretschmer, will leave the arena with a score of 244 thousand b.r.t. and 44 sunk ships in the spring of 1941.
If we look at the effectiveness of submarines against the enemy navy, the successes are much more modest even where such actions were specifically planned. This is difficult to reconcile with the hopes and expectations from the first resounding successes of Otto Weddigen, who already in the first days of the war on the primitive U-9 sank three armored cruisers in just over an hour. Other high-profile achievements of German submariners in terms of defeating large enemy tanks are also known, but that will come later. In the meantime, the “mobilization” of almost all available (about 20 units) submarines to comb the North Sea, supposedly infested with dreadnoughts, did not bring any results. Having learned about the operation in advance, the British removed all valuable oil and gas from the North Sea.
The participation of submarines in the Battle of Jutland, on which great hopes were pinned - after all, by 1916, submarines had already gradually managed to prove themselves - was generally discouraging. They didn't even find anyone there. The main forces of the fleets turned around and fought in the greatest naval battle in history without even being noticed. True, the death of the British Minister of War Field Marshal Lord Kitchener on the cruiser Hampshire, which was blown up by mines, is considered an indirect success of the submarine, but this is nothing more than a consoling “bonus”.
Strictly speaking, the goals in the fight against trade were also unachieved. The blockade of England, hastily declared by the German leadership at the beginning of the war, was not achieved, because it was not reinforced with real forces. Then followed a series of bans due to the international scandal over the Lusitania, the accompanying declines in submarine warfare, and a return to the principle of prize law. The belated announcement of unlimited submarine warfare in 1917 did not help either: the enemy had time to prepare.
However, let’s return to unfulfilled hopes regarding the fight between submarines and NK. It should be noted that in the interwar period (1918-1939) there was no shortage of analysis, researchers and theories on this subject, more profound and interested than in Germany. If in all the variety of reasons and explanations we single out the main ones and discard the particular, biased and secondary ones, which, by the way, are widely used at the “school-cadet” level, the bottom line is that the actions of the German fleet in the First World War were based on the absence of a corresponding to its tasks and material strategy level.
For once, Germany, with a huge effort of all its strength, managed to build the world's second fleet. Combined with a recognized best army, this gave rise to hopes of occupying a dominant position in Europe, and not only in it. Moreover, such serious military preparations, according to the laws of strategy, are irreversible. But the military-political leadership and naval command of Germany did not have the appropriate strategic guidelines regarding the war at sea. This is recognized primarily by their own specialist researchers. Proceeding from the general to the specific, it is appropriate to extend this problem to the submarine fleet, then a very young branch of the force. In this, apparently, we have to look for the main reason for the failure of the German submarine fleet to achieve its goals in the war.
One can also see in this quite profound general operational-strategic consequences. Let's not forget that the British Grand Fleet was almost a third stronger than the German High Seas Fleet, and entering a general battle with such a balance of forces was at least reckless. Based on this, the idea of the German naval command was to first weaken the Grand Fleet by luring the British into the sea with part of their forces and catching them there with superior forces, equalizing the forces for a future general battle. After Admiral Hugo von Pohl missed such a unique opportunity on December 14, 1914, hopes of equalizing forces centered primarily on the success of submarines. 200 of more than 5,000 transports were lost to mines (1.5 million tons) laid by submarines.
As for other reasons, it is customary to say: the Germans entered World War II with a strategy and a well-developed system for training and using submarine forces. Compared to Second First World War without exaggeration, it was a battle of talented, daring and enterprising single submariners. This is understandable, the young branch of the force had few experienced specialists, the submarines had limited tactical and technical characteristics before the war. The fleet command itself lacked clear and distinct views on the use of submarines. Young submarine commanders with their modest captain-lieutenant stripes and sometimes valuable proposals against the backdrop of brilliant and venerable flagships and ship commanders of the High Seas Fleet were simply lost. Therefore, it is not surprising that the main decisions on the conduct of underwater warfare were made without taking into account and deep knowledge of the peculiarities of using submarines. Throughout the war, submarines remained a thing in themselves for naval operators and high command.
German submarine operations
During the Second World War
German submarines operated in the Atlantic from the early days of World War II. On September 1, 1939 German submarine fleet consisted of only 57 submarines, of which: 35 were small series II coastal submarines (with a displacement of 250 tons) and 22 were ocean-going submarines (with a displacement of 500 and 700 tons). With such a small force, the German submarine fleet began the Battle of the Atlantic.
Start of hostilities
German submarines on the Atlantic
At first, the problems of the German submarine fleet were the insufficient number of submarines and their insufficient construction (the main shipbuilding facilities were occupied by the construction of cruisers and battleships) and the very unfortunate location of German ports. German submarines had to sail to the Atlantic through the North Sea, which was full of British ships, minefields, and carefully patrolled by British base and carrier aircraft.
A few months later, thanks to the offensive campaigns of the Wehrmacht in Western Europe, the situation in the Atlantic changed radically.
In April 1940 German troops occupied Norway and thus destroyed the Scotland-Norway anti-submarine line. At the same time, the German submarine fleet received conveniently located Norwegian bases in Stavanger, Trondheim, Bergen and other ports.
In May 1940, Germany occupied the Netherlands and Belgium; Anglo-French troops were defeated at Dunkirk. In June, France was destroyed as an allied state fighting Germany. After the armistice, Germany occupied the northern and western parts of the country, including all French ports on the coast of the Bay of Biscay of the Atlantic Ocean.
Britain has lost its greatest ally. In 1940, the French fleet was fourth in the world. Only a handful of French ships joined the Free French forces and fought against Germany, although they were later joined by several Canadian-built corvettes that played a small but important role in the fight against Nazi Germany.
British destroyers were withdrawn from the Atlantic. The Norwegian campaign and the German invasion of the Low Countries and France placed British destroyer fleets under great strain and significant losses. Many destroyers were taken off convoy routes to support Norwegian operations in April and May, and then withdrawn to the English Channel to support the Dunkirk evacuation. In the summer of 1940, Britain faced a serious threat of invasion. The destroyers were concentrated in the Channel, where they prepared to repel the German invasion. Here the destroyers suffered heavily from air attacks by the German air commander in the Atlantic. (Luftwaffe Fliegerführer Atlantik). Seven destroyers were lost in the Norwegian campaign, a further six in the battles of Dunkirk and a further 10 in the Channel and North Sea in May–July, most of them to air attacks because they lacked adequate anti-aircraft armament. Most of the other destroyers were damaged.
In June 1940, Italy entered the war on the side of the Axis powers. The Mediterranean theater of operations was opened. Great Britain declared war on Italy and strengthened its Mediterranean fleet (6 battleships against 6 Italian ones), placing a new squadron in Gibraltar, known as the H force (H) - the newest English battleship Hood with a displacement of 42,000 tons, two battleships Resolution " and "Valiant", eleven destroyers and the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal" - to counter the French fleet in the Western Mediterranean.
All these events radically changed the situation in the Atlantic Ocean and the adjacent seas.
Germany did not have the opportunity to destroy the allied navies in a direct combat clash, so it began to act on enemy communications. To do this, she used: surface ships (large or boats), surface commercial raiders, submarines, aviation.
"Happy Time" of German submarines
The end of the German campaign in Western Europe meant that the U-boats that had been involved in the Norwegian campaign were now relieved of fleet operations and returned to the war of communications to sink Allied ships and ships.
German submarines received direct access to the Atlantic. Since the English Channel was relatively shallow and had been blocked by minefields since mid-1940, German submarines had to sail around the British Isles to reach the best hunting grounds.
From the beginning of July 1940, German submarines, after patrolling in the Atlantic, began to return to new bases in Western France. The French bases at Brest, Lorient, Bordeaux, Saint-Nazaire, La Pallis and La Rochelle were 450 miles (720 km) closer to the Atlantic than the German bases in the North Sea. This greatly expanded the range of German U-boats in the Atlantic, allowing them to attack convoys much further west and spend longer periods of time on patrol, doubling effective number submarines.
The number of Allied ships sunk began to grow rapidly. In June 1940, the total tonnage of sunken ships of the allied and neutral fleets amounted to 500 thousand tons. In the following months, the British lost transport ships with a total displacement of about 400 thousand tons every month. Great Britain found itself in an extremely difficult situation.
The number of submarines on patrol in the Atlantic began to increase. In turn, the composition of Allied escorts available for convoys, which consisted of 30 to 70 mostly unarmed merchant ships, was significantly reduced. The only consolation for the British was that the large merchant fleets of occupied Norway and the Netherlands were under British control. Great Britain occupied Iceland and the Faroe Islands in order to obtain bases for itself and prevent them from falling into enemy hands after the occupation of Denmark and Norway by German troops.
French Atlantic bases began building concrete bunkers, docks and submarine yards that were impenetrable to Allied bombers until Barnes Wallis developed his highly effective tallboy bomb.
German submarine base in Lorient, Western France
From June to October 1940, more than 270 Allied ships were sunk. The period from June 1940 to February 1941 was remembered by German submarine crews as " Happy time"(Die Glückliche Zeit). 1940 and 1941, when German submarines achieved enormous successes in Allied communications with relatively small losses, the crews of the submarines also called “ fat years».
which was torpedoed but remained afloat
Collections IWM. Photo No.: MISC 51237.
The initial operations of German submarines from French bases were quite effective. This was the heyday of U-boat commanders such as Günther Prien (U-47), Otto Kretschmer (U-99), Joachim Schepke (U-100), Engelbert Endras (U-46), Victor Auern (U-37) and Heinrich Bleichrodt (U-48). Each of them accounted for 30-40 sunk Allied ships.
The most famous of all German submariners was Gunter Prien(1909-1941), commander of the submarine U-47, the first holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves among submariners. He was one of the most successful submarine commanders. Prien earned the nickname "The Bull of Scapa Flow", which he received after torpedoing the British battleship Royal Oak, which was located in a guarded roadstead in the harbor of Scapa Flow. Gunther Prien went missing in the Atlantic Ocean along with his submarine and its entire crew on March 8, 1941, after an attack on convoy OB-293 en route from Liverpool to Halifax.
U-47
The greatest difficulty for submarines was finding convoys in the vastness of the ocean. The Germans had a handful of long-range Focke-Wulf 200 Condor aircraft based in Bordeaux (France) and Stavanger (Norway) that were used for reconnaissance but were essentially converted civilian airliners. This plane was a temporary solution. Due to ongoing tensions between the air force (Luftwaffe) and navy (Kriegsmarine), the primary source of convoy sightings was directly from submarines. Since the submarine's bridge is located very close to the water, the range of visual observation from submarines was very limited.
Long-range maritime reconnaissance "Focke-Wulf-200" (Focke-Wulf FW 200)
Source: Aircraft of the Fighting Powers, Vol II. Ed: H J Cooper, O G Thetford and D A Russell,
Harborough Publishing Co, Leicester, England 1941.
In 1940 - early 1941, half the ships of the Allied merchant fleet were sunk by submarines. By the end of 1940, the British navy and air force had sunk 33 boats. But in 1941, German shipyards increased the production of submarines to 18 units per month. In August 1941, the German submarine fleet already had 100 submarines in service.
"Wolf packs" of Dönitz submarines
In February–March 1941, the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau During a raid in the North Atlantic, 22 Allied transport ships with a total displacement of 115,600 tons were destroyed. However, in May 1941, the British sank the largest German battleship, the Bismarck, and from the summer of 1941 Germany abandoned the use of large surface ships against Allied communications. Submarines remained the only means of combat operations on long-distance communications. At the same time, boats and aircraft operated on close communications.
Commander of the German submarine fleet, Vice Admiral Karl Dönitz developed tactics for attacking submarines on convoys of Allied ships (tactics « wolf packs» ) when a group of submarines attacked simultaneously. Karl Dönitz organized a supply system for submarines directly in the ocean far from the bases.
Vice Admiral Karl Dönitz,
commander of the submarine fleet in 1935-1943,
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy in 1943-1945.
In March 1941, the German submarine fleet suffered its first significant losses when it lost three of its best submarine commanders. They died along with the crews of G. Prien and J. Schepke. O. Kretschmer was captured.
In 1941, the British began to increasingly use the convoy system, which allowed large, organized groups of transport ships to cross the dangerous Atlantic Ocean under the protection of escorts from warships - cruisers, destroyers and escort aircraft carriers. This significantly reduced the losses of transport ships and caused an increase in losses of German submarines.
From the beginning of 1941, British aviation began to take an active part in attacks on German submarines. However, the aircraft did not yet have a sufficient range and were an effective anti-submarine weapon only at short distances.
Dönitz's "wolf packs" of submarines caused great damage to Allied convoys. Until the end of 1941, the German submarine fleet was the dominant force in the Atlantic. Great Britain defended its transport shipping, which was vital for the mother country, with great effort.
On December 11, 1941, Germany declared war on the United States, and immediately German submarines began sinking American merchant ships off the coast of the United States. The American merchant fleet was not ready for war; its single transports were defenseless. German submarines destroyed them without much difficulty. Several months passed before the Americans began to use the effective British convoy system, which immediately reduced the losses of American transport ships.
From December 1941 to March 1943, there was a reduction in air support for the "wolf packs" of submarines. During this period German Navy lost 155 submarines. During the same period, transport ships and warships of the enemy and neutral countries with a total displacement of about 10 million tons were sunk, 80% of them by submarines. In 1942 alone, German submarines managed to sink transports with a displacement of about 7.8 million tons.
1942–1943 were critical in the Battle of the Atlantic. The British began to use the Asdik underwater detection system, radars, and long-range aircraft. The convoys were escorted by naval “support groups”. The protection of allied communications began to improve, the effectiveness of German submarines began to decline, and the number of their losses increased.
During the first half of 1942, the losses of Allied transports from “wolf packs” of submarines reached a maximum number of 900 ships (with a displacement of 4 million tons). During the entire 1942, 1,664 Allied ships (with a displacement of 7,790,697 tons) were sunk, of which 1,160 ships were sunk by submarines.
Instead of using surface fleet raids, Germany switched to unrestricted submarine warfare (uneingeschränkter U-Boot-Krieg), when submarines began to sink civilian merchant ships without warning and without trying to save the crews of these ships.
On September 17, 1942, German Navy Submarine Commander Karl Dönitz issued the Triton Zero or Laconia-Befehl order, which prohibited submarine commanders from providing assistance to the crew and passengers of sunken ships. This was necessary to avoid pursuit of submarines by Allied anti-submarine forces.
Until September 1942, according to the rules of war, German submarines, after an attack by Allied ships, provided assistance to sailors of sunken ships and ships. On September 12, 1942, the submarine U-156 sank the British transport ship Laconia and assisted in the rescue of the crew and passengers. On September 16, 4 submarines (one Italian), with several hundred rescued on board, were attacked by American planes, whose pilots knew that the Germans and Italians were saving the British. As a result of the air raid, the submarine U-156 was severely damaged.
The next day, having learned about what had happened, the commander of the submarine fleet, Admiral Dönitz, issued the order: “ It is prohibited to make any attempts to rescue the crews of sunken ships and vessels. ».
In 1942 fighting in the Atlantic they went with varying degrees of success. German submarines were heading to the shores of North and South America, Central and South Africa, some to the Indian and Pacific oceans. However, the German submarine fleet was unable to achieve the complete destruction of the Allied Atlantic communications.
The turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Losses of the German submarine fleet in 1943
On January 30, 1943, Grand Admiral Raeder was removed from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the German Reich Navy and Karl Dönitz was appointed in his place, who was awarded the military rank of Grand Admiral.
At the beginning of 1943, about 3 thousand ships and up to 2,700 Allied aircraft operated against 100-130 German submarines searching communications.
By the beginning of 1943, the Allies had created new types of aircraft with a longer range, as well as new radars. The Allied navies improved their anti-submarine tactics. Since April 1943, American and British anti-submarine strike groups, led by escort aircraft carriers, began operating in the Atlantic.
In 1943, the number of German submarines reached 250 units. However, in March - May, the Allies sunk 67 German submarines - the maximum number.
In total, in May 1943, the German submarine fleet lost 41 submarines and more than a thousand crew members from depth charges of Allied aircraft and destroyers, mainly in the Central Atlantic, among whom was Peter Dönitz, the youngest son of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
In 1943, German submarines sank in the Atlantic transport ships allies with a total displacement of 500 thousand tons. However, losses of Allied merchant fleets began to decline. In June they dropped to 28 thousand tons. The construction in the USA of a large series of Liberty-class transport ships made it possible by the end of 1943 to make up for the losses.
Since May 1943, great changes have occurred. Allied aircraft began flying constantly over the Bay of Biscay, where the main German submarine bases were located along the French coast. Many of them began to die even before the Allies reached the Atlantic communications. Since submarines of that time could not remain constantly under water, they were constantly attacked by planes and ships of the Allied fleets on their way to the Atlantic. A small number of German submarines managed to approach the heavily guarded convoys. Neither the submarines' own radars, nor enhanced anti-aircraft weapons, nor homing acoustic torpedoes helped in attacks on convoys.
In 1943, a turning point came - for every Allied ship sunk, the German submarine fleet began to lose one submarine.
A German submarine under fire from an Allied aircraft in the South Atlantic in 1943.
The Collection Database of the Australian War Memorial under the ID Number: 304949.
On November 5, 1943, the German submarine U-848 type IXC repels an air attack in the South Atlantic. In the conning tower of the submarine there is a twin 20-mm Flak 38 anti-aircraft artillery mount, and on the deck there is a 105-mm SKC /32 cannon.
The end of the Battle of the Atlantic.
Defeat of the German submarine fleet
From April 1943 to June 1944, the final turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic occurred. The Allies went on the offensive. During this period, there was a qualitative and quantitative growth in the anti-submarine forces and weapons of the allied fleets. The Allies deciphered the radio communication codes of German submarines, and a new type of radar was developed. There was a massive construction of escort ships and escort aircraft carriers. More and more aircraft were allocated to search for submarines. As a result, there was a reduction in losses in the tonnage of transport ships, and the losses of the German submarine fleet increased significantly. The Allies not only defend their communications, but also attack German submarine bases.
After Italy left the war, Germany lost its bases in the Mediterranean.
The German Navy and its submarine fleet finally lost the Battle of the Atlantic by the end of 1944. The Allies by that time had absolute superiority at sea and in the air.
January 30, 1945 Soviet submarine S-13 (commander Alexander Marinesko) sank a German passenger liner in the Baltic Sea "Wilhelm Gustlow" with a displacement of 25,484 tons. For the destruction of the Wilhelm Gustlow liner, Alexander Marinesko was included in the list of personal enemies of Adolf Hitler. On the Wilhelm Gustlow, the elite of the German submarine fleet was evacuated from the Danzig port (Gdansk): 100 submarine commanders who completed an advanced course in operating boats with a single Walther engine, 3,700 non-commissioned officers of the submarine fleet - graduates of the diving school, 22 high-ranking party officials from East Prussia, several generals and senior officers of the Reich Security Main Directorate (RSHA), an SS battalion of the auxiliary service of the Danzig port (300 people). In total, about 8 thousand people died. In Germany, mourning was declared, as after the surrender of the 6th Army in Stalingrad.
Captain 3rd rank A. I. Marinesko, commander of the Soviet submarine S-13
In March 1945, the last special group of German submarines (6 units) - the Sea Wolf detachment - entered the Atlantic. The group was heading towards the United States. The Americans received false information that German submarines were carrying V-2 ballistic missiles to bombard cities on the Atlantic coast of the United States. Hundreds of American aircraft and dozens of ships were sent to intercept these submarines. As a result, five of the six submarines were destroyed.
Over the last five weeks of the war, the German submarine fleet lost 23 submarines with crews, while sinking 10 ships with a displacement of 52 thousand tons.
During World War II, combat losses of the German submarine fleet amounted to 766 submarines. In 1939, 9 were sunk, in 1940 – 24, in 1941 – 35, in 1942 – 86, in 1943 – 242, in 1944 – 250 and in 1945 – 120. submarines.
At the end of the war big number German submarines were destroyed during massive bombing of naval bases and submarine sites.
Of the 39 thousand sailors and submarine crew members, about 32 thousand people died. The vast majority - in the last two years of the war.
On April 30, 1945, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz ordered the start of Operation Regenbogen, during which all German ships, including submarines, except those necessary for fishing and post-war mine clearance, were to be destroyed. However, at the request of the Allies, on May 4, Doenitz gave the order to cancel Operation Regenbogen. The crews of 159 submarines surrendered. But the submarine commanders in the Western Baltic did not comply with Dönitz's last order. They sank 217 combat-ready submarines, 16 decommissioned submarines and 5 submarines on the stocks.
After the surrender of Germany, the Allies carried out Operation Deadlight. From November 1945 to January 1946, off the west coast of Great Britain, the Allies sank 119 captured German submarines by bombing them from aircraft.
Canadian sailors on the captured German submarine U-190, June 1945.
Edward W. Dinsmore/Canada. Dept. of National Defense. Library and Archives Canada No. PA-145577.
Canadian sailors raise their banner above the German flag over the captured German submarine U-190, St. John's, Newfoundland, June 1945.
German submarines sank a total of 2,828 Allied or neutral ships—a total of 14,687,231 tons. According to confirmed data, 2,603 Allied transport ships and warships with a total displacement of 13.5 million tons were sunk, of which 11.5 million tons were losses of the British fleet. At the same time, 70 thousand military sailors and 30,248 merchant seamen died. The British Navy lost 51,578 men killed and missing in action.
German submarines achieved greatest success compared to surface ships and aircraft. They accounted for 68% of the sunk transport ships and 37.5% of the sunk Allied warships.
Of the total number of ships sunk by submarines, 61% are single ships; 9% were ships that lagged behind the convoys, and 30% were ships sailing as part of the convoys. The ratio of losses to victories was 1:3.3 in favor of submarines according to Anglo-American data and 1:4 according to German data.
Germany began the war with 57 submarines, of which 35 were Type II littoral submarines. Then Germany launched a large program to build an ocean-going submarine fleet. During World War II (5 years and 8 months), 1,157 submarines were built in German shipyards. In total, therefore, the German submarine fleet was armed with 1,214 submarines, of which 789 (according to Anglo-American data) or 651 (according to German data) were destroyed.
After the loss of advanced and then some of the main naval bases, Germany lost favorable conditions for combat operations at sea. By the end of the war, US and British industry were building new transport ships and warships faster than the Allies were suffering losses. As a result, Germany was defeated in the Battle of the Atlantic.
German submarines of the XXI series, without exaggeration, are the best ships of this class in the world of that era.
German submarines of the XXI series, without exaggeration, are the best ships of this class in the world of that era. They became role models in all leading naval powers. What was revolutionary about them? The creation of the XXI series submarines began in 1943. Then the “wolf pack” tactics, based on group night attacks by submarines operating from the surface, ceased to bring results. Boats pursuing convoys on the surface were detected by radar and subjected to preemptive counterattacks. Submarines forced to operate from the surface, since underwater they were inferior to convoys in speed and had a limited supply of energy resources, were doomed to lose.
Structure of the XXI series submarine:
a - longitudinal section; b - location of propulsion motors; c - deck plan.
1 - vertical steering wheel; 2 - fairing of the hydroacoustic station (HAS) “Sp-Anlage”; 3 - life raft containers; 4 - creeping electric motor; 5 - a device for operating a diesel engine under water (“snorkel”); 6 - diesel; 7 - living quarters; 8 - air supply shaft for diesel engines; 9 - fenders of the first shots; 10 - 20 mm artillery mount; 11 - gas exhaust shaft; 12 - retractable radio antenna mast; 13 - radar antenna; 14.15 - commander and navigation periscopes; 16 - sonar fairing “S-Basis”; 17 - torpedo loading hatch; 18 - spare torpedo; 19 - torpedo tube; 20 - sonar fairing “GHG-Anlage”; 21 - battery pits; 22 - propeller shaft gearbox; 23 - propulsion motor; 24 - hydroacoustics cabin; 25 - radio room; 26 - central post; 27 - stabilizer; 28 - aft horizontal rudders
The solution to the problem lay in radically improving the quality of the submarine, and specifically the quality of the submarine. And this could only be achieved by creating a powerful power plant and high-capacity energy sources that do not require atmospheric air. However, work on new gas turbine engines proceeded slowly, and then a compromise decision was made - to create a diesel-electric submarine, but focusing all efforts primarily on achieving the best performance of the elements of underwater navigation.
A feature of the new boat was the use of powerful electric motors (5 times more than the previous large submarines of the IX series, which had the same displacement) and batteries with a tripled number of cell groups. It was assumed that the combination of these proven solutions and perfect hydrodynamics would provide the submarine with the necessary underwater qualities.
The submarine was initially equipped with an improved device for operating a diesel engine under water, the snorkel. This allowed the boat, while under the periscope and sharply reducing its radar signature, to charge the battery while making transitions under diesel engines. The approach of the anti-submarine ships conducting the search was detected by the submarine using the signal receiver antenna of operating radar stations installed on the snorkel. The combination of these two devices on one retractable mast made it possible to promptly warn submariners about the appearance of the enemy and evade them by diving to depth.
The total mass of the battery installation was 225 tons, and its share in the displacement reached 14%. In addition, the capacity of cells previously created for Series IX submarines was increased through the use of thinner plates by 24% in a two-hour discharge mode or by 18% in a twenty-hour discharge. However, at the same time, the service life of the batteries was halved - from 2-2.5 to 1-1.5 years, which approximately corresponded to the average “life expectancy” of submarines participating in combat operations. In this regard, the XXI series boats were considered by the designers as wartime ships, as a kind of “expendable weapon” with a relatively short life cycle, the same as a tank or an airplane. They did not have the excess resources typical of peacetime ships that have been in service for 25-30 years.
Placing such a powerful battery became possible only thanks to original form durable body with figure-of-eight cross sections. On boats of the XXI series, the battery pits occupied about a third of the length of the durable hull and were located in two tiers - in the lower segment of the “eight” and above it, with a central passage between the batteries.
The durable hull of the XXI series submarine was divided into 7 compartments. But, unlike the previous boats of the VII and IX series, it refused to highlight shelter compartments with spherical bulkheads of increased strength, which, as a rule, were the end compartments and the central post compartment. War experience has shown that in combat conditions the concept of rescuing submariners from shelter compartments is practically impossible to implement, especially for boats in the ocean zone. The abandonment of shelter compartments made it possible to avoid the technological and layout costs associated with spherical bulkheads.
The contours of the stern end adopted to achieve high speed qualities did not allow the placement of feed devices. But this did not in any way affect the methods of using the new submarines. It was assumed that, having discovered the convoy, she should take a position in front of it, and then, approaching underwater at the maximum possible speed, break through the guard and take a place under the ships inside the order (the relative position of the ships during the sea crossing and during the battle). Then, moving along with the convoy ships at a depth of 30-45m and hiding behind them from anti-submarine ships, the boat, without surfacing, carried out attacks with homing torpedoes. Having fired the ammunition, she went to greater depths and, with low noise, evaded the stern of the convoy.
Artillery weapons were intended only for air defense. Two twin 20-mm artillery mounts were located in turrets, organically integrated into the contours of the wheelhouse fence. Unlike previous ships, the XXI series submarines were for the first time equipped with a fast loading device, which made it possible to reload all torpedo tubes in 4-5 minutes. Thus, it became technically possible to fire with a full load of ammunition (4 salvos) in less than half an hour. This became especially valuable when attacking convoys that required a large expenditure of ammunition. The depth of torpedo firing was increased to 30-45 m, which was dictated by the requirements for ensuring safety from ramming attacks and collisions when the boat is in the center of the order, and also corresponded to the optimal operating conditions for surveillance and target designation equipment when performing periscope-less attacks.
The basis of the hydroacoustic armament was a noise direction-finding station, the antenna of which consisted of 144 hydrophones and was located under a drop-shaped fairing in the keel of the bow, and a sonar station with an antenna installed in the bow of the wheelhouse enclosure (view sector up to 100° on each side). Primary detection of targets at distances of up to 10 miles was carried out at a noise direction-finding station, and accurate target designation for firing torpedo weapons was provided by sonar. This allowed the XXI series boats, unlike their predecessors, to carry out attacks from underwater based on hydroacoustic data, without surfacing under the periscope for visual contact.
To detect the most dangerous opponents - anti-submarine aircraft - the boat was armed with a radar station, which was used only on the surface. Subsequently, on the boats scheduled for delivery to the fleet in the summer of 1945, it was planned to install a new radar with an antenna on a retractable mast, raised in a periscope position.
Much attention was paid to hydrodynamic properties. The shape of the hull ensured low resistance underwater, but at the same time made it possible to maintain good surface seaworthiness. The protruding parts were kept to a minimum and given a streamlined shape. As a result, compared to the previous large submarines of the IXD/42 series, the Admiralty coefficient, which characterizes the hydrodynamic qualities of the ship, for submerged boats of the XXI series increased by more than 3 times (156 versus 49).
The increase in underwater speed required an increase in the stability of the submarine in vertical plane. For this purpose, horizontal stabilizers were introduced into the stern tail. The applied stern empennage scheme turned out to be very successful. In the post-war period, it became widespread and was used on a number of diesel and then first-generation nuclear submarines.
Hydrodynamic perfection had a beneficial effect on the ship's underwater noise. As shown by post-war tests conducted by the US Navy, the noise of the XXI series boats when moving under the main electric motors at a speed of 15 knots was equivalent to the noise of American submarines traveling at a speed of 8 knots. When moving at a speed of 5.5 knots under the electric creeping motors, the noise of the German submarine was comparable to the noise of American boats at the slowest speed (about 2 knots). In low-noise mode, the XXI series boats were several times superior in the range of mutual hydroacoustic detection to the destroyers guarding the convoys.
Special measures were envisaged to significantly improve the habitability of new submarines. Realizing that during long-term cruising, the combat effectiveness of a submarine largely depends on the physical condition and well-being of the crew, the designers used such new items as air conditioning and a water desalination plant. The system of “warm” beds was eliminated, and each submariner received his own individual sleeping place. Were created favorable conditions for service and rest of the crew.
Traditionally, German designers paid great attention to ergonomic factors - the convenience of the crew, the most effective combat use of technical equipment. The degree of thoughtfulness of these “details” characterizes this example. The flywheels on the valves of ship systems, depending on the purpose, had their own shape, different from others (for example, the flywheels of the valves on the lines going overboard had handles with a ball fitting). Such a seemingly trifle allowed submariners in an emergency situation, even in complete darkness, to act unerringly, by touch controlling the valves and shutting off or activating the necessary systems.
Before the end of World War II, German industry in 1944-1945. transferred 121 submarines of the XXI series to the fleet. However, only one of them, on April 30, 1945, went out on its first combat campaign. This is explained by the fact that after the submarine left the factory, 3 months of testing were envisaged, and then another 6-month course of combat training. Even the agony of the last months of the war could not break this rule.
