The first explosion of an atomic bomb in the USSR. Nuclear bomb: atomic weapons to protect the world

On August 6, 1945, at 08:15 local time, the American B-29 Enola Gay bomber, piloted by Paul Tibbetts and bombardier Tom Ferebee, dropped the first atomic bomb, called "Baby," on Hiroshima. . On August 9, the bombing was repeated - a second bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki.

According to official history, the Americans were the first in the world to make an atomic bomb and hastened to use it against Japan, so that the Japanese would capitulate faster and America could avoid colossal losses during the landing of soldiers on the islands, for which the admirals were already closely preparing. At the same time, the bomb was a demonstration of its new capabilities to the USSR, because Comrade Dzhugashvili in May 1945 was already thinking of spreading the construction of communism to the English Channel.

Having seen the example of Hiroshima, what will happen to Moscow? Soviet party leaders reduced their ardor and made the right decision to build socialism no further than East Berlin. At the same time, they threw all their efforts into the Soviet atomic project, dug up somewhere the talented academician Kurchatov, and he quickly made an atomic bomb for Dzhugashvili, which the secretaries general then rattled on the UN podium, and Soviet propagandists rattled it in front of the audience - like, yes, we sew pants bad, but« we made an atomic bomb». This argument is almost the main one for many fans of the Soviet Deputies. However, the time has come to refute these arguments.

Somehow the creation didn’t fit atomic bomb with the level of Soviet science and technology. It is incredible that the slave system was capable of producing such a complex scientific and technological product on its own. Over time, somehow it wasn’t even denied, that Kurchatov was also helped by people from Lubyanka, bringing ready-made drawings in their beaks, but academicians completely deny this, minimizing the merit of technological intelligence. In America, the Rosenbergs were executed for transferring atomic secrets to the USSR. The dispute between official historians and citizens who want to revise history has been going on for quite some time, almost openly, however, the true state of affairs is far from both the official version and the ideas of its critics. But the situation is such that the atomic bomb was the firstand many things in the world were done by the Germans by 1945. And they even tested it at the end of 1944.The Americans prepared the atomic project themselves, but received the main components as a trophy or under an agreement with the top of the Reich, so they did everything much faster. But when the Americans detonated the bomb, the USSR began to look for German scientists, whichand made their contribution. That’s why the USSR created a bomb so quickly, although according to the Americans’ calculations, it could not have made a bomb before1952- 55 years old.

The Americans knew what they were talking about because if von Braun helped them make rocket technology, then their first atomic bomb was completely German. For a long time, they managed to hide the truth, but in the decades after 1945, either someone retiring loosened their tongue, or a couple of sheets from secret archives were accidentally declassified, or journalists sniffed out something. The earth was full of rumors and rumors that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was actually Germanhave been going since 1945. People whispered in the smoking rooms and scratched their foreheads over theireskyinconsistencies and puzzling questions until one day in the early 2000s, Mr. Joseph Farrell, a renowned theologian and expert on an alternative view of modern "science", brought together all the known facts in one book - Black sun of the Third Reich. The battle for the “weapon of retribution.”

He checked the facts many times and many things about which the author had doubts were not included in the book, nevertheless, these facts are more than enough to balance the debit with the credit. You can argue about each of them (which is what US officials do), try to refute them, but all together the facts are extremely convincing. Some of them, for example the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, are completely irrefutable either by the pundits of the USSR, or even more so by the pundits of the USA. Since Dzhugashvili decided to give "enemies of the people"Stalin'sawards(more about below), so there was a reason.

We will not retell Mr. Farrell’s entire book, we simply recommend it as mandatory reading. Here are just a few excerptskifor example a few quotes, govOshouting that the Germans tested an atomic bomb and people saw it:

A certain man named Zinsser, an anti-aircraft missile specialist, spoke about what he witnessed: “At the beginning of October 1944, I took off from Ludwigslust. (south of Lübeck), located 12 to 15 kilometers from the nuclear test site, and suddenly saw a strong bright glow that illuminated the entire atmosphere, which lasted about two seconds.

A clearly visible shock wave erupted from the cloud formed by the explosion. By the time it became visible, it was about one kilometer in diameter, and the color of the cloud changed frequently. After a short period of darkness, it became covered with many bright spots, which, unlike a normal explosion, had a pale blue color.

Approximately ten seconds after the explosion, the distinct outlines of the explosive cloud disappeared, then the cloud itself began to lighten against the background of a dark gray sky covered with continuous clouds. The diameter of the shock wave, still visible to the naked eye, was at least 9,000 meters; it remained visible for at least 15 seconds. My personal feeling from observing the color of the explosive cloud: it took on a blue-violet hue. During this entire phenomenon, reddish-colored rings were visible, very quickly changing color to dirty shades. From my observation plane, I felt a weak impact in the form of slight jolts and jerks.

About an hour later I took off on the Xe-111 from Ludwigslust airfield and headed east. Shortly after takeoff, I flew through an area of ​​continuous clouds (at an altitude of three to four thousand meters). Above the place where the explosion occurred there was a mushroom cloud with turbulent, vortex layers (at an altitude of approximately 7000 meters), without any visible connections. A strong electromagnetic disturbance manifested itself in the inability to continue radio communication. Since American P-38 fighters were operating in the Wittgenberg-Beersburg area, I had to turn north, but at least I could see the lower part of the cloud above the explosion site better. Note: I don't really understand why these tests were carried out in such a densely populated area."

ARI:Thus, a certain German pilot observed the testing of a device that, in all respects, resembled an atomic bomb. There are dozens of such evidence, but Mr. Farrell cites only officialdocumentation. And not only the Germans, but also the Japanese, whom the Germans, according to his version, also helped make a bomb and they tested it at their test site.

Shortly after the end of World War II, American intelligence in the Pacific received a stunning report: the Japanese, just before their surrender, had built and successfully tested an atomic bomb. The work was carried out in the city of Konan or its environs (the Japanese name for the city of Heungnam) in the north of the Korean Peninsula.

The war ended before these weapons saw combat use, and the production facility where they were made is now in Russian hands.

In the summer of 1946, this information was made widely public. David Snell, a member of the Twenty-Fourth Investigative Unit working in Korea... wrote about this in the Atlanta Constitution after his dismissal.

Snell's statement was based on unsubstantiated allegations by a Japanese officer returning to Japan. The officer advised Snell that he was assigned to provide security for the facility. Snell, recounting the testimony of a Japanese officer in his own words in a newspaper article, stated:

In a cave in the mountains near Konan, people were working, racing against time to complete the assembly of the “genzai bakudan” - the Japanese name for the atomic bomb. It was August 10, 1945 (Japan time), just four days after the atomic explosion tore through the sky

ARI: Among the arguments of those who do not believe in the creation of an atomic bomb by the Germans is the following argument: there is no knowledge of significant industrial capacity in Hitler’s government that was allocated to the German atomic project, as was done in the United States. However, this argument is refuted by oneAn extremely interesting fact associated with the concern “I. G. Farben", which, according to official legend, produced syntheticeskyrubber and therefore consumed more electricity than Berlin at that time. But in reality, over the five years of work, EVEN A KILOGRAM of official products was not produced there, and most likely it was the main center for uranium enrichment:

Concern "I. G. Farben took an active part in the atrocities of Nazism, creating a huge plant for the production of synthetic buna rubber in Auschwitz during the war years ( German name Polish town of Auschwitz) in the Polish part of Silesia.

The concentration camp prisoners, who first worked on the construction of the complex and then served it, were subjected to unheard of cruelties. However, at the hearings of the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, it turned out that the buna production complex in Auschwitz was one of the greatest mysteries of the war, because despite the personal blessing of Hitler, Himmler, Goering and Keitel, despite the endless source of both qualified civilian personnel and slave labor from Auschwitz, “the work was constantly hampered by disruptions, delays and sabotage... However, despite everything, the construction of a huge complex for the production of synthetic rubber and gasoline was completed. Over three hundred thousand concentration camp prisoners passed through the construction site; Of these, twenty-five thousand died from exhaustion, unable to withstand the grueling labor.

The complex turned out to be gigantic. So huge that “it consumed more electricity than the whole of Berlin.” However, during the trial of war criminals, investigators of the victorious powers were not puzzled by this long list of terrible details. They were baffled by the fact that, despite such a huge investment of money, materials and human lives, “not a single kilogram of synthetic rubber was ever produced.”

The directors and managers of Farben, who found themselves in the dock, insisted on this, as if possessed. Consume more electricity than all of Berlin - at the time the eighth largest city in the world - to produce absolutely nothing? If this is indeed the case, it means that the unprecedented expenditure of money and labor and the enormous consumption of electricity did not make any significant contribution to the German war effort. Surely something is wrong here.

ARI: Electrical energy in insane quantities is one of the main components of any nuclear project. It is needed for the production of heavy water - it is obtained by evaporating tons of natural water, after which the very water that nuclear scientists need remains at the bottom. Electricity is needed for the electrochemical separation of metals; uranium cannot be extracted any other way. And you also need a lot of it. Based on this, historians argued that since the Germans did not have such energy-intensive plants for enriching uranium and producing heavy water, that means there was no atomic bomb. But as we see, everything was there. Only it was called differently - similar to how in the USSR there was then a secret “sanatorium” for German physicists.

An even more surprising fact is the use by the Germans of an unfinished atomic bomb on... the Kursk Bulge.

The final twist to this chapter, and a breathtaking hint of other mysteries that will be explored later in this book, is a report that was only declassified by the National Security Agency in 1978. This report appears to be a transcript of an intercepted message transmitted from the Japanese embassy in Stockholm to Tokyo. It is entitled "Report on the Splitting Bomb." It is best to cite this amazing document in its entirety, with the omissions that were made when deciphering the original message.

This bomb, revolutionary in its impact, will completely overturn all established concepts of conventional warfare. I am sending you all the reports collected together on what is called the atomic fission bomb:

It is reliably known that in June 1943, the German army, at a point 150 kilometers southeast of Kursk, tested completely new type weapons. Although the entire 19th Russian Infantry Regiment was hit, just a few bombs (each with a combat charge of less than 5 kilograms) were enough to destroy it completely, down to the last man. Next material quoted according to the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Ue (?) Kenji, adviser to the attaché in Hungary and formerly (worked?) in this country, who happened to see the consequences of what happened immediately after it happened: “All the people and horses (? in the area?) of the explosion the shells were charred black, and even all the ammunition detonated.”

ARI:However, even withhowlofficial documents official US pundits are tryingto refute - they say, all these reports, reports and additional protocols are fakeRosovBut the balance still does not add up because by August 1945 the United States did not have enough uranium to produce bothminimummindtwo, and possibly four atomic bombs. Without uranium there will be no bomb, but it takes years to be mined. By 1944, the United States had no more than a quarter of the required uranium, and it would take at least another five years to extract the rest. And suddenly uranium seemed to fall on their heads from the sky:

In December 1944, a very unpleasant report was prepared, which greatly upset those who read it: “An analysis of the supply (of weapons-grade uranium) over the past three months shows the following ...: at the current rate, we will have approximately 10 kilograms of uranium by February 7, and by May 1 - 15 kilograms.” This was indeed very unpleasant news, because to create a uranium-based bomb, according to initial estimates made in 1942, 10 to 100 kilograms of uranium were required, and by the time of this memorandum, more accurate calculations had given the value of the critical mass required to produce uranium atomic bomb, equal to approximately 50 kilograms.

However, it was not only the Manhattan Project that had problems with missing uranium. Germany also seemed to suffer from "missing uranium syndrome" in the days immediately preceding and immediately after the end of the war. But in in this case The volumes of missing uranium were calculated not in tens of kilograms, but in hundreds of tons. It is worthwhile at this point to quote at length from the brilliant work of Carter Hydrick to explore this issue in depth:

From June 1940 until the end of the war, Germany removed three and a half thousand tons of uranium-containing substances from Belgium - almost three times what Groves had at his disposal... and placed them in salt mines near Strassfurt in Germany.

ARI: Leslie Richard Groves (Eng. Leslie Richard Groves; August 17, 1896 - July 13, 1970) - Lieutenant General of the US Army, in 1942-1947 - military leader of the program to create nuclear weapons(Manhattan Project).

Groves states that on April 17, 1945, when the war was already drawing to a close, the Allies managed to capture about 1,100 tons of uranium ore in Strassfurt and another 31 tons in the French port of Toulouse... And he claims that Germany never had more uranium ore, especially thereby showing that Germany never had enough material either to process uranium into raw material for a plutonium reactor, or to enrich it by electromagnetic separation.

Obviously, if at one time 3,500 tons were stored in Strassfurt, and only 1,130 were captured, approximately 2,730 tons remain - and this is still double what the Manhattan Project had throughout the war... The fate of this missing ore unknown to this day...

According to historian Margaret Gowing, by the summer of 1941, Germany had enriched 600 tons of uranium into the oxide form needed to ionize the raw material into a gas in which uranium isotopes could be separated magnetically or thermally. (Italics mine. - D.F.) The oxide can also be converted into a metal for use as a raw material in a nuclear reactor. In fact, Professor Reichl, who was responsible for all the uranium at Germany's disposal throughout the war, claims that the true figure was much higher...

ARI: So it is clear that without obtaining enriched uranium from somewhere outside, and some detonation technology, the Americans would not have been able to test or detonate their bombs over Japan in August 1945. And they received, as it turns out,missing components from the Germans.

In order to create a uranium or plutonium bomb, uranium-containing raw materials must be converted into metal at a certain stage. For a plutonium bomb, metallic U238 is obtained; for a uranium bomb, U235 is needed. However, due to the treacherous characteristics of uranium, this metallurgical process is extremely complex. The United States tackled this problem early, but learned to successfully convert uranium into metal mold in large quantities only at the end of 1942. German specialists... by the end of 1940 had already converted 280.6 kilograms, more than a quarter of a ton, into metal."

In any case, these figures clearly indicate that in 1940–1942 the Germans were significantly ahead of the Allies in one very important component of the atomic bomb production process - uranium enrichment, and therefore also leads to the conclusion that they have come far ahead in the race to possess a working atomic bomb. However, these figures also raise one troubling question: where did all that uranium go?

The answer to this question is provided by the mysterious incident with the German submarine U-234, captured by the Americans in 1945.

The story of U-234 is well known to all scholars of the Nazi atomic bomb, and, of course, “Allied legend” has it that the materials aboard the captured submarine were in no way used in the Manhattan Project.

All this is absolutely not true. The U-234 was a very large underwater minelayer, capable of carrying large payloads underwater. Consider the supremely strange cargo that was aboard U-234 on that final voyage:

Two Japanese officers.

80 gold-lined cylindrical containers containing 560 kilograms of uranium oxide.

Some wooden barrels, filled with “heavy water”.

Infrared proximity fuses.

Dr. Heinz Schlicke, inventor of these fuses.

As U-234 was being loaded in a German port before setting out on its final voyage, the submarine's radio operator, Wolfgang Hirschfeld, noticed that Japanese officers were writing "U235" on the paper in which the containers were wrapped before loading them into the hold of the boat. It hardly needs to be said that this remark caused the whole barrage of revealing criticism with which skeptics usually greet the stories of UFO eyewitnesses: the low position of the sun above the horizon, poor lighting, a large distance that did not allow us to see everything clearly, and the like. And this is not surprising, because if Hirschfeld really saw what he saw, the frightening consequences are obvious.

The use of gold-lined containers is explained by the fact that uranium, a highly corrosive metal, quickly becomes contaminated when it comes into contact with other unstable elements. Gold, in terms of protection against radioactive radiation not inferior to lead, unlike lead it is a very pure and extremely stable element; therefore, it is an obvious choice for the storage and long-term transportation of highly enriched and pure uranium. Thus, the uranium oxide carried on board U-234 was highly enriched uranium, most likely U235, the last stage of the raw material before being converted into weapons-grade or metallic uranium suitable for bomb production (if it was not already weapons-grade uranium) . Indeed, if the inscriptions made by Japanese officers on the containers were true, it is very likely that we were talking about the last stage of refining the raw materials before turning them into metal.

The cargo aboard U-234 was so sensitive that when officials navy The United States compiled an inventory of it, uranium oxide disappeared from the list without a trace.....

Yes, this would be the easiest way, if not for the unexpected confirmation from a certain Pyotr Ivanovich Titarenko, a former military translator from the headquarters of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, who at the end of the war accepted the surrender of Japan from the Soviet Union. As the German magazine Der Spiegel wrote in 1992, Titarenko wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In it, he reported that in reality three atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, one of which, dropped on Nagasaki before the Fat Man exploded over the city, did not explode. This bomb was subsequently transferred by Japan to the Soviet Union.

Mussolini and the Soviet marshal's translator are not the only ones who confirm the version of the strange number of bombs dropped on Japan; There may have been a fourth bomb in play at some point, which was being transported to the Far East aboard the US Navy heavy cruiser Indianapolis (hull number CA 35) when it sank in 1945.

This strange evidence again raises questions about the “Allied legend”, for, as has already been shown, in late 1944 - early 1945 the Manhattan Project faced a critical shortage of weapons-grade uranium, and by that time the problem of fuses for plutonium had not been solved. bombs. So the question is: if these reports were true, where did the additional bomb (or even several bombs) come from? It's hard to believe that three or even four bombs ready for use in Japan were made in such as soon as possible, - unless they were war booty taken from Europe.

ARI: Actually the storyU-234begins in 1944, when after the opening of the 2nd front and failures on Eastern Front perhaps, on Hitler’s instructions, a decision was made to begin trade with the allies - an atomic bomb in exchange for guarantees of immunity for the party elite:

Be that as it may, we are primarily interested in the role that Bormann played in the development and implementation of the plan for the secret strategic evacuation of the Nazis after their military defeat. After the Stalingrad disaster in early 1943, it became obvious to Bormann, like other high-ranking Nazis, that the military collapse of the Third Reich was inevitable if their secret weapons projects did not bear fruit in time. Bormann and representatives of various weapons departments, industrial sectors and, of course, the SS gathered for a secret meeting at which plans were developed for the removal of material assets, qualified personnel, scientific materials and technology from Germany......

First, JIOA director Grun, who was appointed to lead the project, compiled a list of the most qualified German and Austrian scientists that the Americans and British had used for decades. Although journalists and historians have repeatedly mentioned this list, none of them said that Werner Osenberg, who served as head of the scientific department of the Gestapo during the war, took part in its compilation. The decision to involve Ozenberg in this work was made by US Navy Captain Ransom Davis after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff......

Finally, the Osenberg list and the American interest in it seem to support another hypothesis, namely that the knowledge that the Americans had about the nature of the Nazi projects, as evidenced by General Patton's unerring efforts to find Kammler's secret research centers, could act only from the very Nazi Germany. Since Carter Heidrick has proven very convincingly that Bormann personally directed the transfer of German atomic bomb secrets to the Americans, it can be safely argued that he ultimately coordinated the flow of other important information regarding the “Kammler Headquarters” to the American intelligence agencies, since no one knew better about him. the nature, content and personnel of German black projects. Thus, Carter Heidrick's thesis that Borman helped organize the transportation to the United States on the U-234 submarine of not only enriched uranium, but also a ready-to-use atomic bomb, looks very plausible.

ARI: In addition to the uranium itself, a lot more is needed for an atomic bomb, in particular fuses based on red mercury. Unlike a conventional detonator, these devices must explode super-synchronously, collecting the uranium mass into a single whole and starting a nuclear reaction. This technology is extremely complex; the United States did not have it and therefore the fuses were included in the kit. And since the question did not end with fuses, the Americans dragged German nuclear scientists to their place for consultations before loading an atomic bomb on board a plane flying to Japan:

There is another fact that does not fit into the post-war legend of the Allies regarding the impossibility of the Germans creating an atomic bomb: the German physicist Rudolf Fleischmann was flown to the United States for interrogation even before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why was there such an urgent need to consult with the German physicist before the atomic bombing of Japan? After all, according to the Allied legend, we had nothing to learn from the Germans in the field of atomic physics......

ARI:Thus, there is no doubt left - Germany had a bomb in May 1945. WhyHitlerdidn't use it? Because one atomic bomb is not a bomb. For a bomb to become a weapon there must be a sufficient number of themquality, multiplied by the means of delivery. Hitler could destroy New York and London, could choose to wipe out a couple of divisions moving towards Berlin. But this would not have decided the outcome of the war in his favor. But the Allies would have come to Germany in a very bad mood. The Germans already got it in 1945, but if Germany had used nuclear weapons, its population would have gotten much more. Germany could have been wiped off the face of the earth, like Dresden, for example. Therefore, although Mr. Hitler is considered by someWithathe was not a mad politician, but nevertheless he was not a crazy politician, and weigh everything soberlyVquietly leaked the Second World War: we give you a bomb - and you don’t let the USSR reach the English Channel and guarantee a quiet old age for the Nazi elite.

So separate negotiationsOry in April 1945, described in the moviesRAbout 17 moments of spring really took place. But only at such a level that no Pastor Schlag could even dream of over-talkingOThe ry was led by Hitler himself. And physicsRthere was no unge because while Stirlitz was chasing him Manfred von Ardenne

already tested the finished productweapons - at least in 1943onTOthe Ur arc, at most in Norway, no later than 1944.

By byunderstandable???AndTo us, Mr. Farrell’s book is not being promoted either in the West or in Russia; not everyone caught the eye of it. But information is making its way and one day even a stupid person will know how nuclear weapons were made. And there will be a veryicantthe situation will have to be radically reconsideredall officialhistorythe last 70 years.

However, the worst thing will be for official pundits in RussiaInskoy federation, which long years repeated the old mAntru: mAour tires may be bad, but we createdwhetheratomic bombbu.But as it turns out, even American engineers were unable to handle nuclear devices, at least in 1945. The USSR is not involved here at all - today the Russian federation would compete with Iran on who can make a bomb faster,if not for one BUT. BUT - these are captured German engineers who made nuclear weapons for Dzhugashvili.

It is reliably known, and academicians of the USSR do not deny it, that 3,000 captured Germans worked on the USSR missile project. That is, they essentially launched Gagarin into space. But as many as 7,000 specialists worked on the Soviet nuclear projectfrom Germany,so it is not surprising that the Soviets made an atomic bomb before they flew into space. If the USA still had its own path in the atomic race, then the USSR simply stupidly reproduced German technology.

In 1945, a group of colonels were searching for specialists in Germany, who in fact were not colonels, but secret physicists - future academicians Artsimovich, Kikoin, Khariton, Shchelkin... The operation was led by the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Ivan Serov.

Over two hundred of the most prominent German physicists (about half of them were doctors of science), radio engineers and craftsmen were brought to Moscow. In addition to the equipment of the Ardenne laboratory, later equipment from the Berlin Kaiser Institute and other German scientific organizations, documentation and reagents, supplies of film and paper for recorders, photo recorders, wire tape recorders for telemetry, optics, powerful electromagnets and even German transformers were delivered to Moscow. And then the Germans, under pain of death, began to build an atomic bomb for the USSR. They built it from scratch because by 1945 the United States had some of its own developments, the Germans were simply far ahead of them, but in the USSR, in the kingdom of “science” of academicians like Lysenko there was nothing on the nuclear program. Here's what researchers on this topic managed to dig up:

In 1945, the sanatoriums “Sinop” and “Agudzery”, located in Abkhazia, were placed at the disposal of German physicists. This was the beginning of the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology, which was then part of the system of top-secret facilities of the USSR. “Sinop” was called Object “A” in documents and was headed by Baron Manfred von Ardenne (1907–1997). This personality is legendary in world science: one of the founders of television, developer of electron microscopes and many other devices. During one meeting, Beria wanted to entrust the leadership of the atomic project to von Ardenne. Ardenne himself recalls: “I had no more than ten seconds to think about it. My answer is verbatim: I consider such an important offer as a great honor for me, because... this is an expression of exceptionally great confidence in my abilities. The solution to this problem has two different directions: 1. Development of the atomic bomb itself and 2. Development of methods for producing the fissile isotope of uranium 235U in industrial scale. The separation of isotopes is a separate and very difficult problem. Therefore, I propose that the separation of isotopes should be the main problem of our institute and German specialists, and that the leading nuclear scientists of the Soviet Union sitting here would do a great job of creating an atomic bomb for their homeland.”

Beria accepted this offer. Many years later, at one government reception, when Manfred von Ardenne was introduced to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Khrushchev, he reacted like this: “Ah, you are the same Ardenne who so skillfully took his neck out of the noose.”

Von Ardenne later assessed his contribution to the development of the atomic problem as “the most important undertaking to which post-war circumstances led me.” In 1955, the scientist was allowed to travel to the GDR, where he headed a research institute in Dresden.

Sanatorium "Agudzery" received the code name Object "G". It was led by Gustav Hertz (1887–1975), nephew of the famous Heinrich Hertz, known to us from school. Gustav Hertz received the Nobel Prize in 1925 for the discovery of the laws of collision of an electron with an atom - the famous experiment of Frank and Hertz. In 1945, Gustav Hertz became one of the first German physicists brought to the USSR. He was the only foreign Nobel laureate who worked in the USSR. Like other German scientists, he lived without being denied anything in his house on the seashore. In 1955, Hertz went to the GDR. There he worked as a professor at the University of Leipzig, and then as director of the Physics Institute at the university.

The main task of von Ardenne and Gustav Hertz was to find different methods for separating uranium isotopes. Thanks to von Ardenne, one of the first mass spectrometers appeared in the USSR. Hertz successfully improved his method of isotope separation, which made it possible to establish this process on an industrial scale.

Other prominent German scientists were also brought to the site in Sukhumi, including physicist and radiochemist Nikolaus Riehl (1901–1991). They called him Nikolai Vasilyevich. He was born in St. Petersburg, in the family of a German - the chief engineer of Siemens and Halske. Nikolaus’s mother was Russian, so he spoke German and Russian from childhood. He received an excellent technical education: first in St. Petersburg, and after the family moved to Germany - at the Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin (later Humboldt University). In 1927 he defended his doctoral dissertation on radiochemistry. His scientific supervisors were future scientific luminaries - nuclear physicist Lisa Meitner and radiochemist Otto Hahn. Before the outbreak of World War II, Riehl was in charge of the central radiological laboratory of the Auergesellschaft company, where he proved himself to be an energetic and very capable experimenter. At the beginning of the war, Riehl was summoned to the War Ministry, where he was offered to engage in the production of uranium. In May 1945, Riehl voluntarily came to the Soviet emissaries sent to Berlin. The scientist, considered the main expert in the Reich on the production of enriched uranium for reactors, indicated where the equipment needed for this was located. Its fragments (the plant near Berlin was destroyed by bombing) were dismantled and sent to the USSR. The 300 tons of uranium compounds found there were also taken there. It is believed that this saved the Soviet Union a year and a half to create an atomic bomb - until 1945, Igor Kurchatov had only 7 tons of uranium oxide at his disposal. Under Riehl's leadership, the Elektrostal plant in Noginsk near Moscow was converted to produce cast uranium metal.

Trains with equipment went from Germany to Sukhumi. Three of the four German cyclotrons were brought to the USSR, as well as powerful magnets, electron microscopes, oscilloscopes, high-voltage transformers, ultra-precise instruments, etc. Equipment was delivered to the USSR from the Institute of Chemistry and Metallurgy, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics, Siemens electrical laboratories, and the Physical Institute of the German Post Office.

Igor Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of the project, who was undoubtedly an outstanding scientist, but he always surprised his employees with his extraordinary “scientific insight” - as it later turned out, he knew most of the secrets from intelligence, but had no right to talk about it. Talks about leadership methods next episode, which was told by academician Isaac Kikoin. At one meeting, Beria asked Soviet physicists how long it would take to solve one problem. They answered him: six months. The answer was: “Either you solve it in one month, or you will deal with this problem in places much more remote.” Of course, the task was completed in one month. But the authorities spared no expense and rewards. Many people, including German scientists, received Stalin Prizes, dachas, cars and other rewards. Nikolaus Riehl, however, the only foreign scientist, even received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. German scientists played a big role in raising the qualifications of Georgian physicists who worked with them.

ARI: So the Germans didn’t just help the USSR a lot with the creation of the atomic bomb - they did everything. Moreover, this story was like with the “Kalashnikov assault rifle” because even German gunsmiths could not have made such a perfect weapon in a couple of years - while working in captivity in the USSR, they simply completed what was almost ready. It’s the same with the atomic bomb, work on which the Germans began back in 1933, and perhaps much earlier. Official history holds that Hitler annexed the Sudetenland because many Germans lived there. This may be true, but the Sudetenland is the richest uranium deposit in Europe. There is a suspicion that Hitler knew where to start in the first place, because German successors from the time of Peter were in Russia, and in Australia, and even in Africa. But Hitler started with the Sudetenland. Apparently some people knowledgeable in alchemy immediately explained to him what to do and which way to go, so it is not surprising that the Germans were far ahead of everyone and the American intelligence services in Europe in the forties of the last century were already just picking up scraps from the Germans, hunting for medieval alchemical manuscripts.

But the USSR didn’t even have scraps. There was only “academician” Lysenko, according to whose theories weeds growing on a collective farm field, and not on a private farm, had every reason to be imbued with the spirit of socialism and turn into wheat. In medicine, there was a similar “scientific school” that tried to speed up pregnancy from 9 months to nine weeks - so that the wives of the proletarians would not be distracted from work. There were similar theories in nuclear physics, so for the USSR the creation of an atomic bomb was as impossible as the creation of its own computer, since cybernetics in the USSR was officially considered a prostitute of the bourgeoisie. By the way, important scientific decisions in physics (for example, which direction to go and which theories to consider as working) in the USSR were made, at best, by “academicians” from Agriculture. Although more often this was done by a party functionary with an education in the “evening workers’ faculty.” What kind of atomic bomb could there be at this base? Only someone else's. In the USSR they could not even assemble it from ready-made components with ready-made drawings. The Germans did everything, and in this regard there is even official recognition of their merits - Stalin Prizes and orders, which were awarded to the engineers:

German specialists are laureates of the Stalin Prize for their work in the field of atomic energy use. Excerpts from the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "on awards and bonuses...".

[From the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 5070-1944ss/op “On awards and bonuses for outstanding scientific discoveries and technical achievements in the use of atomic energy,” October 29, 1949]

[From the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 4964-2148ss/op “On awards and bonuses for outstanding scientific work in the field of the use of atomic energy, for the creation of new types of RDS products, achievements in the field of production of plutonium and uranium-235 and the development of the raw material base for the nuclear industry" , December 6, 1951]

[From the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3044-1304ss “On awarding Stalin Prizes to scientific, engineering and technical workers of the Ministry of Medium Engineering and other departments for the creation of a hydrogen bomb and new designs of atomic bombs,” December 31, 1953]

Manfred von Ardenne

1947 - Stalin Prize ( electron microscope- "In January 1947, the Chief of the Site presented von Ardenne with the State Prize (a purse full of money) for his microscope work.") "German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project", p. 18)

1953 - Stalin Prize, 2nd degree (electromagnetic separation of isotopes, lithium-6).

Heinz Barvich

Gunther Wirtz

Gustav Hertz

1951 - Stalin Prize, 2nd degree (theory of stability of gas diffusion in cascades).

Gerard Jaeger

1953 - Stalin Prize 3rd degree (electromagnetic separation of isotopes, lithium-6).

Reinhold Reichman (Reichman)

1951 - Stalin Prize 1st degree (posthumously) (technology development

production of ceramic tubular filters for diffusion machines).

Nikolaus Riehl

1949 - Hero of Socialist Labor, Stalin Prize 1st degree (development and implementation industrial technology production of pure uranium metal).

Herbert Thieme

1949 - Stalin Prize, 2nd degree (development and implementation of industrial technology for the production of pure uranium metal).

1951 - Stalin Prize, 2nd degree (development of industrial technology for the production of high-purity uranium and the manufacture of products from it).

Peter Thiessen

1956 - State Prize Thyssen,_Peter

Heinz Froehlich

1953 - Stalin Prize, 3rd degree (electromagnetic isotope separation, lithium-6).

Ziehl Ludwig

1951 - Stalin Prize, 1st degree (development of technology for the production of ceramic tubular filters for diffusion machines).

Werner Schütze

1949 - Stalin Prize, 2nd degree (mass spectrometer).

ARI: This is how the story turns out - not a trace remains of the myth that the Volga is a bad car, but we made an atomic bomb. All that remains is the bad Volga car. And it wouldn’t have existed if they hadn’t bought the drawings from Ford. There would be nothing because the Bolshevik state is not capable of creating anything by definition. For the same reason, the Russian state cannot create anything, only sell natural resources.

Mikhail Saltan, Gleb Shcherbatov

For the stupid, just in case, we explain that we are not talking about the intellectual potential of the Russian people, it is quite high, we are talking about the creative possibilities of the Soviet bureaucratic system, which, in principle, cannot allow scientific talents to be revealed.

The first atomic bomb in the USSR was an epoch-making event that completely changed the geopolitical situation on the planet.

All the key players on the world stage in the 40s of the 20th century tried to get their hands on a nuclear bomb in order to establish absolute power, make their influence on other countries decisive and, if necessary, easily destroy enemy cities and infect millions of people with the deadly effects of high-energy weapons. radiation.

The atomic project in the country of the Soviets got its start in 1943, which became the need to quickly catch up with the leading countries in this matter, Germany and the USA, and prevent them from gaining decisive superiority. The exact launch date is February 11, 1943.

At that time, the scientific developers could not yet fully understand what a terrible weapon they were offering to politicians, who were often very odious individuals. Nuclear weapons can instantly destroy millions of people around the world and cause irreparable harm to nature in all its manifestations.

Today, the political situation is still tense, which is commonplace for eternally warring people, and nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in establishing parity - equality of forces, thanks to which neither side of the new global conflict does not dare to attack the enemy.

Creation of the atomic bomb in the USSR

Molotov became the main politician who was supposed to oversee the nuclear program.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890 - 1986) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet political and statesman. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in 1930-1941, People's Commissar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1949, 1953-1956.

He, in turn, decided that such a serious work of scientists should be headed by Kurchatov, an experienced physicist, under whose leadership Russian science made many outstanding breakthroughs.

This inventor and leader became famous for many things, in particular for the fact that under him the first nuclear power plant was launched, that is, the peaceful use of atomic energy became possible.

The first bomb was called RDS-1. This abbreviation meant the following phrase - "special jet engine". This cipher was developed in order to keep developments as secret as possible.

The shell explosions were carried out on the territory of Kazakhstan at a specially constructed test site.

There are many rumors that the Russian side could not catch up with the Americans, since it did not know some of the nuances of the development. The invention was allegedly accelerated by anonymous American scientists leaking secrets to the Soviets, which greatly accelerated the process.

But critics say that even if this is so, it is worth understanding that the domestic bomb would not have happened without the overall high level of development of science and industry, as well as the presence of highly qualified personnel who were able to quickly recognize and apply the clues, even if they were there.

Julius Rosenberg and his wife Ethel are American communists accused of spying for the Soviet Union (primarily passing on American nuclear secrets to the USSR) and executed for this in 1953.

As for who passed on the secret to speed up the matter, then blueprints for the bomb were sent to the USSR to a scientist named Julius Rosenberg, although he was supervised by other personalities, for example, Klaus Fuchs.

For his act, Rosenberg was executed in the early 50s in the United States. Other names also appear in the case.

The outstanding Russian nuclear physicist Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov is rightfully considered the “father” of the Soviet nuclear project. The creator of deadly weapons took up this project in 1942 and oversaw it until his death.

Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov (1903 - 1960) - Soviet physicist, “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb. Three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1949, 1951, 1954). Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1943) and the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan. SSR (1959), Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (1933), Professor (1935). Founder and first director of the Institute of Atomic Energy (1943-1960).

The development of weapons did not prevent the scientist from acting in other areas; for example, it was he who made a decisive contribution to the launch of the first nuclear reactors in the country and throughout the world for energy production.

Kurchatov was born in 1903 in the family of a landowner, he studied exceptionally well, and already at the age of 21 he completed his first scientific work. It was he who became one of the leaders in the field of studying nuclear physics and all its many secrets.

Kurchatov is the owner of many honorary awards and top-level titles. All Soviet Union knew and admired this man who died at only 57 years old.

The work proceeded at an accelerated pace, therefore, after the start of the project in 1942, it was already On August 29, 1949, the first successful test was carried out.

The bomb was tested by a scientist and a military team under Khariton’s organization. Responsibility for any mistakes was the strictest, so all participants in the work treated their work with the utmost care.

The nuclear test site where this happened historical event, is called the Semipalatinsk test site, and it is located in the vast territory of what is now Kazakhstan, and at that time the Kazakh SSR. Later, other places for such tests appeared.

The power of RDS-1 was 22 kilotons, its explosion caused a huge amount of destruction. Their chronology is still of great interest today.

Here are some nuances of explosion preparation:

1. To test the force of impact, civilian houses made of wood and concrete panels were built at the test site. About 1,500 animals were also placed there, on which it was planned to test the effects of the bomb.
2. Also during the experiment we used sectors with various types weapons, fortified facilities and protected structures.
3. The bomb itself was mounted on a metal tower almost 40 meters high.

When the explosion was carried out, the metal tower where the bomb stood simply disappeared, and in its place a 1.5-meter hole appeared in the ground. Of the 1,500 animals, about 400 died.

Many concrete structures, houses, bridges, civilian and military vehicles were hopelessly damaged. Supervision of work was carried out on top level, That's why no unplanned troubles arose.

Consequences of the creation of the atomic bomb for the USSR

When the coveted form of weapons finally appeared in the hands of Soviet leaders, it caused a lot of different reactions. After the first successful test of the RDS-1, the Americans learned about this with the help of their reconnaissance aircraft.

US President Truman issued a statement about this event about a month after the tests.

Officially, the USSR recognized the presence of the bomb only in 1950.

What are the consequences of all this? History has ambiguity regarding the events of those times. Of course, the creation of nuclear weapons had its own important reasons, which were perhaps even a matter of the country's survival. The developer of such a project also did not understand the full extent of the consequences, and this applies not only to the USSR, but also to the Germans and Americans.

In general, to put it briefly, then the consequences are as follows:

• the establishment of nuclear parity, when none of the parties to the global confrontation would risk starting an open war;
• significant technological breakthrough of the Soviet Union;
• the emergence of our country as a world leader, the opportunity to speak from a position of strength.

The bomb also brought an increase in tension in relations between the USSR and the USA, and today this is manifested no less. The consequences of the production of nuclear weapons meant that the world could slide into disaster at any moment and suddenly find itself in a state of nuclear winter, because you never know what will come to mind for the next politician who has seized power.

In general, the supervision and creation of the RDS-1 nuclear bomb was a complex event that literally opened a new era of world history, and the year the USSR created this weapon became a landmark one.

When did the Second end? World War, the Soviet Union faced two serious problems: destroyed cities, towns, and national economic facilities, the restoration of which required colossal efforts and costs, as well as the presence of unprecedented weapons of destructive power in the United States, which had already dropped nuclear weapons on the peaceful cities of Japan. The first test of an atomic bomb in the USSR changed the balance of power, possibly preventing a new war.

Background

The initial lag of the Soviet Union in the atomic race had objective reasons:

• Although the development of nuclear physics in the country, starting in the 20s of the last century, was successful, and in 1940 scientists proposed to begin developing weapons based on atomic energy, even the initial design of a bomb, developed by F.F., was ready. Lange, but the outbreak of war dashed these plans.
• Intelligence about the start of large-scale work in this area in Germany and the United States spurred the country's leadership to respond. In 1942, a secret decree of the State Defense Committee was signed, which gave rise to practical steps to create Soviet atomic weapons.
• The USSR, waging a full-scale war, unlike the USA, which earned more from it in financially, what Nazi Germany lost, could not invest huge amounts of money in its atomic project, so necessary for victory.

The turning point was the militarily senseless bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After this, at the end of August 1945, L.P. became the curator of the atomic project. Beria, who did a lot to make the tests of the first atomic bomb in the USSR a reality.

Possessing brilliant organizational skills and enormous powers, he not only created conditions for the fruitful work of Soviet scientists, but also attracted to work those German specialists who were captured at the end of the war and were not given to the Americans, who participated in the creation of the atomic “wunderwaffe”. Technical data about the American “Manhattan Project”, successfully “borrowed” by Soviet intelligence officers, served as a good help.

The first atomic munition RDS-1 was mounted in an aircraft bomb body (length 3.3 m, diameter 1.5 m) weighing 4.7 tons. Such characteristics were due to the size of the bomb bay of the TU-4 heavy bomber of long-range aviation, capable of delivering “gifts” to the military bases of the former ally in Europe.

Product No. 1 used plutonium obtained at an industrial reactor, enriched at a chemical plant in secret Chelyabinsk - 40. All work was carried out in the shortest possible time - to obtain required quantity It took only a year to charge the atomic bomb with plutonium from the summer of 1948, when the reactor was launched. Time was a critical factor, because against the backdrop of the US threatening the USSR, waving, by their own definition, an atomic “club”, there was no time to hesitate.

A testing ground for new weapons was created in a deserted area 170 km from Semipalatinsk. The choice was due to the presence of a plain with a diameter of about 20 km, surrounded on three sides by low mountains. Construction of the nuclear test site was completed in the summer of 1949.

A tower made of metal structures about 40 m high, intended for RDS - 1. Underground shelters were built for personnel and scientists, and to study the impact of the explosion, military equipment was installed on the territory of the test site, buildings and industrial structures of various designs were erected, and recording equipment was installed.

Tests with a power corresponding to the detonation of 22 thousand tons of TNT took place on August 29, 1949 and were successful. A deep crater at the location of the above-ground charge, destroyed by a shock wave, exposure high temperature equipment explosions, demolished or heavily damaged buildings, structures confirmed new weapons.

The consequences of the first trial were significant:

• The Soviet Union received effective weapon deterrence of any aggressor, deprived the United States of its nuclear monopoly.
• During the creation of weapons, reactors were built, the scientific base of a new industry was created, and previously unknown technologies were developed.
• Although the military part of the atomic project was the main one at that time, it was not the only one. The peaceful use of nuclear energy, the foundations of which were laid by a team of scientists led by I.V. Kurchatov, contributed to the future creation of nuclear power plants and the synthesis of new elements of the periodic table.

The tests of the atomic bomb in the USSR again showed the whole world that our country is capable of solving problems of any complexity. It should be remembered that thermonuclear charges installed in the warheads of modern missile delivery vehicles and other nuclear weapons, which are a reliable shield for Russia, are the “great-grandchildren” of that first bomb.

The creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb, in terms of the complexity of scientific, technical and engineering problems, is a significant, truly unique event that influenced the balance of political forces in the world after World War II. The solution to this problem in our country, which has not yet recovered from the terrible destruction and upheaval of four war years, became possible as a result of the heroic efforts of scientists, production organizers, engineers, workers and the entire people. The implementation of the Soviet nuclear project required a real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry. This labor feat paid off. Having mastered the secrets of nuclear weapons production, our Motherland for many years ensured military and defense parity of the two leading states of the world - the USSR and the USA. The nuclear shield, the first link of which was the legendary RDS-1 product, still protects Russia today.
I. Kurchatov was appointed head of the Atomic Project. From the end of 1942, he began to gather the scientists and specialists needed to solve the problem. Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by V. Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after atomic bombing Japanese cities) State Committee The Defense Department decided to create a Special Committee, which was headed by L. Beria. It was he who began to lead the Soviet atomic project.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself,” “The Motherland gives it to Stalin,” etc. But in the official resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1946, the RDS received the wording “Jet engine “C”.”
The tactical and technical specifications (TTZ) indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions: using “heavy fuel” (plutonium) and using “light fuel” (uranium-235). The writing of the technical specifications for the RDS-1 and the subsequent development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 were carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was K. Fuchs, a German physicist who participated in work on the nuclear programs of the USA and England.
Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes when creating the RDS-1, significantly shorten its development time, and reduce costs. However, it was clear from the very beginning that many technical solutions the American prototype are not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer best solutions both the charge as a whole and its individual units. But the unconditional requirement of the country's leadership was to guarantee and with the least risk to obtain a working bomb by its first test.
Nuclear bomb should have been manufactured in the form of an aerial bomb weighing no more than 5 tons, with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters and a length of no more than 5 meters. These restrictions were due to the fact that the bomb was developed in relation to the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a “product” with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters.
As the work progressed, the need for a special research organization to design and develop the “product” itself became obvious. A number of studies conducted by Laboratory N2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences required their deployment in a “remote and isolated place.” This meant: it was necessary to create a special research and production center for the development of an atomic bomb.

Creation of KB-11

Since the end of 1945, there has been a search for a place to locate a top-secret facility. Considered various options. At the end of April 1946, Yu. Khariton and P. Zernov examined Sarov, where the monastery had previously been located, and now plant No. 550 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition was located. As a result, the choice settled on this location, which was remote from large cities and at the same time had an initial production infrastructure.
The scientific and production activities of KB-11 were subject to the strictest secrecy. Her character and goals were a state secret of the utmost importance. Issues of security of the facility were in the center of attention from the first days.

April 9, 1946 a closed resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of a Design Bureau (KB-11) at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. P. Zernov was appointed head of KB-11, and Yu. Khariton was appointed chief designer.

The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946 determined strict deadlines for the creation of the facility: the first stage was to go into operation on October 1, 1946, the second - on May 1, 1947. The construction of KB-11 (“facility”) was entrusted to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The “object” was supposed to occupy up to 100 square meters. kilometers of forests in the Mordovian Nature Reserve and up to 10 sq. kilometers in the Gorky region.
Construction was carried out without projects and preliminary estimates, the cost of work was taken at actual costs. The construction team was formed with the involvement of a “special contingent” - this is how prisoners were designated in official documents. The government created special conditions to ensure construction. However, construction was difficult; the first production buildings were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.

Volume construction work was great. There was a need to reconstruct plant No. 550 for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing premises. The power plant needed updating. It was necessary to build a foundry and press shop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, testing towers, casemates, and warehouses. To carry out blasting operations, it was necessary to clear and equip large areas in the forest.
Special premises for research laboratories on initial stage was not envisaged - the scientists had to occupy twenty rooms in the main design building. The designers, as well as the administrative services of KB-11, were to be housed in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery. The need to create conditions for arriving specialists and workers forced us to pay more and more attention to the residential village, which gradually acquired the features of a small town. Simultaneously with the construction of housing, a medical town was erected, a library, a cinema club, a stadium, a park and a theater were built.

On February 17, 1947, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin, KB-11 was classified as a special security enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed security zone. Sarov was removed from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and excluded from all accounting materials. In the summer of 1947, the perimeter of the zone was taken under military protection.

Work in KB-11

The mobilization of specialists to the nuclear center was carried out regardless of their departmental affiliation. The leaders of KB-11 searched for young and promising scientists, engineers, and workers in literally all institutions and organizations of the country. All candidates for work in KB-11 underwent a special check by the state security services.
The creation of atomic weapons was the result of the work of a large team. But it did not consist of faceless " staffing units", and from bright personalities, many of which left a noticeable mark in the history of domestic and world science. Significant potential was concentrated here, both scientific, design, and performing, working.

In 1947, 36 researchers arrived to work at KB-11. They were seconded from various institutes, mainly from the USSR Academy of Sciences: Institute of Chemical Physics, Laboratory N2, NII-6 and the Institute of Mechanical Engineering. In 1947, KB-11 employed 86 engineering and technical workers.
Taking into account the problems that had to be solved in KB-11, the order of formation of its main structural divisions was outlined. The first research laboratories began working in the spring of 1947 in the following areas:
laboratory N1 (head - M. Ya. Vasiliev) - testing structural elements a charge of explosives providing a spherically converging detonation wave;
laboratory N2 (A.F. Belyaev) – research on explosive detonation;
laboratory N3 (V.A. Tsukerman) – radiographic studies of explosive processes;
laboratory N4 (L.V. Altshuler) – determination of equations of state;
laboratory N5 (K.I. Shchelkin) - full-scale tests;
laboratory N6 (E.K. Zavoisky) - measurements of central frequency compression;
laboratory N7 (A. Ya. Apin) – development of a neutron fuse;
laboratory N8 (N.V. Ageev) - study of the properties and characteristics of plutonium and uranium for use in bomb construction.
The start of full-scale work on the first domestic atomic charge can be dated back to July 1946. During this period, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946, Yu. B. Khariton prepared the “Tactical and technical specifications for the atomic bomb.”

The TTZ indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions. In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium (RDS-1), in the second - uranium-235 (RDS-2). In a plutonium bomb, the transition through the critical state must be achieved due to the symmetrical compression of spherical plutonium in the usual way. explosive(implosive version). In the second option, the transition through the critical state is ensured by combining masses of uranium-235 with the help of an explosive (“gun version”).
At the beginning of 1947, the formation of design units began. Initially, all design work was concentrated in a single research and development sector (RDS) KB-11, which was headed by V. A. Turbiner.
The intensity of work in KB-11 was very high from the very beginning and was constantly increasing, because original plans, very extensive from the very beginning, increasing in volume and depth of elaboration every day.
Conducting explosive experiments with large explosive charges began in the spring of 1947 at the KB-11 experimental sites still under construction. The largest volume of research had to be carried out in the gas-dynamic sector. In connection with this, in 1947 it was sent there big number specialists: K. I. Shchelkin, L. V. Altshuler, V. K. Bobolev, S. N. Matveev, V. M. Nekrutkin, P. I. Roy, N. D. Kazachenko, V. I. Zhuchikhin, A. T. Zavgorodny, K. K. Krupnikov, B. N. Ledenev, V. M. Malygin, V. M. Bezotosny, D. M. Tarasov, K. I. Panevkin, B. A. Terletskaya and others.
Experimental studies of charge gas dynamics were carried out under the leadership of K. I. Shchelkin, and theoretical questions were developed by a group located in Moscow, headed by Ya. B. Zeldovich. The work was carried out in close cooperation with designers and technologists.

The development of “NZ” (neutron fuse) was undertaken by A.Ya. Apin, V.A. Alexandrovich and designer A.I. Abramov. To achieve the desired result, it was necessary to master new technology the use of polonium, which has a fairly high radioactivity. At the same time, it was necessary to develop complex system protection of materials in contact with polonium from its alpha radiation.
In KB-11, research and design work on the most precise element of the charge-capsule-detonator was carried out for a long time. This important direction was led by A.Ya. Apin, I.P. Sukhov, M.I. Puzyrev, I.P. Kolesov and others. The development of research required the territorial approach of theoretical physicists to the research, design and production base of KB-11. Since March 1948, a theoretical department began to be formed in KB-11 under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich.
Due to the great urgency and high complexity of work in KB-11, new laboratories and production sites began to be created, and people seconded to them the best specialists The Soviet Union mastered new high standards and strict production conditions.

The plans drawn up in 1946 could not take into account many of the difficulties that opened up to the participants in the atomic project as they moved forward. By Decree CM N 234-98 ss/op dated 02/08/1948, the production time for the RDS-1 charge was extended to more late date- by the time parts of the plutonium charge are ready at Plant No. 817.
With regard to the RDS-2 option, by this time it became clear that it was not practical to bring it to the testing stage due to the relatively low efficiency of this option compared to the cost of nuclear materials. Work on RDS-2 was stopped in mid-1948.

By resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 10, 1948, the following were appointed: first deputy chief designer of the “object” - Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin; deputy chief designer of the facility - Alferov Vladimir Ivanovich, Dukhov Nikolay Leonidovich.
In February 1948, 11 scientific laboratories were hard at work in KB-11, including theorists under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich, who moved to the site from Moscow. His group included D. D. Frank-Kamenetsky, N. D. Dmitriev, V. Yu. Gavrilov. The experimenters did not lag behind the theorists. Major works were carried out in the departments of KB-11, which were responsible for detonating the nuclear charge. Its design was clear, and so was the detonation mechanism. In theory. In practice, it was necessary to carry out checks and carry out complex experiments again and again.
Production workers also worked very actively - those who had to translate the plans of scientists and designers into reality. A.K. Bessarabenko was appointed head of the plant in July 1947, N.A. Petrov became the chief engineer, P.D. Panasyuk, V.D. Shcheglov, A.I. Novitsky, G.A. Savosin, A.Ya. Ignatiev, V. S. Lyubertsev.

In 1947, a second pilot plant appeared within the structure of KB-11 - for the production of parts from explosives, the assembly of experimental product units and the solution of many other important tasks. The results of calculations and design studies were quickly translated into specific parts, assemblies, and blocks. This, by the highest standards, responsible work was carried out by two factories under KB-11. Plant No. 1 manufactured many parts and assemblies of the RDS-1 and then assembled them. Plant No. 2 (its director was A. Ya. Malsky) was engaged in the practical solution of various problems associated with the production and processing of parts from explosives. The assembly of the explosive charge was carried out in a workshop led by M. A. Kvasov.

Each stage passed posed new tasks for researchers, designers, engineers, and workers. People worked 14-16 hours a day, completely dedicating themselves to their work. On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge manufactured at Combine No. 817 was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and then sent by letter train to KB-11. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out. She showed: RDS-1 meets the technical requirements, the product is suitable for testing at the test site.

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Research in the field of nuclear physics in the USSR has been carried out since 1918. In 1937, Europe's first cyclotron was launched at the Radium Institute in Leningrad. On November 25, 1938, by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (AS), a permanent commission on the atomic nucleus was created. It included Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov, Abram Iofe, Abram Alikhanov, Igor Kurchatov and others (in 1940 they were joined by Vitaly Khlopin and Isai Gurevich). By this time, nuclear research was carried out in more than ten scientific institutes. In the same year, the Commission on Heavy Water was formed under the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was later transformed into the Commission on Isotopes.

The first atomic bomb was given the designation RDS-1. This name comes from a government decree, where the atomic bomb was coded as a “special jet engine,” abbreviated as RDS. The designation RDS-1 came into widespread use after the test of the first atomic bomb and was deciphered in different ways: “Stalin’s jet engine”, “Russia does it itself”.

In September 1939, construction began on a powerful cyclotron in Leningrad, and in April 1940 it was decided to build a pilot plant to produce approximately 15 kg of heavy water per year. But due to the outbreak of war, these plans were not realized. In May 1940, N. Semenov, Ya. Zeldovich, Yu. Khariton (Institute of Chemical Physics) proposed a theory of the development of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium. In the same year, work was accelerated to search for new deposits of uranium ores. In the late 30s and early 40s, many physicists already had an idea of ​​what an atomic bomb should look like in general terms. The idea is to quickly concentrate in one place a certain (more than critical mass) amount of material that is fissile under the influence of neutrons (with the emission of new neutrons). After which an avalanche-like increase in the number of atomic decays will begin in it - a chain reaction with the release of a huge amount of energy - an explosion will occur. The problem was obtaining a sufficient amount of fissile material. The only such substance found in nature in acceptable quantities is the isotope of uranium with a mass number (the total number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus) of 235 (uranium-235). In natural uranium, the content of this isotope does not exceed 0.71% (99.28% uranium-238); moreover, the content of natural uranium in the ore is, at best, 1%. Isolating uranium-235 from natural uranium was a rather difficult problem. An alternative to uranium, as it soon became clear, was plutonium-239. It is practically never found in nature (it is 100 times less than uranium-235). It is possible to obtain it in an acceptable concentration in nuclear reactors by irradiating uranium-238 with neutrons. Building such a reactor presented another problem.

Explosion of RDS-1 on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site. The power of the bomb was more than 20 kt. The 37-meter tower on which the bomb was mounted was obliterated, leaving a crater 3 m in diameter and 1.5 m deep underneath, covered with a melted glass-like substance.

The third problem was how it was possible to collect the required mass of fissile material in one place. In the process of even very rapid convergence of subcritical parts, fission reactions begin in them. The energy released in this case may not allow most of the atoms to “take part” in the fission process, and they will fly apart without having time to react.

In 1940, V. Spinel and V. Maslov from the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology submitted an application for the invention of an atomic weapon based on the use of a chain reaction of spontaneous fission of a supercritical mass of uranium-235, which is formed from several subcritical ones, separated by an explosive impenetrable to neutrons, destroyed by detonation ( although the “workability” of such a charge is highly doubtful, a certificate for the invention was nevertheless obtained, but only in 1946). The Americans intended to use the so-called cannon design for their first bombs. It actually used a cannon barrel, with the help of which one subcritical part of the fissile material was shot into another (it soon became clear that such a scheme was not suitable for plutonium due to insufficient closing speed).

On April 15, 1941, a resolution was issued by the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) on the construction of a powerful cyclotron in Moscow. But after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, almost all work in the field of nuclear physics was stopped. Many nuclear physicists ended up at the front or were reoriented to other, as it seemed then, more pressing topics.

Since 1939, both the GRU of the Red Army and the 1st Directorate of the NKVD have been collecting information on the nuclear issue. The first message about plans to create an atomic bomb came from D. Cairncross in October 1940. This issue was discussed at the British Science Committee, where Cairncross worked. In the summer of 1941, the Tube Alloys project to create an atomic bomb was approved. By the beginning of the war, England was one of the leaders in nuclear research, largely thanks to German scientists who fled here when Hitler came to power, one of them was KPD member K. Fuchs. In the fall of 1941, he went to the Soviet Embassy and reported that he had important information about a powerful new weapon. To communicate with him, S. Kramer and radio operator “Sonya” - R. Kuchinskaya were allocated. The first radiograms to Moscow contained information about the gas diffusion method for separating uranium isotopes and about a plant in Wales being built for this purpose. After six transmissions, communication with Fuchs was lost. At the end of 1943, Soviet intelligence officer in the United States Semenov (“Twain”) reported that E. Fermi carried out the first nuclear chain reaction in Chicago. The information came from the physicist Pontecorvo. At the same time, closed secrets were received from England through foreign intelligence scientific works Western scientists on atomic energy for 1940-1942. They confirmed that great progress had been made in creating the atomic bomb. The wife of the famous sculptor Konenkov also worked for intelligence, and she became close to the leading physicists Oppenheimer and Einstein for a long time influenced them. Another resident in the USA, L. Zarubina, found a way to L. Szilard and was included in Oppenheimer’s circle of people. With their help, it was possible to introduce reliable agents into Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and the Chicago Laboratory - centers of American nuclear research. In 1944, information on the American atomic bomb was transmitted to Soviet intelligence by: K. Fuchs, T. Hall, S. Sake, B. Pontecorvo, D. Greenglass and the Rosenbergs.

At the beginning of February 1944, the People's Commissar of the NKVD L. Beria held an extended meeting of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb and its chief designer Yu. Khariton, the heads of the NKVD intelligence. During the meeting, a decision was made to coordinate the collection of information on the atomic problem. coming through the NKVD and the GRU of the Red Army. and its generalization to create department “C”. On September 27, 1945, the department was organized, leadership was entrusted to the GB Commissioner P. Sudoplatov. In January 1945, Fuchs transmitted a description of the design of the first atomic bomb. Among other things, intelligence obtained materials on the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes, data on the operation of the first reactors, specifications for the production of uranium and plutonium bombs, data on the design of a focusing explosive lens system and the size of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium, on plutonium-240, on time and sequence operations for the production and assembly of a bomb, the method of activating the bomb initiator; about the construction of isotope separation plants, as well as diary entries about the first test explosion of an American bomb in July 1945.

Information received through intelligence channels facilitated and accelerated the work of Soviet scientists. Western experts believed that an atomic bomb in the USSR could be created no earlier than in 1954-1955, but its first test took place already in August 1949.

In April 1942, the People's Commissar chemical industry M. Pervukhin, by order of Stalin, was familiarized with materials about work on the atomic bomb abroad. Pervukhin proposed selecting a group of specialists to evaluate the information presented in this report. On Ioffe’s recommendation, the group included young scientists Kurchatov, Alikhanov and I. Kikoin. On November 27, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued a decree “On uranium mining”. The resolution provided for the creation of a special institute and the start of work on geological exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials. Beginning in 1943, the People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (NKCM) began mining and processing uranium ore at the Tabashar mine in Tajikistan with a plan of 4 tons of uranium salts per year. At the beginning of 1943, previously mobilized scientists were recalled from the front.

In pursuance of the resolution of the State Defense Committee, on February 11, 1943, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was organized, the head of which was Kurchatov (in 1949 it was renamed the Laboratory of Measuring Instruments of the USSR Academy of Sciences - LIPAN, in 1956, on its basis, the Institute of Atomic Energy was created, and currently At the time, this was the Russian Research Center “Kurchatov Institute”), which was supposed to coordinate all work on the implementation of the nuclear project.

In 1944, Soviet intelligence received a reference book on uranium-graphite reactors, which contained very valuable information on determining reactor parameters. But the uranium necessary to load even a small experienced nuclear reactor there was no such thing in the country at that time. On September 28, 1944, the government obliged the NKCM USSR to hand over uranium and uranium salts to the State Fund and entrusted the task of storing them to Laboratory No. 2. In November 1944, a large group of Soviet specialists, under the leadership of the head of the 4th special department of the NKVD V. Kravchenko, left for the liberated Bulgaria, to study the results of geological exploration of the Gotensky deposit. On December 8, 1944, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the transfer of the mining and processing of uranium ores from the NKMC to the 9th Directorate of the NKVD, created in the Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GU GMP). In March 1945, Major General S. Egorov, who had previously held the position of deputy, was appointed head of the 2nd department (mining and metallurgical) of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD. Head of the Main Department of Dalstroy. In January 1945, as part of the 9th Directorate, on the basis of separate laboratories of the State Institute of Rare Metals (Giredmet) and one of the defense plants, NII-9 (now VNIINM) was organized to study uranium deposits, solve problems of processing uranium raw materials, obtaining metallic uranium and plutonium . By this time, approximately one and a half tons of uranium ore per week were arriving from Bulgaria.

Since March 1945, after the NKGB received information from the United States about the design of an atomic bomb based on the principle of implosion (compression of fissile material by the explosion of a conventional explosive), work began on a new design that had obvious advantages over the cannon one. In a note from V. Makhanev to Beria in April 1945 about the timing of the creation of the atomic bomb, it was said that the diffusion plant at Laboratory No. 2 for the production of uranium-235 was supposed to be launched in 1947. Its productivity was supposed to be 25 kg of uranium per year, which should be enough for two bombs (in fact, the American uranium bomb required 65 kg of uranium-235).

During the battle for Berlin on May 5, 1945, the property of the Physical Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was discovered. On May 9, a commission headed by A. Zavenyagin was sent to Germany to search for scientists working there on the Uranium project and accept materials on the uranium problem. A large group of German scientists was taken to the Soviet Union along with their families. Among them were Nobel laureates G. Hertz and N. Riehl, I. Kurchatov, professors R. Deppel, M. Volmer, G. Pose, P. Thyssen, M. von Ardene, Geib (a total of about two hundred specialists, including 33 doctors of science).

The creation of a nuclear explosive device using plutonium-239 required the construction of an industrial nuclear reactor to produce it. Even a small experimental reactor required about 36 tons of uranium metal, 9 tons of uranium dioxide and about 500 tons of pure graphite. If the graphite problem was solved by August 1943, it was possible to develop and master a special technological process In order to obtain graphite of the required purity, and in May 1944 its production was launched at the Moscow Electrode Plant, then by the end of 1945 the country did not have the required amount of uranium. The first technical specifications for the production of uranium dioxide and uranium metal for a research reactor were issued by Kurchatov in November 1944. In parallel with the creation of uranium-graphite reactors, work was carried out on reactors based on uranium and heavy water. The question arises: why was it necessary to “spread forces” so much and move simultaneously in several directions? Justifying the need for this, Kurchatov in his Report in 1947 gives the following figures. Number of bombs that could be obtained from 1000 tons of uranium ore different methods equals 20 when using a uranium-graphite boiler, 50 when using the diffusion method, 70 when using the electromagnetic method, 40 when using “heavy” water. At the same time, boilers with “heavy” water, although they have a number of significant disadvantages, have the advantage that they allow the use of thorium. Thus, although the uranium-graphite boiler made it possible to create an atomic bomb in the shortest possible time, it had the worst result in terms of complete use of raw materials. Taking into account the experience of the United States, where gas diffusion was chosen from four methods of uranium separation studied, on December 21, 1945, the government decided to build plants No. 813 (now the Ural Electro-Mechanical Plant in the city of Novouralsk) to produce highly enriched uranium-235 by gas diffusion and No. 817 (Chelyabinsk-40, now the Mayak chemical plant in the city of Ozersk) to produce plutonium.

In the spring of 1948, the two-year period allotted by Stalin to create the Soviet atomic bomb expired. But by this time, let alone bombs, there were no fissile materials for its production. By government decree of February 8, 1948, it was established new term production of the RDS-1 bomb - March 1, 1949.

The first industrial reactor “A” at Plant No. 817 was launched on June 19, 1948 (it reached its design capacity on June 22, 1948 and was decommissioned only in 1987). To separate produced plutonium from nuclear fuel, a radiochemical plant (plant “B”) was built as part of plant No. 817. Irradiated uranium blocks were dissolved and plutonium was separated from uranium using chemical methods. The concentrated plutonium solution was subjected to additional purification from highly active fission products in order to reduce its radiation activity when supplied to metallurgists. In April 1949, Plant B began manufacturing bomb parts from plutonium using NII-9 technology. At the same time, the first heavy water research reactor was launched. The development of the production of fissile materials was difficult with numerous accidents during the elimination of the consequences of which there were cases of overexposure of personnel (at that time no attention was paid to such trifles). By July, a set of parts for the plutonium charge was ready. For physical measurements A group of physicists under the leadership of Flerov went to the plant, and a group of theorists under the leadership of Zeldovich was sent to the plant to process the results of these measurements, calculate the efficiency values ​​and the probability of an incomplete explosion.

On August 5, 1949, the plutonium charge was accepted by the commission headed by Khariton and sent by letter train to KB-11. By this time, work on creating an explosive device was almost completed here. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out, which received the index 501 for the RDS-1 atomic bomb. After this, the device was dismantled, the parts were inspected, packaged and prepared for shipment to the landfill. Thus, the Soviet atomic bomb was made in 2 years 8 months (in the USA it took 2 years 7 months).

The test of the first Soviet nuclear charge 501 was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site (the device was located on a tower). The power of the explosion was 22 kt. The design of the charge was similar to the American “Fat Man”, although electronic filling was a Soviet design. The atomic charge was a multilayer structure in which plutonium was transferred to a critical state by compression by a converging spherical detonation wave. At the center of the charge was placed 5 kg of plutonium, in the form of two hollow hemispheres, surrounded by a massive shell of uranium-238 (tamper). This shell, the first Soviet nuclear bomb, served to inertially contain the core inflating during the chain reaction, so that as much of the plutonium as possible had time to react and, in addition, served as a reflector and moderator of neutrons (neutrons with low energies are most effectively absorbed by plutonium nuclei, causing their fission ). The tamper was surrounded by an aluminum shell, which ensured uniform compression of the nuclear charge by the shock wave. A neutron initiator (fuse) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core - a beryllium-coated ball with a diameter of about 2 cm. thin layer polonium-210. When the nuclear charge of the bomb is compressed, the nuclei of polonium and beryllium come closer together, and the alpha particles emitted by radioactive polonium-210 knock out neutrons from beryllium, which initiate a nuclear chain reaction of fission of plutonium-239. One of the most complex units was the explosive charge, which consisted of two layers. Inner layer consisted of two hemispherical bases made of an alloy of TNT with hexogen, the outer one was assembled from individual elements that had different detonation rates. The outer layer, designed to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive, is called the focusing system.

For safety reasons, the installation of the unit containing fissile material was carried out immediately before using the charge. For this purpose, the spherical explosive charge had a through conical hole, which was closed with an explosive plug, and in the outer and inner casings there were holes that were closed with lids. The power of the explosion was due to the nuclear fission of about a kilogram of plutonium; the remaining 4 kg did not have time to react and were uselessly dispersed. During the implementation of the RDS-1 creation program, many new ideas arose for improving nuclear charges (increasing the utilization rate of fissile material, reducing dimensions and weight). New types of charges have become more powerful, more compact and “more elegant” compared to the first.